

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PAPER

**LEVERAGING NATO: A STRATEGIC
PARTNER NOW AND IN THE FUTURE**

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

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The United States' strategic partnership with NATO is just as important today as it was throughout the Cold War. The United States is the most powerful nation in the world, but as was the case during the Cold War, it cannot fight the Global War on Terrorism alone. The United States must leverage NATO's capabilities and support to succeed in the winning the Global War on Terrorism. Maintaining a strong transatlantic relationship with NATO is a vital interest of the United States. The combined efforts of NATO and the United States resulted in the defeat of Communism and given the opportunity, will defeat terrorism. Despite political disagreements in going to war with Iraq, it appears the ground work is being laid for allowing NATO a greater role in OPERATIONS ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM. The United States leadership must use all its political influence and diplomatic savvy to obtain NATO's commitment and political support in fighting the GWOT. In both the near term and more importantly, the long term, NATO provides the United States with a political and military ally that can assist the United States in defusing known and unknown security challenges.

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NATO AND ITS STRATEGIC ROLE: PAST AND PRESENT

The beginning of the Cold War arrived with the ending of World War II in Europe. Over the next forty years the United States would build and maintain an alliance with European countries in an effort to suppress the spread of communism. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). NATO's strategic role in winning the Cold War is history. Its role in fighting the GWOT is just beginning. NATO is an alliance that has withstood the test of time and by its mere existence prevented war from breaking out in Europe. The United States' strategic partnership with NATO is just as important today as it was during the Cold War. The United States remains the most powerful nation in the world, but as was the case during the Cold War, it cannot fight the GWOT alone. The United States must leverage NATO's capabilities and political support to succeed in the winning the GWOT. NATO'S support to on-going operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are historic and shows that NATO is transforming itself to respond to threats beyond its geographical borders. Terrorism, like communism, is a threat to all nations. The United States and NATO must again confront those that seek to disrupt peace in Europe and around the world.

I will begin by reviewing the origins of NATO in order to understand its strategic role in winning the Cold War. I will then discuss NATO's on-going commitment to fighting the GWOT. Finally, I will discuss why the United States needs NATO and NATO needs the United States in order to effectively prosecute the GWOT with special emphasis on OPERATION IRAQI and ENDURING FREEDOM.

EVOLUTION OF NATO

Following the end of World War II, President Harry S. Truman was faced with the daunting task of determining what role Germany should have in Europe and how to proceed with reconstruction of the war torn continent. The leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, wanted a voice in determining the answers to these questions. No longer could the United States take an isolationist approach to international affairs, as they did prior to entering WWII; they now had to take an active leadership role in directing European foreign affairs and in particular, deal with the Soviet Union. The United States was the standard-bearer of democracy, individual liberty and capitalism, while the Soviet Union was the world's first and greatest socialist state, committed to building communism at home and expanding its influence and control abroad.¹ Because of vastly different ideologies, the Soviet Union and the United States became rivals. In effect, the end of World War II, which eliminated the need to cooperate against a common

enemy, marked the beginning of the Cold War and the chess game between the two great superpowers.

From 1945 to 1947, both superpowers attempted to work out their differences in post-war conferences designed to determine the way ahead for Europe and the defeated Axis powers. One of the most significant was the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. For the first time, leaders of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union formally met to discuss the German Question. Despite differing views on how to proceed with Germany, agreements were reached. Specifically, the allies determined German boundaries and agreed to administer Germany as a whole. Administration of Germany would be the responsibility of the senior military commander controlling the American, French, British and Soviet occupation zones.² Although agreements were reached at Potsdam, in practice they were difficult to implement. In another attempt to resolve economic and political differences and formulate policy, the Foreign Ministers of the four occupying powers met in Moscow. From 10 March to 24 April 1947, they held forty-three sessions, but failed to reach an agreement on any substantial matter.³ Without any agreement, Germany remained divided. This division played the greatest role in the deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Mistrust of Soviet intentions in Europe actually began to take shape in February 1946, when George Kennan, while serving in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, cabled his influential "Long Telegram" to Washington calling attention to the Soviets' expansionist aims in Europe and the need for a Western policy of firm but patient resistance.⁴ In fact, as early as September 1944, Kennan suggested that the United States should respond to Soviet expansion by drawing a line beyond which they would not allow Soviet power to operate unchallenged.⁵ In March 1946, Winston Churchill gave his famous "Iron Curtain" speech. Churchill's reference to an "Iron Curtain" reflected the control the Soviets had over countries adjacent to their borders and their desire to expand control into Western Europe. To oppose Soviet power and doctrine, Churchill called for the formation of a western alliance led by the United States and Great Britain.⁶ Kennan's Telegram and Churchill's speech planted the seed of Soviet mistrust in President Truman and Washington politicians. The actions of the Soviet Union over the next two years watered the seed and caused it to grow.

The first attempt to exercise Soviet expansionism was in Turkey and Greece. In June 1945 and again in August 1946 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Viacheslav Molotov, asked the Turkish government for basing rights on the straits between the Black Sea and the

Mediterranean.⁷ Turkey denied the request and the Soviets accepted their answer. The situation in Greece was of more concern to the Truman administration. Greece was fighting an insurgency against communist guerrillas supported by Yugoslavia, and backed by the Soviets. Although the Soviets approved of the insurgency, they did not provide substantial monetary or material support. In February 1947, Britain informed the United States that it could no longer afford to provide assistance to Greece and would withdraw its forces.⁸ President Truman realized the abandonment of Greece was very dangerous and could send the wrong signal to the Soviets. If Greece fell to communism, then Turkey was in peril and potentially communism could spread to Europe, the Middle East and Asia.⁹ This became known as the “domino theory” and Greece and Turkey, it was feared, could be the first countries to fall. President Truman informed congressional leaders of the perilous situation and requested economic and financial aid to resist the spread of communism, not just in Greece, but around the world.¹⁰ Congress appropriated \$400 million in aid, but more importantly, endorsed Truman’s foreign policy of containment. This became known as the Truman Doctrine and defined US strategy towards the Soviet Union and the spread of communism for the next forty years.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

One final diplomatic attempt to resolve issues surrounding Germany occurred in April 1947 at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. In attendance were the foreign ministers from Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. In discussions with Stalin, Secretary of State George Marshall concluded that Stalin intended to let matters drift until Europe disintegrated, and to advance Soviet interests in the resulting chaos.¹¹ Speaking on radio after his return to the United States, Marshall said: “The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate, so I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion”.¹² The patient was Western Europe, which was suffering a severe economic crisis with no plan to reverse the situation. Marshall, in collaboration with Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff developed a policy to reverse the economic crisis in Western Europe. Key elements of the policy were: financial aid would be directed to avoid economic disaster and not against communism; the plan must be a joint effort of the United States and European states; and lastly, aid should be offered to Eastern European countries and to the Soviet Union.¹³ This policy became known as the Marshall Plan and later as the European Recovery Plan. The pillars of United States foreign policy/strategy were established; containment of communism in Europe and the world; and economic recovery in Europe.

Although the Soviets were also in an economic crisis, they rejected the United States' offer of financial aid and prevented communist countries under their control from accepting financial aid. The Soviets denounced the Marshall Plan, calling it an attempt to enslave Europe. To counter the Marshall Plan, the Soviets established the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). Cominform's purpose was to promote unity and co-operation between member parties by exchange of information, and in practice to ensure uniformity under Stalin's control.¹⁴ Stalin also ordered communist parties in Italy and France to stage general strikes in an effort to cripple their economies. The two most significant events occurred in February and June 1948. In February, the Soviets moved forces to the Czechoslovakia border and replaced the democratically elected government with a pro-Soviet communist party regime. This was alarming to Western Europe and the United States because Czechoslovakia was the only democratic state in Eastern Europe. In June, in a response to the introduction of a new Germany currency for Western Germany and Berlin, and the establishment of a West German state, the Soviets cut off electricity and blocked all routes into West Berlin.¹⁵ The Berlin Blockade significantly increased tension between the Soviets and the United States. It is not clear what Stalin's strategic end state was in regards implementing the Berlin Blockade. What it did accomplish in fact was to strengthen United States and Western European resolve and cooperation. The Berlin crisis raised the possibility of military confrontation with the Soviet's and made definitive the maintenance of two separate German States.

BUILDING THE NATO ALLIANCE

When Czechoslovakia fell to communism, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg responded by signing the Treaty of Brussels. This treaty bound all participants to come to the help of any one of them if attacked in Europe.¹⁶ The United States did not sign this treaty. Without US military and economic support, these countries could not defeat a Soviet attack into Europe.

Getting the United States to formally commit to the defense of Europe was not easy. Negotiations between Western European officials and the Truman administration occurred between March 1948 and April 1949. Preserving Congress' constitutional right to declare war was the most significant issue that prevented Congress from ratifying the treaty. The wording in Article 5 preserved Congress' right to declare war and stated that an armed attack against one would be an attack against all and that in such an event member states would respond as necessary to include the use of armed force.

On 4 April 1949 the United States, Canada, Iceland, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom signed the North Atlantic Treaty. The significance of the North Atlantic Treaty cannot be overstated. It committed the United States to the defense and stability of Europe without complete American predominance.¹⁷ European countries knew that without the US military support, security in Europe was fragile. With the United States, they now had an alliance that could stand up to the Soviets' political and military instruments of power. This, and the economic stimulus provided by the Marshall plan, gave Europeans hope and confidence that they could recover from the war. Europe was on its way to recover but other events would soon intervene to shatter world peace.

IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR

The Korean War broke out in June 1950 when North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel. North Korea's leader, Kim Il-Sung, briefed Stalin on his plan and sought his approval. Stalin gave his approval, partly because he believed the Americans would not come to the aid of South Korea. Almost simultaneously, the United States sponsored a United Nations resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel, and began air-dropping supplies to the South Koreans. Truman ordered military forces to Korea as part of a United Nations operation and fought for three years.

The Korean War greatly influenced actions in Europe. Many believed the Korean War was the forerunner of a Soviet advance on Western Europe and the armed forces in Europe were not capable of defeating a Soviet attack.¹⁸ The Truman administration realized that forward deployed forces were required in Europe and Asia in order to prevent the spread of communism. This was essentially the policy outlined in National Security Council – 68, e.g. utilization of military power as the essential mechanism of containment. In the backdrop of the Korean War, members of the North Atlantic Treaty agreed to establish an integrated defense organization modeled on the Anglo-American joint commands during WWII. Eventually, the North Atlantic Treaty evolved into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Additionally, at a NATO meeting in September 1950, Dean Acheson proposed to end the policy of demilitarizing Germany, and to establish West German forces under NATO command.¹⁹ The United States, Britain and France were tapped out in military manpower and any coherent defense of Europe required fielding of German divisions. The Lisbon force goals of 96 divisions by 1954 could not be attained without rearming West Germany.²⁰

Getting NATO consensus on rearming Western Germany and admitting them into NATO was difficult. France was the most outspoken opponent, but eventually realized, for the security of Europe and continued economic recovery, that Germany must be allowed to rearm. The Paris Agreement of 1954 resolved the Germany rearmament issue by giving operational control of German forces in wartime, and inspection of them in peacetime to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Britain and the United States agreed to maintain a large military presence in Germany for as long as required and the United States extended nuclear deterrence to Western Europe.²¹

NUCLEAR BUILDUP AND VICTORY IN THE COLD WAR

With the development of nuclear weapons, the build-up of conventional forces slowed. NATO countries were not eager to match the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact expenditures on conventional forces and lobbied the United States to defend Europe with tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. By 1957, NATO had deployed almost 7000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and adopted the doctrine of massive retaliation.²² Over the next two decades, the Soviets and the United States jockeyed for nuclear supremacy. Nuclear Deterrence and Mutual Assurance Destruction prevented any use of nuclear weapons. The most significant nuclear event occurred during the Reagan administration. The administrations of President's Nixon, Ford, and Carter supported détente with the Soviets. President Reagan told the Soviets that détente was over and he would deploy Intermediate Nuclear Forces to Europe.²³ The Soviet Union realized it could not economically maintain the arms race and began to negotiate with the United States.

NATO achieved its strategic goal of preventing Soviet expansion into Western Europe. In the long run, the United States' strategy of containment and European economic recovery worked. Germany is reunited and Europe recovered from its economic depression. Today, NATO continues to provide strategic stability in Western Europe. Its membership now includes the former Warsaw Pact countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary with seven additional countries joining the alliance in April 2004. The newest members will add an additional 200,000 troops and extend NATO's reach from the Baltic to the Black Sea. NATO is transforming to meet today's strategic and operational challenges. Little did anyone fathom that NATO would be called upon to assist the United States in fighting the Global War on Terrorism.

TERRORISM STRIKES THE USA

Osama bin Laden's attack on the Twin Towers and Pentagon changed the way the United States and democracies of the world viewed terrorism and those who sponsored terrorism. Not

since the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 had the United States experienced such a tragedy. On 11 September 2001, the world witnessed images of three passenger planes plummeting into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This horrific event caused the death of over three thousand innocent people and shocked the world. Most Americans, and the world in general, perceived the United States as a hegemonic nation immune from terrorist attacks. Certainly, it seemed, no terrorist organization would be capable of carrying out an attack on United States soil. Obviously, the events of 9/11 shattered these perceptions. Clearly, the United States was vulnerable to the ungodly and cowardly acts of fanatical terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. The leaders of all democratic governments had to ask themselves the question: if the United States was susceptible to a terrorist attack how safe was their own country?

President Bush's reaction to the events of 9/11 clearly illustrated to the world that the United States would no longer allow terrorist organizations to operate without the fear of reprisal. All elements of national power, diplomatic, informational, economic and military, would be used to prosecute the war on terrorism. President Bush declared a Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) when he stated, "we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action and this nation will act."²⁴ Convincing the American public that our country was at war was not very difficult. The image of the Twin Towers crumbling and the Pentagon burning will forever be etched in the minds of current and future generations of Americans. Convincing our friends and allies that they too were at war and should join the fight is proving to be a much more difficult task.

The events of 9/11 greatly influenced President Bush's foreign policy by generating what some intellectuals labeled as the "Bush Doctrine". In outline, the doctrine asserts that: (1) The United States will combat terror wherever it exists using all means at its disposal, including force; (2) bilateral relationships around the world will be increasingly defined in terms of those countries that support the war of terrorism and those that do not; (3) "rogue" nations and/or terrorist organizations cannot be permitted to acquire and/or threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction.²⁵ Within the framework of this doctrine, the Bush administration developed its strategy for defeating terrorism and is outlined in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Within the strategy and doctrine for combating terrorism, specific goals were developed. These goals include: Defeat Terrorists and their organizations, Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists, Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit, and Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad.²⁶ In

order to achieve these goals President Bush and his National Security Council fully realized the United States needed the commitment and support of its long standing allies and of nations who embraced a more secure world, free from the threat of terrorist attacks.

GWOT: BUILDING A COALITION

Following the events of 9/11 many governments and Americans expected the United States to quickly strike back at those responsible for the attacks. This was not the case. President Bush and his National Security Counsel understood that building international support for the GWOT was strategically more important than quickly unleashing a symbolic missile attack. The military response to an attack carried out against our homeland, with devastating results, required the combined effects of the United States and coalition armed forces. Building a coalition is a very difficult process. There are many political factors influencing whether or not a nation elects to join a coalition. Most nations are sympathetic to the victim of a terrorist attack and acknowledge that terrorism is a threat to world peace. However, few are willing to provide resources if they don't perceive it to be a vital interest.

For several reasons the United States was very successful in building a coalition in the first Gulf War. First, there was a clearly defined enemy who used military power to occupy a sovereign nation. The world witnessed the Iraqi Army's invasion of Kuwait and listened to Saddam Hussein's claim that Kuwait was now part of Iraq. Second, Middle Eastern Arabic nations believed they were at risk if nothing was done to expel Iraqi forces. Clearly, doing something was in their vital interest. The potential for Saddam Hussein to invade Saudi Arabia and gain control of its oil reserves was very high and would adversely impact the global economy and shift the balance of power in the Middle East to Iraq. Lastly, sufficient time and energy were devoted to developing and implementing a diplomatic solution. The use of military force was the last resort. For these reasons the coalition was quickly assembled, included Arab and non-Arab states, and remained intact until the war was over and coalition forces withdrew from Iraq and Kuwait.

In contrast, the GWOT does not have a unambiguous enemy like Saddam Hussein and his military. Terrorist organizations are by their nature ghostly structures that do not engage in the national and international diplomatic process. The US believed al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks on 11 September 2001, however, our intelligence apparatus could not initially produce irrefutable evidence to convince the world. In the case of Iraq, the evidence presented to the UN appears to have been somewhat over stated and caused some countries to oppose military action against Iraq. This was certainly true in the case of Germany and France. As

expected, the United States viewed the GWOT as a vital interest. Unless a nation is the subject of a terrorist act, it will not necessarily subscribe to define combating terrorism as a vital interest and thus won't commit scarce resources to reduce the global terrorist threat. Additionally, many nations perceive the United States as a nation that acts unilaterally and fails to give diplomacy a chance to work. In the words of President Bush, "you're either with us or against us." I don't believe the United States subscribes to a unilateralist approach when dealing with the world's problems, but other nations do. These are a just a few challenges the Bush administration faced in building an international coalition to fight global terrorism.

THE FIRST STEP "AFGHANISTAN"

Afghanistan is a country whose history is replete with internal civil war and occupation of foreign armies. The Soviet Union learned first hand that invading Afghanistan is possible, but sustaining a military presence is extremely costly. The Islamic inspired Mujahadian, with US support, forced the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan. With the Soviet Union's departure, the Taliban gained control of the country and implemented an extreme Islamic fundamentalist regime that harbored al-Qaeda terrorists in exchange for substantial bankrolling by bin Laden.²⁷ Ideally suited as a base for terrorist operations because of its rugged terrain and permissive government, Afghanistan offered Osama bin Laden an excellent base of operations. With evidence linking Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network to the September 11 attacks, President Bush ordered military strikes (OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM), against the al-Qaeda network of terrorist camps and Taliban military installations.²⁸ The Taliban government was given an ultimatum to turn over bin Laden and cut-off all support to al-Qaeda or be subject to military attack. It failed to deliver and was attacked along with the al-Qaeda network. Afghanistan became the first country to test President Bush's doctrine of attacking states providing sanctuary and support to terrorist organizations.

Building the coalition for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM was the first major step in fighting the GWOT. Much of the work of building an international coalition was given to the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, although President Bush made personal calls to the leaders of France, Germany, Canada and China.²⁹ Most of Colin Powell's effort was directed towards Pakistan and the neighboring countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan. Pakistan and Uzbekistan were extremely critical allies for the simple reason that they border Afghanistan and would facilitate coalition ground and air operations. Pakistan had a great deal of intelligence on the Taliban and provided blanket over flight and landing rights, access to naval and airbases and critical fuel support.³⁰ Pakistan's support was courageous, prompt, and initially based on

trust and verbal agreement. In recent months, extremists have twice attempted to assassinate President Prevez Musharaff. Clearly, in both the long and short term, supporting the coalition was in the vital interest of Pakistan and a chance to weaken fundamentalists and possibly gain future US support for its policies towards Kashmir.³¹ Uzbekistan provided use of its military airfield (leased) but did so only after getting a commitment from the United States for mutual defense and economic support. Assisting the coalition in the short term would help Uzbekistan in fighting the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a revolutionary group tied to the Taliban, and also provided a security blanket against Russian intervention in Uzbek internal affairs.³² Gaining the support of traditional allies presented different challenges, but overall, in the case of Afghanistan, this was less of a problem.

At the outset, most of the world's governments publicly decried the 9/11 attacks and declared their support for the United States. That was not, however, tantamount to offering facilities and military support, nor did they fully understand what support the United States required.³³ Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair stated "democracies of this world are going to have to come together and fight (terrorism) together".³⁴ Overall, the leaders of sixty-eight nations around the world arrived at the same conclusion and subsequently joined the United States in the Global War on Terrorism.³⁵ NATO showed its support by invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one would be an attack against all and member states would respond, as necessary, to include the use of armed force.³⁶ Australia invoked Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty, declaring the 11 September attack an attack on Australia as well.³⁷ The US was prepared to act unilaterally, but in the case of Afghanistan, had overwhelming support of sixty-eight countries and was able to choose capabilities (forces) that supported the military campaign. This was not the case with Iraq.

NATO's unprecedented invocation of Article V is strategically important to the United States. First it signified NATO's willingness to deploy and conduct combat operations outside its normal geographical area of interest. Second, it reflected a new readiness by the Alliance to use its planning experience and expertise to support non-NATO coalition operations led by individual allies.³⁸ NATO supported the GWOT by allowing use of its AWACS fleet, increasing operations against al-Qaeda cells in the Balkans and within the boundaries of its member states and conducting Maritime interdiction operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. In Afghanistan, six NATO countries, to include Germany, provided special operations forces and France and Britain provided substantial naval forces.

Perhaps the most significant contribution in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM took place when NATO assumed command, from British forces, of the United Nations mandated,

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF is a 5,700-member security force responsible for assisting the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) in maintaining security in and around Kabul for ATA and UN personnel.³⁹ Today, NATO is using all its resources to ensure mission success in Afghanistan. Initiatives include assuming responsibility for command, coordination, and planning for ISAF and providing a composite headquarters to form the permanent core of ISAF headquarters. This helps reduce the command, control and planning burden of the NATO country executing the mission and utilizes expertise from NATO's permanent headquarters. NATO has also requested, through the United Nations, to expand its peacekeeping role to other provincial cities. NATO's desire to assume a greater role in Afghanistan and its apparent long term commitment is welcomed news and is supported by Donald Rumsfeld. With time and United States support, NATO could and should be given operational control of Afghanistan. Doing so would reinforce our commitment to NATO, enhance its credibility, and free-up over-committed US forces.

THE SECOND STEP "IRAQ AND REGIME CHANGE"

With success in Afghanistan, the Bush administration shifted focus on Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Despite being defeated militarily in the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein remained in power. For years, Iraq failed to comply with United Nations resolutions ordering the destruction of weapons of mass destruction and allowing weapons inspectors inside Iraq with complete access to all facilities. The United Nations' inability to get Iraq to comply with its resolutions, coupled with the events of 9/11, made Iraq a strategic threat to the United States and the world. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 12 September 2002, President Bush condemned Iraq for its failure to adhere to existing resolutions and called on the United Nations Security Council to pass a new resolution if Iraq failed to comply. The resolution called on Saddam's regime to declare and disarm itself of all weapons of mass destruction or face undefined "serious consequences" if the Iraqi regime did not comply.⁴⁰ What "serious consequences" equated to was not defined and was open for debate. For the Bush administration serious consequences equated to use of military force. On 8 November 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote of 15 to 0.

President Bush also used the United Nations forum as an opportunity to solicit international support for his policy of preemptive action against rogue states that possessed weapons of mass destruction. The policy states: "The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking

anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively".⁴¹ This controversial policy was unacceptable to France, Germany and Russia. President Bush was, however, able to convince Congress (prior to the passage of U.N. Resolution 1441) that Saddam Hussein's regime was a threat and Congress overwhelmingly voted to grant President Bush full authority to attack Iraq, with or without a coalition.

Unilaterally going to war with Iraq was an option, but strategically, not a very viable one. Iraq allowed United Nations weapons inspectors to return and on 7 December 2002, and submitted a written declaration of its weapons programs to the United Nations. The declaration stated that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, but in the words of Hans Blix, Chief U.N. inspector, it lacked supporting evidence.⁴² Blix's subsequent report to the United Nations was nebulous and failed to convince France and Russia that Iraq had a WMD program. Without France and Russia's support the United Nations Security Council would not pass a resolution authorizing military action against Iraq. In one last diplomatic maneuver, Colin Powell presented the United Nations with new allegations, including intercepted conversations and satellite photography, of Iraq's secret weapons programs and cover-ups. Despite this new evidence, France, Germany and Russia remained opposed to military action in Iraq.

The building of a coalition for military action in Iraq was very difficult because many nations were not convinced the United States had provided irrefutable evidence of an Iraqi WMD program. Moreover, they generally disagreed with the implications of our preemption strategy. Unlike Afghanistan, Germany, France and Russia opposed military action against Iraq and remain opposed to on-going stability and support operations. Perhaps the most significant impact on OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM was Turkey's refusal to allow ground forces to transit its territory. This was a strategic set-back for United States forces and caused a major change in the campaign plan. There are factors that determined why these nations failed to join the coalition. Some disagreed with our strategy, others feared their country would become a target of terrorist and others simply refused to act if the action did not have the endorsement of the United Nations. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld stated " a state makes its decisions based upon national interests. If certain of our friends tell us no, the U.S. will not be sad for it."⁴³ This may be true, but the United States must be willing to compromise and discuss objectively, with the necessary knowledge of and understanding for others situation and point of view.⁴⁴ This is the art of diplomacy and it is critical in coalition building.

Overall, forty-six nations supported OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Although countries like Britain, Australia, Spain and Poland provided military forces, the US provided the vast majority of forces. Other NATO and non-NATO nations contributed, and though their contributions are insignificant in terms of military impact, they are significant in terms of diplomatic impact and demonstrated support for the United States.

NATION BUILDING: STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The war in Iraq began on 19 March 2003 and on 1 May 2003, President Bush announced an end to major combat operations. The military might of the United States, and to a lesser degree Britain and Australia, easily defeated the Iraqi army and ousted Saddam Hussein's regime from power. With that accomplished, coalition forces assumed responsibility for a country of 22 million people ravaged by more than two decades of war, totalitarian misrule, and severe deprivation.⁴⁵ Nation building and stability and support operations are, in fact, more difficult to execute than combat operations and require more ground forces to assist in establishing security. Since 1 May 2003, terrorist and remnants from the former regime have inflicted more casualties on US and coalition forces than during the war. On a daily basis enemy forces attack convoys and coalition bases, and are now beginning to attack Iraqi security forces and government officials. To some extent the attacks have had an impact. The attack on the United Nations compound caused them to move their operations out of Iraq. Coalition and Iraqi security forces are on the offensive and are having success in fighting the resistance, to include capturing Saddam Hussein, but the attacks continue. Although coalition forces have suffered casualties, they continue to support U.S. forces. The United States footprint in Iraq has decreased slightly due to 18 of the 26 NATO member states and invitees sending forces and other non-NATO nations providing non-combat support forces. Poland has provided the largest contingent of NATO forces and is currently commanding a multinational division in southern Iraq. Like Afghanistan, NATO has a vested interest in supporting the Polish division. Poland represents NATO and therefore its success or failure in many ways represents NATO's failure or success.

OVERBURDENING THE MILITARY

The United States military is without question the most professional and powerful military in the world. Our success on the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates to the world our ability to execute military operations. The real question is, can we sustain our battlefield success as we transition from combat operations to stability and support operations? The answer is yes, with a caveat that in doing so we will overburden our military forces, in particular

our ground forces. I would also argue that overburdening our ground forces could potentially have negative second and third order effects. If another international crisis occurred, our ground forces would have great difficulty in responding with sufficient combat power and certainly would not be able to sustain combat operations for an extended amount of time. Depending on the nature of the crisis, it is also possible that we would have to greatly reduce our footprint in Iraq. Reducing our footprint would most likely result in significantly increased attacks against coalition forces and Iraqi governmental institutions. If this scenario were to occur, all the gains we've made over the last year would be in jeopardy.

During fiscal year 2003, twenty-four of the Army's thirty-three active duty combat brigades were deployed overseas. This equates to almost 50 percent (232,759) of the active duty force. Additionally, approximately 136,000 National Guard and U.S. Army reservists are mobilized and performing missions in support of the Global War on Terrorism.⁴⁶ The majority of units currently in Iraq and Afghanistan will rotate back to their home bases this spring. Their replacements are coming from units which have yet to see action in Iraq or Afghanistan and in some cases, units like the 3rd Infantry Division, returning to Iraq for the second time.

Rotation of units into and out of Iraq and Afghanistan will most assuredly continue for the next three or four years or longer. The Army leadership and Congress are starting to call for an increase in the force structure in order to have sufficient forces to meet mission requirements. President Bush has repeatedly stated that the United States will not abandon the citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan and will remain until the mission is complete. The strategic objective of a unified, stable, and secure Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors, will take time to achieve as will peace and stability in Afghanistan. The question is: Where can the United States look to get assistance in executing phase IV operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? The most likely source is from NATO.

LEVERAGING NATO

NATO's support to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has helped lessen the strain on United States forces. NATO recognizes participation in the Global War On Terrorism and maintaining security in Europe, requires it to operate outside its traditional geographic boundaries and to transform its C2 and force structure. NATO has transformed its headquarters into a single strategic command (Allied Command Operations) and one that is purely functional (Allied Command Transformation). To become more deployable, NATO is building a response force (21,000 personnel) capable of carrying out integrated air, maritime and ground force operations with as little as five days notice and the ability to sustain itself for a month.⁴⁷

Employment of this force still requires parliamentary approval. This is a weakness in NATO but one the United States insisted in putting into the original charter to appease political opponents arguing that the decision to go to war should require congressional approval. On-going operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates NATO's commitment to the United States and willingness to provide military support despite political differences. Today, 24 of the 26 NATO allies and invitees have troops in either Afghanistan or Iraq, and 17 have sent troops to both. Donald Rumsfeld has publicly supported the possibility of turning military operations in Afghanistan over to NATO and having them assume command of the Polish/Spanish multinational division in Iraq.⁴⁸ The new NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has repeatedly stated that NATO's first priority is supporting operations in Afghanistan, "If we fail in Afghanistan – if we do not meet our commitments to the people of that country to help them build a better future – then who will have confidence in us again".⁴⁹ Allowing NATO to have a greater role in Afghanistan would clearly demonstrate to the international community, particularly within Europe, our commitment and trust in NATO and help give them greater recognition. Additionally, NATO's support helps to reduce the operational tempo on United States ground forces.

Maintaining a strong transatlantic relationship with NATO is a vital interest of the United States. NATO and the United States have for over fifty years forged a partnership based on trust, cooperation, and mutual support (political and military). The combined efforts of NATO and the United States resulted in the defeat of Communism and given the opportunity, will defeat terrorism. Despite political disagreements in going to war with Iraq, it appears the ground work is being laid for allowing NATO a greater role in OPERATIONS ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM. The United States cannot fight the Global War on Terrorism alone. The United States leadership must use all its political influence and diplomatic savvy to obtain NATO's commitment and political support in fighting the GWOT. In both the near term and more importantly, the long term, NATO provides the United States with a political and military ally that can assist the United States in defusing known and unknown security challenges.

WORD COUNT= 6,697

ENDNOTES

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² Ibid.,68.

³ Ibid.,70.

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⁶ Bell, *The World since 1945*, 77.

⁷ Bell, *The World since 1945*, 74.

⁸ Bell, *The World since 1945*, 78.

⁹ Forest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Vol. IV: Statesman, 1945-1959* (New York, 1987), 164.

¹⁰ Peter Duignan, *NATO: Its Past Present, and Future* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 2000), 1.

¹¹ Bell, *The World since 1945*, 80.

¹² Prouge, *Marshall, Vol. IV, pp 191 (Stalin's remarks) and 200 (Marshall's broadcast)*.

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¹⁴ Bell, *The World since 1945*, 90-91.

¹⁵ S.J. Ball, *The Cold War: An International History, 1947-1991* (Arnold Hodder Headline Group, New York, 1998) 30-31.

¹⁶ Bell, *The World since 1945*, 95.

¹⁷ Bell, *The World since 1945*, 99.

¹⁸ Richard L Krugler, *Laying the Foundations*, 49.

¹⁹ Bell, *The World since 1945*, 113.

²⁰ Krugler, *Laying the Foundations*, 56.

²¹ Ibid., 56.

²² Duigan, *NATO: Its Past Present, and Future*, 22.

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²⁵ James Russell and Iliana Bravo. Strategic Insight, "Iraq Next Phase of the Campaign?", Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 2 April 2002.

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²⁸ Howard Fineman, "Bush's phase one", Newsweek, 15 Oct 2001, 48.

²⁹ Woodward, *Bush at War*, 45.

³⁰ Asad Khan, "Pakistan—An Enduring Friend", Marine Corps Gazette, June 2002. Vol. 86 no 6; pg 34.

³¹ Norman Friedman, *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War*: (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD 2003), 138-142.

³² Ibid., 141-142.

³³ Ibid., 136.

³⁴ Speech by British Prime Minister, Tony Blair on 11 September 2001.

³⁵ Richard B Myers, "Six months after: The imperatives of operation enduring freedom" Royal Institute for Defense Studies, April 2002, Vol. 147, no. 2; pg 10. [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 December 2003.

³⁶ Gordon Peterson, "Special Report: Operation Enduring Freedom" *Sea Power*, Nov 2001, Vol. 44, no. 11; 20. [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 December 2003.

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³⁸ Diego A. Ruiz, "The Road to Kabul", *NATO Review*, Summer of 2003,

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Woodward, *Bush at War*, 353.

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⁴² Woodward, *Bush at War*, 354.

⁴³ Charles Lamroschini, 4 December 2003, Interview with European journalists.

⁴⁴ Karsten D. Voight, "German-American Relations After the Iraq War: Defining New Common Ground Is Better Than Bemoaning Old Disputes" *Hampton Roads International*

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⁴⁶ Thom Shanker, "U.S. to Use Mix of Regular, National Guard and Reserve Troops in Iraq." *New York Times*, 24 Jul 2003, p A.10. [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 1 December 2003.

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