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Ever increasing in importance to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is the still evolving role of Information Operations (IO). Properly executed, IO will start during peacetime and play significant role in diffusing potential crisis situations. In times of crisis, IO will be a significant contributor to accomplishing the JFC's objectives and then will enable a smooth transition to a return to peace.

However, it is currently not possible for the JFC to fully exploit all aspects of IO in order to gain and maintain an advantage over the adversary. Doctrinal shortcomings such as IO cell leadership and the IO organizational structure are the main obstacles preventing joint forces from reaping the benefits of fully integrated and synchronized IO.

Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) poses a challenge to the operational commander by stating "…the pace of change in the information environment dictates that we explore broader information operations strategies and concepts." Joint forces should be prepared to accept this challenge, but must first change the way they employ IO if they expect to achieve the JFC's objectives. Implementation of a Joint Forces Information Operations Component Commander (JFIOCC), led by the current Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Commander is the first step towards a synergistic approach to the employment of IO.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND JOINT VISION 2020: READY TO ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND JOINT VISION 2020:
READY TO ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE

Ever increasing in importance to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is the still evolving role of Information Operations (IO). Properly executed, IO will start during

peacetime and play significant role in defusing potential crisis situations. In times of crisis, IO will be a significant contributor to accomplishing the JFC's objectives and then will enable a smooth transition to a return to peace.

However, it is currently not possible for the JFC to fully exploit all aspects of IO in order to gain and maintain an advantage over the adversary. Doctrinal shortcomings such as IO cell leadership and the IO organizational structure are the main obstacles preventing joint forces from reaping the benefits of fully integrated and synchronized IO.

Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) poses a challenge to the operational commander by stating "…the pace of change in the information environment dictates that we explore broader information operations strategies and concepts."[1] Joint forces should be prepared to accept this challenge, but must first change the way they employ IO if they expect to achieve the JFC's objectives. Implementation of a Joint Forces Information Operations Component Commander (JFIOCC), led by the current Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Commander is the first step towards a synergistic approach to the employment of IO.

March 2025. When coalition forces invaded Taiwan last week in an effort to remove Chinese ground forces, the US Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) stated that the success of Phase I, or 'the information phase' as it has been called, was the reason that coalition forces were able to force the Chinese out of Taiwan so quickly and prevent escalation of the conflict. Brigadier General John Smith, USA, the Joint Force Information Operations

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[1] Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, DC: June 2000), 28.

Component Commander (JFIOCC) stated "our Information Operations (IO) plan started off with 'exhaustive coordination' within the interagency environment. My staff then developed a robust plan to deal with the Chinese leadership, troops on the ground, and the military and civilian infrastructure. We were able to achieve absolute synergy among all of the pillars of IO, mainly because the centralized and focused planning effort that began months ago ensured we were all speaking with one voice. When the time came to actively prosecute Chinese targets in Taiwan and on their mainland, having a single source for IO expertise made it easier for us to support the component commanders and achieve the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) end state. Overall, this was a textbook application of IO in support of the JFC and national objectives."

As of early 2002, a JFC would not be able to achieve this level of fully integrated and synchronized IO. While the potential exists, there are doctrinal shortcomings that prevent IO from reaching full potential. Key among the doctrinal shortcomings are the leadership and organizational structure of the IO cell.

Now more important than ever to the JFC, IO offer him a variety of flexible responses to achieve his objectives. Whether targeting the human element such as an enemy's will to fight or a command and control bunker, IO are a critical force multiplier which must be integrated into all operational plans.

Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) poses a challenge to the operational commander by stating "…the pace of change in the information environment dictates that we explore broader information operations strategies and concepts."[2] However, JV 2020 provides no recommendations or likely avenues to increase our IO capabilities. Are joint forces ready to accept this challenge? This paper will explore possible solutions and show that joint forces

must change their approach to the employment of IO if they expect to realize the full benefits of integrated and synchronized IO.

"The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops."[3]

IO Defined

IO as defined by Joint Pub 3-13 are "actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. They apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war. They are a critical factor in the joint force commander's (JFC) capability to achieve and sustain the level of information superiority required for decisive joint operations."[4] Ideally, IO will start during peacetime and play a significant role in defusing potential crisis situations. In times of crisis, IO will be a then be a significant contributor to accomplishing the JFC's objectives and then will enable a smooth transition to a return to peace.

Offensive IO may consist of, but are not limited to, "operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), physical attack/destruction, and special information operations (SIO), and may include computer network attack."[5]

Defensive IO provide a level of protection to friendly forces and may be supported by offensive IO. Defensive IO "are conducted through information assurance, OPSEC, physical security, counterdeception, counterpropaganda, counterintelligence, EW, and SIO."[6] It

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[2] Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, DC: June 2000), 28.
[3] Mao Tse-Tung, quoted in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53, (Washington, DC: 10 July 1996), I-1.
[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13, (Washington, DC: 09 Oct 98), vii.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.

should be noted that Information Warfare (IW) and Command and Control Warfare, both subsets of IO, will be included under the umbrella definition of IO in this paper.

Although not considered part of IO, Public Affairs (PA) and Civil Affairs (CA) are related activities that can clearly support the IO effort. Public Affairs personnel will "expedite the flow of accurate and timely information…and the information they are given must be consistent with national and operations security."[7] Properly employed, PA will credibly convey the message and goals of the JTF Commander to the public. CA allows a commander to influence the civilian leadership and population in selected areas and may be considered a perception management tool. For a truly integrated and synchronized plan, close coordination between IO and both PA and CA is absolutely essential in order to convey the same message and support the JFC's overall objectives. The entire IO effort must be also supported by sound intelligence to be effective.

Benefits of IO

Military forces have been employing many aspects of IO for many years. As far back as 500 B.C., Sun Tzu stated "All warfare is based upon deception,"[8] one of the primary pillars of IO. What the JFC now has with a dedicated IO effort is the potential to bring many disciplines together in a coordinated, integrated, and synchronized effort such that the sum of all of the parts together is much greater than if they were employed in a singular or 'stovepipe' fashion. For instance, while an operation may have a credible deception plan along with an ongoing PSYOP effort, IO will seek to integrate and synchronize each pillar so that the PSYOP effort, and quite possibly the PA effort, is not only deconflicted with the deception plan, but actually provides a credible message that supports it.

We now have the ability to collect, analyze and disseminate information faster than ever before. New technology is used as an enabler to achieving our objectives---operating faster, more effectively, more precisely than our adversaries. The result is that we can "operate 'inside' an adversary's decision cycle by allowing the JFC to process information through the C2 decision cycle faster than an adversary commander."[9]

Collectively, IO will direct efforts towards shaping the battlespace. This will not only prepare the battlespace for decisive actions, it will set the conditions which will allow complete freedom of action by friendly forces. Integrated IO will also prevent the enemy from acting in a rational manner. Examples of IO targets include such diverse entities as military or civilian infrastructure systems, Command and Control nodes, Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), decision makers, troops, or computers and their network systems.

IO Organization.

Joint Pub 3-13 outlines an IO organizational structure based upon the IO Cell. The IO cell is intended to integrate "the broad range of potential IO actions and activities that help contribute to the JFC's desired end state in an AOR (Area of Responsibility) or Joint Operating Area (JOA)."[10] The IO cell also "develops and promulgates campaign or operation IO guidance plans that is passed down to the components or subordinate JTFs for decentralized execution."[11] The IO officer works for the J-3. In order to develop an integrated and synchronized plan, the IO officer must coordinate and integrate the many

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[7] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-61 (Washington DC: 04 May 97), I-1.
[8] Sun Tzu, The Art of War (translated by Samuel B. Griffith), (London U.K.: Oxford 1971), 66.
[9] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, Joint Pub 3-13.1 (Washington, DC: 07 February 1996), I-6.
[10] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13, (Washington, DC: 09 Oct 98), IV-1.
[11] Ibid. IV-2.

capabilities and activities of IO in conjunction with his IO cell representatives as depicted in Appendix 1.[12] For large scale joint operations, the IO officer may also request support from the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), either directly through personnel augmentation to the IO cell or electronically via SIPRNET/JWICS.

One advantage of the IO cell is that it brings many key disciplines together and enables them to exchange ideas about how IO should support the JFC's objectives. This can also ensure deconfliction and to some extent, integration among the various components and agencies involved in the IO plan. Another advantage is that IO plan recommendations will be forwarded to the J-3 based upon many sources and will not be service dependent.

Current doctrine also has some disadvantages, most notably that of a weak IO Officer. The IO officer is normally appointed by the J-3 to "supervise the IO cell to ensure capabilities and activities are planned, coordinated, and integrated within the joint force staff."[13] However, it is the J-3 who is given the overarching responsibility to "ensure IO are fully integrated and synchronized with operations."[14] The IO officer's major objective is to ensure that all organizations are 'speaking with one voice,' that of the JFC. In reality, the IO officer oversees the efforts of numerous cell representatives, all of whom work for different services and supervisors. During Unified Endeavor 98-1, in addition to other members, the IO cell (then C2W cell) consisted of Army PSYOP planners (4th Psychological Operations Group), a Marine targeting representative (II Marine Expeditionary Force), and a Navy Deception Planner (CINCUSACOM). The EW planner and Special Technical Operations (STO) cell were manned by Navy personnel from the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. This diverse group, some of whom were supporting the IO cell as a secondary duty

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[12] Ibid. IV-2-IV-3.
[13] Ibid. IV-3.

and most of whom had different bosses, sometimes had different views towards the employment of IO which were sometimes "hard to overcome."[15] Instead of being empowered to create an integrated and synchronized IO plan, the IO officer leads a cell that is merely a forum to ensure deconfliction. When the cell finally drafts an IO plan, the plan is ultimately not based upon integration, which is pivotal maximizing the effects of IO to achieve the JFC's objectives.

The efforts of the IO officer will be displayed to the entire JFC's staff at the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), where the IO officer serves as the JFC's IO representative.[16] However, he is a minor player during the JTCB, and must use the J-3 as an intermediary for target nominations. Since the J-3 will probably not be highly involved in the IO planning, he most likely will not have the same level of knowledge about the IO plan as the IO officer, and may not be able to present the IO target nominations with the same amount of vigor as the IO officer. If the J-3 presents the nominations and must continually refer to the IO officer to fully answer questions other JTCB members may have, this may present a disjointed IO effort to the rest of the JTCB members, many of whom look to IO to achieve their objectives. In addition, during the early stages of a crisis, various forms of IO targeting such as EW and PSYOP may take precedence over physical destruction of a target. Realizing the importance of IO in achieving the JFC's objectives, the JTCB during Unified Endeavor 98-2, was renamed the Combined Joint Targeting and *Information* Coordination Board (CJTICB).[17] This is definitely not a forum where a weak IO officer will excel and is

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[14] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09, (Washington, DC: 12 May 1998), I-4.
[15] Wegert, Sidney J. <Wegert.Sidney@JIOC.osis.gov> "IO Cell." [Personal E-mail to Anthony J. Clapp <clappa@nwc.navy.mil>] 30 Jan 02.
[16] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09, (Washington, DC: 12 May 1998), I-4.
[17] "ASSESSMENT – OP 5.6, Employ Operational Command and Control Warfare (C2W)," JULLS No. 30956-53766, 04 February 1998. Unclassified. Joint Universal Lessons Learned Database (JULLSDB), Available on NTIC CD-ROM Series. Washington, DC: Naval Tactical Support Activity, October 2001, SECRET/NF.

clearly not conducive to the effective employment of IO. The missing ingredient from this organization is a leader empowered to direct all IO efforts, from planning to execution, who is recognized by all components as the singular point of contact for all IO issues.

There is also a gap in current doctrine that fails to adequately address any national level IO effort that is often already in place, along with a mechanism to ensure that a smooth transition from national level IO to operational level IO takes place. Covert action, the practice of trying to influence events, decisions, and opinions, covertly in other states with some measure of plausible deniability regarding the U.S. role,[18] may have been an ongoing effort at the national level. "When planners begin to lay out themes, messages and statements and determine how best to communicate those messages, whether by public affairs, psychological operations, or physical destruction it becomes critical that the planners have strategic guidance on what the 'message' is."[19] Without knowing from the start exactly what the 'message' is, the IO plan will ultimately fail. For doctrine to be effective, it must adequately ensure that JFC IO planners will pick up where the national level planners left off. The intense coordination between the JFC IO cell and national organizations must continue during the execution phase and then during the return to peace, where the national organizations will undoubtedly have a major role to play. Not only must all JFC's IO activities convey the same message, but the JFC's IO planners must also ensure that the JFC's IO plans and the national plans convey the same message. At the first sign of crisis, the first question the JFC's IO officer must ask is "what has already been done?" not "what can we do?"

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[18] Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, (Washington, DC: Brasseys), 1995, 19.
[19] Paul Bowman, "Information Operations: Strategy or Mission? Reflections on Allied Force," Cybersword, Summer 2001, 21.

The size of the current IO cell is also inadequate for large-scale operations. Evolving from the established Joint Task Force (JTF) C2W cells, the current IO cells are given a much broader mission that requires a significantly greater amount of coordination, not only with CINC staffs, but within the interagency environment. Although Appendix 1 presents a 'best case' scenario with 1 representative from each pillar, reality often is quite different. Rarely are there enough personnel to be able to fully represent each pillar of IO. During Unified Endeavor 98-1, an Army O-4 was responsible for the overall deception plan and the overall OPSEC plan. In addition to his duties as one of the IO representatives to the Joint Planning Group (JPG), a Navy O-4 was responsible for the overall EW and destruction plans.[20] What the JFC is typically left with is an IO cell that may be adequate for small scale exercises, but becomes quickly overburdened during large scale joint exercises and many real world crises.

Although current doctrine may be effective in a few cases, it does not allow the JFC to exploit the full potential of integrated and synchronized IO. Given the problematic U.S. doctrine, it should be no surprise that there were problems when it came time for U.S. and NATO forces to employ IO in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE.

Operation ALLIED FORCE

IO during Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) was said to be "At once a great success…and perhaps the greatest failure of the war…."[21] Why was this? Joint Pub 3-13 was published in October 1998 and clearly outlined guidelines for the employment of effective IO. Does joint doctrine lack the fundamentals to facilitate integrated and

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[20] Wegert, Sidney J. <Wegert.Sidney@JIOC.osis.gov> "IO Cell." [Personal E-mail to Anthony J. Clapp <clappa@nwc.navy.mil>] 30 Jan 02.

[21] James O. Ellis, Commander JTF NOBLE ANVIL during Operation ALLIED FORCE, n.d., <www.nps.navy.mil/iwag/>, [08 Jan 02].

synchronized IO? Admiral Ellis further stated "…properly executed, IO could have *halved* the length of the campaign…."[22]

One of the key reasons for the lackluster performance of IO was a distinct lack of IO cell leadership at the operational level. The JTF IO planning cell was led by a Navy restricted line O-4. Was this really the best person to be given the awesome responsibility of ensuring IO was employed in an integrated and synchronized manner? Absolutely not. The JTF IO officer didn't even fully establish his cell until "the second week of the air campaign."[23] In addition, the entire JTF IO cell consisted of only six personnel at its inception.[24] Although an IO cell with only six personnel may be satisfactory for some small scale efforts, the JTF IO cell during OAF clearly lacked the necessary manning to carry out its mission. The JTF IO cell "…tried to cope with the deluge of actions that were necessary for them to coordinate and execute."[25] In the end, they were overwhelmed and in clear need of personnel augmentation. Any augmentation effort must also ensure the personnel are from the correct specialty. Having someone fill the EW billet who has no experience in EW will have a negative effect. This cell should have been led by a more senior line officer who understood warfighting and the joint planning process. In contrast, the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF), led by an experienced Army O-6, was formed prior to the start of OAF.[26]

The leader of the IO cell must also have the foresight to begin planning at the first sign of a potential crisis, especially if IO is to be used as a Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO).

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[22] Ibid.
[23] Zachary Hubbard. "Information Warfare in Kosovo," Journal of Electronic Defense, Vol. 22, No. 11 (Nov 1999): 58.
[24] Bowman, 21.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

Serbia's experienced propaganda machine, which included near total control of the media and astute manipulation of the internet enabled them to remain on the 'information offensive.'[27] Serbia continued to have an advantage since the US forces violated a core principle of Joint Pub 3-13, specifically, that "IO planning must begin at the earliest stage of a JFC's campaign or operations planning…and must be integrated with other operations to contribute to national and military objectives."[28]

The distinct lack of necessary leadership in the IO cell also led to the absence of centralized, integrated planning and coordination. The IO officer must start with intense coordination with regional Commander in Chief (CINC) staff, in this case CINCEUR. From there, the IO officer, working through the CINC, should begin a dedicated effort to coordinate with such national level organizations as the Department of Justice, Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is also imperative that the JFC IO cell continue coordination efforts with national level organizations throughout any operation, since national organizations may actually carry out politically sensitive forms of IO in support of the JFC. During OAF, when computer hackers with internet addresses later linked to China launched a coordinated cyber-attack against the U.S. following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, national organizations dealt with the problem.[29]

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[27] Wayne A. Larsen, "Serbian Information Operations During Operation ALLIED FORCE," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Air War College, Montgomery AL: April 2000), 4.
[28] Ibid; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, (Washington, DC: 09 Oct 98), VI.
[29] Bob Brewin. "Cyberattacks Against NATO Traced to China." IDG (September 2, 1999); Robert J. Gaines, "Future Information Operations (IO) in the Military: Is It Time for an 'IO CINC?'" (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Air War College, Montgomery AL: April 2000), 10.

At the CINC level, "IO planning for Kosovo began in the spring and early summer of 1998."[30] However, the JTF IO cell did not effectively coordinate with the CINC IO cell to ensure they were conveying the same message and there wasn't a duplication of effort.[31] In addition, "(OAF) planners failed to anticipate Serbia's resolve and therefore saw little need to prepare for a prolonged IO battle.[32] Since NATO had not envisioned a long drawn out war against Serbia, IO assets were not prepared for the conflict nor were they in place. As the gradual build-up of forces began, IO assets were among them. Already off to a slow start, the clear absence of direction and the incremental approach to employing IO resulted in a disjointed effort.

Although not subordinate to the IO cell, the JPOTF is doctrinally bound to integrate the PSYOP effort with the efforts of the IO cell.[33] In fact, there was tension between the JPOTF and IO cell that made coordination less than optimal.[34] Both PSYOP and PA were employed somewhat effectively towards the end of OAF, but it was noted that both PSYOP and PA might have been more effective if used as part of a comprehensive IO strategy that included the disruption of Serbia's broadcast capability.[35] Again, this was an approach based upon deconfliction vice integration; integration is central to effective IO.

Traditional leaflet drops during OAF were numerous. EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft were "deployed and began broadcasting the JPOTF's products."[36] What the IO cell

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[30] Bowman. 21.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After Action Report," (Washington DC: 31 January 2000), 23. <http: //www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf.>, 08 Jan 02.
[33] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13, (Washington DC: 09 Oct 98), IV-5.
[34] Bowman. 21.
[35] Larsen. 29.
[36] Bowman. 21.

and the JPOTF failed to do was direct their efforts towards the internet.[37] The planners failed to realize the Serbians, like many people throughout Europe, received a great deal of information from internet news sources. In the future, the internet must be given ample attention when exploring a medium for the PSYOP message.

The current IO cell structure in Joint Pub 3-13 is clearly flawed. The OAF after-action report stated "the Department [of Defense] will ensure that information operations planning is initiated early and synchronized with other operational plans."[38] It failed, however, to state exactly how this would be accomplished. The key ingredient needed to adequately orchestrate the IO effort during OAF was dedicated leadership beyond the O-4 level. Had the proper leadership been in place to direct a centralized planning effort at the first sign of crisis, there is little doubt that IO would have had a greater impact on the outcome of OAF.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A change to doctrine is clearly needed. Instead of having a relatively disjointed and weak IO effort, it is time for doctrine to change to reflect the importance of IO. Just as C2W was central to Operation DESERT STORM, IO will likely become central to the next conflict we find ourselves in. Going back to the challenge posed by JV 2020, the creation of a Joint Force IO Component Commander (JFIOCC) is one possible step towards exploring "broader information operations strategies and concepts."[39]

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[37] Larsen. 4.
[38] Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After Action Report," 23.
[39] Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, DC: June 2000), 28.

The concept of a JFIWCC (IW Commander) was proven during past major joint exercises,[40] but its utility is relatively unknown to present day JFCs. During a major joint exercise it was noted "the exercise achieved full IW integration and synergistic results on execution via the brokerage of all plans through a single commander."[41] With the ever growing importance of IO, it is now imperative that a JFIOCC emerges to ensure that IO fully support the JFC's objectives. It was further noted that the JFIWCC, being able to coordinate directly with other component commanders, was given greater leverage in the control of all IO.[42]

The JFIOCC must adopt the Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) premise that "centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat."[43] In doing so, the JFIOCC would emerge as the focal point for centralized IO planning and decentralized execution of the IO plans. The JFIOCC would be able to address the JFC as his "IO strategist" vice having to work through the J-3.

The JFC would clearly benefit from this integrated effort, starting at the planning stage and going all the way through execution and a return to peace. The JFIOCC must be at least an O-6 in order to ensure he is seen as an equal by the other component commanders. Since IO often requires coordination with many government agencies, a senior officer in the

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[40] "Command and Control Warfare (C2W)," JULLS No. 62738-20199, 22 March 1997. Unclassified. Available on NTIC CD-ROM Series. Washington, DC: Navy Tactical Support Activity, October 2001, SECRET/NF.

[41] William J. Jensen, "Information Warfare's Missing Quarterback: The Case for a Joint Force Information Warfare Component Commander," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI: February 1998), 13.

[42] "Command and Control Warfare (C2W)," JULLS No. 62738-20199.

[43] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, Joint Pub 3-56.1, (Washington, DC: 14 November 1994), I-2.

role of the JFIOCC will be better equipped to ensure that appropriate coordination has been done before the start of the planning process and remains an ongoing effort. During the execution phase of an operation, the JFIOCC will also provide the necessary leadership to direct the efforts of IO watch officers in the Joint Operations Center (JOC).

The logical choice for leadership in the JFIOCC role is the current JPOTF Commander. By broadening his current mission and giving him full authority to ensure IO is fully integrated and synchronized into all operational plans, the JFC will finally have the requisite leadership needed to direct all centralized planning and decentralized execution of IO plans. Based upon his background, first in a combat arms branch of the Army, and later as a specialist trained in psychological operations, he not only understands the kinetic solution to warfighting, but can ensure that the correct message is conveyed by all IO plans. Joint IO training for all prospective O-6 PSYOP officers can be accomplished via the Information Operations Strategy and Warfare Course at the National Defense University and the Joint Information Warfare Staff and Operations Course, taught at the Joint Forces Staff College. In addition, the JPOTF Commander will undoubtedly have experience coordinating with national level agencies and will be able to ensure a smooth transition between any national level IO effort and the JFC IO effort.

It is imperative that joint forces see IO for what it really is—an essential tool for the JFC to achieve his desired end state. This means that we must allocate sufficient manpower in this critical area and continue training JTF staff members on the requirements for employing IO in an integrated and synchronized manner. Only by doing this will the JFC see the product of dedicated, synergistic IO.

US forces must also continue to push for development of a basic IO doctrine or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for use with NATO and coalition forces. Without a basic IO template to use as a starting point, critical time may be wasted during the early stages of a crisis on the IO organizational structure or who should lead the IO effort. Although the US may have the preponderance of IO assets and expertise, we must make every effort to include NATO and coalition forces in the employment of IO during future operations.

COUNTERARGUMENTS

Not everyone agrees with the concept of an IO component commander. It has been said that a single, national level IO organization is the needed solution and that concentrating IO functions in a theater component may not be the best way to support the JFC since it implies being tied the geographic limitations of the JFC.[44] However, the establishment of a JFIOCC will enable the JFC to receive integrated and focused IO support from personnel accustomed to planning and executing military operations. Constant liaison with national agencies will ensure the JFC is in compliance with, and accomplishes planning that is parallel to, the national agencies. In cases where IO must be employed outside of the JFIOCC's AOR, the JFIOCC's close liaison with the national agencies will ensure effective employment in support of the JFC.

There are also arguments against having the current JPOTF Commander as the leader of the JFIOCC. Currently, many JPOTF Commanders are not trained in all aspects of IO. This can easily be overcome by ensuring the needed experts are assigned to JFIOCC staff. In addition, by attending basic IO courses at National Defense University or Joint Forces Staff

College, the JFIOCC will be able to obtain the needed fundamentals to effectively employ IO. What the JFIOCC really provides is a leader who can provide the necessary direction for the planning and execution of IO missions and understands the overall message that the IO effort is trying to convey. A PSYOP officer is perfect for this job.

With only one Psychological Operations Group (POG) on active duty (4th POG), having enough senior personnel to adequately support each JFC may be a problem. However, ensuring that leaders from the Army reserve receive the same IO training as their active duty counterparts should alleviate this problem.

Some may point out that the staffing required for a JFIOCC is too demanding. By starting with the IO cell members as the core, only a few more personnel should be required, unless IO is the main effort of a large operation.

Some may also argue that having a PSYOP officer leading the JFIOCC will always give the IO plan an Army 'flavor.' This can be addressed by appointing a strong Deputy JFIOCC from another service, perhaps the IO officer normally assigned to the component which is now the JTF staff.

We must also ask ourselves "Do we always want to establish a JFIOCC?" Probably not. There may be smaller operations that will be able to employ IO effectively based upon the current IO cell structure. However, for larger scale operations, the establishment of a JFIOCC is critical to effective IO. The decision, like all others, must be left up to the JFC.

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[44] Jeffrey D. Seinwill, "Organizing Joint Forces for Information Operations: The Viability of a Joint Force Information Operations Component Commander," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Air War College, Montgomery, AL: 1999). 3.

CONCLUSION

In the future, key decision makers are more likely to examine potential responses to crisis situations by first looking at Information Operations. IO offer the JFC a myriad of flexible responses to situations ranging from crisis to conflict to a return to peace. However, it is currently not possible for the JFC to reap the benefits of fully integrated and synchronized IO. Although the JFC has a framework to establish a working IO Cell, this organizational structure results in a weak organization incapable of fully exploiting all of the benefits of integrated and synchronized IO. In order to achieve this level of IO success, we first must make current JFC's aware that having a Joint Force Information Operations Component Commander led by a PSYOP officer is the first step towards a synergistic approach to the employment of IO. By demonstrating the success that a JFIOCC will afford the JFC in major joint exercises, it will be possible for the concept to be included in future joint doctrine. In short, the JFC should embrace IO and relish the challenge of Joint Vision 2020.

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
TYPICAL JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL
JOINT OPSEC
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J-2
J-4
J-5
J-6
J-7
PAO
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
CI PROGRAM
CA PROGRAM
SERVICE AND FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS
SUPPORTING COMBATANT COMMANDERS AND OTHERS
TARGETING CELL
JSOTF
STO CELL
EW
JPOTF
MILITARY DECEPTION
IO OFFICER
OPSEC PROGRAM REP
MILITARY DECEPTION REP
PSYOP REP
EWO REP
STO REP
SO REP
TARGETING REP
OTHER REP/LNO
J-2 REP
J-4 REP
J-5 REP
J-6 REP
J-7 REP
PAO REP
LEGAL REP
CISO
CIVIL AFFAIRS REP
COMPONENT REP
IO CELL
CA Civil Affairs
CI Counterintelligence
CISO CI Support Officer
EW Electronic Warfare
EWO EW Officer
JPOTF Joint PSYOP Task Force
JSOTF Joint SO Task Force
LNO Liaison Officer
OPSEC Operations Security
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PSYOP Psychological Operations
REP Representative
SO Special Operations
STO Special Technical Operations

APPENDIX 1