STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
MORE TIME IS REQUIRED

BY

COLONEL DAVID L. MANESS
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2001

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20010514 042

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Bosnia-Herzegovina
More Time is Required

Colonel David L. Maness
U.S. Army

Dr. Robert Murphy
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel David L. Maness

TITLE: Bosnia-Herzegovina: More Time is Required

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 April 2001 PAGES: 44 CLASSIFICATION

Bosnia-Herzegovina is the first significant test for post-Cold War diplomacy. The United States, as the sole superpower, is leading this mission. The method of waging war changed significantly during the 20th Century. War transformed from "Trinitarian", to insurgent, and finally to complex emergencies (identity conflict). The appropriate response for each is different. World War I and II provided an opportunity for leaders to feel comfortable with the "Trinitarian" response. Cold war politics determined the response to insurgent warfare. Identity conflict is the most dangerous, hardest to solve, and requires a different approach. Civilians are involved to a much greater extent. Hatred, separate visions, and the lack of shared goals fragment society. There is little information on the best way to manage these conflicts due to limited experience. The war in Bosnia lasted from 1991 until 1995. Diplomacy, followed by the use of military force, ended the fighting. Healing started with the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Five years have passed. What progress have we made? Are we closer to the end or does a lot of work remain? Should the United States remain until the appropriate environment is set to ensure success?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT III

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS VII

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 1

WAR IN THE 20TH CENTURY 3

COMPLEX EMERGENCY (IDENTITY CONFLICT) 4

THE REBUILDING MODEL 5

ESTABLISHING SAFETY 6

COMMUNALIZATION AND BEREAVEMENT 6

REBUILDING TRUST AND THE CAPACITY TO TRUST 7

REESTABLISHING PERSONAL AND SOCIAL MORALITY 7

REINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE 7

US POLICY 8

CURRENT STATUS 10

FAILURE TO FOLLOW DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS 11

ELECTIONS 11

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 11

WAR CRIMINALS 11

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION 12

SECURITY/SAFETY 12

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 12

ANTI-CORRUPTION 13

PUBLIC UTILITIES 13

PRIVATIZATION 13

EDUCATION 14

MEDIA 14

NATURAL RESOURCES/AGRICULTURE 15

INSTITUTIONS 15

CONCLUSION **15**

ENDNOTES **17**

BIBLIOGRAPHY **23**

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1-LEST WE FORGET!.....1

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA



FIGURE 1-LEST WE FORGET!

Serbs destroyed this Muslim community near Doboj. This picture demonstrates the vicious nature of an identity conflict. It also reveals that resolution begins on the ground floor, involves tremendous teamwork at all levels, and requires a lot of time.

In War the result is never final. Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort.

—Carl von Clausewitz

Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six republics of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The economic decline of Yugoslavia began in the 1970's. By the time of Tito's

death, foreign debt had increased to more than 20 billion U.S. dollars.[1] The situation worsened during the 1980's. Wages dropped and unemployment increased due to accelerating inflation. People left the city for the farms. Discord increased among the politicians. Foreign funding dwindled as the geostrategic significance of Yugoslavia changed with the end of the Cold War. This further exaggerated the problems for the people and government. Conditions were right for something bad to happen.

In 1991 two of Yugoslavia's republics, Slovenia and Croatia, declared their independence. The German leadership announced in mid-December that it would officially recognize their request on 15 January 1992. They felt this would prevent war. The Bosnian president traveled to Bonn to plead with them to change their minds. This recognition placed Bosnia-Herzegovina in a precarious situation. The constitutional protection of their territory from Croatia and Serbia was gone. In April 1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their independence. The Serbs and Croats wanted to merge with Serbia and Croatia. The Muslims wanted to maintain a unified, multiethnic state. Fighting between the Muslims and Croats ended in August 1994 with the signing of the U.S. pressured Washington Agreement. This created the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia; which fought the Serbs for the remainder of the war. U.S.-NATO bombing and intense diplomatic pressure produced a cease-fire and brought the warring parties to the negotiation table in Dayton. The signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in Paris on 14 December 1995 officially ended the war and instituted a new constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to this plan, Bosnia-Herzegovina is one country consisting of two entities, the Federation (Muslim-Croat) and the Republic of Srpska. The country has three presidents, one Croat, one Muslim, and one Serb.

Over two million refugees and 250,000 deaths resulted from this war.[2] The per-capita income fell from $1900 before the war to $500 at the end of 1995. Unemployment was 75%. Over 80% of Bosnians required humanitarian aid. Industrial production at the end of the war was 10% of pre-war levels. Approximately 50% of primary schools, 40% of bridges, and 35% of roads were damaged or destroyed.[3] The total estimated damage to Bosnia was US$80 billion. Post war reconstruction costs were estimated at US$16 billion. Education, health care, and basic infrastructure rebuilding costs were estimated at US$5.1 billion.[4]

Shortly after signing the treaty, a NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of 60,000 soldiers entered the country to separate the warring factions and develop a buffer zone. President Clinton assured the American public "that the operation had a clear, limited, and achievable mission and that the total troop deployment should and would take about one year."[5] U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot said "There will be no 'mission creep'—from

purely military tasks into 'nation-building'" in Bosnia."[6] Within two weeks of reelection, the president informed the American public, "eight and a half thousand U.S. troops would stay in Bosnia until 30 June 1998, another 18 months. He explained that rebuilding the fabric of Bosnia's economic and political life is taking longer than anticipated."[7] During his visit to Bosnia in December 1997, the president said the exit date had been extended. He said certain benchmarks would have to be met before U.S. soldiers would come home.[8] Three benchmarks were mentioned. First, an independent judiciary must be created. Second, political leaders must give up control of the media. Last, multiethnic political institutions must be established that are self-sustaining after the military operation is complete.[9] Defining these benchmarks for exiting Bosnia was a move in the right direction.

WAR IN THE 20TH CENTURY

The method of waging war changed substantially during the 20th Century. Clausewitz wrote, "War is simply the continuation of a country's policy by an admixture of means."[10] The "Trinitarian war" model described by Clausewitz consisted of combat dictated by the state, conducted by the military, and waged on behalf of the people.[11] Military commanders, in consultation with political leaders, developed the military plans and maneuvered the forces. Planning and fighting were done on behalf of the citizens. Public input was not sought. World War I and II are examples of this model.

The Trinitarian model of warfare ended for two major reasons. First, the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 transformed the nature of warfare. The use of this weapon as an extension of politics was not realistic. Second, colonialism came to an end.[12] Countries focused on their own internal power struggles. This marked the transition to "non-Trinitarian war."

The insurgent movement is the second form of warfare. Examples include independence movements, guerilla warfare, political rebellion, socialist revolution, national liberation struggles, counterinsurgency campaigns, separatist, and irredentist crusades.[13] These conflicts are generally fought within the country's border. The insurgents depended heavily on public support, had a political agenda, and were dependent on outside support. Superpowers provided financial, military, and technical backing. Teenagers and young adults comprised the fighting force. This blurred the distinction between the military and civilian combatants. Communities were usually spared. There were 160-armed conflicts between 1945 and 1991.[14] Of these, three-fourths were low intensity. Funding for these conflicts quickly dried up with the end of the Cold War. This brought most of these conflicts to an abrupt halt.

The third form of war, identity conflict, dominated the 90's. The fighting concerns language, culture, geographic affiliation, religion, ethnicity, nationality, tribal, or some other deep-rooted issue.[15] Society is fully engaged. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a prime example. Normal citizens are the combatants. They are motivated by common passion and survival. There is a strong personal element with emotion and self-justice. Political objectives are not clear. More than 90% of casualties are civilians. Military training tends to be at the lowest level. Weapons are crude and the fighting is ruthless. It is characterized by door to door fighting involving neighbors or relatives, which eventually polarizes the population. That destroys the fabric of society. In essence, the infrastructure of the community is destroyed with a resultant implosion of civilized life. This conflict generates the most refugees and displaced persons. Uncertainty and fear permeate the community. Of the three types of war, identity conflicts are hardest on citizens and the most difficult to manage.[16]

Triumph by one side, followed by a peace accord, marked the end of both World Wars. This represented a clear end to fighting. It signified an agreement between warring states, not individuals. Occupying forces ensured compliance with the treaty guidelines. Steady, rapid recovery was the norm. Most politicians and civilians are comfortable and conditioned to this type of process. Identity conflicts are different. This is a war of passion by individuals. Thus, the agreement negotiated between governments is of questionable value. In addition, the role of the Trinitarian-type occupying force is unclear. Citizens and leaders do not work as a team to rebuild the country. No shared vision or goals exist to guide them. On the other side of the coin, the United Nations does not have a tested method to resolve these conflicts due to limited experience.

COMPLEX EMERGENCY (IDENTITY CONFLICT)

> The gist of new internal conflicts is that the ethnic pieces put together by colonial glue and reinforced by the old world order are now pulling apart and reasserting their autonomy. Old identities, rendered dormant by the structures and values of the nation-state system, are reemerging and redefining the standards of political participation, distribution of goods and services, and government legitimacy.[17]

Most people build their identity around their own knowledge and competence in order to exist within their known reality.[18] Decision-making, healthy relationships, deep mutual respect, and inter-group collaboration are important characteristics. Some conflict is necessary for growth.

Complex emergencies are the antithesis of the ideal state. Destruction of property and physical harm to people create second and third order effects that are immeasurable. The

hallmark of an identity conflict is the significant adverse impact on the people. Fighting is intimate, invasive, and hard to avoid. People are categorized regardless of their affiliations or beliefs. Abuse, intimidation, forced movement, or extermination may result. Fear and distrust permeate the community. Local government, schools, churches, health facilities, military, and civic welfare agencies become drawn into the conflict. The widespread destruction of homes, community buildings, infrastructure, power, water and electric systems destroys the economy and makes this a devastating process for the community and society. People can't generate a livelihood. Normal daily activities cease to function. Items necessary to sustain a household, including food, can no longer be purchased. Once this occurs, people tend to move to the city to live with relatives in hopes of finding employment. Others flee the country. This migration of people leads to regional instability. An increase in arms trade, drug trafficking, antisocial networks to generate revenue, and more violence are the consequences.[19]

Education, health, and social welfare programs are severely damaged. Disruption of the public health care programs threatens the health and welfare of the people. The children, elderly and nursing home patients are especially vulnerable to the demise of social support systems. Normal interactions between individuals and groups that constitute the support systems for daily life are disrupted. Many community leaders are killed or leave. The psychological impact on the citizens can be devastating. Exposure to fighting, abusive behavior, physical deprivation, and loss of meaning and control may cause a myriad of psychological problems. Anxiety, depression, social withdrawal, and post-traumatic stress disorder are a few examples. Trust is hard to regain.

Resolving an identity conflict poses special problems for world leaders. What is the best approach for resolving this unique type of conflict? Is there a management model? If so, are we progressing satisfactorily? Is more time required?

THE REBUILDING MODEL

A different approach is necessary to resolve an identity conflict. People are more important than governments in this scenario. People must want resolution or the intervention has no chance for success. The world has limited experience with this problem so there are no tried and true solutions. Kimberly Maynard recommends an approach in her book, "Healing Communities in Conflict."[20] Her approach hits all levels but emphasizes healing of the community as the foundation. People are the epicenter of the solution.

Conflict management at the strategic level is not a perfect science. Maynard describes two basic approaches, leadership and relationship.[21] These two approaches are

complimentary. The leadership approach employs mediation and negotiation between governments to stop the fighting.[22] Economic sanctions and diplomacy are utilized first. Military force is next. This often resolves the violence, makes for a safer environment, and sets the tone for the relationship approach to begin. The leadership approach usually does not deal with the core issue, the discord between the warring parties. The "relationship approach" focuses on the underlying human relation issues in an attempt to resolve the conflict.[23] This takes place outside the central government and is dependent on the support of the people. The combined approach crosses all levels, the tactical, operational, and strategic.

Community rebuilding must involve the leaders, individuals, and community as a whole.[24] Leaders conduct the necessary negotiations, make the appropriate decisions, prioritize projects, and resolve conflict. The interaction between individuals is healthy, destroys barriers, changes opinions, opens eyes, and helps resolve conflict. Community-based bereavement and relationship building programs, infrastructure redevelopment, and restoring the economy set the foundation for the healing process. These stages consume the most time. Kimberly Maynard recommends a rebuilding model in her book, "Healing Communities in Conflict."[25] This model involves five steps: (1) establishing safety, (2) communalization and bereavement, (3) rebuilding trust and the capacity to trust, (4) reestablishing personal and social morality, and (5) reintegration and restoration of democratic discourse.

ESTABLISHING SAFETY

The danger must be removed and an atmosphere of security must be felt. Fighting must stop throughout the country. Each group must participate in order to sustain the ceasefire. Some indicators of the proper atmosphere include economic security, a job, freedom to move within the community and country, the absence of personal or group threats or attacks, property security, and access to community resources.

COMMUNALIZATION AND BEREAVEMENT

Grief affects each person differently. An individual never gets over the loss of a loved one. Time only lessens the burden. For Bosnia, the loss involved more than the individual or family. Many families lost more than one relative. Neighborhoods and communities were also destroyed. The bereavement process for a single loss takes 6 months to 4 years in a normal supportive environment.[26] Grieving involves multiple stages and relapses are common. For the Bosnian tragedy, it might take generations due to the magnitude of killing and destruction.

Communalization is the process of sharing traumatic experiences with other people in a safe environment.[27] Mourning is the start point and should involve the individual and community. This process documents the history of the experience and is crucial for reestablishing national identity. The importance of this step cannot be emphasized enough. It is the foundation for healing, the beginning of recovery, and sets the stage for true reconciliation. Wrongdoing and forgiveness is the ideal endpoint. Restitution, which symbolically represents remorse, can finalize this stage.

REBUILDING TRUST AND THE CAPACITY TO TRUST

Trust sets the foundation for economic cooperation, trade, mutual assistance, reconstruction, care for dependents, decision-making, and future development within a community. Mending relationships at the individual level is the foundation. Each interaction is important. Faith in others must be restored, communication improved, perceptions changed, and suspicion removed. Multiple interactions are necessary. Consistent interaction on shared problems over time will lead to changed perceptions and hopefully, trust.

REESTABLISHING PERSONAL AND SOCIAL MORALITY

Reestablishing what is right and developing guidelines for individual and group behavior is the fourth phase. Social ethics will provide a basis for behavior within the community. Hopefully, inappropriate behavior will be stopped before becoming offensive and increasing the tension within the community. Recognizing the need for such rules is the first step. Acknowledging the immorality of past acts is next. Third, defining and firmly asserting a moral code sets the tone for the behavior of the community. The legal system can be started after these three processes are well established. Punishment by law must begin gradually. It must appear fair or the community will perceive it as revenge. Maintaining established codes and communal law would reinforce the moral guidelines.

REINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE

A healthy democratic society accepts and integrates its diverse elements. Systematizing a diverse contribution to community affairs helps restore community spirit and helps ensure its sustainability. This process has several phases. Problem solving is first. Reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, and care for marginalized members of the community are significant problems to solve. Second, some elements of all parties must be involved. Third, it should incorporate meaningful participation from as broad a base of the community as possible. This allows the creation of a cooperative vision of shared goals. Last, the focus should be on the

long term. Other possible methods include a national convention, rebuilding traditional decision-making structures, and the development of a civil society. Each method has their advantages and disadvantages.

US POLICY

The U. S. had very little interest in the Balkans prior to 1945.[28] However, the beginning of the Cold War changed that view. Great Britain removed her troops from the Mediterranean in 1947. This opened the door for Soviet intervention in the region.[29] The Truman Doctrine of 1947 addressed support for the Balkans, Greece, Turkey, and the willingness to confront communist/Soviet expansion globally.[30] The Stalin-Tito break in 1948 and the subsequent Yugoslav request for US support increased our involvement in the area.[31] This decision to support a communist dictator was based purely on politics.[32] The country served as a pawn between Moscow and Washington, neither superpower wanted it to fall in the other's hands.

This regional Cold War policy increased the U.S. involvement in Greece and Turkey. Preventing the collapse of the Greek government and improving Turkey's defense against Soviet aggression resulted in a better security arrangement for the region. As a result of this policy, Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952.[33] Since then, the relationship with the United States has been warm and cold. National interests for Greece and Turkey may supersede their regional responsibility now that the Soviet threat has vanished.[34] Significant problems might occur in the region if this happens.

Romania and Albania have also been of concern. Initial U.S. ties with Romania in the late 1960's ignored the inhumane treatment of its people.[35] Instead, the administration chose to back Ceausescu due to his willingness to thumb his nose at Moscow. Ceausescu's megalomania and repressive domestic policies increased by the mid-1970's so the U.S. withdrew support.[36] Since 1994, relations between the U.S. and Romania have improved due to economic and political reform. Albania is important due to its proximity with Kosovo and Macedonia. So far, the U.S.-Albanian relations have been good.

As a result of the continuing turmoil, the entire region is a potential powder keg, ready to explode at any moment.[37] This brief update provides a glimpse of the complexity of the region. Each of these nations must work together to resolve the conflict and maintain long-term stability for the Balkan region.[38]

The long awaited Cold War peace dividend for the United States did not last as long as people expected. The Gulf War occurred within one year of the Berlin Wall coming down. The aftermath of the war, break-up of the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany occupied

the policymakers of the U.S. government during the early 90's.[39] At the same time, the intelligence community was starting to warn the President of the events in Bosnia.[40] This information fell on deaf ears, resulting in no significant strategic policy formulation. The presidential election, the desire to remain isolationist, the perceived lack of support of the American people, military opposition, and the feeling that this was "Europe's problem" contributed to the inaction.[41]

Initially, the United States viewed the events in Bosnia as a local problem for the European's to solve.[42] The conflict did not affect any strategic interests of the United States.[43] What factors called for U.S. action? They include (1) the relationship with Great Britain, France, and Russia, (2) the negative impact on the alliance and missing US leadership, (3) undermining the foundation of peaceful post-Cold War Europe, (4) the instability of the region could cause spillover with a worsening of the refugee problem, (5) the potential negative impact on the newly formed democracies, (6) the view of the Islamic world, and (7) the potential strain between the U.S. and Russia if war broke out.[44]

What changed U.S. opinion? Diplomatic visits to Bosnia, discussions with foreign leaders, and pictures and stories on CNN of ethnic cleansing, mass rape, indiscriminate shelling, bombed-out apartments, and premeditated massacres modified public opinion and changed the view in Washington. The following statistics also made people take notice; 1 of 10 Bosnians were killed or injured, 5 of 10 were displaced from their homes, 8 of 10 were relying on the UN for food, and 9 of 10 were unemployed.[45] In addition, the bombing of the market in Sarajevo was instrumental in finally causing action.[46] Officially, this action was based on (1) the impact on U.S. and Alliance credibility, (2) damage to the prestige of United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other institutions expected to form the core of the post-Cold War security order, and (3) the danger of spillover.[47]

The initial U.S. policy was the arms embargo against Bosnia.[48] Next, lifting of the arms embargo and targeted air strikes were advocated. The goal was to get more arms to the Muslims to level the playing field. Iran was also supplying arms during this period.[49] The Allies strongly opposed the lifting of the arms embargo.[50] After the February 1994 mortar attack on the Sarajevo marketplace, NATO gave an ultimatum for a weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo.[51] In 1995, the Clinton administration supported the increase of UN troops and called for the more robust use of NATO air strikes to protect the Bosnian safe areas. They also intensified diplomatic pressure.[52] These actions brought the warring factions to the negotiating

table in Dayton, Ohio. The resultant Dayton Peace Accords ended the most serious fighting in Europe since World War II.

According to Warren Christopher, the goal of the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) was to create a unitary, multiethnic Bosnian state.[53] He summarized the plan as follows: "There should be a single Bosnian state, with a single international personality, and a commitment to its internationally recognized borders; a federal government representing all the people of Bosnia with foreign policy powers and other national government powers."[54] The end of fighting, free elections, the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their original homes, arrest of indicted war criminals, human rights, and an economic reconstruction program were the major objectives of the DPA.[55] The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina included eleven annexes.

CURRENT STATUS

The sixteenth report of the High Representative to the Secretary General of the UN on 3 May 2000 revealed that implementation of the DPA was at a slow and painful pace.[56] Ethnic hatred persists after five years of hard work.[57] Nationalists continue to work against political change and refugee returns.[58] State institutions have done very little.[59] Regular meetings have failed to result in significant decisions and legislation. The ruling political parties' opposing vision of the state has blocked progress.[60] Parliamentary actions in the Federation continue at a very slow pace due to a lack of political will in the upper House.[61] Important legislation regarding invalid insurance funds, pension plans, and judicial reform are procrastinated. Parallel lines of authority delay progress. Due to this slow pace, the Office of the High Representative has proclaimed 175 edicts since 15 September 1998.[62] Approximately once every 10.5 days the High Representative invokes an action to maintain progress.[63]

At the beginning of November the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina committed to the establishment of a permanent Secretariat, support for adoption of a Permanent Election Law, the creation of a single national passport, and an agreement on the framework of the State Border Service. The UN viewed these actions as critical to hasten the peace process. To date, none of these have been fully implemented.[64] On the bright side, the Parliamentary Assembly passed the Law of the Asylum and Immigration and the Law on Refugees and Displaced persons.[65] Both laws had been pending for more than a year.

Information provided in the following paragraphs will highlight the progress to date in several major areas.

FAILURE TO FOLLOW DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS

The High Representative dismissed twenty-two public officials on 29 November 1999 for serious and persistent obstruction of the Dayton Peace Accords.[66] In particular, they had violated Annex 7 governing the return of refugees.[67] He also banned or suspended another sixty-three Bosnian officials from office for various violations against the Dayton Accords.[68] Further dismissals are expected until more moderate candidates who support the Dayton Peace Accords are elected.

ELECTIONS

The results of the 11 November 2000 elections left the international community disappointed.[69] Voter turnout and the peaceful nature were bright spots. Approximately 60% of voters participated.[70] Of concern is the fact that the nationalist parties remained strong. The Serbian Democratic Party won the majority of seats in the Bosnian Serb Republic. The Muslim Nationalist Party gained 27% of the votes in the Muslim Croat Federation. This made them equal to the Party for Democratic Action and ahead of the Croatian Democratic Union.[71] Despite the progress, a shadow remained over the elections. "If you don't vote for us, no one will take care of you" was the theme of the Nationalists according to Thomas Miller, American ambassador to Bosnia.[72] This campaign threat was successful in scaring voters.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The estimate for minority returns for 1999 was 80-90,000.[73] This is twice the amount in 1998. The first quarter of 2000 is ahead of the 1999 pace.[74] Most refugees and displaced persons return to safe areas, not minority areas. Funding and political resistance in several communities continue to be a problem. Access to documentation, pensions, schooling or prior employment, reconnection to public utilities, and the lack of jobs are problems faced by returnees. Improper conduct, misinterpretation of laws, and denying access to documentation by local officials is hindering the purchase of property.[75]

WAR CRIMINALS

Apprehension of suspected war criminals has been a slow process. To date, the Stabilization Force has captured twenty war criminals, local police nine, and twelve individuals have surrendered.[76] The remaining thirty-eight people are still sought. Of note is the fact that local Bosnian Serb police have not arrested a single war criminal.[77]

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

The economy is slowly improving. Foreign reserves tripled to DM $877 million by December 1999.[78] Two new countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, joined six other European nations in recognizing the Konvertible Mark (KM).[79] Imports were four times exports in 1999. Exports increased by 54% in the Federation and were unchanged for the Republic of Srpska.[80] On 1 Jan 2000 the trade agreement with the European Union came into force. This agreement regulates imports to the EU and is expected to correct the deficit. The GDP for 1999 was 5-8%. In 2000 it was expected to be between 7 and 14%.[81]

Despite the above numbers, unemployment remains high. Elaine Patterson, the Deputy Director of the World Bank in Sarajevo, estimates that 37% of Bosnians are unemployed.[82] Others believe the number is closer to 50%. This is due to the large size of the illegal "gray economy."[83]

Foreign nation builders provided one-third of the available jobs and accounted for one-third of Bosnia's GDP at the end of 1998.[84] These figures must be considered when evaluating the unemployment statistics.

The judicial system and public institutions, which support the economy, are not fully developed. Widespread corruption, fraud, bureaucratic obstacles in the form of old laws and regulations, and political foot-dragging hinder progress. As a result, privatization is slow.

SECURITY/SAFETY

The Standing Committee on Military Matters established a Defense Minister's Working Group to develop a state level security policy. This policy is necessary to achieve stability, encourage foreign investment, and to gain membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures. Progress is slow due to irregular meetings and no set time line for completion.

The Entity Armed Forces reduced by 15% in 1999 and are expected to do the same in 2000.[85] SFOR delegated air traffic control services on a limited basis to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Over flight revenues will fund system improvements.

De-mining was successful in 1999. Over 500 houses, 1.8 million square meters of agriculture areas, and 26,000 square meters of urban areas were de-mined.[86]

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Decisions of the Human Rights Chamber, recommendations of the Ombudsman, and decisions of the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) have improved. Compensation awards have been paid to most people. Property

related matters are hard to resolve locally. International pressure has been the only successful means. No progress has been made in drafting laws in this area. Many people continue to face discrimination in their daily lives. Access to identity cards, employment, pension programs, and utility services are a few of the problems.[87]

Domestic violence is also a major concern.[88] A pilot program in Zenica trains police, judiciary, and social workers to recognize and manage domestic violence.[89] If successful the program will be implemented throughout the country.

Insufficient support exists to pass legislation aimed at getting more women into government.[90] This is viewed as an important step for the country.

ANTI-CORRUPTION

Conflict of interest, corruption, and fraud are areas of major concern. Corruption permeates the country. Businessmen, government officials, and local leaders funnel their energies differently. Instead of fighting, they divert their energy to crime in an effort to retain power and reap the economic rewards. Many examples of fraudulent behavior are noted in the literature.[91]

PUBLIC UTILITIES

The Commission on Public Corporations established multiple working groups to review necessary reforms for ports, posts, the gas sector, and broadcasting transmission infrastructure. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Road Infrastructure Corporation was the second public corporation developed under Annex 9.[92] Development of a master plan for the highway system, and developing and prioritizing projects are the major goals. Linking Bosnia with Europe by highway will improve the trade imbalance.

Postal reform has been initiated. The postal service separated from the telecommunication network in mid-2000. A Working Group on a Postal Public Corporation has asked for a feasibility study from an international consultant.

A telephone-numbering plan for Bosnia is under development. This important program will allow everyone to have a phone. Obtaining a telephone is a major concern for the displaced persons and refugees.

PRIVATIZATION

The World Bank announced in late 1995 that it would raise $5.1 billion in reconstruction aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kemal Dervis, Bank Director for World Bank's Central Europe Branch, assured skeptics that "Yugoslavia was halfway to the market when war broke out."[93]

Expectations were high that Bosnia would respond quickly to privatization. As of the end of 1998, Bosnia had failed to privatize any significant part of its economy. Richard Rutherford, the principal investment officer with the International Finance Corporation in Europe, reported the number of privatized companies in Bosnia is "closer to zero, than one percent."[94]

Political foot-dragging is the primary obstacle.[95] Many Bosnian leaders are political leaders and heads of major state-owned enterprises. This conflict of interest causes many problems and opens the door for corruption. Remnants of the old social bureaucracy are troublesome. Exorbitant taxes, numerous regulations, legislative barriers, and resistance from enterprise managers are the major obstacles to rapid progress.[96]

Bank privatization has just begun. Reform of the Payment Bureaus will make a major difference. It is an imperative economic reform.[97] These bureaus act as barriers, siphon money, and perform no useful function. The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency was formed to help obtain foreign capital. Advice from the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), a joint service of Intern Finance Corp and the World Bank, will help implement the program.[98]

The United States suspended assistance to the Federation program due to this slow pace. Future assistance will be based on progress.[99]

EDUCATION

United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Council of Europe, the World Bank, the European Union, and many other organizations are working to reform the education system.[100] Curricular reform, educational standards, governance and financing issues, capacity building in higher education, teacher training, human rights training and teaching, citizenship, civics education, political leadership, public administration, and business education in local universities are some of the topics under review.[101] Round-table discussions throughout the country are conducted to gain involvement and ownership of this process in the local community.

Textbooks contain hate material based on ethnicity. This material must be removed to ensure the proper education of the students. The first review of textbooks was unsuccessful. A second phase will be conducted to ensure the removal of this material until new textbooks can be published.[102]

MEDIA

The Public Broadcasting System is making sufficient progress. Freedom of Information and other necessary legislation is working through the legislative system. The second phase of

the licensing process has been announced. Higher standards, including those from the International Telecommunications Union, will have to be met. A frequency spectrum plan will follow completion of phase one. Regulations developed for this phase include: A Statement on Goals and Policies for Phase II, Definition and Obligations of Public Radio and Television Broadcasting, Compliance with Copyright Obligations, and Guidelines on Accuracy and Balance.[103] The Code on Media Rules for Elections and Guidelines for Equitable Access to media in Election Periods will provide fair coverage and equitable access to all registered political parties, coalitions, and independent candidates during an election period.[104]

NATURAL RESOURCES/AGRICULTURE

A national water management policy and legislation compatible with European standards are ready for implementation.[105] Norwegian experts helped develop entity electricity laws. A new State Energy Act is almost complete. The feasibility study on high-voltage transmission has been completed. The World Bank will provide funding. The Joint Power Coordination Center has launched a feasibility study for the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System. This will modernize their power systems management in preparation for joining the European grid system. Deregulation, privatization, and the establishment of new laws will transform the management of the gas industry. The U.S. Trade and Developing Agency reviewed the coal industry. Recommendations are due by the end of 2000.

Agriculture production and exports are depressed.[106] Markets were lost during the war and efforts to regain them, or find new ones, are lacking. Imports, including illegal sources, have increased to fill the void. These illegal imports are hurting the farmers. Animal diseases are increasing and must be addressed by the international community.[107]

INSTITUTIONS

The Office of the High Representative is working with Sigma and Phare programs of the European Union to work on public employment.[108] This committee is developing a draft Law on Civil Service. If implemented, the law will ensure the development of an impartial and professional Civil Service. This program will allow the appropriate management of the common institutions. The first institutions receiving attention will be the Office of the Public Attorney, Institution for Standardization, Metrology, and Patents, and the Public Health Service.[109]

CONCLUSION

The demise of the former Yugoslavia began in the late 1970's. Accelerating inflation led to a worsening economy, the loss of jobs, increased tension, and the movement of people from

the cities in search of work. In 1991 the inevitable occurred, Yugoslavia dissolved as a country and war broke out. The magnitude of the destruction was unimaginable. Healing began with the Dayton Peace Accords. Five years and several billion dollars later, the end is not in sight. Based on Maynard's model, more time and work are necessary to ensure a lasting peace. Three areas deserve additional comments.

Closure for families and communities is necessary for Bosnia to move forward. Over 30,000 bodies await positive identification. DNA analysis will take another five to seven years to finish.[110] Once complete, this will ease some of the pain for these families. In addition, plans for a burial ground and memorial for victims of the Srebrinica massacre will help the grieving process for communities and the country.[111]

A sustainable, free-market economy is the most important condition for long-term stability and security, sets the foundation for new jobs, and provides funds for the tax base. A mature marketplace with the necessary jobs is vital to entice the refugees to return home. The peaceful return of refugees to their old homes, with the subsequent incorporation into the community, will set the foundation for enduring peace in the region. Minimal progress has been made in this crucial area.

Since 1996, over 366,262 refugees and 348,171 displaced persons have returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina.[112] Over 800,000 displaced persons and 300,000 refugees remain. Government measures taken to increase the returns and ensure sustainability of the program include the Property Law Implementation Plan of 27 October 1999, economic incentives for building apartments and houses, and increased involvement by local police to improve security for the returnees.[113] These steps are important, however, without sufficient jobs and a safe environment they will have little impact on the number of returnees.

The facts clearly demonstrate that the proper infrastructure for sustaining peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not complete. At least eight to ten years is required to complete the necessary infrastructure, and an additional twenty to thirty years to complete the process. A country with the right diplomatic, economic, and credible military must be involved to see this through. The United States is the only country that meets these criteria at the present time in history.

Identity conflicts are expected to remain at the same level or increase over the next twenty years.[114] The working relationship developed between NATO, the European Union, the United States, and Non-Government Organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be important as the world faces the future challenge of the post Cold-War era.

Word Count = 5985

ENDNOTES

[1]Zlatko Isakovic, "The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords: Failure or Success," March 1998, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/isz01/isz01.html,2-3.

[2] The White House, Statement by President Clinton on the Bosnia Peace Agreement, 21 November 1995, Internet accessed 20 September 2000, 1.

[3] Deputy Treasury Secretary Summers, "Rebuilding Bosnia," 10 April 1996, Internet accessed 20 September 2000, 1.

[4] Bosnia-Herzegovina, Business Europa Briefing, Summer 1996, Internet accessed 20 September 2000, 1.

[5] Dempsey, Gary, "Rethinking the Dayton Agreement: Bosnia Three Years Later," 14 December 1998, Internet accessed 9 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/deg01/deg101.html, 6.

[6] Ibid. 7.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Dempsey, "Rethinking the Dayton Agreement, 7.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl von Clausewitz: On War. (Princeton University Press, 1976), 80-81.

[11] Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford University Press,1983), 47-73.

[12] The Nature of Conflicts and Complex Emergencies, 15 May 1995, Internet accessed 30 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/access/maynard/maynard03.html, 2.

[13] Ibid. 3.

[14] Ibid. 3.

[15] Ibid. 4.

[16] Ibid. 4-18.

[17] The International Humanitarian Context, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/access/maynard/maynard01.html, 1.

[18] Quinn, Robert E., Deep Change; Discovering the Leader Within. Torry-Boss Publishers, San Francisco, 1996. p.3.

[19] Forced Migration: A Consequence of Conflict, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed 30 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/maynard/maynard03.html, 11-16.

[20] Rebuilding Community Cohesion, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/maynard/maynard06.html, 1-14.

[21] Ibid. 2-4.

[22] Ibid

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid

[26] Grieving: Facing Illness, Death and Other Losses, October 2000, Internet accessed 23 January 2001, http://www.aafp.org/afp/20001001/1689ph.html.

[27] Ibid. 8.

[28] Stephen F. Larabee, "US Policy in the Balkans, From Containment to Strategic Reengagement," RAND, 1998, 276.

[29] Stephen F. Larrabee, ed. The Volatile Powder Keg (Washington, The American University Press, 1994) 202.

[30] Ibid. 203.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Larabee, US Policy in the Balkans, 287-291.

[35] Larabee, The Volatile Powder Keg, 204.

[36] Larabee, US Policy in the Balkans, 277.

[37] Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "Strengthening American Security Through World Leadership-Bosnia and Beyond," 1 Nov 1995; Internet accessed 20 Sept 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/policy.html, 3.

[38] Larabee, US Policy in the Balkans, 285-292.

[39] Larrabee, Stephen F. "US Policy in the Balkans, From Containment to Strategic Reengagement," RAND, 1998, 280.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid. 279-281.

[43] Richard Holbrooke, To End A War (Random House, Inc, 1998), 26-27.

[44] Strobe Talbott, "Strengthening American Security Through World Leadership-Bosnia and Beyond," 1 November 1995. Internet accessed 25 September 2000, 5-8.

[45]Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "Making Progress Toward a Lasting Peace in Bosnia," 18 March 1998, Internet accessed 20 Sept 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/policy.html, 1.

[46] "Why Bosnia Matters," Internet accessed 25 Sept 2000, http://www.firstsearch.oclc.org/WEBZ/FTFETCH? sessionid,1.

[47] Ibid. 3-7.

[48] Former Yugoslavia and U.S. Policy, 20 Dec 1996, Internet accessed 1 Oct 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/91-089.htm, 1-4.

[49] Ibid. 1.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Dempsey, "Rethinking the Dayton Agreement: Bosnia Three Years Later," 1.

[54] Ibid. 2.

[55] Ibid. 1.

[56] S/2000/376, Letter dated 4 May 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, 1-2.

[57] Watson, Paul. "Postwar Bosnia Still Battling Ethnic Hatreds; Five Years after Dayton pact, unity remains a dream. Critics say nation cannot survive without foreign troops and aid." The Los Angeles Times, 19 November 2000, sec A.1, 1-7.

[58] Press Release SC/6912, Briefed on Bosnia-Herzegovina by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Council Hears Range of Views on Implementation of Dayton Accords, 15 August

2000, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

[59] S/2000/376, Letter to Secretary-General, 2.

[60] Press Release SC/6854, Security Council Hears Briefing on Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by High Representative for Implementation of Dayton Accords, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query, 2.

[61] S/2000/376, Letter to Secretary-General, 3.

[62] Watson, "Postwar Bosnia Still Battling Ethnic Hatreds; Five Years after Dayton pact, unity remains a dream,"4.

[63] Carla Anne Robbins, "Bricks and Mortars: Nation-Building Looms as a Policy Challenge For the New President—Bosnia, Haiti Offer a Lesson: U.S. Efforts Can Work, But Results Take Time—A Long And Unfinished Road." The Wall Street Journal, 3 November 2000, sec. A.1, 2.

[64] Ibid.

[65] S/2000/376, Letter to Secretary-General, 2.

[66] Ibid. 3.

[67] Press Release SC/6854, Security Council Hears Briefing on Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina by High Representative, 4.

[68] Watson, "Postwar Bosnia Still Battling Ethnic Hatreds; Five Years after Dayton Pact, unity remains a dream," 4.

[69] R. Jeffrey Smith, "No Clear Mandate in Bosnian Vote; Serb, Croat Nationalists Still Command Support," The Washington Post, 13 November 2000, sec, A16.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Carlotta Gall, "Bosnian Election Returns Point to Little Change, Analysts Say." The New York Times, 20 November 2000, A.10.

[72] Ibid., A11.

[73] S2000/376, Letter to Secretary-General,12.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid. 9.

[77] Gall, "Bosnian Election Returns Point to Little Change," 3.

[78] Ibid. 6.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid. 7.

[81] Ibid. 7,8.

[82] Watson, "Postwar Bosnia Still Battling Ethnic Hatred; Five years after Dayton Pact," 5.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Dempsey, "Rethinking the Dayton Agreement," 9-10.

[85] Ibid. 13.

[86] Ibid.

[87] S2000/376, Letter to Secretary General, 11.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Smith, R. Jeffrey, "West is Tiring of Struggle to Rebuild Bosnia; Five Years After War's End, Efforts Have Largely Failed." The Washington Post, 25 November 2000, A.1, 2-5.

[92] Ibid. 8.

[93] Dempsey, "Rethinking the Dayton Agreement," 13.

[94] Ibid. 14.

[95] Ibid. 14.

[96] Ibid. 16.

[97] S2000/376, Letter to Secretary-General, 7.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] SC/6854, Security Council Hears Briefing on Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by High Representative for Implementation of Dayton Accords, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query, 3.

[101] S2000/376, Letter to Secretary-General, 10.

[102] Watson, "Postwar Bosnia Still Battling Ethnic Hatred; Five years after Dayton Pact," 1-2.

[103] S2000/376, Letter to Secretary-General, 5.

[104] Ibid. 5.

[105] Ibid. 8.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid. 4.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Lynch, David J. "One of the Worst Places on Earth." USA Today, 17 November 2000, A.19, 3.

[111] Press Release SC/6940, Senior United Nations Official in Bosnia and Herzegovina Announces Plans for Burial Ground and Memorial for Victims of Srebrenica Massacre, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

[112] Summary of Registered Returns of Refugees and Displaced Persons, UNHCR, Statistical Overview, January 2001, Internet accessed, 24 January 2001, http://www.unhcr.ba/.

[113] Ibid. 12.

[114] Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About The Future with Non-government Experts, Internet accessed 24 January 2001, http://www.cia/gov/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

After the End, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/ulr01/ulr 01.html.

Agreed Measures, Geneva, 13 June 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960126a.html.

Alessandra Stanley. "Olympics on TV Unite the Bosnians," The New York Times, 30 September 2000.

Anonymous. "Hard Men Win." The Economist, 18 November 2000, p.62.

Atanasovski, Mirko. Implementing Minority Rights in the Balkans. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 27 April 1998.

Atlantic and Pacific Integration: A Comparative Study of Post War Western Europe and East Asia, 20 February 1999, Internet accessed 9 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/isa/mj101/nij101.html.

Bennett, Christopher. Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences New York University Press, 1995.

Blaudschun, Mark. "With the World Watching, Bosnian's Make United Stand," Boston Globe, 16 September 2000.

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997, "Making Peace Work," 5 December 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d961205b.html.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Europa World Year Book 2000 VOL 1 (London, Europa Publications Limited 2000).

Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War, February 1997, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/iwp01/ab.html.

Bosnia, 15 April 1995, Internet accessed 25 September 2000, http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FTFETCH?sessionid.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Business Europa Briefing, Summer 1996, Internet accessed 20 September 2000.

Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. MacMillan Publishing Co. Inc New York, 1973.

Capozzi, Rocky P. The United States and Peace Operations in Bosnia: Foreign Policy Victory or Defeat? Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 15 April 1996.

Chairman's Conclusions, 13 June 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960613a.html.

Chairman's Summary, 13 June 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001,http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960613b.html.

Chandler, David. Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton Pluto Press, 1999.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton University Press, 1976.

Collins, Donal J. The War in Bosnia. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 1995.

Communities in Conflict, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/access/maynard/maynard05.html.

Constitutions, The Federalist Papers and the Translation to Democracy, Internet accessed 30 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/anderson/anderson03.htm.

Corpac, Peter S. It's the Economy! A Long Term Strategy to Resolve the Brcko Issue and Achieve Regional Stability in Bosnia. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 6 April 1998.

Critical Assessment of the Achievements of FR Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, 20 February 2000, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/isa/rev01/rev01.html.

Dempsey, Gary, "Rethinking the Dayton Agreement: Bosnia Three Years Later," 14 December 1998, Internet accessed 9 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/deg01/deg101.html.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "Strengthening American Security Through World Leadership-Bosnia and Beyond," 1 Nov 1995; Internet accessed 20 Sept 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/policy.html.

Deputy Treasury Secretary Summers, "Rebuilding Bosnia," 10 April 1996, Internet accessed 20 September 2000.

Domestic Structures and Democratic Foreign Policy: Peacemaking after World War II, July 1997, Internet accessed 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/rin01/rin01.html.

Earle, E. Douglas. Beyond Dayton: Finding a Solution in Bosnia. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 7 April 1997.

Elder, Robert K. "The Agony in Bosnia, Frame by Comic Frame," The New York Times, 18 Oct 2000.

Estonia: Nation Building and Integration, Political and Legal Aspects, August 1999, Internet accessed 9 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/sem01/sem01.html.

Fastabend, David A. A General Theory of Conflict: Bosnia Strategy and the Future. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1 May 96.

Final Document, 23 March 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960323a.html.

Forced Migration: A Consequence of Conflict, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed 30 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/maynard/maynard03.html.

Former Yugoslavia and U.S. Policy, 20 Dec 1996, Internet accessed 1 Oct 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/91-089.htm.

Gall, Carlotta. "Three Main Nationalist Parties Showing Strength in Bosnia Vote," The New York Times, 14 November 2000.

Gall, Carlotta. "Bosnian Election Returns Point to Little Change, Analysts Say." The New York Times, 20 November 2000, A.10.

Gall, Carlotta. "New Leader in Yugoslavia Due in Bosnia." The New York Times, 22 October 2000, sec.1.9.

Geyer, George Anne. "UN's Credibility is on the Ropes," Chicago Tribune, 15 September 2000.

Gillingham, David. Kosovo: A Critical Analysis of Sovereignty and International Relations. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 10 April 2000.

Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About The Future with Nongovernment Experts, Internet accessed 24 January 2001, http://www.cia/gov/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html.

Grdic, Darko. The Role of the Military in a Democratic Society, Zagreb Defense and Protection Command, Croatian Armed Forces, 1991-93. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 16 March 2000.

Gribling, Richard H. Peace Operations in the Gray Zone. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 15 April 1996.

Grieving: Facing Illness, Death and Other Losses, October 2000, Internet accessed 23 January 2001, http://www.aafp.org/afp/20001001/1689ph.html.

Halpern, Joel M. and Kideckel, David A. Neighbors at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav ethnicity, culture, and history The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

Hettne, Bjorn, Inotai, Andras, Sunkel, Osvaldo. The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Great Britain: MacMillan Press LTD, 2000.

Holbrooke Horror: The U.S. Peace Plan for Bosnia, 27 October 1995, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/cat10/cat10.html.

Holmes, Steven A. "Gore Assails Bush on Plan to Recall U.S. Balkan Force," The New York Times, 22 Oct 2000.

Howard, Michael. Clausewitz, Oxford University Press, 1983.

Implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement: The Importance of Civilian Implementation, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, 28 May 1997.

Internal and External Challenges for FR Yugoslavia, June 1998, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/iai/iai_98sip01.html.

International Intercession in Community Rehabilitation, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed, 9 January 2001, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/maynard/maynard07.html.

Interventionism Reconsidered: Reconciling Military Action with Political Stability, September 1999, Internet accessed 30 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/un101/un101.html.

Isakovic, Zlatko,"The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords: Failure or Success," March 1998, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/isz01/isz01.html.

Kaminski, Matthew, "Balkan Votes May Give NATO Forces a Way Out: Political Moderates Win Elections in Kosovo, Bosnia Poll is Next," The Wall Street Journal, 2 November 2000.

Killing with Kindness: The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia, 30 June 1995, Internet accessed, 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/hij01/hij01.html.

Kochovski, Sergei I. The Balkan Crisis 1912-1913. The Balkan League Alliance. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 15 April 1996.

Larrabee, F. Stephen, ed. The Volatile Powder Keg, Washington, The American University Press, 1994.

Larrabee, Stephen F. "US Policy in the Balkans, From Containment to Strategic Reengagement," RAND, 1998.

Letter Dated 15 January 1999 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council. Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Letter dated 4 May 2000 from the Secretary –General to the President of the Security Council, UN Security Council Documents, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Lewis, Anthony. "Bush and the World," The New York Times, 30 September 2000.

Lim, Dennis. "Rebirth of a Nation," The Village Voice, 19 September 2000.

Lindner, Philip R. U. S. Military Involvement in the Balkans: In what interest...At what cost? Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 15 April 1993.

Linking Policy Networks and Conflict Resolution Capacities of International Governmental Organizations: The Case of the World Bank in the Balkans. 14 March 2000, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/isa/oha01/oha01.html.

Lynch, David J. "One of the Worst Places on Earth." USA Today, 17 November 2000, A.19.

Lyon Summit, 29 June 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960629a.html.

Mace, Patrick D. The Dayton Accord: Defining Success. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 17 April 96.

Mediating Ethnic Conflict: A Task for Sisyphus, 16 February 1999, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/isa/rio01/rio01.html.

Mediating ethnic Conflict: A task for Sisyphus? 20 February 1999, Internet accessed 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/rio01/rio01.html.

Meeting Essential Needs in Post-Conflict Recovery, 1998, Internet accessed 9 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/fos03/fos03.html.

Meier, Viktor. Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise Routledge, 1999.

Merkwan, John A. Balkan Stability and the "Second Marshall Plan." Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 23 February 2000.

Meyer, Kent R. U.S. Support for Baltic Republic Membership in NATO: What Ends, What Risks? Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 10 April 2000.

Meyers, Steven Lee. " Texas Guard Unit Home After 8 Months in Bosnia," The New York Times, 9 October 2000.

Myths About America's Commitment in Kosovo-What the U.S. Should Do, The Heritage Foundation, 24 August 2000.

Official Summary of Conclusions Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work, 5 December 1996, Internet accessed, 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960126a.htm.l

Operation Joint Endeavor (IFOR): "Agreed Measures," 18 March 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2000, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960318a.html.

OSCE Agreement on Confidence and Security Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 26 January 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960126a.htm

Liotta, P. H. The Wreckage Reconsidered: Five Oxymorons from Balkan Deconstruction Oxford: Lexington Books, 1999.

Poet, Steve M. Providing Personnel Service Support to a Peace Operations Force: What is the Right Recipe? Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 7 April 1998.

Press Release by High Representative for Implementation of Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release GA/9100, Time for Reconciliation Has Come, But War Criminals Remain Free, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina tells General Assembly, 25 September 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release GA/9205, Assembly Acts on Financing of Six Peace-Keeping Operations, Adopts 10 Texts on Recommendation of Legal Committee, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release GA/9820, Adopting Two Draft Texts, Assembly Reaffirms Primacy of Dayton Accords, Decides to Observe 40th Anniversary of Decolonization Declaration, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6253, Security Council Expresses Readiness to Consider Economic Measures to Ensure Compliance with Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 August 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6302, Security Council Sets up Stabilization Force to Succeed Existing Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 12 December 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6455, Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina until 21 June 1998, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6755, Three-Member Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Briefs Security Council, Announces 'New York Declaration,' Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6854, Security Council Hears Briefing on Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by High Representative for Implementation of Dayton Accords, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6874, Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Briefs Security Council, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6880, Security Council Extends Bosnia Mission Until 19 June 2001 by Vote of 14-0-1; Russian Federation Abstains, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6881, Special Envoy for Balkans, Carl Bildt, Briefs Security Council, Says Integration of Region into Europe Vital for Stability, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6912, Briefed on Bosnia/Herzegovina by Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping, Council hears Range of Views on Implementation of Dayton Accords, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6940, Senior United Nations Official in Bosnia and Herzegovina Announces Plans for Burial Ground and Memorial for Victims of Srebrenica Massacre, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6950, Security Council Briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping on Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/6973, Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Briefs Security Council, Says Recent Events Provide 'Historic Opportunity' to Close Tragic Decade, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Press Release SC/9688, Assembly Adopts Text on Bosnia and Herzegovina; Takes Up Security Council Reform, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www/fastweb?state_id=979044096&view=unsearch&docrank=59&numhitsfound=1810&query.

Preventing Deadly Conflict: The Responsibility of States, Leaders, and Civil Society, Internet accessed 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/ccpdc05.html.

Preventive Diplomacy: It's Working in Bosnia. Should it be used elsewhere? 27 February 1998, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/phei/csis/wch01/98_205.html.

Rebuilding Community Cohesion, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/maynard/maynard06.html.

Resolution 1031, United Nations, 15 December 1995.

Review of U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina, U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement, 17 April 2000.

Holbrooke, Richard. To End A War Random House, Inc, 1998.

Robbins, Carla Anne. "Bricks and Mortars: Nation-Building Looms as a Policy Challenge For the New President---Bosnia, Haiti Offer a Lesson: U.S. Efforts Can Work, But Results Take Time---A Long And Unfinished Road." The Wall Street Journal, 3 November 2000, sec. A.1.

Robertson, Lord. "The Work Ahead in Bosnia." The New York Times, 25 November 2000, A.19.

Robinson, Aida Cerkez. "Bosnia's Wounds Barely Healing After 5 Years: Ethnic Hatred Still Present Amid Signs of Reunification," Chicago Tribune, 20 November 2000.

Rogel, Carole. The Breakup of Yugoslavia and The War in Bosnia (Greenwood Press, 1998)

Rohde, David. "Jury in New York Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions," The New York Times, 26 September 2000.

Roungas, George. The Role of Greece in the Balkans During the Next Twenty Years. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 7 April 1999.

Rubin, James P. Spokesman, "Conduct of Bosnia's 8 April Municipal Elections," U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement, 9 April 2000.

Schneider, Robert. "A Massacre. Still Fresh, Remembered," The New York Times, 5 November 2000.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "Making Progress Toward a Lasting Peace in Bosnia," 18 March 1998, Internet accessed 20 Sept 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/policy.html.

Simons, Marlise. " Trial Reopens Pain of 1995 Bosnian Massacre," The New York Times, 7 November 2000.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "No Clear Mandate in Bosnian Vote; Serb, Croat Nationalists Still Command Support," The Washington Post, 13 November 2000.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Over a Million Bosnians vote in Elections, Western-Oriented Party Favored," The Washington Post, 12 November 2000.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Ethnic Hatred Permeates Bosnia's Bitter Peace; 5 Years After Dayton Accords, Nationalist Ideology Still Strong." The Washington Post, 10 November 2000, sec. A.30.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Fund Misuse Tied to a Top Bosnian; Money for Job Creation Was Funneled Secretly to Favored Firms, Audit Shows." The Washington Post, 9 November 2000, sec A.20.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "West is Tiring of Struggle to Rebuild Bosnia; Five Years After War's End, Efforts Have Largely Failed." The Washington Post, 25 November 2000, A.1.

Statement on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 March 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960126a.html.

Structural Prevention: Strategies to Address the Root Causes of Deadly Conflict, Internet accessed 9 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/ccp01/ccpcc04.html.

Suligoj, Bojan. The Mystery of the Slovenian Military Success in 1991. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1999.

Summary of Registered Returns of Refugees and Displaced Persons, UNHCR, Statistical Overview, January 2001, Internet accessed, 24 January 2001, http://www.unhcr.ba/

Summary of U.S. Government Policy on Bosnia, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, 16 July 1998.

The Balkans on the Brink: Is Another Bosnia on the Horizon? 4 February 1997, Internet accessed 9 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/pbei/csis/wch01/98_170.html.

The Betrayal of Bosnia, autumn 1993, Internet accessed 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/brl01/brl101.html.

The Check is in the Mail: Improving the Delivery and Coordination of Post Conflict Assistance, December 1998, Internet accessed 28 Nov 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/pas/01.html.

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Failure of Implementation, March 1996, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/iec03/iec0312-96.html.

The International Humanitarian Context, 15 May 1999, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/maynard/maynard03.html.

The International Humanitarian Context, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/access/maynard/maynard01.html.

The Issues Raised by Bosnia and the Transatlantic Debate, May 1998, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/com01/cam01.html.

The Nature of Conflicts and Complex Emergencies, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed 30 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/access/maynard/maynard03.html.

The Next Phase in International Aid, 15 May 1999, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/maynard/maynard08.html.

The Political Economy of Realism, Internet accessed 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/kapstein/kapstein03.html.

The Process of Returning Home, 15 May 1999Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/maynard/maynard04.html.

The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict, February 1997, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/iwp01/iwp01ag.html.

The Rome Statement, 18 February 1996, Internet accessed 9 January 2001, http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/d960218a.htm.

The Task Structure of International Peace Operations, March 1998, Internet accessed 30 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/jot01.html.

The United States, Europe, and Asia, 15 April 1998, Internet accessed 9 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/blr03/blr03.html.

The White House, Statement by President Clinton on the Bosnia Peace Agreement, 21 November 1995, Internet accessed 20 September 2000.

Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Address, Business Council for International Understanding, Washington, D.C., 7 August 2000, Internet accessed 20 November 2000.

Thompson, Lewis H. Correcting Dayton's Oversight: Underpinning Bosnian's Democracy with the Rule of Law. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 7 June 1998.

Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers, 13 June 1996, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/conf/inc02/inc02.html.

Triplett, Michael T. Yugoslavia: Did the Media Formulate U.S. Policy? Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 13 May 1996.

Tsimogiannis, Kostas. Balkans Towards 2000. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 10 April 1997.

Turner, Barry, ed. "Bosnia-Herzegovina." The Statesman's Yearbook: The Politics, Cultures, and Economies of the World 2000. New York, St. Martin's Press.

U.S. Intervention in Ethnic Conflict, May 1995, Internet accessed 30 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/wef03/wef03.html.

U.S. Priorities in Relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bureau of European Affairs, 8 March 2000.

Udovicki, Jasminka, and Ridgeway, James. Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia. Duke University Press, 1977.

Unfinished Business in the Former Yugoslav Area, June 1998, Internet accessed, 11 December 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/iai/iai98cvc01.html.

Unfinished Business in the Former Yugoslavia, June 1998, Internet accessed 28 November 2000, http://www.c.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/01j/iai/iai_98cvc01.html.

Van Weel, Chris. "General Practice Unites Bosnia-Herzegovina," The Lancet, 4 November 2000.

Vuckovic, Gojko. Ethnic Cleavages and Conflict: The Sources of National Cohesion and Disintegration: The Case of Yugoslavia Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1997.

Watson, Paul. "Postwar Bosnia Still Battling Ethnic Hatreds; Five Years after Dayton pact, unity remains a dream. Critics say nation cannot survive without foreign troops and aid." The Los Angeles Times, 19 November 2000, sec A.1.

Why Bosnia Matters, Internet accessed 25 Sept 2000, http://www.firstsearch.oclc.org/WEBZ/FTFETCH? sessionid.

Clinton, William J. A National Security Strategy for a New Century Washington, D. C.: The White House, December 1999.

Wolffframm, Gunther E. The Implications for Yugoslav Borders of the Dissolution of the Yugoslav State. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. 31 March 1992.

Woodard, Colin. "A higher-education system, and a country, divided." The Chronicle of Higher Education, 22 September 2000, A51-A52.