

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CREATING STRATEGIC AGILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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Northeast Asia remains one of the most volatile areas of the world. Military rivalries, economic competition, ideological differences, strategic location, and our commitment to our allies, combine to make stability in this region a vital interest of the United States.

For the last fifty years the United States forces in Northeast Asia have focused primarily on the defense of South Korea from a North Korean attack. Over 37,000 US forces remain today in Korea, with a significant number in Japan in a support role. In recent years however, the South Korean defense capability has significantly improved while many aspects of the North Korean offensive capability have eroded; yet the size and mission focus of U.S. forces in Korea remains virtually unchanged. Despite recent announcements admitting to a nuclear program by Pyongyang, many remain optimistic that an attack by North Korea is increasingly unlikely and that a peaceful reconciliation between North and South is probable in the near future.

This research paper examines the strategic importance of Northeast Asia and the possible points of conflict, reviews the current political/military situation on the Korean Peninsula, and asks the question; "does the United States still have the right forces and mission focus in Korea, or are there options which could be pursued today that better meet the objectives of the National Security Strategy, set the favorable conditions for reconciliation between the two Koreas and provide a much more flexible regional response capability in Northeast Asia?"

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CREATING STRATEGIC AGILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking, and the development of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances. The ability to adapt will be critical in a world defined by surprise and uncertainty.

—Donald H. Rumsfeld¹

Fifty-two years ago the United States deployed combat forces to the Republic of Korea (ROK), to defend this country from an invasion by North Korea. Today over 37,000 U.S. troops remain deployed in Korea to deter North Korean aggression.² Although the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea has not changed in fifty years, Northeast Asia has changed dramatically. The region has increased in strategic significance to the United States, and the future stability of this region is a vital interest of the United States. Despite the regional changes, the American military presence in Korea has focused solely on defending South Korea. The only other U.S. military presence in the region is in Japan and has focused primarily on defense of Japan. America's defense structures in the region have not evolved to meet the development and associated emerging strategic challenges. Meanwhile there is a growing resentment of this military presence in the region. The U.S. commitment is unquestioned. However, it appears the United States may be confronting a strategic policy and military strategy disconnect in Northeast Asia. The strategic challenges in the region demand more regional strategic agility than exists with the current U.S. military force structure in Northeast Asia. Thus, a change to organization, roles, and missions of US forces in South Korea is the most suitable, feasible, and acceptable way for the U.S. to answer these new challenges.

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Northeast Asia comprises five nations: Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, and the eastern portions of Russia.³ The Northeast Asia region encompasses the majority of the economic and military power of Asia, and the future stability of this region is a vital national interest of the United States.⁴

South Korea lies at the geographic center of the region and has long been a cultural crossroads in Asia, and represents a historic land bridge from Japan to China. It is largely this geographic position that elevates this nation's strategic importance.⁵ In less than fifty years it has overcome the devastation of war to become a world economic power, ranking thirteenth in

world gross domestic product.⁶ A strong and continuous United States diplomatic, economic and military support has bolstered this success. Today South Korea remains well positioned to continue its economic growth.⁷ Korean goods are competitive on the world market and internal fiscal policies make Korea attractive to international investment.⁸ South Korea appears to aim at becoming the facilitator of a Northeast Asian economic community that if successful would dwarf the European Union.⁹ Nevertheless, the economy faces potential threats; an attack from the North, the impact on the South of an internal collapse in North Korea, and the potential economic fallout from a Chinese/Japanese economic competition. These scenarios have strategic implications for the U.S. economy as well.

The Korean/U.S. alliance remains instrumental to the nation's economic and democratic success, and the most significant deterrent to North Korea efforts against the South. The South Koreans for many years viewed North Korea as a direct threat to their nation and thus field the world's sixth largest military force to defend their nation.¹⁰ The Koreans accepted the impact of a large American military presence, as a necessary price of maintaining their freedom. Today however, there is a growing anti-American sentiment in Korea. Many Koreans consider the United States to be domineering and paternalistic. The new South Korean President, Roh Moo-Hyun campaigned on an anti-American platform and promised that Korea would never "kowtow" to the United States. Moreover, he commented that the fifty year old alliance needed to "mature and advance."¹¹

The present anti-American sentiment rests on a combination of the Asian philosophy of self reliance, the perception of their being treated as the junior partner in the alliance, and the maturation of South Korea's defense capabilities. There is also great resentment of America's hard line approach toward North Korea that appears at odds with South Korea's policy of engagement toward North Korea known as the "Sunshine Policy". Many in the South perceive the recent provocative actions by the North as resulting from this US hard-line policy.¹² South Korean strategic objectives are the peaceful renunciation of the peninsula, economic prosperity in the south, and increased independent political influence in the region. While South Korea's pride envisions a self sufficient Korea that will not rely on U.S. forces, at least for the near term U.S. military forces in Korea are essential to South Korea's defenses.

North Korea, on the other hand, represents the classic example of a failed economy, with a political system characterized by a bizarre personality cult, reinforced by brainwashing and brutal repression by a fanatical military.¹³ It is the antithesis of the other nations of Northeast Asia. The despotic government focuses the nation's efforts on a military first policy, while its citizens starve. Kim Chong Il is a reclusive, unpredictable, frightening dictator, who remains one

of the world's most significant threats to peace and stability.¹⁴ A recent Japanese assessment describes him as "shrewd and intelligent enough to outwit and outmaneuver the opponent."¹⁵

North Korea retains ambition of being a world power and has not given up on its ambition to dominate the Korean Peninsula. In the midst of economic collapse, this nation still fields the world's fifth largest military force.¹⁶ This force is still very capable with seventy percent of its army deployed within ninety miles of the Demilitarized Zone which separates North and South Korea¹⁷. Most threatening are the artillery forces deployed within range of Seoul. Analysts estimate North Korean artillery units can fire up to 500,000 rounds per hour against South Korea, which would result in tremendous civilian casualties, especially in the densely populated Seoul area.¹⁸ Moreover, North Korea claims to possess at least two nuclear weapons and has announced its withdrawal from the international non-proliferation treaty. Their long range missile program is also aggressive with proven capability to range any of the Northeast Asian nations and even the United States.¹⁹ North Korea also possesses a robust chemical weapon stockpile and most likely a biological weapon program as well.

Diplomatic overtures to South Korea in 2000 gave optimists hope that North Korea had abandoned its long stated goal of reunifying the Korea under North Korea. Whether this goal remains is a subject of great debate. Although Kim has indicated that he might perhaps accept U.S. Force presence during the initial stages of reunification, he will eventually demand withdrawal of all U.S. forces to facilitate his long term objectives.²⁰ Nevertheless, North Korea blames the United States for its internal challenges, and international isolation. The future of North Korea has great strategic implications for the U.S. An attack by the North would immediately embroil the United States in a major conflict. An internal collapse in the North would require massive humanitarian support and create economic conditions that would threaten the South Korean economy. Kim Chong Il's relationship with China and Russia continues to represent a challenge for the U.S. in the region as well.

China is emerging as a superpower with the economic, military, and manpower potential to become a peer competitor of the United States. China fields the world's largest military force, is a nuclear power, and has the world's sixth largest gross domestic product. It seeks to retain its own hegemony and regional leadership in Northeast Asia, one challenged only by the United States. Some academics believe conflict between the United States and China is inevitable as each pursue their strategic goals in the region.²¹

China remains North Korea's largest trading partner, providing aid in excess of \$470 million annually. It also provides over 70 percent of North Korea's fuel imports and a third of all

grain imports.²² Despite this, China's commitment to North Korea is waning. The Chinese have a growing diplomatic and economic relationship with South Korea, one threatened by North Korea's strategic ambitions. Moreover, China has grown increasingly frustrated with the internal situation within North Korea, one that has resulted in a refugee flow across the Yalu into its already troubled northeastern border region. Aid to North Korea is an economic burden as well. Most troubling to China is the potential of war on the Korean peninsula. Such a war would eventually result in a U.S. supported South Korean victory, closer ties between the United States, South Korea and Japan, and continued U.S. military presence in the region - exactly what the Chinese want to avoid. Additionally the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea disrupts the balance of power in the region and risks igniting a nuclear arms race. It also would push Japan into developing nuclear weapons - something the Chinese desperately want to avoid.

Stability on the Korean peninsula benefits Chinese long term national goals. Perhaps more importantly, China sees U.S. military presence as a balance that keeps Japan from expanding its military capability beyond the present self-defense capabilities. On the other hand the North Korean situation does give China strategic leverage, and serves as a subtle foil against the United States over the Taiwan issue. China may prefer a more stable North Korea, but the continued existence of a separate North Korean nation, non-aligned with the west, as a limiting force to external influences on the peninsula, represents a strategic advantage for China.²³

Japan is one of the world's leading economic powers. Despite recent setbacks, it still has the world's second largest gross domestic product behind that of the United States.²⁴ The two nations' economies are inextricably entwined. Militarily Japan has begun to move beyond its post World War II self-imposed limitation of military power. It is seeking an evolving security role in Northeast Asia, while actively involving itself in a long standing regional land dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands.²⁵

Japanese strategic goals focus around the need to maintain its position as a global player with significant influence. While it has influence today, there are internal challenges that may threaten its position in the future. Japan's economic power has been singularly responsible for its global position and influence, but that power has displayed some weaknesses in recent years.²⁶ The effect is felt outside Japan as well, with the weakness of the yen impacting the global financial markets. Japanese efforts to battle deflation led to a weak yen, which could lead to competitive depreciation in the region eventually forcing China and South Korea to cheapen their currencies to remain competitive in the export market.²⁷ These moves would

cause serious repercussions in the American economy. Even with a strong Japanese economy, China and South Korea are potential challengers to Japanese regional economic hegemony.

Japan has limited its military power to only self defense capabilities, relying on its relationship with the United States to ensure the nation's defense. Today the Japanese are wrestling with this approach, and many are concerned with the lack of a legitimate national military element of power. If Japanese economic influence becomes threatened, there may be a greater need for military power. With a possible Korean reunification on the horizon, the Japanese remain worried about the future of U.S. forces in the region. A withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea would present a significant threat. The Japanese are asking "what should a nation do to ensure the security of its citizens? In light of world peace and stability to the security and prosperity of Japan ...what concrete measure should be taken to further strengthen our contribution to international efforts to resolve conflicts?"²⁸ This is a call for greater Japanese military participation in regional and international efforts at resolving conflicts. Prime Minister Koizumi has urged modification of the Self Defense Forces charter so they can perform "territorial security missions" and participate in international crisis response actions.²⁹ However, such a shift from self-defense, and the associated perception of a rearming Japan, may only add to the regional tensions.

Too many overlook Russia as a Northeast Asian nation, but in fact it remains an influential regional power with strategic ambitions. Russia borders China, North Korea, and Japan's islands. Although challenged economically, it still ranks tenth in gross domestic product, fields the world's third largest military, and has the world's largest nuclear force.³⁰ During the Cold War the Soviet Union was a key supporter of North Korea and it still maintains close ties. North Korea has often played China and Russia against each other to achieve its objectives. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Soviet regime, the new Russian government ignored its interests in Northeast Asia. Today, Russia realizes the strategic importance of this region, especially its economic potential. It seems to be focusing much strategic effort on maintaining a powerful voice in the region.

Within Northeast Asia China is viewed as its peer competitor militarily. China, Japan, and South Korea all threaten Russia economically. There are regional land disputes with Japan over the Kurile Islands, while Russia remains concerned about the balance of power in the region, especially the uncertain influence of the United States and China following a reunification of the two Koreas. Russia's immediate strategy in Northeast Asia includes four characteristics: greater integration into world economy, aggressive diplomacy emphasizing

multilateral approaches to problem solving, recognizing the distinct interest and orientation of Russia's regions that face the Pacific, and an integrated and dynamic pursuit of economic and strategic objectives.³¹

Therefore within this region there are economic rivalries among China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. There is political and military rivalry between North Korea and South Korea. There is a rogue state with ambitions empowered by a large military force and nuclear weapons. There are territorial land disputes involving China, Russia, and Japan. And there are internal economic challenges for all five states. All of the above have repercussions directly or indirectly on the United States and its strategic policies. Compounding an already complex situation is the growing demand within South Korea and Japan for the removal of U.S. forces. Given this convergence of competing economies, large military capabilities, competing regional objectives, and the uncertainty of a well armed rogue state, the future of the region is far from certain, and of great strategic importance to the United States. Continued U.S. military presence is an essential element of overall U.S. strategy in this troubled region.

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION

Approximately 90,000 US military personnel serve Northeast Asia, assigned to bases in South Korea and Japan. United States Forces Korea (USFK) totals 37,000 personnel with 47,000 assigned to United States Forces Japan (USFJ).³² This may appear a formidable military presence, but the singular mission focus of most of these forces, along with a paucity of actual combat forces results in limited available combat power. This limited combat power creates strategic risk for the United States in the region.

The U.S. military presence in South Korea has been the stabilizing force in the region for the last fifty years. United States Forces Korea is a sub-unified command of Pacific Command.³³ Its mission remains the same since the armistice ending the war: deter aggression against South Korea, and should deterrence fail, defeat the aggressor. It is a "ready to fight tonight" organization. Forces assigned to United States Forces Korea, combined with South Korea's forces remain sufficient for deterrence, and, if necessary, defeat of a North Korean attack. Subsequent offensive operations, however, require follow-on forces from the United States.

The air component comprises a numbered Air Force (Seventh Air Force) with two fighter wings. These two wings combined have three fighter squadrons with F-16s and one squadron of A-10 aircraft.³⁴ There are no naval or Marine forces permanently assigned in South Korea although each has a small headquarters element; US Naval Forces Korea (USNFK) and US

Marine Forces Korea (MARFOR-K). The Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) in Okinawa and Seventh Fleet, home-ported at Sasebo Japan, become the designated naval and marine forces of United States Forces Korea upon commencement of hostilities. Eighth Army is the major U.S. ground combat force in Korea, and serves as the Army Service Component Command. It has a large theater army headquarters and several major subordinate commands with combat forces.

Its air cavalry brigade contains two AH-64 attack helicopter battalions. Its general support aviation brigade has one lift battalion (UH-60) and one medium lift battalion (CH-47). It also has a Patriot Battalion deployed in Korea defending critical facilities from air/missile attack. Although not considered combat forces, critical combat multipliers in Korea include the theater intelligence brigade and signal brigade deployed in support of United State Forces Korea. These two brigades fulfill the unique role of theater intelligence and theater C4I and provide a critical capability.

The largest ground combat force is an infantry division (Second Infantry Division). This division has an organization unique in the U.S. Army that provides capabilities in certain areas, while shortfalls in others. (Figure 2) The division has only two ground maneuver brigades, (one armor and one infantry), vice the standard three.³⁵ The Aviation brigade has a lift battalion (UH-60s), an air cavalry squadron (OH-58D-KW), but limited attack capability with only AH-64 battalion. The division's artillery Brigade (DIVARTY) possesses the majority of the firepower. The DIVARTY contains two 155mm self propelled howitzer battalions and the unique addition of two multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battalions.³⁶ This is a specific design to support the theater counterfire fight against North Korean artillery.

Unique to Korea is the command arrangement under which these forces operate. During peacetime United States Forces Korea is under operational control of Pacific Command. However, upon declaration of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, or as directed, these forces fall under the operational control of Combined Forces Command. Combined Forces Command is a combined defense organization of South Korean and U.S. forces, with the responsibility for prosecuting a war on the peninsula should one occur. All training and planning of U.S. forces in Korea focuses on supporting this mission. Additionally since assigned to Combined Forces Command, the U.S. forces in Korea must meet requirements concerning force availability, and are not generally available for deployment outside of South Korea. This restriction creates further limits on U.S. regional agility.

United States Forces Japan, like United States Forces Korea, is a sub-unified command of Pacific Command. This command numbers approximately 47,000 personnel with a Theater

Army (United States Army Japan) as the army's component, a numbered air force (Fifth Air Force), a Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), and Seventh Fleet as naval component. Upon closer look what is within these organizations does not represent a robust combat force.

Fifth Air Force, based at Yakota Japan is the air component. It consists of two fighter wings and an airlift wing. There are presently two squadrons of F-15s primarily for air to air combat. The remaining two fighter squadrons are F-16C/J "Wild Weasel" aircraft, specially configured for the suppression of enemy air defense mission.³⁷ These forces train both for the Japanese defense missions and other missions in the Pacific region. They are more readily available than forces in Korea to support regional contingencies. However, they are critical for the defense of Korea should hostilities occur.

A final key element of the Air Force in Japan is the 353d Special Operations Group. This group provides air support to special operations forces and flies the MC-130 Combat Talons and MC-130P Combat Shadow aircraft. Of note, this force provides the fixed wing insertion capability for the special operations elements of the Korean Army. This capability represents a critical role should hostilities commence in Korea, because the South Koreans possess no such capability.

The United States Army headquarters in Japan is a skeleton organization designed to maintain a logistics/support infrastructure for missions supporting operations in Japan or Korea. It centers around a theater support command that provides a robust theater level logistics infrastructure. The only deployed army combat force in Japan is a Special Forces battalion from First Special Forces Group.

The Marine Expeditionary Force in Japan also consists mostly of headquarters and staff elements. The Marine combat elements, located on Okinawa, include a Marine Division headquarters, a Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEU-SOC), and a Marine Air Wing. However, there are few actual combat units within these units. The Marine division has only a regimental headquarters element permanently deployed on Okinawa. Its three subordinate battalions are part of unit deployment program (UDP) and rotate to Okinawa for six-month training rotations.³⁸ The supporting artillery forces on Okinawa are also unit deployment program battalions, with only one or two batteries deployed in Okinawa at any given time. This unit-based rotation to a forward presence mission is unique within the Marine Corps. The Marine expeditionary unit consists of a reinforced infantry battalion with fires, aviation, and support element. Although based in Japan this element embarks with its amphibious ready group and can be anywhere in the PACOM area doing a variety of missions. It may or may not be available to support a combat requirement in Northeast Asia. Finally the Marines have a

Marine Air Wing permanently deployed to Okinawa in support of the Marine Expeditionary Force. This wing includes three FA-18 C/D squadrons, with helicopter support.

The most powerful combat force in Japan is the Seventh Fleet. Although the Seventh Fleet is home-ported in Japan, it is actually a subordinate of the Pacific Fleet. Seventh Fleet can comprise a number of ships, but primarily consists of the Kitty Hawk Carrier Battle Group. The missions of Seventh Fleet are unique, as it has a forward presence mission in the Western Pacific region that frequently takes it outside the Northeast Asia area. In addition to a role in defense of Japan and Taiwan, the Seventh Fleet also serves as the U.S. Navy element in defense of Korea. Commander Seventh Fleet serves as the Commander Combined Naval Forces Korea upon activation. Even with its mission for the defense of Japan and Korea, the Kitty Hawk battle group often deploys outside the region, including stints in Indian Ocean in support of the war against terrorism. As this paper is being written, the Kitty Hawk has received deployment orders deploying it to Central Command for potential operations against Iraq. These situations further restrict U.S. agility in Northeast Asia.

In sum, on any given day in Japan the Marines may have only one to two infantry battalion equivalents available to provide immediate support to a regional contingency. If the Marine Expeditionary Unit is committed in Southeast Asia or somewhere such as Timor, there is only one Marine Infantry battalion available in theater. The only other ground force in Japan is the Special Forces Battalion which is a highly specialized unit with limited capabilities. The Carrier Battle Group is tremendous capability, but lacks any type land power other than what Marine forces in Okinawa may be available. The battle group's area of operations is the entire Pacific Command area and it can easily be five to seven days away. Even if at port in Japan, if "steam is not up," it may take two to five days to deploy the group.

In summary, given the sole defense focus of forces in Korea, if an immediate crisis developed in Northeast Asia and the National Command Authority requiring a response involving ground presence within forty-eight hours, the only forces that the U.S. military leadership could guarantee would be available, trained, and ready in theater is a little more than one infantry battalion. One infantry battalion out of a regional presence of over 90,000 does not provide U.S. decision makers a strategic agility in an area of such vital interest.

A REVIEW OF OPTIONS

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States lists the following objectives, each of which is directly applicable to America's strategic objectives in Northeast Asia

- Champion aspirations for human dignity
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of development
- Transform America's National Security Institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

The National Security Strategy further states,

"The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces and their forward presence has maintained the peace in some of the world's most strategically vital regions." It further states, "The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the US commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of US Forces."³⁹

These requirements mandate a capable military presence in Northeast Asia. Unfortunately the current presence focuses on past, not future requirements. The volatility of the region justifies the need for greater strategic agility. However, the internal pressures over U.S. force presence both in Japan and Korea make any increase in either of these countries unlikely. Both Korea and Japan have considerable trouble with the impact of current force levels. These negative impacts include space, training area requirements, the environment, and the dollar amount of burden-sharing costs borne by the host nation. Notable incidents such as the recent rape of a Japanese woman by a U.S. Marine and the deaths of two Korean school-girls run over by an armored vehicle have further exasperated an already difficult situation. Keeping current level of forces is a daily battle, not only with South Korea and Japan, but also with forces within the Department of Defense and Congress; the idea of adding forces is a non-starter. Establishing a U.S. presence in China or Russia, at least in the near future is also not an option. Japan based U.S. forces already have a mission covering the entire PACOM area. However, there are opportunities to develop greater strategic agility within the structure of United States Forces Korea. But there are calls coming not only from North Korea and an ever growing percentage of the South Koreans, but also from the United States Congress and the U.S. Department of Defense for an American withdrawal. Many argue that the United States

should withdraw its forces from Korea and, if necessary, move them to Japan. Those who advocate such a policy possess a number of assumptions, unfortunately mostly false. Some believe South Korea is not at risk from the North and therefore maintaining a force presence in that country is no longer a vital interest of the United States. North Korean capabilities and intent counters this argument. South Korea acknowledges that the U.S. presence and capability is the principle deterrent to North Korea. Even with the eroding conventional capabilities of North Korea, the long range missile threat coupled with the threat of weapons of mass destruction assure that even if South Korea did eventually defeat the North, the expected devastation and casualties from artillery and missile attacks against South Korean infrastructure and population centers are unacceptable.

Others argue that although North Korea still presents a legitimate threat to the security and perhaps survival of South Korea, the U.S. presence in Japan is enough to handle any Korean contingency and provides sufficient regional presence. The above analysis indicates that the available combat power in Japan under the best of circumstances is the equivalent of two infantry battalions, three to four fighter squadrons, and the two fighter squadrons equivalents of the Kitty Hawk Battle Group (if not deployed outside the area). The problem becomes a time/space challenge. If U.S. forces withdraw from Korea, they will possess only limited access for a return to South Korea. The range limitations associated with operations from Japanese bases impacts the sortie generation capability, delaying response times. Operations from Japan would require Japanese approval. A lesson from today's build up in the Persian Gulf is that there is never a guarantee of political approval of allies. However, negative impact on the command and control integration with South Korean defense forces is perhaps the greatest disadvantage if U.S. forces moved to Japan.

Perhaps the most important justification for remaining in Korea is the fundamental nature of Combined Forces Command, the alliance's war-fighting command. This force leverages the combined capabilities brought by the United States and South Korea. Its effectiveness rests on the synergy gained from the relationship, and the resultant asymmetric advantages created as compared with North Korea. For example, the South Koreans provide the majority of the defensive forces in manpower, over 600,000 daily, in defense of South Korea. But South Korea lacks many of the modern precision engagement weapons and other combat multipliers. The United States brings the intelligence, command and control, precision attack, theater missile defense, SOF infiltration capabilities, and much more. This complementary effect is what creates the combat power capable of defeating a North Korean attack, while protecting Seoul.

There is also a budget issue. The Korean Defense budget is \$14 Billion for 2003.⁴⁰ However, there is little available to invest in developing organic systems to replace the systems the US brings to the fight. This year Korean defense development priorities are a MLRS type system and a destroyer project for the Navy. The costs of these weapons systems prevented Korea from pursuing a Patriot type Theater Ballistic Missile capability as well as other needed defense improvements. The U.S. military commitment to South Korea provides large economic savings for the Korean Government, allowing it to invest these savings in other critical domestic and foreign programs. The cost of the U.S. presence in Korea to the U.S. budget is \$1.3 Billion, which does not include the investment and procurement costs of the systems themselves, such as attack helicopters or the extensive space system support necessary that to support Korea's defense.⁴¹ If the United States were to withdraw its military from South Korea, it would take South Korea a number of years to attain such capabilities, thus providing a window of opportunity to North Korea.

Some still argue American force projection capabilities from Alaska, Hawaii, and the west coast of United States could easily substitute for forces in the region. The deployment time is again the critical factor. Under best cases, one could expect to deploy a brigade or perhaps air elements to Korea within ninety-six hours. Over the years the unambiguous warning time of impending North Korean attack has declined from ten days to as little as seventy-two hours.⁴² Forces off the peninsula simply cannot get there in time. Additionally with the world-wide demands on U.S. forces, especially as the United States is engaged in war with Iraq, those forces apportioned to support Pacific Command will out of necessity deploy elsewhere and not be available.

Accepting that Korea is at risk should America withdraw forces, even to Japan, some still argue that the ingratitude and mass anti-American sentiment justifies leaving Korea to deal with its own problems. Admittedly, there are tensions resulting from U.S presence in South Korea. Incidents such as violent crime by American service members and tragic accidents certainly enflame these tensions. However, on the whole, both government officials and the citizens of South Korea generally accept the necessity of a U.S. presence as a vital interest of their country.⁴³

Finally, some argue that a U.S. withdrawal from South Korea will lead to greater regional stability, since the regional states, especially China and Japan, will likely take a more active regional role. Although certainly this might occur, the results could well be counter to America's strategic objectives in Northeast Asia an arms race, even a nuclear arms race in the region. Such a state of affairs would threaten U.S. vital interests and would definitely limit U.S.

influence. The fact is that the U.S. military presence in Korea has been a stabilizing force in the region that prevents such occurrences.

While the above makes a case for retaining U.S. forces in South Korea, the present unsatisfactory situation demands change. There are negative aspects and false assumptions about the role and significance of current U.S. forces in Korea. The first consideration addresses the question of deterrence. Just how much U.S. military presence is required to deter North Korea? The two components of deterrence are capability and intent. For North Korea the calculation boils down to does the United States have the capability to defend South Korea and the intent to become involved in a major theater war? The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea is a strong indicator of such intent. These forces inextricably link an attack on Korea as a direct attack against the United States, justifying U.S. retaliation with all its might on North Korea. The United States must keep soldiers on the ground to maintain this strategic deterrence against North Korea. However, does the same deterrence exist with 25,000 U.S. forces in South Korea? What about 10,000? Strategic deterrence is the result not only of deployed forces but also a combination of all the elements of U.S. power and a coherent strategy toward North Korea. U.S. boots on the ground in forward defense represents a considerable political statement and a legitimate tripwire that commits the United States. As long as U.S. forces of some sort remain associated with forward defense, this tripwire exists, and thus the intent portion of deterrence remains unambiguous. The numbers are not so important.

The second component of deterrence is capability, and on this point numbers and the capabilities of those forces matter. U.S. forces represent a critical element of South Korea's capability to defeat a North Korean attack. The United States brings asymmetric advantage and technological overmatch to South Korea's defense capabilities. These capabilities force the North Koreans to confront the probability of their defeat, if they choose to go to war. Without U.S. capabilities a North Korean attack is unlikely to succeed but the extent of the threat by itself could gain considerable political concessions from South Korea. U.S. forces in South Korea ensure deterrence.

This leads to the faulty assumption that U.S. ground combat presence in South Korea is the principle force on which deterrence rests. This is not the case. South Korea provides approximately fifty divisions for defense of the nation. The United States provides one division. America's most significant contributions to the defense of South Korea lie the areas of command and control, intelligence, and precision attack (both airpower and long range fires),

and theater missile defense. These asymmetric capabilities significantly enhance South Korea's military capabilities.

Despite these advantages, U.S. forces in South Korea cause great stress on South Korea. American bases, in many cases operationally mal-positioned, take valuable land needed by South Korea to support a growing population.⁴⁴ The cost to support U.S. forces in Korea to the United States is quite large. Moreover, the decay of U.S. facilities in Korea results in a significant commitment of service budgets to improve quality of life, including building new barracks and housing facilities. This expansion of U.S. presence further inflames the South Koreans, who see these efforts as long term increased American presence and not a path toward reducing pressures. The "center of gravity" of U.S. forces remains in the capital, on what is perhaps the most valuable real estate in Seoul, similar to the Koreans having a large military post in Central Park in New York. In addition the current presence represents a significant challenge to the services, considering other worldwide commitments. Since most Korean assignments are a one year remote tour a large percentage of the force is either preparing for a Korean tour, serving in Korea, or is recovering from a recently completed.

There is serious tension between Korea and the United States in their defense relationship. America brings the asymmetric capabilities and technological overmatch, but also the extensive requirements to train and exercise those forces to U.S. standards and well as meet the associated U.S. quality of life standards for the troops. This, along with a U.S. policy that South Koreans perceive as counter to their "sunshine policy" further exasperates the pressures on them. These pressures contribute to the perception that the United States is domineering and parental in its defense relationship with South Korea. For example Combined Forces Command, the defense organization which controls all U.S. and Korean forces in defense of South Korea, comprises approximately fifty divisions. There is only one U.S. division, yet the United States insists on an American General in command. While there are valid reasons, this demand represents a vivid example of the friction points that strain the relationships. Clearly from the regional assessment and review of military presence in the region there is little argument U.S. forces need to be in South Korea. However, if the force presence is itself a source of some of the strategic friction between the United States and South Korea, is there a way to maximize capabilities, while minimizing the associated challenges?

A RECOMMENDED STRATEGY

“Improvement will require not only technological solutions, but also cultural change; a willingness to challenge standard practices, and question current organizational patterns and command processes”

—General Richard B Myers, CJCS⁴⁵

Given that U.S. forces in Korea are necessary to defend South Korea, and that Japan is not likely to accept additional forces, modifications to the U.S. force structure in Korea must meet two conditions. First, the U.S. military force presence in South Korea must ensure the defense of South Korea. Second, the forces must be capable of meeting U.S. regional strategic objectives. Based on the assumption that any future plan must ensure no overall strategic risk to defense of Korea and that there will be no additional forces available and "less is better", the United States should consider the possibilities of reorganizing current forces, focusing on maximizing the essential capabilities provided to defense of Korea while simultaneously developing a regional response capability with available forces.

The evolution of the South Korean military provides insight into possible areas where U.S. force presence can change. Following the Korean War, the defense of Korea was solely dependent on U.S. forces. Over time the South Koreans developed a large and capable military force. Today many analysts believe South Korean ground forces could successfully defend South Korea against North Korean ground attack. However, it is what the United States forces bring to the fight that ensures a rapid victory, and protection of key infrastructure. The value of the U.S. contribution is not the ground maneuver forces, but rather the technological combat multipliers and resultant asymmetric advantages. The U.S. multiple launch rocket systems, long-range canon systems, and precision all-weather air force attack capabilities are essential to defeat a North Korean attack. U.S. intelligence systems bring unmatched situational awareness to the South Koreans. Early warning of a North Korean attack is not possible without these capabilities. Coordinating the various South Korean and U.S. forces and directing this million man combined force requires the U.S. command and control capabilities and advanced technologies that American forces integrate into the command structure. The Patriot systems are also vital for key target defense.

Given these capabilities essential for defense of Korea, it leaves a significant amount of the U.S. military presence Korea that is not so essential for deterrence or a successful defense. Specifically other than counterfire and associated counterfire support units of the Second Infantry Division, the rest of the division is not essential. However, since there is limited U.S. capability to respond to contingencies in the Northeast Asia region, it seems more prudent to

explore options to utilize better these non-critical forces to satisfy US regional requirements. There are many advantages to restructuring the current presence in Korea to an organization that maximizes the capabilities essential to defeat a North Korean attack, while simultaneously creating a regional joint task force. This task force would focus primarily on regional contingencies, with a reinforcement mission in Korea.

A possible course of action to meet the two requirements of defense and regional agility is to reduce 2nd Infantry Division from a full division to a smaller, functionally focused force. It would be a "fires based" combat command construct with associated intelligence, security, aviation support and a large logistics force. This would be a fires-based element designed largely to provide long-range operational fires to defeat a North Korean attack (counterfire), in other words as counterfire task force. This would maintain the U.S. boots on the ground for deterrence, and the essential U.S. contributions to forward defense of South Korea. The headquarters element of the counterfire task force (recommended one star general officer commanding) would include a small operations and planning staff, a small logistics coordination staff, and much of the near real time targeting capability of the current division's intelligence staff. The goal would be to gain at least a sixty percent or larger reduction in the current headquarters.

The actual fires task force would be built from the two Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalions, two self-propelled artillery battalions, a small aviation element with C2, lift, and scout capabilities, intelligence, signal, air defense capabilities, and most important a tailored logistics unit approximating the size of a main support battalion. A South Korean infantry battalion could serve as a security force for this task force.

Such a functional based fires organization is not unprecedented in the U.S. Army. The former 56th Field Artillery Command (Pershing) is a historic model for such a force.⁴⁶ That unit formed up in the mid 1980s as a command responsible for providing general support nuclear fires in support of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Its construct applied in Korea would restructure the forces in 2nd Infantry Division to a command optimized to perform the division's most critical mission; providing responsive long-range fires. A possible organization is below:




FIGURE 1: PROPOSED FIRES TASK FORCE

The second element in the reorganization plan is would be to create additional U.S. strategic agility in Northeast Asia by developing a standing, rapidly deployable joint task force from available elements in theater, with no reduction in the capability to defend South Korea. This task force would primarily focus externally on Northeast Asia, but would retain the capability to respond within South Korea in event of hostilities. Such a force would meet the emerging goals espoused in recent Department of Defense documents, which identify several operational themes to needed to maintain U.S. military preeminence in the 21st Century. One specific requirement for future forces is, “to develop tailored combat forces that are joint and expeditionary in character, rapidly deployable and immediately employable from a forward posture to assure US allies and partners, or dissuade, deter, or defeat an adversary when necessary.”⁴⁷ Core capabilities for this force would include not only combat, but capabilities for show of force, force enhancements, military to military contact, peace operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, and humanitarian assistance. This force could be the Pacific Command’s executive agent for theater engagement strategy in Northeast Asia.

The first step of creation of this “Joint Task Force Northeast Asia” would be to reorganize the elements of 2nd Infantry Division no longer necessary to support the fires mission. Elements of these forces would form the nucleus of a provisional joint task force.

The first and foremost requirement for such a Joint Task Force would be to establish a permanent standing headquarters. This would not be a joint task force “plug,” as currently planned by Joint Forces Command, but a standing, “warfighting” headquarters with permanently

assigned personnel capable of operationally employing joint forces in a variety of roles anywhere in Northeast Asia. A large portion of this headquarters could initially form up from elements in the current infantry division headquarters. The present two star commander could initially become the unit's commander, but the billet could easily, and should, rotate between services. Initially with the preponderance of force coming from what was the 2nd Infantry Division, the division's staff would establish the initial headquarters, but over time these billets should evolve into a truly joint headquarters. This could occur in a relatively short time with the personnel available already in Pacific Command, United States Forces Korea, and United States Forces Japan. The end goal would be no net increase in personnel in Korea, and in fact a reduction. The Joint Task Force should be a subordinate of Pacific Command, even though located in South Korea. This is necessary because of its regional focus outside of South Korea. United States Forces Korea requires administrative control (ADCON) to facilitate routine issues, with Pacific Command retaining operational command (OPCOM).

The units comprising the Joint Task Force would be built around functional elements. It should include an assigned ground maneuver element, maneuver support element, and a protection element. Initially the ground maneuver element would consist of the two light infantry battalions of the 2nd Infantry Division, but these would be placeholders for a Stryker brigade combat team, the ideal army element for this Joint Task Force. Habitual relationships should occur with and air and Marine elements.

The air component of the joint task force could consist of one fighter squadron from Kunsan that would train with the joint task force. In the event of its employment, this fighter squadron would serve as the primary air element. This would be an on order OPCON type relationship. However, the JTF could function equally as well with any air asset assigned, including forces out of Hawaii or Alaska depending on the mission. Specialized aircraft in Japan such as F-15s and F-16 SEAD aircraft would also train to establish relationships. The Marine Expeditionary Unit in Japan would remain a separate force not assigned to Joint Task Force Northeast Asia. However, the joint task force would be capable of adding the MEU as a MAGTF operating under its headquarters if the situation warranted. As such, sufficient Marine representation must form part of the staff. A proposed model for the initial joint task force is below:




FIGURE 2: PROPOSED JOINT TASK FORCE

The location of this joint task force is extremely important. It must be near airbases and ports capable of power projection. Kunsan Air Base is one such location – and that location would remove the headquarters and troops from the heavily congested areas of Seoul and Pyongtek. It would also remove the joint task force from North Korean artillery range and prove its non-offensive nature following reconciliation. A relocation of these forces would also ease the internal tensions. The units assigned could rotate in and out in unit sets. For example, an infantry battalion doing a six month rotation to the joint task force, similar to Marine unit deployment rotations in Japan. Since the vision is for such a force to spend much time off peninsula in theater engagement missions, the task force would be family restricted tour, which would reduce the associated infrastructure costs. Adopting the proposed force structure potentially would provide an immediate reduction of forces in Korea of approximately 3,000 personnel within 2nd Infantry Division, as well as reduce the footprint of U.S. forces north of Seoul by almost 50 percent.⁴⁸ This would represent a substantial political statement to both North Korea and South Korea.

The final element would address a sensitivity issue. As discussed, Combined Forces Command a predominately South Korean force, still possesses a U.S four star general as commander with a South Korean four-star deputy. It is time to look closely at the benefits of this command arrangement. The position of commander in chief and deputy commander in chief should rotate between the United States and South Korea. At the end of each two-year term the positions would switch between a U.S. commander in chief and South Korean deputy to a South Korean commander in chief with a U.S. deputy. The issue of the United Nations Command complicates this, but it could still be done. This would do much to repair the perceptions of Korea being the junior partner in the alliance.

In summary this plan would reduce combat forces assigned to United States Forces Korea to the critical capabilities for defense, create a standing, rapidly deployable joint task force with a regional mission, and provide opportunity for significant force reductions, and significantly improve relations with South Korea.

This proposed phase one reorganization of US forces in Korea provides these advantages over current force structure:

- Better satisfies regional objectives stated in the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review.⁴⁹
- Offers greater strategic agility for the U.S. in the region.
- Potentially could be packaged as a "reduction in threat" in negotiations with the North in support of reconciliation or disarmament.
- Allows more tailored training and packaging for the current regional forces in Japan that today respond to many nations within the PACOM area of responsibility.
- Sets the conditions for enduring US military regional capability within Korea post-reconciliation or reunification.
- Supports the creation of a Partnership for Peace type organization in Northeast Asia to improve regional military to military engagement, potentially involving China, Russia and perhaps even North Korea.
- Adds significant regional capability with no increase in force structure.
- Sets the groundwork for a combined regional peacekeeping/humanitarian force that could include Korean and/or Japanese elements, i.e. U.S. forces with strategic lift provided by Korea or Japan that would appeal to both nations' desires for greater regional security roles.
- Would continue to give South Koreans more responsibility for defense of their nation, which matches their own desires of Chu'che (self- reliance).
- Finally, most significantly all Northeast Asian states and other Asian nations have their military power built around land power (army forces). A regionally focused army ground force with staying power is greatly needed.⁵⁰

Following a reconciliation or reunification of the two Koreas, the United States will undoubtedly need to make additional major changes to its regional defense structure. As part of

reunification one can expect a rise in nationalism, and demands for an American withdrawal from Korea. Assuming confidence building measures and conditions for reunification results in reduction of North Korean threat, especially artillery and weapons of mass destruction, a fires based combat force could be withdrawn from theater. The removal of United States Forces Korea may be part of reunification conditions. However, the Joint Task Force with a regional focus, and by then credibility established through theater security engagement actions, should be not become part of such a withdrawal.

At that point United States Forces Korea and United States Force Japan could restructure in a single command perhaps, a Northeast Asia Command. This would remain a subordinate unified command of Pacific Command, but would be a focus for employment of U.S. military forces in Northeast Asia. Joint Task Force Northeast Asia would remain a standing major subordinate command and could evolve to a robust joint task force with additional roles and missions.

CONCLUSION

The conventional threat from North Korea has deteriorated to the point where the U.S. ground maneuver forces are no longer critical for either deterrence or actively defending South Korea. Meanwhile, the United States has too few options in theater to react elsewhere in Northeast Asia. At the same time Northeast Asia is rapidly becoming a region that impacts many vital American interests. In order to maintain strategic relevance and capabilities in Northeast Asia, it is essential that the United States modify the force structure and mission focus of forces assigned to the defense of Korea. By so doing it would provide a capability for more regional military-to-military engagement, and greater regional response. This option fully supports the goals of the Quadrennial Defense Review and National Security Strategy and may in fact help in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, including the growing demand for removal of U.S. forces. Most importantly, following reunification there will undoubtedly be calls for the United States to leave Korea. Adopting the proposed model would provide a wider range of strategic options for the United States. For example it could withdraw the proposed counterfire task force following reunification and bill it as "the last US combat division leaving Korea," a significant political statement. Meanwhile the Joint Task Force would remain and provide a significant, politically acceptable, U.S. regional capability in this vital area. Cooperation with Korea, Japan, and perhaps China and Russia, could bring enough combined capabilities to this task force, and satisfy enough of their own regional security aspirations that

they would welcome, or at least accept, the presence of such a force following Korean reconciliation or reunification.

There are risks, but increasing sales and fielding of U.S. systems such as MLRS and missile defense systems to South Korea can mitigate many of these. Since the standing joint task force remains based on the peninsula with a reinforcing mission to United States Forces Korea there would be little change in the combat capability available to defend South Korea.

Setting the conditions for US strategic presence in Northeast Asia must occur today. The proposed model represents a much needed force construct adjustment, with no increased forces, and positions the United States to be more strategically responsive and relevant in Northeast Asia tomorrow.

WORD COUNT 8,910

ENDNOTES

¹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, as quoted in "Joint Operational Warfighting (JOW): Thoughts on the Operational Art of Future Joint Warfighting (DRAFT)," (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, January 2003), p. 23.

² Thomas A. Schwartz, "Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & United States Forces Korea," Sworn testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 27 March 2001, p.1.

³ Some sources include Taiwan as a Northeast Asia nation. For purposes of this paper I will not specifically address Taiwan although it should be noted that the tensions over Taiwan's desire for separate nation status and Chinese goals to regain sovereignty over Taiwan remains a significant flashpoint in Asia and Northeast Asia.

⁴ Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Relations "Northeast Asia After 9/11; Regional Trends and U.S. Interests", 100th Congress, 1st Session, 15 November 2001.

⁵ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, (Massachusetts: 1997), pp. 3-6,411.

⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, (Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002), available at <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html>, internet, accessed 10 November 2002.

⁷ South Korea Economic Overview, "Country Watch," Available from <222.countrywatch.com/cw>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2003. Despite the South Korean economic crisis in 1997-1998 that resulted in a \$58 Billion IMF "bailout," the nation recovered rapidly, and by 2001 South Korea had completely repaid its IMF loans, ahead of schedule

⁸ Examples of South Korean economic growth include ship building and electronics. South Korea is now the world's leading shipbuilder. This is remarkable considering 40 years ago South Korea had no shipbuilding industry. South Korea is also challenging Japanese market dominance in electronics. Samsung and LG Electronics are South Korean brand names recognized around the world for quality.

⁹ Chae Jung Lim, "Roh Seeks Regional Economic Block" Korean Herald, 25 January 2003. The new Incheon airport, one of the world's largest and only partially, and associated planned business industrial complex is one example of investment Korea is making to position itself as economic facilitator and crossroads in the region.

¹⁰United States Forces Korea, "Korea-Region in Transition," United States Forces Korea Command Briefing, October 2002.

¹¹ CNN, "South Korean Victor Seeks Change in US Alliance," Available from <www.cnn.com/2002/world/asiapcf/east/12/20skorea.president>;Internet; accessed 20 December 2002.

¹² Steven Weisman "South Korea, Once a Solid Ally, Now Poses Problems For The US," New York Times, 2 Jan 2003.

¹³ Mark Litke on ABC Evening News, 9 Jan 03.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Japanese International Affairs Institute, "Kim Jong Il and His Strategic Goals," October 1995.

¹⁶ Richard Sisk, "Bush Sobered By Their Might, New York Daily News, 10 January 2003.

¹⁷ Schwartz, 2001 Testimony, p. 5.

¹⁸ Phillip C. Sounders, "Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program," Monterey Institute of International Studies, 10 January 2003, p.3. Available from <<http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm>>; Internet, accessed 12 February 2003. Most threatening are the 170mm Koksan Guns and 240mm Multiple Rocket Launchers that can range Seoul from current firing positions. Analysts estimate North Korean artillery units can fire up to 500,000 rounds per hour against South Korea, which result in tremendous civilian casualties

¹⁹ CNN.com "North Korea Has Ballistic Missile Capable of Hitting United States," 12 February 2003. Available from <www.cnn.com/2003/world/asiapcf/east/02/12/03.us.nkorea/index/html>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2003.

²⁰ Japanese International Affairs Institute, "Kim Jong Il and His Strategic Goals," Japan: International Affairs Institute, 12 October 1995.

²¹ John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York, 2001) pp. 373-377.

²² Philip P Pan, "China Treads Carefully Around North Korea," Washington Post, 10 January 2003.

²³ James Przystup, "Anticipating Strategic Surprise on the Korean Peninsula," Strategic Forum, The military is comprised of an active duty force of over one million, with another six to seven million in a ready reserve type force, out of a population of only 23 million

²⁴ Carolyn W. Pumphrey ed., The Rise of China in Asia (Carlisle Barracks PA, 2002) and Andres Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds, China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities (Carlisle Barracks PA, 2002), pp. 1-9.

²⁵ Congress, "Northeast Asia After 9/11" p.36.

²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Challenge 2001-Japan's Foreign Policy Toward the 21st Century," available from <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/challenges21.html>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2003.

²⁷ Country Watch "Japan Economic Outlook," available from <www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2003.

²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, p. 8.

²⁹ Janes "China and Northeast Asia Risk Pointers-Japan," available from <www2.janes.com/docs/regionalrisk/asia_pacific/china_northeast-asia/japan.shtml>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2003

³⁰ CIA, The World Fact Book.

³¹ Anna V. Shkuropat, New Dynamics in Northeast Asia, (Washington DC, 2002), p. 3.

³² Global Security.org, "United States Forces Japan", <www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/usfj.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 November 2002.

³³ Department of Defense, "Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces," Washington DC, The Joint Staff, 10 July 2001. A Subordinated Unified Command is defined as "A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces within the assigned operational area. Also called a sub-unified command.

³⁴ United States Air Force "Kunsan Air Base Fact Sheet" 8th Fighter Wing Office of Public Affairs, available from <www2.hickam.af.mil/facts/KunsanAirBase.htm>; Internet: accessed 13 January 2003. Seventh Air Force is under operational control of USFK, but is assigned to Pacific Air Forces, the Pacific Command Air Component.

³⁵ The armor brigade in 2d Infantry Division has two tank battalions and one mechanized battalion. The infantry brigade in 2d Infantry Division is unique to Korea. It is comprised of two air assault infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion. The total is 2 tank battalions, two mechanized battalions, and two air assault infantry battalions.

³⁶ Global Security.org "2d Infantry Division Artillery (DIVARTY)," available from <www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2id-divarty.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2003. Although formed as two separate MLRS battalions, it is the equivalent of 1 battalion plus one battery.

³⁷ United States Air Force, "Fact Sheet Misawa Air Base," 35th Fighter Wing Public Affairs Office, available from <www2.hickam.af.mil/facts/misawa.htm>, Internet; accessed 13 November 2002.

³⁸ Third Marine Division "Third Marine Division Homepage," available from <www.3div.usmc.mil>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2003.

³⁹ The White House, "A National Security Strategy For A Global Age," (Washington DC, The White House, September 2002), p. 29.

⁴⁰ "ROK Fears North Korean Ability to Wage Asymmetric Warfare," National Defence Magazine available at <www.nationaldefensemagazine.org>; Internet; accessed 5 February 2003.

⁴¹ United States Forces Korea, "U.S. Forces Korea Resource Management Fact Book," (USFK, 2003), p.44. The \$1.319 (Millions) figure includes the O&M, Family Housing, and MILCON costs for Eighth Army, 7th Air Force, Naval Forces Korea, Marine Forces Korea, SOCKOR, and the Installation Management Agency Korea.

⁴² Richard Halloran, "New Warplan Calls for Invasion of North Korea," *Global Beat*, New York: November 1998, available from <www.nyu.edu/global/asia/Halloran111498.html>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2003.

⁴³ This observation is based on my experience during four years service in Korea 1998-2002. Those that oppose American presence are generally the younger generation without personal memory of the Korean War and the immediate aftermath. Additionally U.S. opposition usually rises during election campaigns especially the Seoul Mayoral campaign and Korean Presidential campaign. Following the elections the rhetoric usually subsides.

⁴⁴ The mal-positioning is a result of continued occupation of military bases or camps that US has retained since end of Korean War. With changes to missions these bases are not always in the best operational locations. For example the Apache battalion of 2nd Infantry Division is located well within range of North Korean artillery, and separated from the division by several hours ground travel. USFK is undertaking a installation downsizing initiative known as Land Partnership Plan, an element of the plan is to better align unit locations with operational missions.

⁴⁵ General Richard B. Myers, quoted in "Joint Operational Warfighting (JOW): Thoughts on the Operational Art of Future Joint Warfighting (DRAFT)," (Washington DC, The Joint Staff, January 2003), p. 13.

⁴⁶ The 56th Field Artillery Command (Pershing) was formed from the 56th Field Artillery Brigade in 1986. This unit was equipped with the Pershing II missile, an intermediate range nuclear missile. The units mission was to provide general support nuclear fires in support of SACEUR. The unit organization consisted of three Pershing Missile battalions, an infantry battalion with the sole mission of security of the missile battalions, a signal battalion, support battalion, small aviation element, and headquarters company.

⁴⁷ The Joint Staff, "An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century," (Washington DC, The Joint Staff, January 2003), p. 5.

⁴⁸ This is a extremely conservative estimate based on the manpower calculations involved in removing a brigade from the division and the associated support force reductions. Under this model the following forces are available for withdrawal from Korea: Armor Brigade headquarters (90), 2 armor battalions @450 each, a mechanized infantry battalion (450), one engineer battalion (500), engineer brigade headquarters (75), two intelligence companies (75 each), air defense company (50), forward support battalion (500), signal company (75), finance and personnel battalion reductions (100-150). With this reduction USFK would be able to accelerate the Land Partnership Plan and immediately give up several camps including the five located within the Western Corridor (Howze, Giant, Edwards, Stanton, and Greaves), and the smaller installtions in Tonduchon and Uijongbu, both highly congested urban areas.

⁴⁹ Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," (Washington DC, Department of Defense, September 2001).

⁵⁰Andrew Scobell, The U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific, (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle PA, 2001), pp. 2, 21-28.

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