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As the 21st century emerges, the U.S. will face threats that are more ambiguous and regionally focused than those found in previous years. This monograph seeks to determine if the U.S. military would be better prepared to conduct contingency operations if each geographic combatant commander established regionally-focused, contingency-based standing JTF headquarters. After analyzing the current political and military environments, the author highlights the doctrinal guidance concerning JTFs and identifies the circumstances surrounding their formation. The three methods used to form JTFs in contingency operations are then analyzed, citing historical examples of each, and the advantages and disadvantages of each method are identified. The initiative of standing JTFs is then dissected through a similar analysis. The author determines that standing JTFs are more effective when considering staff synchronization, responsiveness, regional knowledge and understanding, interoperability, service biases, resources, and commander/staff expertise. The author concludes by making recommendations to mitigate the disadvantages found with the standing JTF initiative.

Standing Joint Task Forces: Commands Now Needed

A Monograph

by

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The Romans said, "If you would have peace, you must be prepared for war." And while we pray for peace, we can never forget that organization, no less than a bayonet or an aircraft, is a weapon of war.[1]

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> The superpower conflict is over, but many complex and dangerous challenges remain. The enemy we face today is instability and unpredictability. It is a virulent drug trade, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And it is terrorism, the weapon of cowards and malcontents.
>
> - President George Bush[2]

The fall of the Berlin wall in October of 1989 signaled the dawn of a new era in global politics. Before that event, the international community was largely divided along deeply held and politically opposed orientations sponsored by the two reigning superpowers. In the intervening decade, the specter of major theater war (MTW) diminished as the former Soviet Union steadily declined. The encouraging signs of cooperation between North Korea and South Korea and the firm control established over Iraq with no-fly zones and pre-positioned equipment reinforce the notion that future conflicts will not resemble the previous models of global conflagration.

As the new century emerges, contemporary threats faced by the armed forces of the United States are more ambiguous and regionally focused than those recently experienced in the 20th century.[3] Strategic warning of an emerging conflict will often be missing because collection assets may not be optimized for the area in which a conflict erupts.[4] Even in times of peace, regional actors seeking to expand their influence by coercion or force will challenge combatant commanders as they operate in their assigned areas of responsibility (AOR).[5] Challengers and adversaries may be states or groups of states, as well as non-state groups including terrorist, criminal, ethnic, religious, and special-interest organizations.[6] Most analysts also believe that future threats will allow minimal time for response and the nation will not be allowed to build-up

forces for extended periods before commencing operations. Additionally, the nature of the threats requires a capability to respond to multiple crises simultaneously – potentially in the same combatant commander's AOR.[7]

Regional rivalries and conflicts over scarce resources may often create turbulence and lead to conflict in previously unimportant states. These threats do not necessarily influence the balance of power in the international community, but world leaders are now taking a more active interest in the political strife, ethnic turmoil, and humanitarian issues found throughout the world. Arguably, the United States will show a greater interest in regional conflicts and humanitarian issues because the Soviet Union is no longer a viable superpower and the nation now has the luxury of increased attention to and participation in smaller-scale contingencies (SSC).[8]

In the 21st century, the scope of military operations extends beyond conventional warfighting to encompass the full spectrum of operations. American armed forces not only win the nation's wars, but also participate in military operations other than war in pursuit of national objectives.[9] In addition to focusing on the military forces associated with an operation, most operations now involve combining the assets and efforts of governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in a complementary fashion with the military often supporting the other instruments of national power.[10] Contrary to popular opinion, these operations are not new to the United States and the armed forces have conducted them frequently during the second half of the 20th century. Fifty years ago, President Harry S. Truman understood the prevalence and use of diverse military operations to support political efforts when he stated that, "...we should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and peacetime activities."[11]

What is new to the United States in the past twelve years is the pace, scope, and complexity of contingency operations. For example, since 1989, the U.S. Army's

participation in contingency operations has increased from an average of once every four years to once every fourteen weeks.[12] In the 1990s, both Republican and Democratic administrations deployed military forces to smaller-scale contingencies and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), GEN Henry H. Shelton, recently stated that the military will likely continue to deploy forces for varied contingency operations regardless of the President's party affiliation.[13]

While conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict, American armed forces organize and fight as a joint force. Joint Vision 2020 extols the virtues of joint formations and emphasizes that the joint force will remain the key to operational success in the future.[14] LTG Paul Van Riper and MG Robert H. Scales, Jr. emphasize the joint perspective and boldly state that, "No American commander today would consider launching ground combat operations without command of the air and space, nor littoral operations without command of the sea."[15] They further insist that joint operations are not only rhetorically correct, but also a frank acknowledgment of the current strategic and operational imperatives.[16] Military forces must be able to project power anywhere in the world, with minimal notification, to counter a variety of threats and the initial act of deployment must necessarily involve the use of joint forces. Due to the reduced forward presence of the nation's military, response must be achieved through power projection and that construct has become the foundation of America's strategic response concept.[17]

With the military's ill-fated Desert One hostage rescue attempt and its less than acceptable performance in Operation Urgent Fury providing impetus, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 sought to increase the joint warfighting capability of the American armed forces. Among the many changes wrought by the act was to hold the unified and specified commanders clearly responsible for the

accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands.[18] Consequently, combatant commanders now exercise combatant command (COCOM) over their assigned forces and are directly responsible to the National Command Authority (NCA) for the accomplishment of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform those missions.[19] Their responsibilities include the planning, preparation, and execution of military operations in response to crises and the goal of this clear assignment of responsibility is to achieve unified action.[20]

Joint operations are not new to the U.S. military. In 1781, George Washington led French land forces and operated jointly with ADM DeGrasse's French naval forces to achieve victory at Yorktown.[21] Commodore Thomas MacDonough's operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor in influencing the ground campaigns during the War of 1812 and the teamwork of MG Ulysses S. Grant and RADM David D. Porter during the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 demonstrates the positive effects that can be achieved through joint military planning and execution.[22] President Dwight D. Eisenhower, based on his experiences in the Second World War, understood the importance of joint warfare and stated, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."[23] Although all forces will likely be involved in future operations, the goal of joint warfare is not necessarily to involve all forces or all forces equally, but to increase the total effectiveness of the force being employed.[24]

Each of the military departments currently stresses the importance of joint operations and the synergistic effects that can be achieved through innovative and overwhelming combinations that capitalize on the strengths of each service. For example, the navy's capstone manual unequivocally states that, "We are committed to full partnership in joint operations."[25] Additionally, an examination of recent U.S. military

operations and regional contingency plans authored by the commanders-in-chief (CINC) indicate that three-star general and flag officer commands are now clearly expected to operate effectively as a joint force headquarters in a multinational environment.[26]

D. Robert Worley examines many trends that characterize the post Cold-War era and the one that tops his list is the tendency to operate with temporary command structures instead of the permanent commands that typified U.S. forces for many decades.[27] Joint task forces (JTF) are now the organizations that determine success or failure in complex contingencies and the skillful and selective combinations of service capabilities into JTFs provide U.S. commanders great flexibility in tailoring forces to meet national objectives.[28] Indicative of this trend in command and control arrangements, the frequency of JTF formation has increased significantly in the past ten years. For example, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) recently reported standing up JTFs at the rate of once every six weeks.[29]

The earliest JTFs, numbered 1, 2, and 3, were formed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to conduct large-scale nuclear weapons tests and weapons systems evaluations. The trend to execute interagency and multi-service tests of major weapons systems through JTF organizations has continued through the years and two recent examples are JTF-17 for the Advanced Tactical Fighter and JTF-22 for establishing the parameters of future strike aircraft.[30] More recently, JTFs 4, 5, and 6 were established within the past ten years to support counter-narcotics missions.

None of these JTFs fit the doctrinal definitions and expectations cited later due to their semi-permanence and are not considered part of the issue this monograph examines. In fact, several of these JTFs had or currently have authorization documents providing both personnel and equipment.[31] Other JTFs that have also been formed for long-term specific missions other than contingency operations are excluded from

examination. For example, this monograph does not discuss the formation and employment of JTF-Full Accounting. Additionally, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is excluded from this discussion because it is specifically designed to respond to only a small portion of the contingency spectrum.[32]

Fundamentally, the focus of this monograph is organizational in nature. The author examines the issue of forming JTFs to determine if the U.S. military would be better prepared to conduct contingency operations if each geographic combatant commander established regionally-focused, contingency-based standing JTF headquarters. An underlying assumption throughout is that the U.S. will not develop a contingency joint task force with assigned forces to respond to crises in the near future.

In the following chapters, the author highlights the doctrinal guidance concerning JTFs and identifies the circumstances surrounding their formation. The three methods used to form JTFs in contingency operations are then analyzed, citing historical examples of each, to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each method. The initiative of standing JTFs is then dissected through a similar analysis and conclusions are made to determine the most effective JTF structure for use in contingency operations. Finally, recommendations are made to improve the formation process of the preferred method.

CHAPTER 2

DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF JTFs

> No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances, we will fight as a joint team. We will have fingers on the team that are individual services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed, clenched fist of American military power. The days of single service warfare are gone forever.
>
> - ADM David E. Jeremiah[33]

Combatant commanders may directly control the conduct of military operations in their AOR or may delegate that responsibility to subordinate commanders. Such an arrangement allows subordinate commanders to focus on specific operations while the combatant commander supports them with forces and resources. This relationship is frequently referred to as a "two-tiered system," and was successfully employed in Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada), Operation Just Cause (Panama), and Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti).[34] Normally, the great complexity of theater-wide requirements and the need for decentralized execution of joint operations precludes a combatant commander from directly controlling contingency operations.[35] By creating subordinate joint forces, the establishing headquarters can remain focused on the theater as a whole.

Of all of the aspects of contingency operations, command and control may be the most important and COL Robin P. Swan, Director of the U.S. Army's Advanced Military Studies Program, frequently states that command and control is the most difficult task for a military force to accomplish.[36] The failure to quickly and efficiently create an adequate joint command and control structure to respond to contingencies often leaves tactical forces without sufficient operational guidance during the critical deployment and initial employment phases of an operation.[37]

Once a combatant commander receives a mission from the NCA requiring the use of joint forces, he may establish a subordinate unified command, functional component command, or a JTF in response.[38] The Secretary of Defense, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander can also establish JTFs, although this occurs less frequently.[39] JTFs are temporary, transient organizations and although the armed forces have made great strides institutionalizing "jointness" at the strategic level, permanent joint structures at the operational level remain largely unrealized. After the commander decides to respond to a contingency by forming a JTF headquarters, he may use an existing JTF headquarters, form an ad hoc headquarters from various contributors, or augment a core service component headquarters to command and control the operation.[40] This selection will form the basis of discussion for the following chapters.

Doctrine indicates that JTFs are formed when a mission has a specific, limited objective, is usually confined to a specified joint operations area (JOA), and is dissolved when the purpose for which it was established has been accomplished.[41] The *Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1* also lists the need for close, integrated efforts as an imperative that can be met by forming a JTF.[42] When the original mission is changed or extended, the JTF may evolve into what doctrine calls a "semi-permanent JTF."[43] Doctrinally, JTFs do not require the centralized control of logistics, but the CINC retains the option of doing so through the COCOM he exercises over the joint force.[44] For example, during joint exercise Unified Endeavor conducted in November of 2000, the III Corps commander centralized the control of all JTF logistics assets in the JOA based on his estimate of the situation.[45] An organizationally sound JTF should also provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution.[46] Moreover, although

a JTF is a force composed of two or more services, the combination of navy and marine forces does not constitute a JTF.[47]

Consistent with the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the joint force commander tailors the contingency force to most effectively respond to the developing crisis and promote unity of effort within the organization.[48] If he does not use the best force available, he undermines the potential effectiveness of the JTF and diminishes his chances of success. This requirement may mean that combat support and combat service support forces have a greater role than combat units in the JOA. Doctrine also directs the commander to consider the situation at hand and ensure that the organization is sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the operation and any development that may necessitate a change in plan.[49] This imperative has extensive implications when determining the most effective organization for JTFs in response to contingency operations.

When employed, the authority establishing the JTF selects the commander and assigns the mission and forces to him.[50] Those who are assigned as JTF commanders must possess acumen in orchestrating air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces into smoothly functioning joint teams.[51] Selection of the JTF commander may occur after some initial operational decisions have been made or after the proposed courses of action (COA) have been submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA during crisis action planning (CAP). Ideally, the JTF commander should participate in COA development with the combatant commander's staff; however, the choice of the commander may depend on which COA the NCA approves, thereby effectively preventing early selection.[52] Doctrinally, forces commanded by lieutenant generals and vice admirals are those that are most often designated as JTF

headquarters. For example, an army corps is the most likely army unit to be designated a JTF.[53]

Not only does the commander of the JTF normally exercise operational control (OPCON) over the forces assigned and attached to him, but he is responsible as well for making recommendations to the establishing authority regarding the proper employment of those forces in accomplishing assigned objectives.[54] The JTF commander is also accountable for the joint training of those assigned and attached forces.[55] This training may or may not be accomplished due to the transient nature of the force and the urgency of action required.

To ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces are thoroughly familiar with the joint force's capabilities and limitations, positions on the staff should be assigned so that service representation and influence generally reflect the service composition of the force.[56] It is important for the staff to understand the capabilities, needs, and limitations of each force that is being employed in the JTF. For example, if an airborne operation is going to be conducted as part of a contingency operation, the JTF staff should have significant airborne experience to understand and effectively accomplish the complex task.

The team must consist of seasoned and qualified staff officers. Each officer must be expert in both his or her own field and in the required knowledge of joint and service warfighting doctrine. These officers should also be keenly aware of the operational concepts that underlie the warfighting doctrine of other components and must be well schooled in the challenges of joint operations. They must demonstrate an ability and desire to rise above parochialism and bias and develop a joint perspective predicated on shared values.[57] Likewise, personal and professional relationships

between officers of different services provide the institutional and psychological basis for integrated action and, consequently, offer the foundation for achieving unity of effort.[58]

For the JTF staff to function effectively, the personnel who compose it should be assigned to it long enough to gain a thorough knowledge of the commander's policies and preferences.[59] Effective decision-making requires that the basic process be understood by all members of the JTF and then adapted to the prevailing situation. While all decisions rest with the JTF commander, the staff must present issues and recommendations to him with all the thought and research that an organized and efficient staff can develop.[60]

The highly effective team sought in joint doctrine is based on the joint staff members having trust and confidence in each other and this can be achieved only through hard work, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together.[61] Through frequent interactions, the joint staff members not only become more familiar with joint forces and emerging joint doctrine, but also learn about and understand the capabilities that each member brings to the team. Joint doctrine indicates that, in peacetime, staffs should be identified and trained to plan, prepare, and execute operations as a JTF headquarters. Additionally, the training focus sought and the exercise objectives developed should be based on the combatant commander's joint mission essential task list (JMETL).[62]

Due to the inability to accurately predict time-sensitive requirements of contingency operations, JTFs usually require augmentation from various organizations to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them. When mission requirements exceed the JTF staff's capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, and equipment), they request assistance from the establishing authority.[63] For example, JTFs conducting humanitarian assistance missions usually request and receive augmentation

in the areas of the staff judge advocate (SJA), public affairs (PA), health services, civil affairs (CA), nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC), meteorology and oceanography (METOC), and communications.[64] To also support the needs of the JTF, doctrine describes the deployable JTF augmentation cell (DJTFAC) as a group of specially selected officers sent from the combatant commander's staff to the JTF to provide expertise not resident in the newly created JTF.[65]

JTFs operate primarily at the operational level of war but may or may not conduct campaign planning.[66] Although the campaign is the central organizing instrument of joint warfare, the specific objectives assigned to a JTF could limit the long-term sequencing of actions required for campaigns.[67] If the assigned missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, or duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans.[68] If the task is much simpler and discrete, the JTF may only develop and execute an operations plan.[69] Consequently, doctrine indicates that JTFs must be proficient in developing both campaign and operations plans – two essential command and control instruments used by commanders.[70]

Campaign planning is done in crisis or conflict, but peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises lay the framework for successful JTF operations.[71] Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and by using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented.[72] Products developed during deliberate planning provide a foundation for CAP and ease the transition to crisis resolution.[73] Although every crisis cannot be anticipated, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished in the time available for deliberate planning can

expedite effective decisionmaking and execution during a crisis.[74] DJTFAC personnel who were involved in the development of deliberate plans can also provide continuity to the JTF staff that may be invaluable.

In crises, JTFs normally follow CAP procedures to adapt and implement previously prepared joint operations plans or to develop orders where no useful joint plans exist. CAP is conducted in six phases and immediately focuses on the combatant commander in whose AOR the crisis is unfolding.[75] It is time-sensitive and based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time of planning using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and other resources.[76] The CAP model usually indicates formation of a JTF during phase V of the process (Execution Planning) while the identity of the organization is determined during phase III (Course of Action Development).

Throughout the 1990s, countless authors have criticized the joint community for a lack of specific doctrine regarding JTFs and the performance standards for them. For many years, this assertion was largely justified and the first Joint Doctrine Master Plan released in 1987 indicated that the "doctrine for forming and employing a JTF" was the highest priority joint doctrine requirement.[77] The joint community has made great strides in the last three years regarding the doctrinal foundation supplied for JTF operations and the J7 and the Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) have achieved these results through aggressive efforts.

The JTF Headquarters Master Training Guide was originally produced in 1994 and has been continually updated based upon lessons learned and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) developed during joint exercises such as Unified Endeavor. The current version was published in 1999 as *CJCSM 3500.05 Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide* and serves as a training document to help assess individual and collective command and staff tasks during crises. Borrowing

heavily from the army, this guide uses a Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) as a hierarchical listing of tasks to be accomplished and is organized along an expected JTF life- cycle.[78] Joint publications currently provide effective doctrine and TTPs in sufficient detail to plan, prepare, and execute JTF operations. For example, one manual lists all of the potential boards, centers, and their associated attendees for use when conducting operations.

Joint doctrine clearly explains the JTF employment concept and the issues surrounding routine JTF operations once the organization is formed. In the following chapter, the author analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the three formation options available when structuring a contingency-oriented JTF in response to an emerging crisis.

CHAPTER 3

JTF FORMATION

> ...the composition of JTF staffs is driven by mission demands...we have big debates over this, and there is not a single answer.
>
> - RADM David E. Frost[79]

When a combatant commander decides to use a JTF to orchestrate a joint response to a crisis, doctrine provides him three options – use a standing JTF headquarters, form an ad hoc headquarters from various contributors, or augment a core service component headquarters.[80] In spite of universal agreement that U.S. armed forces must always be ready to operate in smoothly functioning joint teams, exactly how to organize, prepare, and train contingency JTF headquarters remains an issue without a fully satisfactory answer.[81]

Critics tend to categorize all JTFs as "ad hoc" regardless of the formation option selected. Although it is true that no two JTFs are identical in structure, the author will only use the term "ad hoc" to refer to the doctrinal option in which disparate people and equipment are assembled for employment without an existing nucleus or structure to build upon.

Standing JTF Headquarters

Several of the combatant commanders currently employ JTFs for broad continuing missions but they are not necessarily designed for contingency operations. For example, JTF-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) is an established organization in the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) tasked to resolve the cases of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the Southeast Asia conflict. Their operations include

investigations, archival research, an oral history program and remains recovery operations.[82] Clearly, this organization is not organized to conduct contingency operations although it is officially classified as a standing JTF.

The option to use a standing JTF has numerous advantages. Perhaps the most important is that the team already exists when the crisis emerges. The joint staff is already formed and familiar with the command's standard operating procedures (SOP) and TTPs. Additionally, it is equally knowledgeable of the commander and his or her preferences for information flow and decisionmaking processes. Throughout their continuing employment, the standing JTF staff becomes familiar with the doctrine of other services and develops an understanding of joint operations that would otherwise not be present. In an existing JTF, joint boards and centers used to orchestrate the staff effort are routine and members of the headquarters have an intimate familiarity with the strengths and weaknesses of each another. In theory, a standing JTF staff reacts quicker and makes faster decisions because it is a well-practiced team.

Standing JTFs also offer familiarity with the particular region in which it is operating. Consequently, background information that a new JTF must assimilate as part of their planning and preparation is already resident within the standing JTF. The staff's familiarity with the governments, economies, languages, and customs of an area can be invaluable in determining the best COAs for a region and the potential reactions to them. For example, in late 1998, the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) employed JTF-Bravo to assist in providing humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. Normally focused on counterdrug operations, JTF-Bravo performed their humanitarian assistance mission with distinction and the lessons learned from this limited duration operation included recognition of "the value of a

forward deployed standing JTF, especially the regionally oriented and experience[d] command and control headquarters."[83]

The existence of the standing JTF clearly reduces the time required to form the organization and begin operations. The team is already assembled and can immediately influence action in the JOA. This is an important factor when the NCA and combatant commanders require an immediate response to time-sensitive operations such as a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in a rapidly deteriorating country. Due to its existence, the standing JTF option does not require additional personnel, equipment, or money to achieve an initial operating capability.

Since communications in a standing JTF are already established upon receipt of the newly-assigned mission, systems interoperability is initially good and continually refined. This connectivity allows for an increased information flow and facilitates rapid decisionmaking within the JTF. In a similar vein, subordinate organizations understand what is expected from them and what they can expect from the JTF commander and staff due to an existing relationship that has been built through previous operations. Through their routine operations as a subordinate JTF organization, they also become familiar with the decisionmaking processes used by the JTF headquarters.

Although the advantages listed are significant, there are noteworthy disadvantages to this option. Using a standing JTF for an emerging crisis risks diffusing its focus and unity of effort. Doctrinally, if a JTF still exists than the mission for which it was created has not been accomplished. In addition, JTFs are tailored organizations for use in specific missions. Rarely will a standing JTF have the exact structure and forces needed for a different contingency while continuing the initial operation.

Another disadvantage that could have significant implications is the standing JTF commander's experience in the type of operation being planned. Naturalistic

decisionmaking research by Gary Klein indicates that expert decisionmakers and those who exhibit an intuitive grasp of complex situations are leaders who have a wealth of experience in similar situations.[84] They can mentally simulate an action by consciously imagining people and objects and transforming them through several transitions, finally picturing them in a different way than at the start. This ability is important for commanders and takes an extensive amount of experience to develop.[85] Emerging army doctrine reinforces this notion and clearly states that, "experience, combined with situational understanding, provides the intellectual setting around which commanders visualize the operational design."[86]

Unfortunately, the commander of a standing JTF may have no experience in the intricacies of the new mission; therefore, he is unable to provide expert, or even sufficient, direction and guidance to the staff. Information that would be routine to a commander familiar with an operation can provide significant obstacles to a commander less versed in that area. World War II German General Lothar Rendulic supports this perspective and stated that operations confront the commander with significant uncertainties when decisions must be made. He characterizes the decision making process as a "creative act" which is shaped as much by intuition and perception as by the cold calculation of objective factors.[87]

In Operation Urgent Fury, VADM Joseph Metcalf III, by his own assertion, stated that he "had reservations about certain high-risk aspects of the plan, particularly those involving rangers parachuting at night."[88] Initially, this would seem to be a reasonable concern regarding the employment of his force, but he continues and states that his anxiety was ameliorated only after some experienced staff members persuaded him that "rangers really could execute a night parachute drop."[89] As opposed to prudent concern over a somewhat risky operation, Metcalf's comments demonstrate a lack of knowledge

concerning what is a well-known ranger capability and a routine rather than exceptional mission tasking for a ranger battalion.[90] His lack of experience in ranger operations clearly limited his ability to provide direction and effective leadership regarding their employment in the operation.

Finally, the standing JTF may not be prepared to operate at the operational level. If the mission for which the standing JTF was created required only a major operation and did not necessitate campaign planning, then the structure may not include a J5 cell for future planning. The members of the staff may not be prepared to plan operationally if that had not been a requirement in their initial operation. Consequently, the standing JTF would have to receive augmentation or develop the capability over time to operate effectively in both missions and at the operational level.

Two examples in which CINCs contemplated using standing JTFs for large-scale contingency operations are Operation Urgent Fury and Operation Just Cause. In October of 1983, the commander of the United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), ADM Wesley MacDonald, was tasked to conduct military operations to evacuate noncombatants from the Caribbean island of Grenada. The mission, as specified by the JCS Execute Order, was to "conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadine forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants, assist in the restoration of the democratic government of Grenada."[91]

The existing plan called for either the use of U.S. Forces Caribbean (USFORCARB) as JTF 140 or the creation of a JTF around the army's XVIII Airborne Corps.[92] ADM Wesley MacDonald and GEN John Vessey, CJCS, both lacked confidence in the abilities of JTF 140 to conduct the operation that it was supposedly

trained and organized to execute.[93] JTF 140 had been designated the "small island" JTF and possessed only a skeletal structure that would likely be inadequate for the operation.[94] Consequently, Admiral MacDonald chose to create JTF 120 around his assigned forces and designated the 2nd Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Metcalf, as the JTF commander and assigned him the responsibility for executing the mission.[95] Four days after the NCA decided to invade, the island was assaulted and all operational objectives were subsequently achieved.

In the late 1980s, the political situation in Panama deteriorated at an alarming rate as Manuel Noreiga consolidated his power within the state. Consequently, U.S. military planning and activity in response to his actions became increasingly aggressive and reflected President Bush's hardening stance toward the dictator. In reaction to the rising tensions, USSOUTHCOM formed JTF Panama in April of 1988 around the United States Army South (USARSO) and placed MG Bernard Loefke in command. Its mission was to coordinate security operations, engage in contingency planning, and manage the routine aspects of dealing with the escalating tensions in Panama.[96]

Initially, SOUTHCOM considered JTF Panama as the warfighting headquarters if combat operations were required in Panama.[97] Although JTF Panama conducted limited operations for months before the December invasion, the JCS and USSOUTHCOM soon realized that the existing JTF could not manage the plan due to its complexity.[98] JTF Panama was soon relegated to a subordinate organization commanding only the existing forces in Panama because the overall command of the operations then being refined required a three-star corps commander with a fully-manned joint warfighting capability.[99]

Historical examples of CINCs using standing JTFs for large-scale operations are difficult to find. Even when they are purposely designed to react to a specific

contingency as seen in both Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause, senior leaders have been reluctant to allow them to command operations when the execute order is received from the JCS. Although there are distinct advantages to this option, it does not appear to be a widely-accepted alternative among senior leaders.

Ad Hoc JTF Headquarters

As mentioned earlier, ad hoc staffs are those that are formed from disparate organizations and rapidly assemble people, equipment, and processes in response to an emerging crisis. An extreme example of an ad hoc JTF is the one established by the United States European Command (USEUCOM) during Operation Restore Hope in response to the 1994 massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda. The main JTF headquarters was formed without a nucleus and was ultimately composed of units and individuals from 118 different locations in USACOM, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USEUCOM.[100] Because the staff was not able to form or train together before employment, operations in Rwanda were fragmented and lacked synchronization.[101]

The advantage of the ad hoc headquarters option is that it is requires no resources. In this option, no personnel, equipment, money, time, or effort is spent before an operation and a temporary savings is accrued in every facet. Likewise, there is no need to change any of the current structures in the Department of Defense (DOD). Another significant advantage is that the JTF staff itself can be precisely tailored to most effectively respond to the emerging crisis.[102] This concept is a joint doctrine imperative and can be accomplished with great precision through specified taskings after a careful analysis of the mission requirements. Additionally, the officer with the most experience in the type of contingency operation being conducted can be selected to command the JTF – capitalizing on the experience and insights of a fully-qualified senior officer.

Likewise, the staff can be assembled based on the force composition and the experience that they possess employing the types of assets involved. The taskings can potentially also ensure that the plans officers are proficient and conversant in campaign planning and operational art.

The disadvantages to this approach, however, are significant. This option is slow in responding to emerging crises. It takes time to assemble a JTF, receive equipment, and achieve an initial operating capability. Service members from all over the world have to be alerted, prepared for movement, transported, and assembled. Throughout a crisis, the JTF staff forms while the situation develops and as the JTF executes operations. The JTF staff may also not be sufficiently formed when operations commence. For example, the ad hoc JTF staff never reached its personnel authorization at any time during United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).[103]

Interoperability in an ad hoc staff is normally difficult to achieve. Not only are the personnel tasked to form the organization unfamiliar with each other, but also the equipment sent to support the operation is sometimes incompatible. Communications systems and computer software programs vary between the services and even within the same service. Although these issues are slowly being resolved through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), they are still present during the formation of a JTF headquarters. Doctrinal interoperability between services is also an issue and many personnel tasked to form ad hoc staffs have recently been found lacking in joint doctrinal knowledge and experience.

Training, the key to quick, effective mission execution is frequently lacking in ad hoc staffs.[104] Staff members are not only unfamiliar with each other but also the SOPs and TTPs used by the command. They are equally unfamiliar with the commander and what his or her preferences and tendencies are. Subordinate components of the JTF,

when formed, are unaware of the expectations of them by the JTF commander and staff and, consequently, significant time and effort are expended in developing processes and procedures for basic interactions.

Temporarily tasking people from other organizations not only affects the initial operating capability of the JTF, but also diminishes the effectiveness of every effected headquarters. Contingencies, by definition, are unplanned and each organization from which personnel are tasked will be adversely impacted upon activation of a JTF headquarters. Research also indicates that as individual JTF staff members return to their parent organizations, those units experience a decrease in unit cohesion because their staffs have not experienced shared hardships and challenges.[105]

The April 1980 attempt to rescue American hostages being held in Iran is an example of a failed ad hoc JTF. American citizens rightly wondered aloud how the most technologically advanced nation in the world could fail to plan, prepare, and execute a joint military operation even though it had six months to organize.[106] When it was over, the U.S. had lost several helicopters, a C-130 transport plane, and eight Americans without facing an armed enemy or reaching the objective.

When the President ordered the JCS to prepare contingency plans to rescue the hostages, an ad hoc staff was assembled because no single service had the capability to undertake the mission and there was no organized military force prepared to conduct such an operation.[107] As weeks passed, all four services assigned forces to the organization and planning continued in a compartmentalized manner.[108] The planning staff that was finally assembled had no experience in the type of operation being planned and their efforts were further hindered by a confused command structure that made communications among its members difficult. To prevent security leaks, each component of the operation was compartmentalized so that no one had the overall

authority to check each component and ensure they were capable of performing the assigned missions.[109] As a result, qualified leaders outside of the JCS never subjected the rescue plan to an intensive review.[110] The force did not train together at any point and the JTF staff never achieved a synchronized effort due to its ad hoc and OPSEC-minded nature.

In its aftermath, the JCS commissioned a Special Operations Review Group to examine the planning, organization, coordination, direction and control of the operation. Commonly referred to as the Holloway Commission, the group strongly felt that the decision to form an ad hoc JTF disrupted unity of command and hindered a cohesive effort.[111] Of the 23 issues cited by the commission as contributing to mission failure, nine can be directly linked to unfamiliarity with JTF operations.[112]

By not using an existing JTF organization, the JCS had to literally establish a JTF, find a commander, create an organization, provide a staff, develop a plan, select the units, and conduct some training before attaining even the most rudimentary mission readiness. William M. Steele sums up the fragmented nature of the operation by stating that, "The decision not to use an existing JTF, failure to conduct an independent plans review, and the ad hoc nature of the JTF planning process, training management and command and control unnecessarily complicated an already complex plan."[113]

Lessons learned by USCENTCOM from their experiences in Somalia also highlight the difficulties associated with the ad hoc approach to JTF organization. During UNOSOM II, the commander of the JTF met his staff only after he arrived in Somalia and less than a third of his staff had deployed when operations began. Consequently, a significant amount of time was spent forming the team instead of resolving operational issues. The staff lacked experience and two noted observers offered that, "Neither the makeshift UNOSOM II headquarters staff nor the weak UN

secretariat had experience organizing and commanding such a large, complex multinational operation."[114]

In an attempt to make the organization work in a chaotic environment, the JTF improvised a Joint Operations Center (JOC) using the equipment and personnel available yet many of them had no knowledge or experience in joint command and control operations.[115] The JOC personnel came from a variety of units and services and had never functioned as a cohesive unit before.[116] They brought whatever equipment they thought they would need and the result was an assortment of administrative supplies, computers, and radios. Throughout the operation, they had serious command, control, and communications problems, originating from the lack of integrated staff training, inadequate planning, an absence of clear doctrine, and inadequate communications liaison between headquarters and component units.[117] UNOSOM II was not equipped or trained to function as a joint staff and many critical functions were either missing or not represented 24 hours a day.

Augmented Core Service Component JTF

Somewhat of a middle ground between the two options examined above is the augmentation of a core service component headquarters to transform it into a joint staff. This has been done several times in recent operations and appears to be the CINCs' preferred option. The primary advantage of this option is that the service core component headquarters of the potential JTF provides the basis for a well-trained and cohesive staff. The selected component forms a nucleus for the joint staff and has an existing, functional staff with operationally ready and interoperable support structures.[118] The majority of the staff has already worked together on a daily basis and has trained in many different scenarios. However, regardless of the degree of training that has

occurred and the level of interoperability between the core organization and its augmentees, the initial fusing of the many elements of a JTF staff remains a difficult task.[119] For example, a recent after action review (AAR) conducted following a CAP exercise involving the United States Southern European Task Force (USSETAF) and its augmentation personnel amplified the difficulties associated with assimilating new staff members into the team even when the combination is expected:

> The critical first 48 hours of JTF operations stretched the staff as a predominantly army staff transitioned to a joint staff planning for command and control of a sizable joint force. New staff officers issued competing and conflicting guidance due to their unfamiliarity with the joint SOP. Routine and critical interfaces were unclear, as were expectations of various boards and centers.[120]

The augmentation option meets the intent of joint doctrine by allowing the CINC to tailor the force to the emerging crisis. He selects as the JTF the organization that has the most experience in the medium in which the crisis is occurring. For example, if a contingency operation requires execution of a humanitarian airlift, then the CINC could name a numbered air force as the JTF headquarters since the commander has developed a level of expertise regarding airlift operations and the staff possesses an understanding of the issues involved in that type of operation.

This option also provides the CINC flexibility and allows him to respond to multiple contingencies simultaneously. Combatant commanders have trained army corps, navy fleets, air force numbered air forces, and marine expeditionary forces to serve as a JTF staffs for contingency operations and more than one can be employed simultaneously if required. These forces are exercised and evaluated on a recurring basis although each combatant commander prioritizes which organizations are more likely to deploy as a JTF to focus their limited training resources.

Augmenting a core service component headquarters is also reasonably responsive to the needs of an emerging crisis. As part of existing plans, each organization develops and rehearses deployment plans and can modify their processes to fit the needs of the crisis. Additionally, core component headquarters are generally found throughout a combatant command's AOR and are potentially near the sites of crises. For example, in May of 1991, the President directed the U.S. military to provide humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh in the wake of a cyclone that destroyed much of the nation's infrastructure. A JTF was formed around the nucleus of the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), based nearby in Okinawa, and humanitarian operations began within two days of the CJCS execute order.[121]

Time will still be required to form the entire JTF staff since other components must augment the nucleus and the DJTFAC must arrive from the combatant commander's staff. When the DJTFAC arrives, it provides additional expertise and brings insight from the combatant commander's headquarters not otherwise found in the service component.[122] This provides a linkage from the strategic to the operational levels. Their familiarity with the history of the operation, course of action development, and intimate knowledge of the rest of the CINC's staff make their integration an important part of the JTF staff. As a result of combining the efforts of the core service component, service augmentees, and the DJTFAC, the operational planners will be able to plan further into the future and not merely focus on the day-to-day actions of the force.

Although there are significant advantages to the augmentation option, disadvantages remain. Because the nucleus of the staff is of a single service, there exists a tendency towards service biases. There may be a penchant to use service-specific acronyms and procedures and not those found in joint doctrine. Not only are

doctrinal references potentially skewed in favor of the predominant service but also biases may tend to inhibit the ability to analyze and solve problems under conditions of uncertainty. Although there is considerable evidence that service biases can be mitigated through training, when situations become unclear and ambiguous, human nature tends to resort to the elements in which they are most comfortable and familiar.[123] In a service-dominated JTF, unfounded biases could lead to an inappropriate use of forces based on a dominant service perspective.

There are also challenges involved when integrating augmentation personnel into the organization. In an augmented headquarters, there is usually a level of unfamiliarity among its members, an insufficient time to train as a staff, and the JTF augmentation assignment is most likely an additional duty. Sending a DJTFAC from the CINC's staff to the core service component is difficult to execute in an environment with several simultaneous actions and no CINC is currently postured to establish and provide more than one DJTFAC at a time. The CINC's staff is frequently consumed by more work than they can accomplish on a daily basis and is hard pressed to release valuable staff officers from ongoing operations to support JTF training – supporting components often face the same dilemma. For example, although the commander of USEUCOM has directed that DJTFAC personnel participate bi-annually with each of the six USEUCOM directed JTFs operational tempo has prevented the DJTFAC from participating in a single exercise in the last two years. Of the eighteen field grade officers allocated to USASETAF as the DJTFAC from USEUCOM, only six participated in a recent exercise.[124] Not only is the integration of new staff members difficult during crisis response, the CINC's staff and the other service components will be adversely effected by the loss of valuable members from their teams as the JTF forms.[125]

Lastly, there is the issue of core service components serving as both the JTF staff and as a service component command – such as an ARFOR headquarters. Although research and experience has found that three-star commands are capable of performing both roles, the organization has to virtually split the headquarters into two separate teams to perform both missions effectively. LTG Carl Stiner indicated that, based on his experience, a corps headquarters could perform both missions, but only for limited periods.[126]

On November 20, 1992, USCENTCOM notified I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), commanded by LTG Robert B. Johnston, of a time-sensitive contingency operation to support humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia.[127] I MEF was a logical choice for the mission because they had recently conducted a humanitarian assistance exercise and they initially based their plan on an existing deliberate planning document for peacetime humanitarian assistance.[128]

Organizationally, I MEF was to fill most of the personnel billets and receive augmentation from the other services to make the JTF staff fully operational – the marines contributed over 600 of the 900 people on the staff.[129] Unfortunately, forming around a marine headquarters led to the plans and orders being filled with Marine Corps acronyms and TTPs.[130] The cumulative effect of this bias resulted in non-marine personnel and organizations misunderstanding instructions and delaying actions while waiting for clarification of terms and tasks.[131] Another difficulty with using I MEF as the JTF headquarters was the lack of compatible computer hardware and software throughout the joint force. Consequently, reports, instructions, and orders were delayed.[132] Additionally, since the marines had only nine days between the alert order and execution, the JTF staff had to simultaneously plan and execute operations while

attempting to integrate new members on the JTF staff – a clear and difficult challenge to even the most flexible of military organizations.[133]

In August of 1989, the responsibility for commanding potential combat operations in Panama was transferred from JTF Panama to the XVIII Airborne Corps. Commanded by Lieutenant General Stiner, the corps served as the foundation of a new JTF headquarters. This organization, termed JTF South, would control all ground and air operations in Panama if the NCA decided to execute a major contingency plan and, if activated, would absorb JTF Panama into its structure.[134] The strategic objectives given to the JTF included ensuring the continued freedom of transit through the Panama Canal, the removal of Noreiga and his government from power, and allowing the freely-elected government of Panama to govern.[135]

When Operation Just Cause commenced in December of 1989, enough time had been available to fine-tune essential aspects of the operational plan, resolve doctrinal and procedural differences, and assure relatively thorough and effective direction of a highly decentralized operation.[136] The operation, primarily a ground campaign, was characterized by the introduction of overwhelming combat power against 27 targets during the hours of darkness and its goals were to minimize casualties on both sides and incapacitate the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) and its leadership as quickly as possible.[137]

The corps benefited from augmentation by the SOUTHCOM staff and the CINC's staff participated in the bulk of the deliberate planning before JTF activation. Once the corps was activated as JTF South, personnel who had been instrumental in developing the initial operations plans joined the JTF staff.[138] The success achieved by the XVIII Airborne Corps staff was due, at least in part, to the fact that all of the officers who eventually formed JTF South had worked together as a joint staff for months prior

to the operation and they had developed a clear understanding of each other and the strengths and weaknesses of the organization as a whole.[139]

Each of the three options discussed in this chapter offer unique advantages and disadvantages. There is no widespread consensus on which option is most effective in all situations, yet there may be another option to consider that is not currently found in joint doctrine – establishing standing JTF headquarters within each geographic combatant commander's AOR for contingency use. This initiative frames the discussion for the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

STANDING JTFs

In the past, attempts to create contingency-oriented standing JTFs at both the national and service levels have failed.[140] On October 1, 1979 the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was formed to provide the CINCs with a four-service joint headquarters to execute contingency plans in their AORs. Initially a national level JTF, the RDJTF was commanded by LTG P. X. Kelley and was designed for contingency operations anywhere outside of NATO and Korea. Although it had a worldwide response capability, it focused primarily on the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf following the fall of the Shah of Iran.[141] President Jimmy Carter wanted a light, mobile U.S. military force that could deploy and conduct operations without relying on permanent bases in the region.[142]

The RDJTF was the first permanent, fully-staffed JTF headquarters in U.S. military history that was organized, trained, and equipped to prepare for contingency employment.[143] During its truncated four-year existence, the RDJTF was never employed operationally and was finally matured into USCENTCOM in 1983. Moreover, the indefinite nature of its existence and the unspecified nature of its mission are contradictory to the doctrinal definitions associated with modern JTFs as discussed earlier. The RDJTF's existence received primarily negative reviews. It was disliked by the CINCs due to their perceived lack of control over its employment and they considered it an "outsider" organization.[144] Most defense analysts and strategic leaders also viewed the organization in an unenthusiastic manner primarily because it did not have any assigned forces.[145]

A more recent example of a standing JTF can be found in the Marine Corps. In his 1995 Commandant's Planning Guidance, GEN Charles C. Krulak indicated that the Marine Corps must provide a capable, expeditionary JTF headquarters organized and equipped to deploy immediately to meet the uncertain challenges of the 21st century.[146] He envisioned a joint force that would be the headquarters of choice when the NCA and the CINCs needed to respond to emerging crises in the world's littorals.[147] Unfortunately, this JTF was joint in name only. The Marine Corps provided the vast majority of the personnel to staff the organization while the navy supplied minimal representation. The army and air force did not substantially support the organization with either rhetoric or resources. In 1998, the Marine Corps abandoned the standing JTF concept due to an inability to resource required joint force functions from the other services – not because it was organizationally deficient.[148]

The advantages accrued by establishing standing JTFs are substantial and the creation of them would solve many of the deficiencies inherent in the other options provided by joint doctrine. In general, staffs that exist only during times of crisis have proven to be less effective than established organizations.[149] There is clearly an advantage in having a stable, educated, and experienced joint staff that can train and fight together as a team and that benefit facilitates unity of effort. As Ardant du Picq stated generations ago:

> A wise organization insures that the personnel of combat groups changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peace time maneuvers shall be comrades in war. From living together and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue and rest, from cooperation among men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, above all unity.[150]

This echoes the sentiments of the Holloway Commission when they found that having even a small, permanent nucleus of a JTF staff would facilitate more effective and unified responses to contingency operations.[151]

To be most effective, the JTF commander and staff must have substantial experience employing the elements of the JTF to develop models of pattern recognition that facilitate rapid decisionmaking in ambiguous environments.[152] An established team will be able to participate in training exercises, refine SOPs, TTPs, and staff procedures unique to the organization before employment. As the staff trains together, they will gain an understanding of not only their own capabilities and limitations, but also of the other services, non-DOD agencies, and possible coalition partners.[153]

A knowledgeable, well-trained staff that follows established SOPs saves time for the commander. Having a staff that practices and follows SOPs, especially the procedures that will be used in CAP, will save considerable time in the production of orders and operation of the headquarters. By training and working together on a daily basis, the doctrine most relevant to the JTF will be constantly analyzed, practiced, evaluated, and revised.[154] Just as in any other complex activity, the development of operational proficiency takes time and it must be exercised frequently to maintain proficiency. Obviously, developing proficiency, trust, and teamwork before hostilities begins is preferable to attempting to do so in the midst of a contingency operation.[155]

Constantly working JTF issues makes the staff comparative experts in its employment and the doctrine surrounding the organization. Expertise is a significant feature and Michael L. Henchen indicates that the level of joint expertise on the JTF staff influences the success or failure of an operation more than any other single factor.[156] The staff can also becomes experts at campaign planning and operational art since that is their focus throughout both training and employment. Additionally, the staff

might, in training, develop courses of action and publish orders that mirror missions they might encounter when employed. Training studies indicate that personnel turbulence of more than 25 percent of an organization from one mission to the next makes it virtually impossible for a unit to gain or maintain proficiency in organizational processes.[157] While normal personnel turbulence can be expected, a relatively stable JTF staff allows the organization to gain expertise. As a staff trains and employs together, the commander and staff will become intimately familiar with one another and understand the collective strengths and weaknesses before receiving a mission.[158] In essence, a standing JTF provides the commander the ability to test the structure before employment.

John C. Coleman analyzes the decisions made by JTF commanders and groups them into three areas – organizational, informational, and operational. In his analysis, many of the organizational and informational decisions will have already been made within a standing JTF prior to employment and the commander can then devote his attention and resources to the operational decisions that deserve attention.[159] Additional advantages of a standing JTF are articulated in the study *The Achievement of Organizational Objectives by Task Force.* The author notes that a team with a permanent cadre will possess the necessary knowledge, skills, and high degree of trust and confidence in each other to perform at a high level. He also suggests that an organization that works closely together over an extended period rapidly disseminates information and receives feedback.[160]

Command and control should be more than simply words on paper. It must be uniquely human and rely on "mutual understanding, using a minimum of key words, well-understood phrases, or even anticipation of each other's thoughts" and is a vastly more effective way of communicating than detailed, explicit instructions.[161] Coleman values

this implicit communication and indicates that it is most likely achieved within standing organizations.[162] This level of familiarity enhances understanding and allows lessons learned from one operation to be more easily transferred to the next than would be possible in other JTFs.

Standing JTFs allow the JTF commander and staff to participate in the deliberate planning and CAP of their higher headquarters. If collocated with the CINC's staff, the standing JTF would be familiar with the deliberate planning products that provide a basis for CAP. The CINC could immediately involve the JTF staff in the planning process and correspondence with the JCS instead of waiting until phase V of CAP. Some critics proffer that this close relationship may lead a combatant commander to allow the JTF to assume the primary role in the CAP process although this appears to be personality dependent. As planning assumptions are made at the strategic level, they should be communicated often to the operational command. This involvement reduces the reaction time required and increases the depth of understanding of regional issues. Additionally, collaboration planning could potentially influence task organization, mission statements, intelligence requirements, and end state conditions of the operation. S. L. Arnold and David T. Stahl also argue that collaborative planning can also help ensure that end state planning is consistently achieved in all levels of command.[163]

Standing JTFs would also provide regional specialization. Already being knowledgeable of a region's governments, economies, languages, and customs of an area will reduce the time needed to familiarize the command and staff with a particular JOA. A regionally-oriented JTF headquarters can deploy an element quickly, initiate effective operations sooner, and would likely possess language-qualified personnel.[164] Lastly, the interoperability of equipment would be a significant advantage of a standing

JTF. All of the necessary equipment to conduct operations such as communications links and computer software would already exist and be prepared for employment.[165]

The disadvantages associated with a standing JTF are also numerous and the critics are not difficult to find. Sounding loudest is the charge that standing JTFs require too many resources during a resource constrained era. The additional costs in personnel, training, and infrastructure are all legitimate indictments. Initial start-up costs would be substantial to place a fully-operational JTF headquarters in each of the geographic combatant commands. Additional personnel must be allocated to these organizations, they must receive new equipment, and the sustainment costs associated with maintaining a contingency headquarters are significant.

Another disadvantage is the notion that due to the range of possible missions, a standing JTF can not represent the doctrine-mandated tailored organization for each crisis.[166] One of the important advantages of a JTF is the ability to task organize for a specific operation to maximize the capabilities of the employed forces. The staff should mirror the force employed and a corresponding representation on the staff when compared to the force would only be achieved through chance. If the JTF staff was manned so that regardless of the force selected for employment there would be enough JTF staff officers expert in that medium, the pool of staff members required from each service would be excessive.

The commander of the standing JTF deserves unique attention. Due to the wide-range of potential missions and the substantial space found in each combatant command's AOR, it is unlikely that the designated commander can be expert in all possible missions and provide informed direction and guidance when required. Intuition and effective mental simulation are products of experience and if the commander does not have any in the type of mission being executed, his impact will be minimal.

Lastly, budgetary constraints would limit the number of JTFs that could be established. For the sake of argument, assume that each combatant commander established one standing JTF in his respective AOR. When employed, the CINC no longer has the ability to respond to a second contingency operation with a "trained" JTF and lacks redundancy in his organization. The NMS indicates that combatant commanders must be able to respond to more than one contingency simultaneously in the same AOR and establishing several standing JTFs in each AOR appears to be cost-prohibitive.[167]

As W. Ross Ashby states, "There is no such thing as a 'good organization' in any absolute sense. Always it is relative; and an organization that is good in one context or under one criterion may be bad under another."[168] This profound statement clearly holds true when analyzing JTF formation options. While no option can be the best in all conditions, the next chapter determines if the regional, contingency-based standing JTF option is the most effective for contingency responses across the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, recommendations are offered to improve the implementation of the option found to be most effective.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

> Well-trained joint staffs are as critical to operations as well-trained forces provided by the services.
>
> - Joseph J. Redden[169]

As JV 2020 indicates, to build the most effective force for the future the U.S. armed forces must be intellectually, operationally, doctrinally, technically, and *organizationally* joint (emphasis added).[170] It is difficult to determine which structure will be most appropriate in every contingency, but the proclivity to use JTFs to orchestrate a response has been clearly demonstrated in recent history. John Shy stresses that failings in command and control have provided the most consistent reasons for failure in American military history.[171]

Although there are occasions in which single service responses are most appropriate, joint forces will be most effective if trained, equipped, and organized into regionally-focused, contingency-based standing JTFs. Standing JTFs allow the combatant commander to deploy a trained, joint staff that is specifically prepared to command and control joint formations at the operational level of war. Commanders at the operational level of war provide the essential link between strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield and it is not a skill easily mastered.[172] While the U.S. defense establishment has recently made significant strides towards jointness through both hard work and legislation, these efforts have not focused on the operational level.

When compared to the three doctrinal options presented in this monograph, regional contingency-based standing JTFs exhibit better staff synchronization, are more

responsive, and possess an in-depth understanding of the region within which they operate. Additionally, standing JTFs display better interoperability in both doctrine and communications systems and minimize potential service biases. Although these aspects are true, standing JTFs are resource-intensive propositions and opposed by many factions. Additionally, the commander would not be selected for the specific mission, the staff would not necessarily be tailored to reflect the composition of the assigned forces for the mission, and redundancy within an AOR would not exist.

Standing JTFs are clearly a substantial investment in terms of personnel, training, education, and money. Mark W. Clay refutes the opponents of standing JTFs and argues not for additional force structures, but rather an examination of the current organizations. Clay argues that additional forces are not required, but rather the forces available should be reorganized to reflect the manner in which the U.S. intends to operate.[173] He also argues that the resistance to re-organize into JTFs is firmly entrenched in service parochialism. Each service apparently advocates the necessity of "training as they expect to fight" and yet none will organize in a manner that creates well trained, effective staffs below the level of combatant commands.[174] Although clearly a resource intensive option, it is an investment in the most effective joint command and control structure for U.S. armed forces operating in response to emerging crises.

In pursuit of the standing JTF imperative, certain military specialties and assets must be added or expanded to support the new commands. For example, each standing JTF would likely require a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) and there are currently insufficient numbers of trained CA personnel in the active force to fill the expected positions. Additionally, significant joint communications assets would be needed. The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) now provides communications support to JTFs worldwide and advertises a 125-person deployable

package for deployed forces.[175] Additional packages must be developed for simultaneous deployment or organizations established within each AOR to support the new commands.

Another obstacle that must be addressed if standing JTFs are to become a reality is the inability to select a JTF commander on a mission basis. Joint staffs can overcome the inexperience of a commander but it may take time and contingency operations lack excessive time for deliberation. The author believes that shocking examples such as Admiral Metcalf's lack of knowledge about basic ranger operations during Operation Urgent Fury are less likely in the 21st century due to continuing joint education programs, but practical experience will remain lacking in some areas. As standing JTFs are established, the combatant commanders must analyze their AOR and determine the type of force – ground, air, or maritime – that is most likely to be employed in a region. The JTF commander should then be selected from the service that is most likely to play a leading role in future operations. Similarly, the deputy JTF commander should be selected from the next service most likely to lead an operation and his knowledge should complement the commander's lack of experience in that medium. Likewise, although representing all services, the JTF staff should be designed to maximize the expertise of the service expected to lead contingency operations in an AOR.

At first sight, a standing JTF appears to be a force that is not tailored to a specific operation. Although based only on a best estimate of future requirements and not tailored as specifically as an ad hoc headquarters, the actual forces assigned and employed can still be purposely tailored to the specific mission parameters. In fact, it is the appropriateness of the total force to the mission "which ultimately provides a more reliable index of success."[176]

Lastly, the issue of redundancy remains. Clearly, in an unconstrained resource environment, multiple JTFs in each AOR would be optimal but it is unrealistic in the current situation to expect such force structure. Although each geographic combatant commander would possess a standing JTF for contingency operations, a redundant capability is required if multiple contingencies occur simultaneously in the same AOR. The author submits that the training and preparation of core service component headquarters continue to provide a secondary force for employment by the CINC. Additionally, USJFCOM forces should be apportioned to geographic combatant commanders for possible contingency use. Although not as effective as the standing JTF, augmented core service components have proved capable in the past with augmentation from other services and the DJTFAC.

Joint doctrine must continue to evolve and the J7, Joint Warfighting Center (JWC), and the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) should continue to serve as the focal points for providing input and evolving joint doctrine.[177] United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and current joint doctrine will continue to offer valuable direction for JTF training once CAP begins, but the doctrine is operational in nature and USJFCOM remains reluctant to challenge service component responsibilities or provide authoritative direction for peacetime training outside of CINC-directed joint exercises. To be most effective, CINCs should be funded to adequately train the JTF staffs instead of relying on infrequent joint exercises and the good graces of the services to provide trained joint headquarters in a contingency.

Joint doctrine must be taught not only at officer education institutions, but also at senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) schools. Many joint staffs have found senior NCOs in positions of authority who have no joint experience or education. The Joint Service Officer (JSO) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II

program at Norfolk, VA must be expanded to accommodate the additional positions found throughout the combatant commanders' AORs.[178] JPME is critical to whether the unified combatant commands can simultaneously conduct contingency planning without augmentation because it is the foundation of JTF staff skills.[179] This cost must also be included in the resources for establishing the new commands.

Ultimately, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must initiate the change in joint structure recommended by the author. He is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for recommending changes in joint force structures as may be necessary and his oversight is required no less than every two years.[180] As the U.S. forges into the 21st century, it is time for the DOD to truly organize as it fights and establish regional contingency-based standing JTFs – it is the most effective organization in an unstable and unpredictable world.

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