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**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY,  
GREECE AND PEACE OPERATIONS**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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The paper focuses on the development of the European defense initiatives within the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP), and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) concepts. It examines the evolution of the ESDI and the CFSP/ESDP concepts, their application to peace operations, and their relationship to the national security interests of Greece.

The paper discusses the evolution of the European defense concepts in post-WW II Europe and the roles that have been played in the formulation of the present European defense identity concepts (EU, the U.S. and NATO). The focus is on EU and U.S. perceptions regarding the definition and use of ESDI and the existing tensions within NATO involving its implementation. The ESDI and CFSP/ESDP concepts are examined in relation to EU-led peace operations. The analysis focuses on the creation of the EU Rapid Reaction Force and on the various factors that will affect EU-led peace operations. It also examines EU's participation in the Bosnia and Kosovo peace operations and formulates certain principles that could be applied in the recent crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The paper finally examines Greek participation in peace operations.



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# EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY, GREECE AND PEACE OPERATIONS

## INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War period has generated a new environment for the continent of Europe, its nation-states and the multilateral political-economic organizations and military alliances that are present. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany and the crises in the Balkans have fundamentally changed the political, socioeconomic and security challenges that are faced by individual European nation-states and multilateral organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These challenges arise not only within the geographic boundaries of what has been traditionally defined as the European continent, but they are very much present in Europe's immediate perimeter. Thus, political and socioeconomic developments and conflicts that take place in regions such as Africa, Asia and the Middle East have both direct and indirect effects on European security and welfare.

The post-Cold War era has also brought the need for fundamental changes in the concepts and definitions of national and collective security. This need is particularly acute for the nation-states and multilateral organizations in Europe. The focus of globalization in international relations, the undisputed world leadership of the U.S., and the increasing trends of European integration, tend to erode the traditional concepts of the nation-state and the associated definitions of national defense and collective security. However, the armed conflicts in the Balkans and in the Caucasus have amply demonstrated that the *de facto* erosion of national boundaries are inherently dangerous, particularly for regions that have not reached a certain stage of socioeconomic development and political maturity. These localized and limited conflicts currently tend to define the broad needs of national and multilateral security in Europe. Similarly, they tend to define both national and multilateral defense initiatives for EU and NATO member and non-member states. These initiatives have largely shifted the focus from the traditional territorial defense of a multilateral alliance during the Cold War to the emphasis on "humanitarian interventions" that include "out of area" engagements and center on the conduct of peace operations.

The Kosovo crisis evidenced the tensions that exist in the political and security priorities, deliberations and decision-making that exist between the U.S. and its European NATO allies. The crises in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated the U.S. preference for "NATO-centric" humanitarian interventions *beyond* NATO's traditional geographic boundaries, and the application of "containment" policies in the Balkans. These policies, coupled with NATO's enlargement, are considered by the U.S. as being mutually beneficial for the security of its European allies. However, the positions of the Europeans allies in the NATO context are often delegated to the role of "sharing" in the associated responsibilities, missions and tasks.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the strategic definition of European security interests inherently is a delicate balance between *directly* interested nation-states within the European continent, and a geographically separate and distinct global power that may not have coincident long-term interests and priorities.

Such tensions have been demonstrated in the context of U.S. bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. Issues such as the NATO enlargement, the U.S. initiatives on ballistic missile defense (BMD), and occasional calls for "intervention" in localized crises within the boundaries of the Russian Federation, are points of friction between the U.S. and Russia that directly affect European security. However, the long-term implementation of "European integration" concept *involves* the constructive engagement of the Russian Federation since Russia is historically and geographically a part of Europe.

## **BACKGROUND**

### **Emergence of the European Defense and Security Concepts**

The end of WWII found Europe exhausted after almost six years of continuous warfare, economically devastated and politically divided in the two camps of the Cold War. The Cold War boundaries were being tested not only in the Berlin Airlift of 1948-1949 but also in the application of the Truman Doctrine during the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949. The emphasis on the prevention of renewed conflict led to arrangements such as the Dunquerque Accords of 1947 between France and Great Britain (designed to deter a future German threat), and the embodiment of Winston Churchill's idea of a united and democratized "greater Europe" in the Council of Europe of 1949.<sup>2</sup> NATO was also created in 1949 and the Marshall Plan aid significantly improved the political and economic fortunes of Western Europe.<sup>3</sup>

Both the 1940s and 1950s saw an increased movement at European transnational integration and unification. These manifested in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and, under the leadership of Jean Monnet, the creation of the European

Economic Community (EEC) became a reality through the Treaties of Rome in 1957.<sup>4</sup> The 1991 Treaty of Maastricht gave a new impetus to the integration of EU political and economic institutions while the 2000 Nice Conference further clarified the mechanisms for EU's enlargement.

Greece, a NATO member since February 1952<sup>5</sup> became formally associated with the EEC in 1962 under the premiership of Constantine Karamanlis. Its accession to the EEC/EU was derailed and blocked following the takeover of the country by a military regime in 1967-1974. Following the return of democracy in Greece in July 1974, Prime Minister Karamanlis proceeded with renewed accession negotiations and Greece became a full member of the EEC/EU in 1981. During the tenure of Prime Minister Constantine Simitis, Greece met the Maastricht Treaty economic criteria and became a full member of EU's European Monetary Union (EMU) as of January 1, 2001.

Although the creation of the EEC and other transnational European organizations in the 1940s and 1950s was principally motivated by post-WWII economic reconstruction criteria, the non-Warsaw Pact nations of Europe strove for the development of a unique integrated political identity. This was and continues to be a difficult task in view of the existing national, social, cultural and religious differences that exist between EU's current and prospective member states. Often, EU's political and economic interests are not always coincident with those of the U.S. or other major nation-states in the international arena. Furthermore, this type of political integration has often meant the subjugation or alignment of national institutions of government (including national constitutions) to collective transnational bodies of governance, e.g., the EU's Council of Ministers, Commission, European Parliament, etc. EU's integration and enlargement efforts were and are also particularly difficult because of the highly divergent economies that exist within its actual and prospective member states. Western European nations with their robust and highly developed industrial economies are often called to support EU's economic development programs in less developed regions within and outside the EU. This is a source of friction in view of the fact that EU member states such as Germany also suffer from their own structural economic problems, e.g., domestic unemployment, high costs of reunification, etc. The perceptions of common EU strategic interests may also significantly diverge from what national security concerns individual EU member states may have. For example, national security interests of the UK are more closely aligned with those of the U.S., while the national security interests of Greece in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean are substantially different from those of Western European EU member states.

## EU, the U.S. and NATO

The Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. actually assisted in the development of the EU's unique political identity in international affairs. Not only Western European economies of EU member states matured in the 1960s and 1970s but they also became credible competitors to the U.S. economic power. Although the European members of NATO benefited from the security umbrella that included the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the U.S. and the UK, the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis had a fundamental effect on European perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. France, unwilling to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities developed its own nuclear weapons, and by 1966 it had withdrawn from the military scale of the NATO alliance.<sup>6</sup> The deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the European continent was also always viewed as a "mixed blessing." For example, tactical nuclear weapons could be prematurely involved in the escalation of a conventional conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and the location of additional U.S. intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe was considered to be destabilizing (the presence of the U.S. Jupiter nuclear intermediate range ballistic missiles in Turkey was one of the issues that concerned Soviet leaders at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis).<sup>7</sup>

European political and economic interests also mandated improvement of relations with the U.S.S.R. German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *ostpolitik* recognition of the post-WWII frontiers and the *de facto* partition of Germany in 1970 was soon followed by the U.S.-Soviet *detente* and substantive agreements for the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons during the years of the Nixon Administration.<sup>8</sup> The heightened Cold War rivalries between the U.S. and the USSR during the years of the Reagan Administration led to the introduction of numerous and powerful intermediate range nuclear weapons into the European continent. These included the mobile Soviet SS-20 and the U.S. Pershing II ballistic missiles as well as the U.S. Tomahawk ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Although certain of the European NATO allies (notably the U.K. and Germany) welcomed the reinforcement of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in Europe, the overwhelming popular sentiment was clearly against the presence of these weapons on European soil. The subsequent U.S.-Soviet *détente* between President Reagan and Chairman Gorbachev and the political and economic decline of the Soviet Union resulted in the removal of these weapons from a number of European nations under the terms of the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF).<sup>9</sup>

In NATO's Southeastern Flank, Greece realized that its NATO membership did not provide the requisite degree of protection against external threats. The Cyprus crisis of 1974 resulting

from the Turkish invasion and military occupation in that island republic demonstrated that NATO was incapable and/or unwilling to protect one of its members against the direct aggression of another. Following the fall of the Greek military regime that governed Greece in 1967-1974, a series of Greek governments under Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou reoriented Greek defense policies towards the realistic external security threat from Turkey. By the early 1990s, Greek national security policy had implemented the Unified Defense Doctrine that included unoccupied Cyprus within its defensive perimeter. The eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the immediate reduction of the associated security threat (including the threat of nuclear warfare), gave new impetus to the creation and development of a unique and formal European defense identity among the EU member states.

## **THE EU AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE CONCEPTS**

### **The EU and the Transatlantic Link**

The creation of the EEC/EU provided the foundation for formal discussions regarding the development of a unique European defense identity. However, initial attempts for the establishment of associated organizations and institutions in the 1950s and the 1960s met with failure. These attempts included the European Defense Community in the 1950s and the Fouchet Plans in the 1960s.<sup>10</sup> These attempts failed not only because they had adopted rather ambitious targets but also because the related initiatives were rapidly subsumed by NATO defense initiatives and bilateral disagreements among the European NATO allies. For example, at that time the UK was not an EEC member, its security policies were more closely aligned with those of the U.S., and the UK often frustrated French European political cooperation initiatives. However, matters of joint weapon systems development and the U.S. predominance in the field of arms production and export gradually caused certain European nations to increase their mutual cooperation in these fields.<sup>11</sup>

The Western European Union (WEU) that was originally created in 1954 provided a more viable institutional framework for the development of a distinct European defense identity. Although the WEU was relatively dormant because of the political and military predominance of NATO and the U.S., this institution was reactivated in the mid-1980s. The WEU was perceived in the 1980s as the means for strengthening European unification in matters of defense and security within the European scale of the NATO alliance.<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, the reactivation of the EU was caused because of the divergence of EU and U.S. foreign policies following the 1973

Middle East War and the resulting oil embargo. This divergence included such matters as the advent of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the acceleration of nuclear armaments. Furthermore, the WEU provided a convenient way of defense coordination between France (which militarily had exited NATO) and its fellow EU member states.<sup>13</sup> By the mid-1990s the WEU had developed a number of mechanisms and working groups that dealt with operational military coordination and defense industrial cooperation. Furthermore, EU member states designated distinct military formations from their respective armed forces for operations that could be undertaken under the WEU umbrella.<sup>14</sup> However, it must be noted that some of the same military units had also been tasked with parallel NATO commitments.

The 1991 Maastricht Treaty not only defined the new political and economic identity of the EU, but it also formalized EU's commitment for the establishment of its security and defense identity. The EU leaders recognized that European integration could not be readily achieved without the existence of a *collective* but unique defense policy. Title V of the Maastricht Treaty formally established the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) policy "pillar." The CFSP was established as the second of the three pillars of the EU which also includes human rights, democratization and the promotion of international cooperation. The EU's defense policy is harmonized with NATO's common defense and security policy. In the 1996 NATO Berlin Communiqué, the Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO decided that a European Security and Defense Identity (**ESDI**) should be built *within* NATO.

The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty defined the EU's provisions of a common foreign and security policy, "which might lead to a common defense." Included in this policy was the possibility of integrating the WEU into the EU and encompassing the WEU's Petersburg tasks that refer to the use of military forces in humanitarian and rescue missions and tasks, crisis management, peacekeeping and peacemaking. However, the related article of the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 17 – ex Article J.7), declares that EU's policy "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework."<sup>15</sup>

The NATO leaders during the Washington Summit on April 23-24, 1999 (while the Kosovo crisis was still unfolding) recognized EU's firm resolving to maintain the capability of independent military action. In this manner, the EU will be able to decide and approve military action in geographic areas where the NATO alliance may not have the necessary consensus to intervene politically and/or militarily in an integrated fashion.

The EU Helsinki Summit in December 1999 formally stated a leading goal of providing a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops (deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least a year), in order to enhance the European capabilities for the full range of "Petersburg tasks" by 2003. The EU recognized that EU-led operations will be undertaken only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The EU further agreed to consult and cooperate with NATO with the necessary transparency in this type of operations.

The European Security and Defense Policy (**ESDP**) concept is part of the overall CFSP policies of the EU. This concept found its first concrete pronouncement in the St Malo Declaration of France and the UK of December 1998, and references the EU willingness and capacity to undertake autonomous actions that are supported by credible military forces.<sup>16</sup> The St Malo Declaration also stressed that the strengthening of European military forces and capabilities must be supported by corresponding European initiatives in defense industries and technology.<sup>17</sup> It appears that the EU's CFSP and the ESDP concept espoused under the St Malo Declaration are *interrelated* with many common elements that can lead to a central overriding theme of an ***independent and common*** European defense policy.

The U.S. currently maintains a traditional and rather limited view of the ESDI concept. The U.S. considers and supports the ESDI a "a separable but not separate" capability within NATO.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, the U.S. supports the concept that the ESDI can be used as a vehicle for NATO intervention through the independent and autonomous use of European capabilities where such intervention *avoids* the engagement of the *total* NATO Alliance.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, the U.S. is always interested to have the European NATO allies increasing their collective and individual military capabilities, and assuming a larger share of the related economic burden. However, it appears that the U.S. wish to have the formulation and implementation of the ESDI concept as an instrument *within* NATO (an Alliance traditionally dominated by the U.S.) holds the possibility of conflict with EU's distinct political identity. After all, as it has been previously discussed, it was the divergence of EU and U.S. foreign policies that brought about the quest for an *independent* and *distinct* European defense identity. Thus, although the U.S. apparently seeks to have the EU as a "responsible partner to NATO,"<sup>20</sup> it is unclear whether this "partnership" will be "equal" and "workable" for the ESDI roles that the U.S. envisages. It has become apparent that certain members of the EU and NATO hold views that espouse a more independent role for the ESDI (France), while others support the historically traditional predominance of the NATO Alliance under U.S. leadership.<sup>21</sup> For example, some major differences have already emerged between the U.S. and EU NATO Allies over the ESDI implementation mechanics.

The U.S. has clearly declared that the implementation of the ESDI concept cannot lead to a “duplication” of the NATO Alliance and must encompass non-EU NATO members – a particular emphasis on Turkey.<sup>22</sup> The EU is of the view that its actual and immediate accession candidate members are *eligible* to participate in the ESDI. Because the ESDI calls for the *sharing* of NATO resources, including planning resources, Turkey advocates its participation in the ESDI as a non-EU and NATO country and has so far – as a NATO member – raised objections to the sharing of NATO resources in the course of the ESDI implementation.<sup>23</sup> Turkey’s objections are politically motivated. Turkey seeks to become a member of the EU with the *minimum* scrutiny and *without* fulfilling the prescribed criteria when the EU in principle accepted the notion that Turkey can be an applicant for accession to the EU.<sup>24</sup> Such criteria not only include legislative and socioeconomic *structural reforms*, but they also mandate significant improvements in Turkey’s bad record on human rights, a resolution of the Cyprus crisis, and a cessation of Turkey’s aggressive moves against Greek sovereignty. U.S. foreign policy unconditionally supports Turkey’s positions on ESDI and on its rapid accession to the EU because Turkey has been a traditional element of the U.S. regional “containment” policies in Asia and the Middle East during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.<sup>25</sup> Naturally, this presents serious issues for both the NATO Alliance and the EU. These issues concern the political and socioeconomic identity of the EU, the identity and mechanism of European defense initiatives (ESDI, CFSP/ESDP), and the cooperation between the EU with NATO and the U.S. in defense and foreign policy matters.

It is easy to understand why the EU is extremely reluctant to unquestionably accept U.S. suggestions that concern the EU’s *own* membership. The question of statehood for the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico has periodically presented many challenges for the *domestic* policy of the U.S. The scale and scope of the issues that need to be resolved for the accession of Turkey to the EU are much larger. The resolution of these issues will involve only the *present* EU member states and Turkey. Thus, U.S. interventions that question the core principles and mechanisms of European political and socioeconomic integration are not likely to be viewed by the majority of the EU member states in a positive light.

The participation of non-EU and/or non-NATO countries in ESDI missions and tasks is not an insurmountable problem. For example, countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania may be willing to participate in ESDI missions and tasks *even if* such missions and tasks are *defined* and operationally *directed* through a decision making mechanism that *only* involves EU member states. Correspondingly, EU member states that are not part of NATO do participate in operations that have largely been

defined by NATO, e.g., Sweden is an active participant in KFOR's operations in Kosovo. It is highly doubtful that Turkey would be an ESDI participant under such an arrangement given its political goals for EU accession. However, the participation or non-participation of a *single* NATO but non-EU member in ESDI cannot be permitted to materially hinder the potential effectiveness of European defense initiatives *within* (ESDI) or *outside* (CFSP/ESDP) the context of the NATO Alliance. In the event that such hindrance manifests itself, then the EU and NATO members can and will be obliged to undertake those necessary measures that will effectively preserve the European character of defining and controlling the ESDI-related operational missions and tasks. The U.S. will not be left with easy or enviable choices in these situations. The U.S. will have to truly weigh the *collective* interests of the NATO Alliance that can be effectively served through the ESDI missions and tasks as opposed to the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy goals with regard to the integration of Turkey in ESDI and ESDP.

Flexibility for ESDI participation under some of the parameters that have been discussed above may also become necessary because of the missions and tasks that may be undertaken in regions outside the European continent. For example, ESDI operations in the Middle East or in the African continent may encompass forces from nation states that wish to participate under a NATO-EU command structure or have a formal association link with the EU.<sup>26</sup>

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### **European Defense Initiatives and the Russian Federation**

The broader nature and mission of the NATO Alliance and the boundaries of the subsumed or independent European defense initiatives also involve the unilateral and multilateral relations between the member states of the EU and NATO with the Russian Federation. U.S. foreign policy considerations that usually drive NATO consensus are still governed by the historical influence and antagonisms of the Cold War in U.S.-Russian relations. The EU and its member states have strengthened their approach of *realpolitik* towards Russia especially after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the German reunification. In addition, Russia historically has been and continues to be a major political actor in the European continent.

In view of its severe domestic political and socioeconomic problems, Russia views with extreme fear, the existence and *eastward expansion* of the NATO Alliance and the intentions of U.S. policies that concern Russian national security, domestic political stability, and economic development. Since Russia faces its own domestic ethnic and religious separatist movements that have often entered into open armed conflict with the central Moscow government, e.g., Chechnya-Dagestan, Russia fundamentally disagrees with NATO's *unilateral* "humanitarian intervention" policies. Naturally, Russia prefers that "humanitarian interventions" be exercised under UN auspices where Russian foreign policy can exercise some degree of control through its veto power in the UN Security Council.<sup>28</sup>

The eastward expansion of NATO's membership worries Russia both in terms of the Alliance's policy intentions and military capabilities. Such expansion naturally has decreased the "security zone" that Russia once enjoyed around its European frontiers and limits its routes of geographic access. The 1999 accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO not only expanded the Alliance's perimeter but it has also formed a barrier to potential Russian military movements *through* these countries. For example, Russia could not reinforce or supply by air its mechanized unit that had moved from Bosnia occupying the Pristina airport ahead of NATO's deployment into Kosovo, since both Hungary and the Ukraine had denied overflight rights to Russian transport aircraft.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, by 1999 potential Central and Eastern European NATO members had been supplied with an "air space management system" of U.S. origin for civilian air traffic control which, however, could easily serve military purposes.<sup>30</sup> Thus, despite the existing NATO agreements with Russia and the Ukraine that facilitated NATO's initial eastward expansion, NATO's extension of membership to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is likely to face larger obstacles.<sup>31</sup>

U.S. national security policies also affect the multilateral relationship between NATO's European Allies and Russia. The U.S. focus on the development of a national missile defense (NMD) has been faced with both Russian protestations that it violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and European worries that the U.S. NMD initiative may lead to a renewed nuclear arms race.<sup>32</sup> Russia, fearing a degradation of its nuclear deterrence capabilities, has countered the U.S. NMD initiative with a proposal for the joint development of a missile defense system with the U.S. and Europe.<sup>33</sup>

In view of EU's less adversarial relations with Russia, it appears that ESDI missions, especially those that will involve geographic areas *outside* NATO or EU boundaries, will necessitate consultation with Russia and, perhaps, its participation. For example, despite the difficult situation that developed in Kosovo following the surprise insertion of Russian forces into

the picture, NATO-Russian cooperation in accomplishing KFOR's peacekeeping mission has been excellent.<sup>34</sup>

## **EUROPEAN DEFENSE CONCEPTS AND PEACE OPERATIONS**

### **Defining the Missions and Tasks**

The EU has taken numerous steps to institutionalize the mechanisms for reaching the necessary decisions in defining the missions and prescribing the tasks under the currently existing European defense initiatives. Most of these institutions were developed under the aegis of the WEU and include:

- The Council of Ministers that acts as a decision-making body and is composed of the EU ministers for foreign affairs and defense.<sup>35</sup>
- The Political and Security Committee.<sup>36</sup>
- The Military Committee of the EU.
- The Military Staff of the EU.<sup>37</sup>

The Political and Security Committee is considered to be the linchpin of EU's EDSP/CFSP. Under directions of the Council it is responsible for providing the necessary political guidance that concerns EU's military capabilities and for formulating options for the Council in the event of a crisis. The Political and Security Committee also "exercises 'political control and strategic direction' of the EU's military response to the crisis."<sup>38</sup> The Military Committee of the EU is composed of the Chiefs of Defense (Chiefs of Staff or General Staff) and its principal mission is the provision of military advice and recommendations to the Political and Security Committee.<sup>39</sup> The EU Military Staff organization enables "the EU to assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks" that are defined in the EU Treaty, and the Petersberg tasks. The main operational functions of the EU Military Staff include "early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning."<sup>40</sup> The WEU's military institutional structure had already included various working groups (politico military, military representatives, planning nucleus, defense industrial cooperation etc.). Furthermore, the WEU had developed certain C<sup>3</sup>I assets such as the Situation Center (Lisbon, Portugal), the Satellite Center (Torrejon, Spain), and the European Helios military reconnaissance satellite system with associated ground support and communications infrastructure..<sup>41</sup> Although there are continued efforts to enhance independent and EU-dedicated military C<sup>3</sup>I assets (including satellites), related multilateral programs have been degraded because of the withdrawal of certain member states due to budgetary constraints and arguments over "unnecessary duplication" of existing space-based NATO assets. Thus, it is not surprising that the Satellite Center at Torrejon has utilized

commercial satellite imagery from such systems as SPOT and LANDSAT, as well as from Russian military satellites, while according to certain accounts its performance has been mixed at a rather high cost.<sup>42</sup>

The emerging institutional framework for decision making within the European defense initiatives and its coordination with NATO has been put so far to rather limited operational tests.<sup>43</sup> The U.S. perception of the ESDI emphasizes European-led initiatives *within* NATO and implies *joint* decision-making *and* operational control. However, the EU may have defined a certain set of parameters that tend to emphasize the *autonomy* of EU's military initiatives *within* (ESDI) and *outside* (CFSP/EDSP) the formal NATO structure. Some of these parameters are stated below in the form of "guiding principles":

Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members *will participate if they so wish*, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, *on a decision by the Council*, be *invited* to take part in operations where the EU *does not use NATO assets*.

Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU *may also be invited by the Council* to take part in *EU-led operations* once the Council has decided to launch such an operation.

All the States that have confirmed their participation in an *EU-led* operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day-to-day conduct of such an operation.

\* \* \*

There will be *full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework*.<sup>44</sup>

The "guiding principles" for the "operational phase" of "arrangements during crisis periods" specify the following:

For operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, operational planning will be carried out by the Alliance's planning bodies, and for autonomous EU operation it will be carried out within one of the European strategic level headquarters. For operations requiring recourse to NATO assets, the non-EU European allies will be involved in planning according to the procedures laid down within NATO. For autonomous operations in which they are invited to take part, the candidate countries and non-EU European allies may send liaison officers to the European Military Staff [EUMS] bodies at strategic level for exchanges of information on operational planning and the contributions envisaged. The States concerned will provide the EU with an initial indication of their contribution, which will then be further specified during exchanges with the Operation Commander assisted by the EUMS.<sup>45</sup>

The "guiding principles" regarding EU-NATO cooperation rely on the NATO Washington Summit of April 1999, and appear to establish the necessary parameters for access to certain NATO resources for the EU military activities:

(1) *Guaranteed Access to NATO's Planning Capabilities*

The European Union will have *guaranteed permanent access* (11) to NATO's planning capabilities:

- when the EU examines options with a view to an operation, drawing up its strategic military options can involve a contribution from NATO's planning capabilities.
- in order to provide operational planning for an operation which has recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

\* \* \*

(2) *Presumption of availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities*

Regarding the pre-identification of assets, work on pre-identifying the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance which may be used for *EU-led* operations will be carried out by EU and Alliance experts and will be validated by a meeting of the Military Committees of the two organizations with a view to their approval under each organization's specific procedures.

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(11) **Without case-by-case NATO authorisation**<sup>46</sup>

## **EU Involvement in Peace Operations and the Concept of Humanitarian Intervention**

The preceding discussion of the "guiding principles" strongly indicates the EU views that it *will have unhindered access* to NATO's planning assets and capabilities whether or not the specific operation in question is or is not under a "mixed" NATO-EU or "pure" EU initiative.

The definition of the missions and tasks that can be undertaken under European-led defense initiatives under either the ESDI or the EDSP/CFSP framework is fully linked with the concept of "humanitarian intervention." The concept of "humanitarian intervention" has been tested on numerous occasions, under varying circumstances and with mixed results, especially in the context of both peacekeeping and peace making operations. Humanitarian intervention has presented and is presenting particular challenges for the UN, the EU and NATO in the various conflicts that led to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and continue to threaten peace and stability in the Balkans. Humanitarian intervention involves the use of force for the mitigation of a crisis.<sup>47</sup> The use of humanitarian intervention usually rests on certain universally applicable principles that are prescribed either by existing international law or acceptable norms of conduct. The commitment of state actors or organizations -- on a unilateral or multilateral

basis -- in humanitarian intervention operations, involves inherent tensions between the purpose of the intervention and its context. As the Yugoslav conflicts have demonstrated, these tensions are particularly severe if the purpose of the intervention conflicts with such concepts as national sovereignty, internationally recognized boundaries, whether the intervention intentionally or unintentionally will benefit a certain side in a particular conflict, whether the intervention will have unintended short and long-term consequences, etc.

The NATO-led and U.S.-inspired humanitarian interventions in the Bosnian civil war that led to the Dayton Accords of 1995, and in Kosovo in 1999, were not hampered by the concepts of national sovereignty, boundaries, or territorial integrity. These interventions strictly focused on a temporary or permanent resolution of armed conflicts through the use of predominantly military means when the corresponding crises had escalated to catastrophic proportions. The accepted legal basis for these humanitarian interventions continues to be in dispute especially with respect to the Kosovo crisis. The NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis did not rely on the strict interpretation of international law despite the Yugoslav offensive against the Albanian guerilla forces in Kosovo and the violent expulsion of the Albanian ethnic population. Under the UN Charter, the NATO bombardment did not rely on the principles of self-defense against a direct attack or on the specific mandate of a UN Security Council designed to safeguard international peace and security. Indeed, it was not until the Washington Summit of 1999 that NATO agreed on the undertaking of operational missions outside the boundaries of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that explicitly contemplates the use of force in defense against an (external) attack against a NATO member.<sup>48</sup> Instead, there appears to be an increasing reliance on the more abstract principles that involve the broader protection of basic human rights and the historical precedent of unilateral or multilateral humanitarian interventions.

However, the definition of what amounts to the protection of basic human rights and the decision to mount a humanitarian intervention are, more often than not, matters of subjective judgement. For example, neither NATO nor the U.S. ever seriously answered to the question of the treatment of the ethnic Kurdish minority during the multi-year Turkish counter-guerilla campaign against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).<sup>49</sup> A mix of political motives and humanitarian concerns prompts humanitarian interventions. Thus, the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo was prompted by both the "containment" policies that the U.S. Clinton Administration had earlier implemented against the Milosevic regime in Belgrade and the forcible expulsion of the ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Similarly, Vietnam's invasion and ouster of the murderous Pol Pot regime in Cambodia in 1978, and the 1971 Indian invasion of East Pakistan (now

Bangladesh), were intended not only to save human lives but to pursue the respective national security interests of Vietnam and India.<sup>50</sup>

The Bosnia and the Kosovo experiences indicate that the U.S. and its European NATO allies tend to adopt different perspectives when it comes to issues and decisions that involve humanitarian interventions and especially peace making operations. The Europeans live under the historical experience of two world wars and the divisions of the Cold War. They are completely familiar with the history and politics of their continent. Their inherent sensitivity to concepts of national sovereignty and recognized boundaries makes them more reluctant to intervene in crises that involve or hold the potential of prolonged regional conflicts. European nations also have to cope with the long-term direct and indirect human and economic costs if humanitarian interventions fail to *permanently* resolve a regional crisis, which either continues or spreads. The U.S. is often imbued by a "can do" attitude that may ignore the historical roots of a crisis but has the will and can mobilize and direct in a short time tremendous political, economic and military resources towards the temporary or long-term resolution of a crisis conflict. This attitude risks the long-term substitution of one crisis for another, or the intervention tends to favor a certain party to the crisis conflict over another. The U.S. always maintains the option of terminating or limiting its transatlantic commitments in crisis management or resolution especially when U.S. national security interests are not directly threatened. Both the U.S. and its European allies are equally hampered by domestic policy considerations that limit the willingness to sustain casualties or become involved in protracted peace operations without a clear "exit strategy." Using Bosnia and Kosovo as indicators one can reasonably conclude that neither the U.S. nor its European allies have been very good in managing regional crises in the European continent while *preventing their escalation*.

Indeed, the EU involvement in the Yugoslav conflicts of the early to the mid-1990s was largely political. Germany's premature and ill-advised recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991, led to the subsequent failures of the EU to take more decisive actions during the Yugoslav crisis including the deployment of peacekeeping forces into Croatia in 1992. Instead, military contingents from EU countries entered Croatia and later Bosnia under the flag of the UN and in accordance with UN resolutions that had no immediate effect on the ongoing hostilities. Since 1993, the U.S. Clinton Administration clearly adopted positions that were in favor of the Bosnian Muslims that proved to be a point of tension within NATO. It was not until the 1995 NATO aerial bombardment of Bosnian Serb positions and the creation of a European rapid reaction force under a French initiative that created the necessary coordination and preconditions for the subsequent U.S.-led Dayton Accords and the cessation of hostilities in

Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>51</sup> The West's predisposition against the Milosevic regime largely defined a policy that largely ignored the rapidly escalating civil conflict in Kosovo in 1998-1999 until this conflict reached the stage of a crisis with immense humanitarian dimensions. The unilateral NATO intervention that resulted in the bombardment of Yugoslavia and the insertion of the KFOR peacekeeping force did not result in a permanent solution of the Kosovo crisis. Instead, NATO's actions in Kosovo have essentially strengthened the secessionist and nationalistic aspirations of ethnic Albanians in the region. The result is that the Kosovo crisis has recently manifested itself in open hostilities in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the only former Yugoslav republic that had managed so far to avoid internal conflict and promote a democratic multiethnic society within its economically meager means.

### **Current security crisis in FYROM**

The recent conflict in FYROM and the experience of the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo provide some important lessons for the character of humanitarian interventions and associated peace operations that may be undertaken under the ESDI or EDSP/CFSP concepts.

1. The identification, diagnosis and classification of the crisis conflict within the framework of the EU and NATO must be timely and impartial. The root causes and the respective interests of the actors in a crisis conflict must be clearly and speedily recognized at their earliest stage. Such recognition cannot be occluded by the *humanitarian consequences* of the crisis conflict. For example, at this early stage of the open conflict in FYROM, the UN, NATO, the EU and various individual nation-states have uniformly recognized that the ethnic Albanian guerillas have secessionist aims through the use of violence while the government in Skopje intends to preserve the integrity of the Republic by all necessary means. This recognition has not (*yet*) been affected by the domestic and transnational refugee flows that are the clear *result* of the conflict.<sup>52</sup>
2. There must be a clear definition of the operative policy principles *under which a unified* response to the crisis conflict will be formulated. So far, the response of both the EU and NATO to the conflict in FYROM has been based on the principle that the internationally recognized boundaries of a sovereign state cannot change through violent means.

3. There must be a rapid, uniform and multidimensional response to the crisis conflict at the *appropriate scale* so that the crisis conflict will not *escalate* or *expand*. For example, in the FYROM crisis so far both the EU and NATO have framed their respective responses to largely diplomatic measures and limited military assistance. Both NATO and the EU have refrained from putting into motion a stronger military response and a more expansive program of security assistance to the FYROM government. The EU and NATO response has so far included:

- The unanimous EU and NATO *political* condemnation of the actions of the secessionist ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (UCK) in FYROM and continuous consultations with the central government in Skopje.
- The uses of political and economic pressure on the Kosovo ethnic Albanian political movements in order to achieve the political isolation of the UCK guerilla actions in FYROM. It appears that the threat of *halting economic assistance* to the devastated Kosovo region has motivated the Kosovo ethnic Albanian political movements to distance themselves from the UCK activities in FYROM and to call for a cessation of the hostilities. Furthermore, the Albanian government itself has criticized the UCK guerilla actions in FYROM.
- NATO reinforcement and intensification of the KFOR patrols at the FYROM-Kosovo frontiers and the utilization of U.S., UK and French unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the monitoring of the FYROM-Kosovo frontier zone with the purpose of intercepting the cross-border flows of UCK personnel and military munitions.
- The dispatch of military advisors by the UK to the FYROM's military command and the donation by Greece of two Huey transport helicopters.

Additional measures that the EU and NATO can take so that the crisis in FYROM can be timely and effectively defused include:

- Concrete offers of military assistance to the FYROM government, especially in items that are essential for a counter-guerilla campaign in mountainous terrain, e.g., more transport and armed helicopters with self-protection systems, light armored vehicles, heavy infantry weapons, C<sup>3</sup>I gear, etc., training and sharing of relevant tactical and political intelligence data. FYROM has been able to obtain two Mi-17 transport and two

Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters from the Ukraine. In addition, it appears that only Bulgaria has so far provided military munitions to the FYROM government.

- Economic assistance designed to quickly obviate the humanitarian effects of the fighting and provide the basis of self-sustaining economic development that will *impartially* benefit all local inhabitants. The FYROM government has promised but can ill-afford to compensate those who suffered property losses during the successful assault against the Albanian guerillas around Tetovo. Long-term capital investment that will *impartially* benefit all ethnic elements in FYROM is critical, e.g., capital investment by Greek enterprises in FYROM so far amounts to approximately \$300 million.
- The NATO and the EU can assume a larger military role *within* FYROM while not subjecting the participating personnel to a significant risk of attack or direct hostilities. Such role can include tasks such as:
  - Providing assistance for the better policing of FYROM's frontiers with Albania.
  - Assistance with static defense duties of significant infrastructure elements (e.g., electric power generating stations, POL refining and storage facilities) and lines of communication (e.g., bridges, highways, and rail lines).
  - Assistance with humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts, (e.g., repairing and rebuilding damaged housing stock).

The crisis in FYROM clearly demonstrates the need for timely and multidimensional response for future EU-led humanitarian interventions.

### **EU and Peace Operations – Military Structures and Means**

The NATO and European humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and in Kosovo have demonstrated the need for the rapid deployment of flexible military formations that can easily adapt in the roles that are necessary for the modern conduct of peace operations. It is obvious that the EU military formations that will be involved in the conduct of peace operations in the ESDI or CFSP/EDSP context must maintain a proper balance between increased mobility that is essential for rapid intervention, and the need to maintain the necessary combat capabilities. Experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now FYROM, plainly indicate that that the modern character

of peace operations is or can be drastically different from the traditional peacekeeping mission of simply patrolling a well-defined line or zone that separates two combatants. The overall change of the security situation in Europe, i.e., the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, has redefined the missions and tasks and is transforming the respective organizational structures of the armed forces in most of the EU nations. Most of the EU member states are gradually moving away from national conscript armies and are adopting or increasingly rely upon professional military organizational structures. For example, both France and the UK already have professional force structures, while Greece and other EU/NATO members increasingly utilize professional military personnel in peace operations. Naturally, a professional force structure readily provides the requisite resources of well-trained personnel and thus is more conducive for the rapid deployment and execution of missions that relate to peace operations. However, even the ongoing changes in the military organizational structures of the EU member states will continue to present certain challenges for the rapid assembly and deployment of sizable forces for particular missions of longer duration. Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, with a certain degree of irony has observed the following:

Kosovo showed how much work remains to be done. Even though Europe has two million soldiers in uniform, which is half a million more than the United States, it still struggled to scrape together 40,000 for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. This represents about 2 percent of the forces Europe has on paper. If you can only use 2 percent of your forces when you really need them, you have a problem.

The EU has finally heard this wake up call. At Helsinki, it has set an ambitious military target. By the year 2003, it wants to have the capability to deploy about 60,000 troops within 60 days of the order being given, and that that forces should be able to remain in the field for at least one year.

This is a very ambitious goal. To be able to sustain a force of 60,000 troops in the field for at least one year, at least 140,000 more at home are needed to be able to rotate them through. Furthermore, if they are to deploy in 60 days *they must be training constantly at a high level.*<sup>53</sup>

The EU ministers of defense decided in November 2000 on the formation of the EU Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) that will be operational in 2003 with the immediate commitment of 60,000 personnel. There is also a broader commitment of 100,000 personnel, 400 aircraft of all types, and 100 naval vessels of various types from the existing EU member states.<sup>54</sup> This EURRF will not be a "standing" military force but it will be composed of various designated units from the EU member states. For example, Greece has committed a full mechanized infantry brigade, six CH-47D Chinook transport helicopters, 30 combat aircraft, six RF-4E Phantom

reconnaissance aircraft, four C-130H Hercules transport aircraft, six missile-guided frigates, one submarine, and five auxiliary naval vessels.<sup>55</sup>

Naturally, the operational capabilities of the EURRF will depend on the investment that the EU member states will be willing to make individually and collectively. Such investment is considered essential for increasing the mobility and the available firepower of the EURRF. It is widely believed that this can be achieved through the deployment of the appropriate transportation assets (especially transport aircraft and helicopters), the increased acquisition of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and the use of better C<sup>3</sup>I systems.<sup>56</sup> However, although it appears that the EU member states in Western Europe are ready to make the requisite financial commitments, such commitments always compete with fiscal and budgetary constraints. The defense spending in certain of these countries ranged from 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in Germany to 2.6% in the UK and 2.8% in France in 1999 (the U.S. expended 3.2% of its GDP on national defense in 1999).<sup>57</sup> In sharp contrast, because of its unique national security situation, Greece expends approximately 4.9% of its GDP in constant prices on national defense that is the highest comparable figure among all NATO nations.

Military procurement decisions by EU members are usually influenced by the strong desire to sustain and enhance the technological and commercial potential of European defense firms. For example, a number of EU member states and Turkey have decided on the joint development, production and procurement of approximately 224 Airbus A400M military transport aircraft with a payload capacity of 20-30 tons each.<sup>58</sup> Because the A400M will not be available for years to come, UK's Royal Air Force has had to make alternative air mobility arrangements for the interim period that involve U.S. made Boeing/McDonnell Douglas C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft.<sup>59</sup> Certain EU nations have moved to coordinate their defense procurement programs within the context of the Organization for Joint Armament Co-operation known as OCCAR (*Organization Conjointe de Co-operation en Matiere d' Armement*), which gained its own legal existence on January 28, 2001 following the ratification of the OCCAR Convention of September 1998.<sup>60</sup> The OCCAR organization already manages a number of collaborative projects that include PGMs, armored vehicles, military electronics, etc. In this respect, OCCAR furthers the goals of European defense industrial cooperation and is a useful element within the ESDI and CFSP/EDSP concepts. Furthermore, OCCAR may play a useful role in lessening the tensions and antagonisms that traditionally have existed between the European and U.S. defense industries on questions of military procurement through various partnership arrangements.

The armed forces of both the EU member states and the U.S. are faced with the fundamental issues of the appropriate force structure and related equipment requirements that are appropriate for the conduct of peace operations. The experiences of the peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo do not clearly favor the use of highly mobile but "light" formations. For example, the UN/NATO Nordic Battalion in Bosnia was equipped with Leopard 1 main battle tanks (MBTs) and was able to successfully engage Bosnian Serb armored forces with T-54/55 MBTs in a certain instance. Certain KFOR contingents were accompanied by MBTs during their initial entry into Kosovo since the armor elements of the withdrawing Yugoslav forces had not been seriously affected by the NATO bombardment. On the other hand, light formations have the inherent advantage of *strategic* mobility. For example, the UK was able to deploy a parachute battalion, Special Forces elements, transport helicopters, and vehicles to Sierra Leone in 2000 within a 36-hour time interval.<sup>61</sup> The strategic mobility of light forces also provides the *political benefits* of an *early* intervention into a crisis. This may either assist in its de-escalation or may act as a "tripwire" permitting the concentration of heavier follow-on forces, e.g., the early deployment of the U.S. Army 82<sup>nd</sup> and 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Divisions to Saudi Arabia during the August 1990 *Desert Shield* operations.<sup>62</sup> The timing of deployment and the proper unit mix of light and heavy units will be crucial for the European forces that will be involved in peace operations under the ESDI and CFSP/EDSP concepts. For example the early deployment of a "light" battalion in a crisis situation may have the political and military value of a "heavy" brigade a week later.<sup>63</sup>

The development, training and equipment of the appropriate force structure for peace operations within *each* of the EU member states naturally pose some interesting dilemmas. Although peace operations are generally compatible with NATO-defined missions, the development of the necessary capabilities faces the usual obstacles of operational, political and fiscal constraints. The current trend for the U.S. and its European NATO Allies is the overall numerical reduction of the available forces. Naturally, this reduces the available personnel resources of *each* country that can: (1) *readily* be deployed for peace operations; (2) meet other NATO missions; and (3) meet its *own* specific national security needs. These competing needs must also be accommodated within the specific budgetary constraints of each country. Certain EU countries that are also NATO members do maintain diversified force structures because of their own national security needs and can readily deploy forces for peace operations, e.g., France, UK. Other member states, such as Greece, have focused their military forces on traditional integrated war fighting missions and capabilities. However, even Greece is developing a rapid reaction force capability that has already been partially utilized for peace operations.

Inevitably, the rapid deployment of EU "light" units for peace operations in a crisis environment will have to rely on the capabilities of selected members, while more conventional "heavy" units will have to be deployed as "follow-on" forces. This is especially true with respect to strategic lift capabilities that have not yet been fully developed among the EU military forces in a coordinated fashion.

## **GREECE, PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE ESDI - CFSP/EDSP CONCEPTS**

The geopolitical position of Greece and the continuous, and often violent changes, that have taken place in the Balkans since the end of the Cold War, have sharply increased the responsibilities, commitments and burdens for peacekeeping operations by the Hellenic Armed Forces. The involvement of the Hellenic Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations is not a new phenomenon. A Hellenic Army battalion and a squadron of Hellenic Air Force DC-3 Dakotas saw extensive combat action under the UN banner during the Korean conflict in 1950-1952. During the 1990s, the Hellenic Armed Forces have participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia and in the Balkans. The peacekeeping mission and commitments of the Hellenic Armed Forces are expected to continue in the near future not only in the context of the UN, the NATO alliance or the Greek membership in the EU, but also because of other bilateral or multilateral obligations

### **The Hellenic Armed Forces and Types of Peace Operations**

The Hellenic Armed Forces have and are typically involved in peace operations that are defined by missions of peacekeeping, peace observation, peace and sanction enforcement, and protection of humanitarian operations. Such involvement has typically taken place in the context of multinational peace operations under the leadership of the UN or NATO. Typical examples of Greek military participation in peace operations have included:

Peacekeeping: Participation in the operations of the Implementation and Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia and in the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR).

Peace Observation: The Hellenic Army participates with officer observers in the UN policing of demilitarized zones and cease fire agreements in Kuwait (UNIKOM - since 1991), Georgia (UNOMIG - since 1994) and Western Sahara (MINURSO - since 1991).

Protection of Humanitarian Operations: A Hellenic Army transport unit participated in the UN humanitarian operations in Somalia in 1992-1993. In 1997, along with other contingents and following the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1101/1997, a Hellenic Army Unit (Ελληνική Δύναμης Αλβανίας - *Elliniki Dýnamis Alvanías* or Hellenic Force in

Albania), entered Albania in order to protect ongoing humanitarian operations and to safeguard the peaceful conduct of elections in that country.

Peace and Sanction Enforcement: Hellenic Navy units have participated in the enforcement of international blockades and sanctions both in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, and during the Yugoslav conflicts in the mid to late-1990s.<sup>64</sup>

In addition, small Hellenic Army units have undertaken integrated missions for the extraction of ethnic Greek residents from former republics of the Soviet Union in situations of civil conflict, e.g., Georgia 1993. Greek fire/rescue teams, civilian medical units and Hellenic Air Force fire fighting and transport aircraft immediately and actively participated in relief operations in the aftermath of the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey. This humanitarian assistance was *automatically* sent to Turkey *without any political preconditions*.

### **Political Framework for Greek Participation in Peace Operations**

Greek participation in peace operations was and still is largely defined by the collective goals of multilateral organizations or alliances, e.g., the UN, NATO and the EU. The evolving international political situation in the Balkans and Greece's national security interests in the region naturally mandates a regional focus for the Greek involvement in peace operations. Greece shares the goals of other countries and multilateral organizations for international peace, stability and prosperity. The aftermath of the various conflicts in former Yugoslavia emphasize the need for attaining the goals of peace, stability and economic prosperity in the region of the Balkans. These goals are fully consistent with Greek national security policies and strategy. The avoidance of conflict or alternatively the maintenance of peace in the Balkans has direct positive and material effects for Greek national security and economic interests. Alternatively, armed conflicts and instability in countries that border or are in close proximity to the boundaries of the Greek state engender political, security, economic and social costs. These include border tensions, inflows of political and economic refugees, rise in transnational criminal activities, decreases in international trade and investment, increases in defense and domestic security expenditures, etc. Thus, Greek participation in peace operations in a multilateral or unilateral context in the Balkans serves the goals of Greek national security policies and strategy.

### **International and Domestic Coordination**

Greek involvement in peace operations, especially in the Balkans, demand coordination both politically and operationally within multilateral organizations such as the UN, NATO, and

the EU (where Greece is the only member from the Balkan states). As the Kosovo crisis clearly demonstrated, Greek involvement in peace operations must also meet the constraints of domestic Greek politics. In this respect, it must be recognized that domestic politics always play a pivotal role in the commitment of individual nation states in unilateral or multilateral peace operations. American popular opinion strongly questioned the U.S. involvement in the peace operations in Somalia and the resulting sacrifice that was made by U.S. Army servicemen in 1993.<sup>65</sup> The majority of the Greek public opposed NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis of 1999 and demonstrated against the insertion of NATO KFOR units through Greek harbor and airport facilities. The Greek government stayed a difficult course in meeting its NATO commitments and obligations and maintaining its focus on the *long-term* national security interests of Greece.

### **Greek National Policy Objectives and Implementation**

It is beyond doubt that Greek involvement in peace operations is designed to further regional peace and stability, especially in the Balkans. The involvement of the Hellenic Force in Albania was not simply limited to the protection of humanitarian operations and the security of subsequent Albanian national elections, but it also extended to the restructuring and modernization of the Albanian armed forces following the complete collapse of the Albanian government institutions in the spring of 1997. During its deployment the Hellenic Force in Albania engaged in the construction and improvement of Albanian military facilities, transferred large quantities of logistical support equipment to the Albanian armed forces (tracked vehicles, trucks, ambulances, computers, pharmaceuticals, hospital equipment, etc.), provided direct humanitarian assistance to the indigenous population and, most importantly, engaged in the training of Albanian armed forces personnel.<sup>66</sup> These activities not only helped to stabilize Albania's political and security situation but they also promoted Greek national security interests in the Balkans. It must be noted that an Italian armed forces contingent has established a permanent presence in Albania, while Turkey has also extended military assistance to the Albanian armed forces.

The Albanian crisis in the spring of 1997 provides the best example of a situation where EU forces can undertake a *meaningful* peace operation through *already existing* means under the ESDI and CFSP/EDSP concepts. The dimensions and the context of the Albanian crisis easily lent themselves to the multidimensional political and military intervention of primarily European countries that managed to defuse potentially dangerous conditions of domestic political and socioeconomic instability.

The role of Greece in the context of the EU and the Balkans forms a connection for the conduct of peace operations in the region. In this respect, Greece played an important role in the organization of the Multinational Peace Force of South Eastern Europe with Greece, Romania, Turkey, Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria and Italy as participants. The current commander of this force is a Turkish Army brigadier general and its headquarters are currently located in Bulgaria.<sup>67</sup> This Force could become a strong candidate for participation in peace operations under the ESDI and CFSP/EDSP concepts.

### **Greek Resource Capabilities and Constraints for Peace Operations**

The bulk of the Hellenic Army contingents that have been involved in peace operations in the Balkans are mainly mechanized infantry units that are lightly armed. Their equipment usually includes lightly armored wheeled reconnaissance vehicles (French Panhard VBLs) and M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs). Support elements have included engineering, medical and military aviation units (transport helicopters). These contingents have undertaken a number of transport and local security missions in Kosovo and in Bosnia under NATO command. For example, the Hellenic Army contingent in Kosovo operates in the U.S. sector of Kosovo and is under the overall KFOR command structure. Both the Hellenic Navy and the Hellenic Air Force (HAF) support Greek participation in peace operations or provide direct support to multilateral forces that are engaged in similar activities. For example, HAF C-130 transport aircraft flew missions to the Sarajevo airport in support of UN peace operations and contingents *before* the entry of the IFOR/SFOR forces into Bosnia.

The Hellenic commitment in peace operations is linked to the overall capabilities of the Hellenic Armed Forces to rapidly deploy combat units and related support elements at crisis areas. In recent years, there has been a restructuring of the Hellenic Army that aims to create these capabilities. The B' (2nd) Army Corps has been designated as the core rapid deployment force of the Hellenic Armed Forces. For example, the Hellenic Army units that have been committed in the Kosovo peace operations are under the command structure of the B' Army Corps. This presents the obvious problem that units that are committed to peace operations are not readily available for rapid deployment into crisis areas that are more critical to Greek national security interests. For example, the Hellenic Army commitment in KFOR has reached approximately 1,636 men. This represents approximately 1.4%- of the overall Hellenic Army personnel strength in peacetime and 4.7% of the KFOR manpower.<sup>68</sup> Greece bears the total cost of its participation in and support to peace operations. For a country where defense expenditures amount to 4.9% of its GDP in constant dollars this is not a small burden.<sup>69</sup>

The broad reorganization of the Hellenic Armed Forces and of the Hellenic Army in particular presents new challenges and opportunities for Greek involvement in peace operations. Greece, following the example of other NATO countries, is proceeding with the increased professionalization of its Armed Forces. Indeed, the largest part of the Hellenic Army contingent in Kosovo is composed by regular and volunteer non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who have 5-year military service obligations.

Increasing national commitments in peace operations necessitate radical rethinking and reformulation of military ideology concepts and related training. The personnel involved in peace operations must reorient their military thinking from the clear war fighting mission of national defense to the *different* and *multiple* missions and goals of peace operations. Such goals and missions are often ambiguous and lack clearly defined political and military objectives.<sup>70</sup> For this reason, the Hellenic Armed Forces have established the Multinational Training Center that focuses on officer training for participation and support of peace operations. Officers from other NATO countries and non-NATO Balkan states have attended the related training courses. In addition, the cultural upbringing of the average Greek officer and soldier has facilitated the positive interaction with the local populations where Hellenic peace operations contingents have deployed despite existing linguistic, social, cultural and religious differences.

Greece current policy of involvement in peace operations, especially in the Balkans region, has served Greek national security interests and must continue. The increased European orientation of Greek foreign policy in the context of the European Security Defense Identity will invariably necessitate Greek participation in and support of peace operations within, and possibly outside, the European continent that will be carried out by European countries that are or are not members of existing multilateral organizations such as the EU and NATO. In this respect, Greece can and should continue to play the role of the connecting link between the EU and NATO members and the Balkan non-member states.

Greek involvement in peace operations has been conducted in the context of Greece's participation in multilateral organizations and alliances, e.g., UN, NATO, EU, etc. This approach has served the long-term national security interests of Greece despite occasional domestic political opposition. However, Greece must play a more active role in the defining the political and military scope and objectives of multilateral peace operations. In addition, Greece must maintain the political will and increase the independent capabilities for unilaterally undertaking short-term peace operations with clearly defined missions, e.g., the evacuation of Greek nationals in emergency situations but in a *hostile environment*.

## THE FUTURE OF THE ESDI - CFSP/EDSP CONCEPTS AND PEACE OPERATIONS

The currently prevailing perceptions are that the European defense initiatives under the ESDI and CFSP/EDSP may result in certain tensions with the short and long-term national security policy goals of the U.S. and within the NATO Alliance. These tensions can actually provide the basis for a constructive transatlantic dialogue and common policy formulation. Such tensions provide a useful European perspective to U.S. policy makers while emphasizing the need for the EU member states to proceed with the *concrete implementation* of and *resource commitment* to the European defense initiatives. Actually, the U.S. perspective for keeping the implementation of EU defense initiatives *within* NATO, i.e., ESDI, may provide the EU member states with an initially limited but useful context for the testing and long-term maturity of a uniquely European defense identity. Increased participation of EU member states along with non-EU and/or non-NATO states in EU-led peace operations will provide the requisite testing ground of whether the long-term CFSP/EDSP *common defense* goals of an *integrated* Europe are achievable.

The similarity or the mutual interests of the U.S. and the EU and the processes of NATO and EU enlargement will definitely influence the long-term development of a unique and independent European defense identity. It is unclear if on a long-term basis the *alternative* collective security arrangements that can become available under the EU defense initiatives will compete with those that will be offered under the NATO Alliance. Similarly, no one can easily predict whether the presence of the U.S.-dominated NATO Alliance will be conducive to the further political and socioeconomic integration of the nation-states in the European continent.<sup>71</sup> For example, Turkey's admission to the EU and its ESDI participation have become contentious issue in EU-U.S. relations. In the distant future, there may be a more intensified debate if the issue of European political and socioeconomic integration were to encompass the Russian Federation and other CIS members.

Greek foreign policy has repeatedly sought a debate on issues involving the security of one NATO member who is threatened by another. Since the collective NATO security arrangements have conclusively failed to address this area, Greece (especially in view of the upcoming accession of the Cyprus Republic to the EU) is paying additional attention to the *collective defense arrangements* that can become operational through the long-term implementation of the CFSP/EDSP concept. Naturally, both Greece and Cyprus will be inclined to rely more on the political, economic and security mechanisms of the EU in order to deter *external threats* to their security.<sup>72</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

The similarity and mutuality of security interests of the U.S. and the EU will influence the long-term development of a unique and independent European defense identity. Although the U.S. may view with a certain degree of apprehension the development of such an identity along the lines of the CFSP/ESDP concept, such an identity will not lead to the severance of the transatlantic security link and will not undermine the NATO Alliance. The long-term development of the European defense identity is likely to parallel the future EU enlargement and, thus, is likely to benefit the overall *collective* strategic goals of the NATO Alliance. Since the development of a European defense identity will be paralleled by the requisite economic and sociopolitical *integration*, it is less likely to be perceived as a military threat by the Russian Federation and/or other regional actors.

The ESDI concept can be viewed as an *interim* stage in the long-term development of an independent and unique European defense identity. This interim stage will provide the testing ground of whether the EU member states can materially implement and successfully *utilize* their commitment to a European defense identity within or outside the NATO Alliance. Similarly, the EU will be able to test whether it can utilize its own defense initiatives with or without the necessary coordination and/or cooperation of the NATO Alliance. This is particularly important for the undertaking of peace operations in a crisis situation.

It is crucial that the EU member states should commit to the *early, decisive, and multidimensional* response that involves a *proportional* "humanitarian intervention" and the conduct of peace operations in a crisis. The current FYROM crisis is appropriate for such an action. Permitting a crisis to fester may render such an intervention unworkable or may necessitate the commitment of much larger political, socioeconomic and military resources with higher attendant risks. These risks include the prolongation and escalation of the crisis situation, its potential spread to neighboring regions, and the attendant risks that EU military personnel will be actively involved in "peace enforcement" duties. Naturally, there must be a clear definition of the principles, missions, and tasks involved in the related peace operations. The creation of the EURRF was the first step. A coordinated military equipment procurement program among the EU member states can guarantee that by 2003 the EURRF will possess the appropriate and effective mix of mobility and firepower.

The strategic national security interests of Greece and the Cyprus Republic coincide with the development of a unique and independent European defense identity that is along the lines of the CFSP/ESDP concept. These interests will be better served through an enlarged EU

(where Cyprus will be a member), and the two nations will enjoy a better political deterrent capability against external threats.

Greek national security interests mandate the continuous participation of the Hellenic Armed Forces in peace operations, especially in the Balkans. Although Greek participation in peace operations will continue in the context of the NATO Alliance and the EU defense initiatives (EURRF), the Hellenic Armed Forces must attain the capability to carry out peace operations on a *unilateral* basis.

**WORD COUNT = 11834**



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP, St. Martin's Press, New York, NY, 2000, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Ioannis Parisis, I Europaiki Amyna Kai Asfaleia Sti Metapsichropolemiki Epohi (The European Defense and Security in the Post Cold War Period), Hellenic Foundation of European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Con. Tourikis Publishing, Athens, Greece, 1997, p. 29. See also Eric Stein, Peter Hay and Michel Waelbroeck, European Community Law and Institutions in Perspective, Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., Indianapolis, 1976, pp. 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> Bernard A. Weisberger, Cold War Cold Peace, American Heritage Press, Inc., New York, 1985, p. 95.

<sup>4</sup> Stein, Hay & Waelbroeck, pp. 2-4. The Treaties of Rome established the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

<sup>5</sup> Yiannis P. Roubatis, Tangled Webs: The U.S. in Greece 1947-1967, Pella Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1987, p. 110. Turkey became a NATO member at the same time.

<sup>6</sup> Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control, Random House, Inc., New York, 1985, pp. 24-25. The presence of the independent British and French U.S. nuclear forces considerably complicated various nuclear weapons limitation negotiations between the U.S and the USSR

<sup>7</sup> The Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey which were obsolete by the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were quietly removed following the withdrawal of the Soviet nuclear weapons from Cuba.

<sup>8</sup> Weisberger, pp. 270-271.

<sup>9</sup> Duke, pp. 65-66.

<sup>10</sup> Michael E. Smith, Policy Paper 52: Understanding Europe's "New" Common Foreign and Security Policy: A Primer for Outsiders, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2000, p. 3.

<sup>11</sup> Duke, pp. 49-50. The cancellation of the joint UK-U.S. Skybolt missile project brought certain tensions in the defense relationship of the two countries in the 1960s.

<sup>12</sup> Ελληνική Δημοκρατία, Υπουργείο Εθνικής Άμυνας, Ευρωπαϊκή Ασφάλεια κ ' Διεθνείς Οργανισμοί, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of National Defense, European Security & International Organizations, Athens, Greece, 1999, pp. 167-168 (Hellenic M.O.D., European Security & International Organizations).

<sup>13</sup> Duke, p. 73-74.

<sup>14</sup> Hellenic M.O.D., European Security & International Organizations, pp. 184-185.

<sup>15</sup> Duke, Appendix 7, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union," p. 339.

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<sup>16</sup> Col. Edward Murdock, USA, Regional Strategic Appraisal – Europe, “European Integration,” Lesson 3, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, February 2, 2001. See also Duke, Appendix 10, “Franco-British Summit – Joint Declaration on European Defence,” pp. 354-355.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., Duke, p. 313.

<sup>18</sup> Cdr. John W. Cotton (USN), Lt. Col. John F. Garrity (USA), III, Lt. Col. Steven C. Sifers (USA), United States Global Security and the European Security and Defense Identity: A Case for European Military Autonomy, Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, April 26, 2000, pp. 29-30.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>20</sup> Murdock.

<sup>21</sup> Roger Cohen, “Shifts in Europe Pose Prickly Challenges to U.S.,” The New York Times, February 11, 2001.

<sup>22</sup> Alexander Nicoll, “US warns Europe on plan for defence identity outside NATO,” Financial Times, February 5, 2001, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup> Douglas Hamilton, “Turkey Blocks Deal To Share NATO Force,” The Washington Post, December 16, 2000, p. A22.

<sup>24</sup> Peter Norman and Leyla Boulton, “Deal agreed on Turkish Path to EU,” Financial Times, December 5, 2000; BBC News, “Turkey deal struck by European ministers,” December 4, 2000, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid\\_1053000/1053697.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1053000/1053697.stm).

<sup>25</sup> ABC News, “Turkey firm on EU force after Albright intervenes,” December 14, 2000, [http://abcnews.go.com/wire/World/reuters20001214\\_2837.html](http://abcnews.go.com/wire/World/reuters20001214_2837.html).

<sup>26</sup> Cotton, Garrity, Sifers, p. 20.

<sup>27</sup> Cotton, Garrity, Sifers, p. 20.

<sup>28</sup> Russian fears of *unilateral* foreign military intervention within CIS territory date back to the WWI Allied involvement against the Bolsheviks.

<sup>29</sup> STRATFOR Systems Inc., It’s the Russians, Stupid, Global Intelligence Update, June 14, 1999.

<sup>30</sup> The Economist, NATO Survey, April 14, 1999, p. 17.

<sup>31</sup> Duke, pp. 154-156.

<sup>32</sup> Cohen.

<sup>33</sup> Charles Clover, “Russia outlines missile defence plan,” The Financial Times, February 21, 2001, p. 2. The Russian plan puts emphasis on “joint threat assessment and political solutions to ballistic missile threats, rather than on building new hardware.”

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<sup>34</sup> U.S. and Russian troops often engage in joint KFOR patrols and other peacekeeping duties in Kosovo.

<sup>35</sup> Papisis, p. 123.

<sup>36</sup> EU, Draft Presidency Report On The European Security And Defense Policy, Brussels, Belgium, December 13, 2000, p. 3 (EU, Draft Presidency Report On The European Security And Defense Policy), <http://ue.eu.int/New.../LoadDoc.cfm?MAX=1&DOC=!!!&BID=75&DID=64256&GRP=3020&LANG>.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., Annex III, p. 20.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., Annex IV, p. 21.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., Annex V, pp. 23-24.

<sup>41</sup> Papisis, pp. 125-139.

<sup>42</sup> Duke, pp. 254-255.

<sup>43</sup> These tests have largely been confined to command structures of peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and especially in Kosovo. Col. Nikolaos Grammatikopoulos, Hellenic Army Signal Corps, European Union Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and the Transatlantic Link, Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, unpublished paper, April 10, 2000, unpublished paper, pp. 12, 17.

<sup>44</sup> EU, Draft Presidency Report On The European Security And Defense Policy, Annex VI, "Arrangements Concerning Non-EU European NATO Members and Other Countries Which Are Candidates for Accession to the EU," p. 28 (emphasis added).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., Appendix to Annex VII, "Annex to the Permanent Arrangements on EU/NATO Consultation and Cooperation on the Implementation of Paragraph 10 of the Washington Communiqué," pp. 33-34, 36 (emphasis added).

<sup>47</sup> Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME, 1999, pp. 72-73.

<sup>48</sup> The Economist, "War With Milocevic – Law and right: When they don't fit together," April 3, 1999 (17:21), p. 20. Greece has repeatedly argued that the North Atlantic Treaty does not explicitly cover the possibility of an attack by a fellow NATO member, i.e., Turkey.

<sup>49</sup> Chomsky, pp. 52-62.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 75-76. The U.S. had criticized both Vietnam's involvement in Cambodia where the Pol Pot regime was also enjoying Chinese support, and India's invasion of East Pakistan.

<sup>51</sup> Duke, pp. 204-213.

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<sup>52</sup> Counter-guerilla operations inevitably result in the voluntary and/or forcible displacement of populations for reasons of safety or for depriving the guerilla forces from sources of support.

<sup>53</sup> Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, "NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative and Relations with the European Union," ROA National Security Report, Reserve Officers Association of the U.S., January/February 2001 (140:142), p. 141 (emphasis added).

<sup>54</sup> Στρατηγική, «Ευρωπαϊκός Στρατός – Ο κύβος ερρίφθη για την Ευρώπη», No. 75, Δεκέμβριος 2000, Αθήνα, σ. 62-65; Strategy, "European Army – The die was cast for Europe," No. 75, December 2000, Athens, Greece, pp. 62-65.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* The Greek commitment amounts to 3,500 personnel in ground forces and is the seventh in size among the corresponding levels committed by the other EU states. Germany has the top commitment of 13,500 personnel, followed by the UK with 12,500 and France with 12,000, while Italy, the Netherlands and Spain have a commitment of 6,000 personnel each.

<sup>56</sup> Alexander Nicoll, "A new model army," Financial Times, November 15, 2000, p. 18.

<sup>57</sup> Matthew Kaminski, Geoff Winestock, "Europe Musters Its Own Hot-Spot Squad: Nimble EU Crisis Force May Hone Spending; Conflicts With NATO?", The Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2000, p. A21.

<sup>58</sup> <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/fla>; <http://www.airbus-military.com/requirement.html>. The nations involved in the A400M "future large aircraft" (FLA) project and their respective FLA requirements are: Belgium (7), France (50), Germany (73), Italy (16), Portugal, Spain (27), Turkey (26), and the UK (25). A number of European aerospace firms, including Airbus and EADS, and Tusas of Turkey are involved in the A400M project.

<sup>59</sup> Francis Tusa, "A400M – Come Back When You're Serious," Defence Analysis, December 2000, republished by Defence Systems Daily at <http://defence-data.com/archive/pageda06.htm>; Francis Tusa, "Not much good news.....UK Budget Profile," Defence Analysis, September 2000, republished by Defence Systems Daily at <http://defence-data.com/archive/pageda03.html>. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft is capable of airlifting a cargo load of 76.64 tons. John Pike, Federation of American Scientists, April 25, 2000, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-17.html>.

<sup>60</sup> Defence Systems Daily, "OCCAR achieves legal status," January 30, 2001, <http://defence-data.com/archive/page9766.htm>. The founding nations of OCCAR are France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Other European nations can join OCCAR if they wish to participate in a major project in partnership with one of the founding members.

<sup>61</sup> Francis Tusa, "Medium Weight Wheeled Forces – Neither Fish nor Fowl," Defence Analysis, February 2001, republished by Defence Systems Daily, p. 1, <http://defence-data.com/archive/pageda08.htm>.

<sup>62</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, Appendix E, reprinted in Course 4: Implementing National Military Strategy, Vol. III, U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Academic Year 2001, p. 21-56.

<sup>63</sup> Tusa, "Medium Weight Wheeled Forces – Neither Fish nor Fowl," p. 2.

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<sup>64</sup> Ελληνική Δημοκρατία, Υπουργείο Εθνικής Άμυνας, Λευκή Βίβλος για τις Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις 1998-1999, Αθήνα, 2000, σ. 60; Hellenic Republic, Ministry of National Defense, White Paper for the Armed Forces: 1998-1999, Athens, Greece, 2000, p. 60 (Hellenic M.O.D. White Paper).

<sup>65</sup> See *generally* Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down, 1997 (Summary Note).

<sup>66</sup> Hellenic M.O.D., White Paper, p. 57.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>68</sup> The Hellenic Army numbers approximately 116,000 - 120,696 personnel. See International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999-2000, Oxford University Press, London, UK, October 1999, p. 58; Άμυντική Βίβλος 2001-2002, Στρατηγική, Επικοινωνίες Α.Ε., Αθήνα, Καλοκαίρι 2000, σ. 22; Amyndiki Vivlos 2000-2001 Defense Bible 2001-2001, Strategy, Epikoinonies S.A., Athens, Greece, Summer 2000, p. 22.

<sup>69</sup> NATO, NATO Review, Brussels, Belgium, Spring/Summer 2000, Documentation Table 3, p. D15.

<sup>70</sup> See *generally* Fabrizio Battistelli, Teresa Ammendola and Maria Grazia Galantino, "The Fuzzy Environment and Postmodern Soldiers: The Motivations of the Italian Contingent in Bosnia," "Peace Operations Between War and Peace," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Special Issue, Vol. 10, No. 2, Autumn 1999, pp. 138-160.

<sup>71</sup> Duke, pp. 299-301.

<sup>72</sup> The Cyprus Republic is a designated participant in the EU Rapid Reaction Force with a mechanized infantry company and has committed to facilitate EURF deployment through its airport and port facilities. Strategy, "European Army – The die was cast for Europe."

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