



**STRATEGY
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AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE: A REFOCUS

BY

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African Crisis Response Initiative: A Refocus

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the Cold War the growth and stability of individual nations highlight Africa's complexity, diversity, and rapid change. Throughout the last ten years, the United States National policy towards the region has been fairly consistent. Limited US interests focus on the promotion of security, economic prosperity, and democracy. However, in the 21st century the United States will play a more vital role, as a hegemonic power, in attempts to bring stability and development to Africa using limited military resources.

In 1996 the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was implemented to enhance the indigenous African capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations. This US training initiative provides for peacekeeping training and limited non-lethal equipment for battalion sized units in selected countries.

Since the ACRI concept is viewed as a flagship initiative for military to military engagement within the region, it is now time to consider building on the initial success of the program. A re-orientation of the program to focus on sub-regional organizations with the regional capacity to conduct the full range of peacekeeping through peace-enforcement operations may be warranted.

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AFRICA CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE: A REFOCUS

Peacekeeping is no job for a soldier; but only a soldier can do it.

—Dag Hammarskjöld
UN Secretary-General

Interest in Africa's emergence since the end of Cold War has challenged not only the regional powers but also the entire international community. Since breaking from the grips of colonialism, Africa has had limited success and much disappointment toward the goal of democratization. In numerous cases Africa's democratic openings have been characterized as "virtual democracies". Such governments have the appearance of democracies, such as scheduled elections, but political opposition is stifled behind a veil of legitimacy. The struggle for democratic reform throughout the region has produced mixed results and faces an even more uncertain future.¹

Time and again, violence and instability in Africa since 1994 has led to failed states, jeopardizing the stability of the surrounding countries. Conflicts among states, and the disintegration of the states themselves not only threatens those living in sub-Saharan Africa but also challenges the international community to develop an appropriate response. During the last decade as many as fourteen of US European Command's (USEUCOM) thirty-five sub-Saharan countries were in various stages of transition and turmoil. USEUCOM is the combatant commander charged with executing the National Military Strategy into a Theater Engagement Plan for Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.² The Rwanda genocide of 1994, followed by the upheaval in Congo (Zaire) in 1996-1997, a new Congo civil war in 1998, the Liberian civil war and most recently the uprising in Sierra Leone provide some of the most dramatic recent examples of the violent conflict that is destabilizing Africa.³

As the region struggles to stabilize by means of the democratic and social elements of power, regional economic prosperity is stifled, and in many cases, regressing. Skeptics of Africa's economic performance note that despite a growth spurt in mid-decade, overall GDP growth for the years 1991-1992 was only 2.2% per year, somewhat less than the population growth rate.⁴ Of the 48 least developed countries in the world, 33 are in Africa, according to the United Nations. Fifteen sub-Saharan countries are currently faced with exceptional food emergencies. In the Democratic Republic of Congo alone, the food supplies of more than 10 million people are threatened by civil conflicts.⁵

Likewise, Africa's AIDS epidemic continues to intensify. According to a December 1998 United Nations update, 70% of all new HIV infections occur in sub-Saharan Africa, and 80% of all AIDS deaths occur there. The disease takes away young adults in their most productive years with devastating effects. Infection rates in some countries in southern Africa, which is severely infected, are estimated at 20%-26% of people aged 15-49.⁶

Many argue that even though Africa is making progress in many areas, most outside perceptions of the region focus on violent, dramatic events, primarily through media coverage. A preventative policy to favorably shape the environment is overshadowed repeatedly by a reactive response triggered by the "CNN effect". When the international community views images of regional devastation on television, a call for humanitarian assistance usually follows.

Despite such perceptions of on-going crises, more and more African governments are being held accountable to their citizens; economic policies are empowering a growing private sector; and there is real progress in addressing difficult but solvable problems. The international community, particularly the United States, has a vested interest in the promotion of national values in the region. As the leading advocate for democracy, economic expansion by the way of free markets, and observance of human rights, the United States must take the lead in supporting peace, prosperity, and regional stability in Africa.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

US African policy is often controversial, with debate typically centering on whether a particular administration is doing too much or too little in a region with no US vital interests. Prior to the end of the Cold War, Soviet interests and apartheid issues greatly influenced US policy objectives. With the reduction if not elimination of Cold War tensions and some alleviation of African racial tensions, the US continues to push for numerous reforms, such as promoting democracy and free-market economies.

The Clinton administration, decidedly optimistic, stressed Africa's potential as a US trading partner, emphasizing the growing importance of oil imports from the region and the possibilities for increased exports and investment there. Africa has vast resources, over 700 million people, and is potentially a very promising new market for investment and trade in this decade. Currently 150,000 American jobs depend on trade with Africa. Trade is steadily increasing, while US imports greatly exceed what is exported to Africa. The US had over 22.4 billion in trade with Africa in 1999: 13% of US foreign oil imports come from Africa, more oil from West Africa than from the Persian Gulf.⁷

All of this indicates some progress in this complex, diverse region characterized by rapid change. The Clinton administration recognized that Africa faced continuing economic problems and disruptive conflicts in a number of nation states. Thus the 1999 US National Security policy objectives for sub-Saharan Africa seek to promote security, economic prosperity, and democracy. The US also has a number of other trans-national interests in Africa, such as preventing weapons proliferation, preserving environmental resources of global importance, preventing human rights violations, and preventing international terrorism.⁸

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The present National Military Strategy, derived from the National Security Strategy, is designed to promote peace and stability.⁹ Even though the Department of Defense declares that the US has "very little traditional strategic interest in Africa," the US has intervened militarily in the region more than twenty times since 1990.¹⁰

The role of the US military is extremely important in Africa since many African leaders depend greatly on their military to maintain their positions of power. Thus many African countries need military support to sustain an environment wherein "democracy" and "free market" trade may be allowed to emerge. US success in promoting peace and stability, thereby promoting security and economic prosperity, will have a large impact on achieving the third US objective, promoting democracy abroad.

The policy objective of promoting regional stability depends on two underpinning military objectives. The first and possibly the most important broad objective is the promotion of internal stability in these nations as well as providing stability to the entire region through democratization and military professionalism. Since militaries are necessary elements of power for emerging nations, Africa cannot afford inefficient or undisciplined ones. The second objective is to relieve suffering by providing prompt response to humanitarian crises, which usually result from having failed to achieve the first objective; this is done at considerably more expense.

Africa is a relatively isolated region, thousands of miles from the US and Europe. The US military has limited resources available for dealing with Africa's large problems. The force structure in the European Command area of operations provides only the minimal resources necessary to support the military strategies in this theater (Europe and sub-Saharan Africa). Resources available for African operations are even more constrained. US decision-makers are hard pressed to choose between protecting important US interests and promoting humanitarian

interests. Always they must decide what ways and means should be applied to achieve given ends.

Long-range approaches to providing sub-Saharan security by African nations, if successful, may reduce future direct US military involvement. From April 1996 to April 1997 USEUCOM conducted Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) in Liberia, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, the MLO in Liberia, and well as Operations GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE and GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL in Zaire. Economically, the US and other countries have poured billions of dollars into Africa, responding to humanitarian disasters (such as \$1.5 billion expended in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide and civil war). Such reactive involvement does nothing to eliminate the root causes of the instability. So the problems persist even after the expenditure of huge amounts of resources. Continuing to ignore Africa's instability and its impact on the economic, military, and diplomatic initiatives in the region will only delay the resolution of African problems and increase the costs in human life and economic loss for such efforts.¹¹

Efficient and effective use of force structure and funding may shape an African environment in which the military element of power is used as a stabilizing factor, rather than destabilizing the region. African nations are exploring security arrangements and examining sub-regional approaches to conflict management. They are now more open to cooperation with the United States and other nations on security issues than at any time in the past. This affords the United States a substantial opportunity to shape the post Cold War regional security environment.¹² If the US seeks to shape the African environment rather than continuing to respond to crises, now is the time, more than any other, to engage.

AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSIVE INITIATIVE




FIGURE 1 UGANDA SOLDIERS PARTICIPATING IN ACRI

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was established in 1996 both as a political response and an effort to use military resources constructively. This Presidential initiative sought a way of averting rather than responding to another African crisis. The primary catalyst for this initiative was the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when the lack of US responsiveness was sharply criticized. Initially, an Africa Crisis Response Force was envisioned. But after numerous discussions with African leaders, European officials and members of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), it was decided not to create a standing force but rather to increase capabilities of individual nations to conduct peacekeeping operations. Such a capability would provide the UN, the OAU, or other African sub-regional organizations with more flexibility in dealing with African problems.¹³ Further, individual nations would decide whether to initiate peacekeeping operations, thereby maintaining their sovereignty. If they lack sufficient capability to respond to a given situation, then they could call for additional support from African allies or from international resources. Again, it would be their decision.

As the lead agency for the ACRI, the Department of State set the priorities, evaluated countries, and fully developed ACRI as a training initiative to give selected African nations the capability to respond to regional peacekeeping operations. Three broad parameters are required for African nations to participate in ACRI: a democratic civilian government; respect for human rights; and a significant military capacity. ACRI seeks to develop partnerships among individual African countries, enhancing their capacity to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner, without total dependence on the international community. Further ACRI training integrates the international relief community into the program as a vital aspect of the initiative.¹⁴ In Uganda this was especially effective. The World Food Program and the International Red Cross were fully integrated into many of the training events producing tremendous results.

As of September 2000, EUCOM has provided training to approximately 800 soldiers in each of the following countries: Senegal, Uganda, Mali, Malawi, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Benin. The US goal is to train about 12,000 peacekeepers in 10 to 12 battalion-sized units and two to three brigade level headquarters.¹⁵

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE

ACRI began as bilateral training program before the OAU or the international community had settled on a unified approach. As crises continued to occur, the ACRI and its training partners deemed it wise to start preparing for the inevitable crises as soon as possible. Also

none of the ACRI training precludes a broader African approach, whether at regional or sub-regional levels. So it was a prudent decision to begin strengthening African peacekeeping capacity immediately, paving the way for cooperation and coordination to continue among nations.¹⁶

However if the ACRI concept is to remain viable it must expand. Likewise African nations must continue to take further unilateral initiatives to develop and enhance peace operations capabilities. Trained units of the African states may effectively participate in peacekeeping operations. But Africa as a region will continue to rely on the United Nations, the United States, and Western Europe to fund, organize, and support any future peacekeeping operations.¹⁷ Increased western resources are especially necessary if a peace-enforcement capacity (which the donor countries have so far shied away from) is to be achieved. But western assistance for enhanced effectiveness in this endeavor will not and should not increase without corresponding improvements in African legitimacy.¹⁸

FRANCE'S RESPONSE

The United States, France, and the United Kingdom have agreed to work together in promoting a joint initiative to strengthen the capacity of Africa countries to participate in peacekeeping under the auspices of the OAU and the UN. This joint initiative is based on four principles:

Long Term Capacity enhancement: The objective of the initiative is the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, particularly the capacity to mount rapid and effective collective response to humanitarian and other crises, consistent with the objectives and the parameters established with the UN stand-by arrangements. This goal will be achieved through coordinated and sustained efforts to increase interoperability through training, joint exercises and the development of common peacekeeping doctrine. There is no intention of creating a standing African force. The activities undertaken under this initiative should be the ones that enjoy the support of the African countries themselves.

Legitimacy: These activities will be carried out in consultation and coordination with the OAU and UN. The OAU and UN secretariats will be involved in the coordination of training activities.

Openness: All African states will be able to participate, with the exception of those states subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. Potential international donors will also be invited to associate themselves with the initiative. Such donors will be free to determine the states

with which they intend to cooperate in specific projects without being constrained to contribute, financially or otherwise, to a project with which they do not agree.

Transparency: There will be full transparency vis-à-vis the international community, and, in particular, to African and other donor states. We shall seek to establish an African peacekeeping support group, bring together the OAU, UN, African member states and potential donors in New York.

— Department of State – Principles of Peacekeeping

France, as the US, also made a major shift in strategic thinking about African Security assistance in large part due to the French military involvement in response to the Rwanda genocide. Similar to ACRI, the French program, Reinforcement of Capabilities of African Missions of Peacekeeping (RECAMP), is designed to help Africans solve their own conflict resolution problems by enhancing their peacekeeping skills. The success of the concept was demonstrated during a February 1998 RECAMP exercise called "Guidmakha," which was a joint French-African military maneuver with the armed forces of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. Close coordination and cooperation in peacekeeping techniques was put to the test during this exercise, which employed modern equipment, logistics, air support, and transport supplied by the French military.¹⁹

The ACRI concept should also be evaluated during a regional peacekeeping exercise similar to "Guidmakha". For example, regional exercise, Natural Fire, was conducted in 1998 involving Kenya, Kenya, Uganda (ACRI battalion), and Tanzania, focusing on peacekeeping operations. The success of the exercise was probably a major factor in convincing Kenya to participate in ACRI. The JCS exercise series, known as Flintlock, conducted with a regional focus in Africa, could possibly be expanded and structured to exercise the militaries, which have completed ACRI training.²⁰

Even though conceptually ACRI and RECAMP have many similarities, there are two major differences: ACRI seeks to enhance internal African peacekeeping skills, and has been coordinated bilaterally. Although ACRI trains individual nations' militaries, one of the program's aims is to create a peacekeeping capability that can be adapted by regional and sub-regional organizations. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is particularly interested in this kind of security architecture and is particularly interested in the way the US responds to crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone.²¹ On the other hand, RECAMP claims to operate through sub-regional organizations in Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS. Further RECAMP, unlike ACRI, is pre-positioning a fairly

substantial amount of equipment in Africa for potential use by African peacekeeping forces. Finally the ACRI initiative, unlike RECAMP, distributes a fairly large amount of non-lethal equipment, which is issued directly to the participating countries.²²

France has also provided over \$1 million to the OAU to enhance conflict resolution capabilities. Also, under its RECAMP program, France provided \$30 million in aid to African states to strengthen their peacekeeping capacity. The "Guidimakha" exercise, which brought together the armed forces of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, and created of a peacekeeping training center in the Ivory Coast - both initiatives to strengthen of African peacekeeping capabilities. Now placed under the auspices of the UN, these projects give African states the means to play a more active role in peacekeeping operations on their continent.²³

The United States seeks to improve the capabilities of the OAU and has provided over \$10 million to the OAU over the last five years to bolster institutional conflict resolution capabilities, funding the construction of the Conflict Management Center. In addition the US recognizes the importance of sub-regional organizations: In 1998 the US provided \$30 million in assistance to ECOMOG, the peacekeeping mission of the Economic Community of West African States.²⁴

EMPLOYMENT OF ACRI FORCES

Continuing political oversight as well as command and control and actual deployment and employment of ACRI might be handled in several ways: First, ACRI could become a UN operation approved by the Security Council, paid for by UN assessments. Second, it could be a multinational force operation, hopefully approved by the Security Council, again funded by UN assessments. Third it could be a sub-regional organization designed to conduct peacekeeping in its sub-region, funded sub-regionally, and hopefully seeking the approval of the Security Council for specific operations. Finally it could be an OAU peacekeeping operation.²⁵

The UN experimentally supported with the notion of robust humanitarian operations in early 1990s, but the Security council-- after the Somalia operation-- seems to have lost its ability to garner the political will of possible contributing countries for such operations: This hesitancy was clearly displayed by the failure to act in Rwanda. Moreover, the UN lacks the ability to coordinate and deploy a true enforcement operation, capable of sustaining combat operations that might be needed to conduct UN Charter Chapter VII operations. Given the UN's shortcomings, the unlikely prospects of radical Security Council reform or restructuring, and the unwillingness of the international community to provide large amounts of resources (particularly direct military intervention), the UN will simply fail to meet many of Africa's security concerns.

This deficiency dramatizes the need for the development of an African capacity to deal with regional crises in a timely manner.

In the wake of increased US involvement, the impact of the tragedy in Somalia, and the slow US response to the Rwanda genocide, Presidential Decision Directive 25 was issued. It proclaimed that the US would selectively engage its forces and resources in overseas conflict situations linked to vital US interests. But the US has no vital interests in Africa. It also called for numerous reforms to strengthen the UN's management of peace operations, while reducing the amount of US funding. The directive also signaled that even though the US may support peace operations, US troops would be deployed only in support of vital US interests. Thou it established a checklist of strict criteria for deciding upon such deployments. So PDD-25 likewise dramatizes the need for an African capacity to respond quickly and effectively to its own regional crises.

Within Africa, the OAU is widely regarded as legitimate. But it is chronically incapable of decisive action, a view shared by many nations having an interest in the continent. This is due as much to its nature as a consensus body as to perpetual shortages of staff and resources. The OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Resolution and Prevention could probably coordinate the work of monitors for a classic peacekeeping operation, but the OAU cannot field or coordinate a non-consensual enforcement action. If such robust action is to be taken, it seems likely that responsibility will fall on sub-regional organizations or ad-hoc coalitions of willing states.

Sub-regional organizations vary widely in their ability to conduct military operations. The Economic Community of West African States and Southern African Development Community, which have the most potential, are dominated by individual states (active Nigeria and reticent South Africa, respectively). Action by a small number of individual states tends to raise problems regarding legitimacy, because in these operations it becomes easier to mask self-serving interests under the cloak of "humanitarian" or "security" interests.²⁶

PEACEKEEPING THROUGH PEACE-ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Conflicts in Africa are usually isolated within a single country's borders and involve belligerents with limited ability to control all the combatants effectively. An intervention force with superior arms with the ability to respond rapidly to outbreaks of hostility will command greater respect from and compel quicker compliance from the belligerent parties in such conflicts.²⁷

Military intervention sometimes occurs within the consent of the troubled nations, and sometimes without such consent. Consensual interventions include traditional peacekeeping,

limited humanitarian intervention, and the implementation of comprehensive settlements. They authorized under UN Chapter VI. Non-consensual interventions, in contrast, include peace-enforcement operations governed by UN Chapter VII.²⁸

Peacekeeping, a military operation undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents is designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement," governs these operations. Typical operations may include protection of humanitarian assistance; observing, recording, supervising, monitoring, and occupying a buffer or neutral zone; and reporting on the implementation of the truce and citing any violations.

Peace-enforcement involves the application of military force, or the threat or its use, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Chapter VII, "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," governs these operations. Typical missions include restoration and maintenance of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee or denial of movement, establishment and supervision of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.

Chapter VII of the United Nations allows the Security Council to authorize non-consensual military action necessary to "maintain or restore international peace and security." Still, the principle of sovereignty, and its corollary of non-intervention, creates a high bar for the determination of an international threat. The precise actions that should trigger intervention, of course, are not universally agreed upon. Large-scale flows of refugees across borders, the potential for the fighting itself to spill across borders, and the overthrow of a democratically elected government may suffice. Contained civil war usually does not. Genocide, however, even if fully contained within borders, does justify such action (in fact obliges the action, according to the Genocide Convention).²⁹

Some participants of the ACRI suggested that the US consider whether to train and equip for peacekeeping operations or for the more challenging peace-enforcement actions. Many conflicts in Africa require robust intervention forces, but the UN DPKO advised the ACRI to concentrate initially on peacekeeping - emphasizing training, not equipment. Thus several training tasks were eliminated from the ACRI Program of Instruction because of the perceived offensive nature of the tasks.

It is essential that development of military capabilities should not outpace efforts to ensure its legitimate use. Some nations, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, and France also fear getting overly involved in the seemingly hopeless conflicts in Africa. These countries share very real concern about the legitimacy and appropriateness of increasing

African military capabilities. Enhancing the capabilities of a military may lead to increased instability if the National Command Authority of a country uses them inappropriately. Strong militaries also increase the risk of a coup.

OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF (NIGERIA)

Nigeria is not only the key to ECOMOG, it is the cornerstone” of the regional peacekeeping force, and the United States should do all it can to support Nigeria’s continuing involvement in it and other international peacekeeping efforts.

—USAIS, Pickering says US wants to work with Nigerian military, Nov 99

The Economic Community of West African States was founded in 1975. Although it has not achieved much of the desired economic integration and political union envisaged by its founders, ECOWAS has done much to check the escalation and spread of conflicts in the region through the intervention of its cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

Established in August 1990 to stem the tide of war in Liberia, ECOMOG has also seen action in Sierra Leone and, briefly, in Guinea-Bissau. At its inception ECOMOG was a Nigerian initiative. Given the country’s pre-eminence in the sub-region, it contributed about 90% of the troop requirements and funded most of the missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The cost to Nigeria has therefore been immense and has to some extent diminished its capacity to provide essential services to Nigerians. The country had a similar experience in the early 1980s, when it sent peacekeeping troops to Chad at the behest of the OAU. At the end of the operation the OAU failed to reimburse Nigeria for her expenditure in that mission. These situations offer a sharp contrast to other peacekeeping missions in which Nigeria has participated under the UN flag. Starting with the Congo (Democratic Republic) in 1960-1964, the Nigerian contingent was a major component of the peacekeeping forces sent in by Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjold, in furtherance of his strategy of “preventive diplomacy.” This succeeded not only in keeping the Congo conflict from spreading into the adjoining states but also in preserving the unity of the country. ³⁰Then good relationship between the US and Nigeria was dampened when the Babangida regime annulled the 12 June 1993 election result and the Abacha regime embarked on repressive rule and abuse of human rights. The US rightly refused to continue cooperation with governments that used their enhanced military capacity to subvert democratic ideals and brutalize the same people they were supposed to protect.

Thus Nigeria did not meet the three basic criteria to participate in the African Crisis Response Initiative: a democratic civilian government, respect for human rights, and a significant military capacity. Four years later Nigeria’s international status significantly

improved. Military dictatorship has given way to elected governments at all levels, and the rule of law prevails in a country previously notorious for its human rights violations.

So the US has indicated its intent to enhance the capabilities of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Nigeria has demonstrated an important commitment to regional stability and peacekeeping, spending an estimated \$10 billion over the last ten years on peacekeeping operations. The Nigerian military, with the size, experience and readiness to undertake peacekeeping and stability missions, has become an important partner for US engagement. Nigeria has offered at least five battalions for service in Sierra Leone as part of the USAMSIL peacekeeping mission. DOD is training and equipping these troops on a priority basis.³¹ Nigeria's needs are likely to fall into two broad, intertwined areas. First is the need for general retraining of the armed forces in areas such as professionalism, observance of human rights, and operating under democratic control. Second is the need for upgrading the equipment of the armed forces.³²

REFOCUSING

There have been many discussions concerning the level of training and the selection of countries participating in ACRI. Since inception of ACRI in 1996, the training focused on providing Africans with the ability to bring resolution to many internal problems. The decisions made since 1996 have resulted in a viable program that gives Africans an ability to conduct peacekeeping operations. The recent defeat of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and the role of the US in conducting Operation Focus Relief with Nigeria tell us the time has come to address certain aspects of the ACRI program. Perhaps the program should be refocused to provide for greater effectiveness, unity of effort, and unity of command.

With ACRI focusing on peacekeeping, virtually every country that voluntarily agreed to participate was selected, providing the three criteria were met. Countries that were large enough to produce, maintain, and deploy a peacekeeping capability either did not volunteer or were not selected, such as Nigeria, South Africa, and until lately Kenya. Unfortunately, the countries most capable of regional peacekeeping operations have not received the benefit of ACRI or RECAMP training. The regional anchor countries of Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia are also the most capable of stabilizing the region.

Lacking a single country capable of providing the necessary resources, the region is faced with the dilemma of relying either on a sub-regional organization such as ECOWAS, or a regional organization such as the OAU or UN. Even though these organizations might be

pressed to provide resources for the employment of peacekeeping forces, they would be severely strained to sustain those operations.

PEACEKEEPERS OR PEACE-ENFORCERS

The level of ACRI training (conducting Chapter VI – peacekeeping) was selected because of two important factors: First, the inter-agency working group was probably concerned that if the capability was used by one country to destabilize another, funding for the entire program might be jeopardized. Second, Congressional approval was for funding non-lethal training and equipment. Therefore, Department of State, the Executive Agent, determined Chapter VI- level training to be appropriate.

Training was thus focused on giving selected African nations the ability to respond to and monitor crises in Africa, with the consent of all major parties. Training in those selected countries was focused on battalion level, multi-echelon levels, and on those tasks which were mission-essential to peacekeeping. In accordance with Chapter VI, peacekeeping operations must be conducted with consent of the major parties, and the primary role of the peacekeepers would be to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement, while supporting diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peacekeepers are obliged to maintain agreements and to rely on the principals of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force. Training focused on rules of engagement, observance of human rights, integration of NGOs, and defensive measures, such as establishing checkpoints, establishing observation posts, and similar activities. The equipment provided was non-lethal, consisting of communications equipment, demining equipment, water purification, and individual equipment. Basic rifle marksmanship and eye examinations were incorporated in the training to insure that if force had to be used civilian casualties would be minimized. The Program of Instruction was developed by the 3d Special Forces Group and approved by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to provide for legitimacy and commonality of training. Follow-on iterations would focus on any deficiencies identified during the initial training, command post exercises, and accountability and maintenance of equipment to sustain the program. After the initial issue of equipment, a limited amount of equipment would be provided for follow on training and sustainment. In short, ACRI training focuses exclusively on peacekeeping missions and seeks to negate any perceptions of training for offensive military actions.

Probably the most important aspects of the training are emphasis on understanding rules of engagement, respect for human rights, and professional conduct of soldiers. Since the training was being given to existing combat units, which already possessed an ability to conduct

limited offensive operations, training them as potential peacekeepers involved much instruction on restraint.

Increasingly the failed states in Africa have found themselves in situations where either consent has been violated or consent is not attained. Then combat forces are inserted to induce consent. With the strict limitations of ACRI to peacekeeping standards (Chapter VI), these forces are not prepared for insertion-for combat operations. If the peacekeepers are not able to adapt or the employment of peace-enforcers is not timely, hostilities may escalate resulting in more violence and death, thereby producing the "CNN effect" and seriously damaging the image of the UN and the entire region. Loss of lives and losing the political will of contributing nations then have crippling effect on current and potential peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

A graduated approach may offer a compromise solution to enhance the effectiveness and survivability of an ACRI trained force. After their initial training to conduct operations as peacekeepers, the force should go thru a probationary period. If certain criteria (a democratic civilian government; respect for human rights; and a significant legitimate military capacity) continue to exist, another equipment package would be introduced and subsequent training would focus on the tasks required to conduct peace-enforcement operations. This does not mean that all selected countries receiving ACRI training based on Chapter VI criteria would be selected for Chapter VII level training. It would mean, however, that the entire equipment package would not be issued at one time. Countries with the military capacity to contribute at least a brigade would be selected for peace-enforcement training. So even as the capabilities of the ACRI forces increased, the US is very prudently and scrupulously arming them for peace-enforcement.

This modified program would provide the African nations with two distinct capabilities, which are required for successful intervention in regional crises. The capability of conducting peacekeeping in an environment where there is consent among the major parties; another force, with the inherent size and capabilities to force consent during a peace-enforcement situation.

STRATEGY ADJUSTMENTS

At the time ACRI was introduced in 1996, the OAU was ineffective in responding to crises. The OAU could not achieve the synergistic effect of contributing nations to produce a peacekeeping capability, and peacekeeping was conducted on a bi-lateral basis. The inability of the UN to conduct peace-enforcement operation, or to maintain stability and protect the civilian

population of Sierra Leone has produced a situation where the US is equipping and training Nigerian military forces to conduct UN Chapter VII operations. Sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS, and by military extension, ECOMOG appear to have the greatest influence in their regions. Nigeria is the influential country within ECOWAS, and South Africa within SADC. They have emerged as anchor states due to many factors, the military might being one of the most significant.

Two factors greatly influence the abilities of any organization to affect events in Africa: its ability to build a consensus and its willingness to expend resources. To execute any engagement strategy, particularly military, both in shaping and responding to the environment, the ability to build a consensus in a timely manner is critical to the future of peace operations in Africa. The US must develop multifaceted approach on several levels, ranging from the UN DPKO, through the OAU Crisis Management, through sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC, though the National Command Authorities of countries selected to receive training in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement would be the optimum solution. ACRI has strengthened the abilities of selected African countries to conduct peacekeeping. The US now needs to focus on assisting Africa on building the operational employment mechanism to most effectively use ACRI capabilities. The US should provide African leadership with guidance on how best to address the issue of employment of an African peace-enforcement capability.

US partners in the UK and France should join the US in developing this strategy of engagement in Africa. The multi-national approach is critical not only to assume the efficient use of limited resources, but also to gain greater effectiveness through unity of effort. Even at the tactical level, the US and France are introducing similar peacekeeping systems through ACRI and RECAMP. Without more cooperation, these systems may prove to be incompatible, with devastating results in future deployments.

CONCLUSION

The United States has interests in Africa, and those interests will become increasingly important in the future. Oils exports, prevention of human suffering, refugee flows, and HIV/Aids all have global implications. Although US policy-makers generally agree that Africa will be increasingly important in the future, there is probably a similar acknowledgment that direct US military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely. The policy decision then becomes how the US should use its military element of power in a region where failed states are more frequent and consent of major parties for peaceful agreements are growing more infrequent. There is a tremendous risk involved in enhancing the African military capacity, through selective

engagement, to successfully perform peace-enforcement operations. The US must insist that Africans leaders specify what assistance they require. Rather than engaging on a bi-lateral basis, the US should focus on strengthening African regional organizations. Also the US, UK, and France must take a more coordinated and unified approach to enabling Africa to deal with its problems, especially in the area of peace operations for no other reason than to insure that training and equipment is compatible. The US must accept risks and make the best decisions possible. Otherwise the US will neglect a region struggling for stability, prosperity, and even democracy.

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