

**The U.S. Army Corps
in Humanitarian Assistance Operations**

**A Monograph
By
Major Jeffrey K. McGee
United States Army**

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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ABSTRACT

THE U.S. ARMY CORPS IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS by Major Jeffrey K. McGee, USA, 52 pages.

Natural disasters have plagued the world since the earliest recorded history but word of these events spread only as fast as the existing mode of travel allowed. Although these disasters have caused immense human suffering throughout the ages, the invention of technologies such as global satellite broadcasting of voice and images has transmitted vivid pictures of far away disasters into the homes of people around the world. These news reports and pictures brought into sharp focus the magnitude of the natural disaster and human suffering within a matter of minutes or hours. With this increased awareness in the situation and plight of others around the world, the leading nations of the world have found this human suffering to be morally unacceptable and are more likely to intervene to bring better living conditions to those less fortunate.

With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the free world began searching for a new unifying purpose since the Soviet Union and its satellite countries were no longer a viable threat for nuclear or conventional war. Without the focus of an impending war on the European continent, political leaders were more comfortable engaging their military forces in the conduct of peace keeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance missions. Often all three types of missions occurred simultaneously in the same area.

Using the requirements of previous humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, the monograph provides more insights into whether an U.S. Army corps is capable of conducting this type of operation. Using a posited natural disaster in Cuba, the U.S. Army corps' capability in a complex humanitarian assistance operation will be used to provide an answer to the research question. The situation begins with a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, that strikes the island of Cuba causing massive destruction to the civil infrastructure. The destruction is so extensive throughout the island that the Cuban government is unable to restore public services. The population becomes restless after several days without power, water, and other essential services. Demonstrations, riots, and looting overwhelm the ability of the police to maintain law and order. Eventually the Cuban government implodes, causing a complete breakdown in services and order throughout the island.

The intent of this monograph is to explore the structure of the corps headquarters and identify the required capabilities to restore order and perform the humanitarian assistance missions for the people of Cuba following a natural disaster. The capabilities of an U.S. Army corps headquarters is built for the purpose of controlling multiple divisions and non-divisional units in the execution of combat operations. Although some tasks within Stability and Support Operations are similar to combat operations, there are myriad of other tasks that the corps headquarters may not be designed to perform. Comparing the structure of the normal corps headquarters to the required capabilities will identify any shortfalls in manning or equipment that will impair the accomplishment of the mission.

The study concludes that the current US Army corps staff is capable of forming, training, and deploying the force and disarming factions and the Cuban military force since these are tasks similar to combat tasks. The establishment of law and order will require the screening, selection, and retraining of former Cuban military and police forces to form the new police force. After the police force is formed, the US military and international civilian police will monitor the police performance. Humanitarian assistance operations will rely heavily on a robust CMOC cell to coordinate and manage the efforts of military resources and NGO/PVO/IO organizations. Military governorship will require a large outlay of personnel to fulfill the responsibilities inherent in the administration of the interim national government. Local and national elections will be the primary responsibility of an international, non-partisan organization with only logistics and security support responsibilities for the US Army corps staff.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction.....	1
II. The Combat Battle Staff.....	6
III. The Operational Environment.....	14
IV. Humanitarian Assistance Functions.....	21
V. Corps Staff Structure Analysis.....	30
VI. Conclusion.....	39
Endnotes.....	43
Bibliography.....	49

Chapter One.

Introduction.

Natural disasters have plagued the world since the earliest recorded history but word of these events spread only as fast as the existing mode of travel allowed. Although these disasters have caused immense human suffering throughout the ages, the invention of technologies such as global satellite broadcasting of voice and images has transmitted vivid pictures of far away disasters into the homes of people around the world. These news reports and pictures brought into sharp focus the magnitude of the natural disaster and human suffering within a matter of minutes or hours. With this increased awareness in the situation and plight of others around the world, the leading nations of the world have found this human suffering to be morally unacceptable and are more likely to intervene to bring better living conditions to those less fortunate.

With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the free world began searching for a new unifying purpose since the Soviet Union and its satellite countries were no longer a viable threat for nuclear or conventional war. Without the focus of an impending war on the European continent, political leaders were more comfortable engaging their military forces in the conduct of peace keeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance missions. Often all three types of missions occurred simultaneously in the same area. With less reason to focus intensively on high intensity conflict, the Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted more humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years than during the cold war period.¹

Humanitarian assistance operations deliver aid in the form of life support (food, water, shelter, etc) and, to some extent, law and order to stabilize the situation until the

government is able to provide these services for the populace.² Examples of humanitarian assistance operations the U.S. has participated in include Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in April 1991, Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh in May 1991, United Nations Operations in Somalia in 1993, Operation Support Hope in Rwanda in 1994, Operation Restore Dignity in Haiti in 1996, and most recently flood relief operations in Mozambique. Peacekeeping operations insert non-partisan military forces between two or more warring factions to prevent any further fighting and are reliant upon an agreement between the factions to cease hostilities for the common good.³ Examples of peacekeeping operations include Operation Joint Endeavor in 1996, Operation Joint Guard ongoing since 1997, and Operation Allied Force ongoing since 1999. Each of these operations are being conducted in the Balkan region. The favored level of headquarters for the operations in the Balkans is a corps-level headquarters operating either as an organic unit or as a JTF. This monograph will explore the issue of whether an U.S. Army corps is capable of performing this type of operation without augmentation.

Using the requirements of previous humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, the monograph provides more insights into whether an U.S. Army corps is capable of conducting this type of operation. To determine the U.S. Army corps' capability in a complex humanitarian assistance operation, a hypothetical situation in which a natural disaster has struck the island of Cuba is used to provide an answer to the research question. The situation begins with a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, that strikes the island of Cuba causing massive destruction to the civil infrastructure. The destruction is so extensive throughout the island that the Cuban government is unable to restore public

services. The population becomes restless after several days without power, water, and other essential services. Demonstrations, riots, and looting overwhelm the ability of the police to maintain law and order. Eventually the Cuban government implodes, causing a complete breakdown in services and order throughout the island.

The resulting anarchy and human suffering results in popular support within the world community for the restoration of order and an end to the suffering of the populace. Reporters from news services such as CNN broadcast vivid images of the situation into the homes throughout the civilized world, fanning the flames of moral righteousness and spurring the world to action. The United States alerts an U.S. Army corps to respond as the headquarters to restore law and order and render humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people. Initially, the U.S. Army corps will restore law and order and then will work with Non-Governmental Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations, and United Nations commissions to provide humanitarian assistance and transition control of the nation to a democratically elected government.

The intent of this monograph is to explore the structure of the corps headquarters and identify the required capabilities to restore order and perform the humanitarian assistance missions for the people of Cuba following a natural disaster. The capabilities of an U.S. Army corps headquarters is built for the purpose of controlling multiple divisions and non-divisional units in the execution of combat operations. Although some tasks within Stability and Support Operations are similar to combat operations, there are myriad of other tasks that the corps headquarters may not be designed to perform. Comparing the structure of the normal corps headquarters to the required capabilities will

identify any shortfalls in manning or equipment that will impair the accomplishment of the mission.

The first chapter begins by setting the stage for this examination. Initially, it outlines the traditional corps battle staff positions, functions, and tasks and discusses the organization of various cells to facilitate combat operations. The combat battle staff is the baseline against which the monograph assesses the capabilities of the humanitarian assistance staff.

The second chapter describes the operational environment for humanitarian assistance, highlighting how the Cuban environment within this scenario differs from a combat environment. The operational environment includes the command structures, threats, and tasks that may exist during this operation. Identifying the threats that will exist within the context of this scenario is critical to assessing the competency of the corps headquarters to operate in this environment without augmentation. These threats include the weather and its associated effects, existing military and political structure, refugee health and requirements, and the restoration of critical services and agencies.

Chapter three details the functions that are essential to the success of a corps headquarters in a humanitarian assistance operation. These functions include the establishment of law and order, restoration of essential services, and providing humanitarian assistance to the population. The last two functions require the coordination and synergistic engagement of capabilities and resources resident within the private and non-governmental organizations to most rapidly ease the suffering of the Cuban people.

Three criteria measure staff effectiveness in coordinating or facilitating the corps' response to the demands of the operational environment. One is the ability to eliminate civil disturbance while simultaneously administering aid for the needs of the local populace. The number of reported crimes and incidents of lawless behavior measure this criterion. Second is the ability of the corps to deal with civilians, including local government and law enforcement, and non-governmental organizations (NGO). This criterion is measured subjectively by the ability of the corps to influence and provide a united, efficient effort towards the common goal of restoring essential services for the people of Cuba. The last criterion is the rapidity of progress towards accomplishing military tasks that support the political end-state, which is measured in time. The result of this analysis is an identification of key players, structures, and procedures to conduct humanitarian assistance operations.

The fourth chapter describes the corps staff structure in peacetime and defines any critical shortages that may exist in the corps staff structure that will impair the execution of a humanitarian assistance mission on the Island of Cuba within this scenario. The analysis is a product of the comparison of existing staff functions in the corps headquarters with the requirements for success identified in conducting a humanitarian assistance operation in Cuba. Using the disparity, the author will provide insight into what structures within the corps headquarters would best execute these functions.

In conclusion the author summarizes the data presented and synthesizes the capability of the corps headquarters to execute a humanitarian assistance operation within the confines of the scenario provided. The conclusion will include recommendations for

additions to the corps headquarters staff, if necessary, to bring the proper competencies to bear in the execution of a humanitarian assistance operation.

Chapter Two.

The Combat Battle Staff

This chapter provides the basic foundation and explanation of staff organizations from battalion through corps. Staff structures and organizations, within the limitations of regulations and laws often reflect the commander's operational requirements, experience, and span of control. The U.S. Army uses standardized staff organizations to provide consistency in performance, responsibilities (regardless of unit type or echelon), training, and resources.

The primary duty of staffs at all echelons exist to assist the commander in accomplishing his mission, provide information to help him make and execute the decisions of the commander. The staff manages information for the commander and provides him with situational awareness, an understanding of the battlefield, and helps to prevent information overload by filtering out non-essential information before it reaches the commander.⁴ This filtration process allows the staff to present the commander with only the information that is required to maintain the commander's situational awareness with enough time to exploit opportunities that present themselves on the battlefield.

The Corps staff is organized according to the considerations of mission, broad fields of interest, and regulations and laws.⁵ The *mission* determines activities units are to accomplish. These activities, in turn, determine how the commander organizes, tailors,

or adapts the staff to accomplish the mission. Regardless of the command mission, every Army staff has common *broad fields of interest* that determine how the commander divides duties and responsibilities.

The Army's doctrinal reference for broad fields of interest, or staffs, is FM 101-5. According to this publication the following broad areas of interest are identified and grouped to allow an effective span of control and unified effort:

- Personnel (G1).
- Intelligence (G2).
- Operations and training (G3).
- Logistics (G4).
- Civil-military operations (G5).
- Signal operations (G6).
- Resource management (RM).⁶

Although the broad fields of interest may vary depending on the level of command, mission, and environment, there are certain staff positions that are required by regulation or law. In the operational environment that the corps will find itself in this humanitarian assistance operation in Cuba, a critical staff officer will be the Political Advisor (POLAD) to the commander. Army *regulations* establish special relationships between certain staff officers and the commander. For example, AR 20-1, AR 27-1, and AR 165-1 require the inspector general (IG), the staff judge advocate (SJA), and the chaplain to be members of the commander's personal staff.⁷ Each commander must use his professional knowledge, experience, and leadership style to develop and efficiently and effectively organize his staff. With these factors in mind, the monograph will

explore in more detail the various staff positions, functions, and tasks and how each staff is organized to facilitate combat operations.

The G1 is the principle staff section for all matters concerning human resources (military and civilian), which include personnel readiness, personnel services, and headquarters management. This section develops the personnel estimate and concept of personnel support within the battle staff. Additionally, the G1 is responsible for addressing personnel considerations in the development and integration of courses of action during the military planning process. The G1 provides staff oversight for the Corps Surgeon, Public Affairs Office, Staff Judge Advocate General, The Corps Chaplain, the Corps Finance Group, the Corps Personnel Group, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs, and the Corps Safety Office.⁸

The G2 is the primary staff officer for all matters concerning military intelligence, counterintelligence, security operations, and military intelligence training. The G2 also has staff oversight of the staff weather officer (SWO). The SWO is similar to a weatherman who monitors and predicts weather conditions and then makes an assessment of the impact of the weather effects on current or future operations.⁹

Military intelligence matters include disseminating intelligence to commanders and other users, collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence, conducting and coordinating intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and describing the effects of the battlefield environment on friendly and enemy capabilities. Military intelligence matters also include determining enemy most probable and most dangerous courses of action and key events, and coordinating ground and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance operations with other collection assets.

Counterintelligence operations attempt to deny the enemy commander knowledge that will provide an advantage in current or future operations. These operations involve identifying enemy intelligence collection capabilities, including human intelligence, signal intelligence, and imagery intelligence. Counterintelligence operations also include evaluating enemy intelligence capabilities as they affect the areas of operations security, counter-surveillance, signal security, security operations, deception planning, psychological operations, rear area operations, and force protection.

Security operations evaluate both internal and external threats to the military operation. These include security checks to validate the trustworthiness of personnel to gain access to protected areas, physical security of essential areas, and evaluating the vulnerabilities for infiltration or loss of critical intelligence information. Security operations also involve the processing, investigation, and revalidation of indigenous personnel that are employed by the U.S. government for the purpose of host nation support services, translation duties, and advisors.

Military intelligence training is conducted to educate and refresh intelligence collectors on the methods used to collect intelligence and integrate the various assets into a cohesive collection effort. Additionally military intelligence training formulates the command intelligence training plan and integrates the collection effort and intelligence preparation of the battlefield into other training programs within the corps.

The largest staff section within the Corps Battle Staff is the G3. The G3 is the primary staff officer for all matters concerning training, operations and plans, and force development and modernization. Additionally, the G3 provides staff oversight for the following special staff officers: air defense coordinator, air liaison officer, air/naval

gunfire liaison company commander, aviation coordinator, chemical officer, deception officer, electronic warfare officer, engineer coordinator, explosive ordnance disposal officer, fire support coordinator, historian, subordinate unit liaison officers, provost marshal, psychological operations officer, safety officer, special operations coordinator, and theater airlift liaison officer.¹⁰ In the context of combat operations, the G3's planning and current operations functions are the most critical. This is not to say that training and force modernization are unimportant. Each of these areas provides enhanced function and capability to the forces within the corps.

Training the force is essential to maintain military forces in peak performance with an intimate knowledge of the equipment to exploit the technological superiority against the enemy force. Training will also provide a platform for the integration and synchronization of forces to build and mass combat power against the enemy forces and create a standard doctrine of warfighting amongst the military force.

The plans and operations sections are the lifeblood of the corps. The plans, or future operations section is responsible for planning combat operations 72-96 hours in advance of current operations. Plans task organizes and recommends use of resources for maneuver, support, and deception to the commander. The operations, or current operations section is responsible for tracking the current fight, coordinating and directing terrain management, directing troop movements, and integrating fire support into the current fight.

Force development and modernization provides the corps with new force structures and equipment to take advantage of more modern technologies and capabilities. This includes the fielding of new weapons, equipment, software, and

training to soldiers and support personnel in the receiving unit to ensure that the new technology is leveraged to the maximum extent possible. In a combat environment in which the conflict is estimated to be of short duration, force development and modernization would most likely not be performed until the conflict is terminated.

If the G3's plans and operations section is considered the lifeblood of the corps, then the G4 logistics operations would be considered the heart; pumping supplies throughout the corps to sustain operations and maintain the force. The G4 is the principal staff officer responsible for coordinating the logistics integration of supply, maintenance, transportation, and services for the corps. The G4 is the link between the commander and the support units and provides visibility of the logistics posture of the units within the corps structure. The G4 provides logistics and transportation planners for the battle staff; responsible for planning, coordinating, and tracking the events that impact logistics during combat operations.¹¹

The G5 is the principal staff officer responsible for all matters concerning civil-military operations. This includes evaluating and mitigating the impact of military operations on the civilian populace and the activities of the civilian populace on military operations. The G5 is also responsible for enhancing the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and populace to ensure that the local, non-military population will not hinder ongoing and future operations. This is accomplished through the establishment of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to maintain liaison with and coordinate the activities of other U.S. government agencies, host nation civil and military authorities, and non-governmental, private voluntary, and international organizations. The G5 advises the commander on the legal and moral obligations that

coincide with the impact of current and proposed future military operations. Also critical is the G5's duty to minimize civilian interference in military operations, including dislocated civilian/refugee operations, curfews, and movement restrictions.¹²

The G6 is the principal staff officer responsible for all matters concerning signal operations, automation management, network management, and information security. As part of signal operations, the G6 will manage radio frequency allocations, manage communications protocols and interfaces, and ensure redundant signal means are available to pass time-sensitive battle command information from collectors to processors and between medical units and medical laboratories and medical centers. Automation management involves the use and configuration of local area networks, and providing systems administration for all automation systems and software. Information security, as its name implies, is establishing and maintaining communications security systems for both voice and data transmissions using inherent system capabilities and encryption.¹³

This chapter has thus far explained the duties and responsibilities of the primary staff officers in the corps headquarters. These staff sections are responsible for the management of personnel, intelligence, operations and plans, logistics, civil-military operations, and signal operations. Next, the author will give a brief explanation of the key special staff members and their areas of responsibility during combat operations.

With increased fiscal constraints and making the best use of money for the most good, the resource manager/comptroller is an important player in all forms of military operation. The resource manager (RM) is responsible for budget formulation and resource management analysis and implementation for the commander. Although money is less of an issue during combat operations, military operations other than war

(MOOTW) are monetarily more tightly controlled and require increased accounting systems for the flow of funds. ¹⁴

In combat, soldiers and civilians will be killed and wounded. The surgeon is the special staff officer responsible for coordinating health assets and operations within the corps. The surgeon has staff oversight for the medical care of enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and civilians within the corps area of operations. Veterinary care of government-owned animals, such as military police working dogs, is an important part of operations from the forward line of troops rearward. As combat operations shift from high intensity combat to MOOTW, the veterinary officer must maintain the military police working dogs in good health for the enhanced capability they bring to military police units in handling EPWs and, in conjunction with local authorities, maintaining positive crowd control. ¹⁵

The G3 has coordinating responsibility over the following special staff officers: air defense coordinator, air liaison officer, air/naval gunfire liaison company commander, aviation coordinator, theater airlift liaison officer, electronic warfare officer, engineer coordinator, explosive ordnance disposal officer, fire support coordinator, subordinate unit liaison officers, psychological operations officer, and special operations coordinator. The job titles of these special staff officers or sections are self-explanatory, thus the author will not go into detail about their duties and responsibilities. Each has a specific and integral part in enhancing the combat capability of the corps in combat and, in subsequent chapters, the reader will find that each is just as valuable in corps operations other than war.

Within this first chapter, the composition, duties, and responsibilities of the corps primary staff and special staff have been documented. Using this as the baseline for core competencies within the corps headquarters in combat operations, the next chapter details the operational environment that the U.S. Army corps will encounter as they begin the humanitarian operation on the Island of Cuba.

Chapter Three.

The Operational Environment

The operational environment for a humanitarian assistance operation is a dynamic and ever-changing landscape. While similar to high intensity combat in the differing situations throughout the battlespace, humanitarian assistance environments have requirements for different competencies. The operational environment includes the command structures, threats, and tasks that may exist during this operation. Identifying the threats that will exist within the context of this scenario is critical to assessing the competency of the corps headquarters to operate in this environment without augmentation. These threats include the weather and its associated effects, existing military and political structure, refugee health and welfare requirements, and the restoration of critical services and agencies.

Fidel Castro, leader of Rebel Army in the Cuban Revolution, defeated the unpopular dictator, Fulgencio Batista, in late December 1959.¹⁶ Castro's army enjoyed widespread popular support among the people of Cuba and portrayed the best organized group with which to fill the vacuum in the capital city of Havana after the expulsion of the Batista regime. According to noted Cuban scholar Andres Suarez, Castro's ideology

for Cuba relies on revolutionary violence as a means to socio-political transformation. This ideology can be characterized by five principles. First, that social change will be made through revolutionary change or violence. Second, this change requires a monopoly of the state apparatus. Third, the state will be seized through guerrilla war and later through the creation of a politico-military organization commanded by a leader who exercises both political and military roles. Fourth, that revolutionary victory demands popular mobilization. And fifth, that mass mobilization is facilitated by sophisticated manipulation, especially the elaboration of a variety of anti-imperialist nationalism, preferably identified with a historical personality who is able to be mythologized.¹⁷

The island nation of Cuba holds both promise and threat due its proximity to the shores of the United States. Currently, Cuba is the only nation in the world that the United States, by law and policy, has the intention of replacing their government. Congressional passage and Presidential signature on the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 brought about this political and legal position. This act stipulates specific actions and sanctions that the U.S. will employ to force the removal of the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro. Further, this act requires the return of all confiscated property to the U.S. corporations and exiled Cubans it was seized from, including reparations for losses.¹⁸

Within the National Security Strategy of the United States, President William J. Clinton has stated that:

“The United States remains committed to promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba and forestalling a mass exodus that would endanger the lives of migrants and the security of our borders. While maintaining pressure on the regime to make political and economic reforms, we continue to encourage the emergence of a civil society to assist the transition to democracy when the change comes. As the Cuban people feel greater incentive to take charge of their own

future, they are more likely to stay at home and build the informal and formal structures that will make transition easier. Meanwhile, we remain firmly committed to bilateral migration accords that ensure migration in safe, legal and orderly channels.”¹⁹

This position, while on the surface is peaceful in nature, provides friction between the U.S. and Cuban governments. The U.S. Government wants a smooth transition to a democratic government in Cuba. Cuban leader Fidel Castro is content to remain in power as the military dictator of Cuba. Underlying the U.S. strategy of a peaceful transition is the desire that the Cuban people ‘take charge of their own future,’ which really translates into the formation of an insurgent movement to oust Castro from power.

The United States has various national interests in the nation of Cuba. These include the avoidance of uncontrolled immigration into the U.S., maintaining stability and peace, facilitating trade and economic development, promoting democracy and human rights, and preventing the use of the island as a base for illegal drug trade and trafficking into the United States.²⁰ To prevent a mass exodus of people from Cuba, such as the 1980 Mariel Boatlift that flooded the Florida coast with over 120,000 illegal immigrants, the people of Cuba must be content in Cuba.²¹ This means stable economic growth, a viable and democratic government, and protection of the people and restoration of basic human rights.

The strongest political and social power of Castro’s government is clearly resident in the Cuban military, known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). Currently the number of soldiers, sailors, and airmen on active duty is estimated at 165,000, reserve forces estimated at approximately 135,000, paramilitary elite forces estimated to be 30,000 and Territorial militia forces estimated to be more than 1,000,000.²² Members of the FAR are given a special status among the Cuban people; to do otherwise could prove

to be a costly mistake for those who would relegate the military to the status of common citizens. Historically, if the FAR supports an individual or group it is virtually unstoppable in attaining its cause.²³

Manuel Moreno Fraginals, a noted Cuban scholar, believes that Cuba has suffered a total disintegration of its society and the family unit.²⁴ He states that civil society beyond the family clan and short of the state is absent. The result is an apathetic populace that awaits direction from the state and is unconcerned about anything beyond the production of daily essentials of food and shelter. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba has lost its political and monetary support base from which to carry on the revolution. Without the financial inflow from the Soviet Union, Castro's government has found it increasingly difficult to provide the Cuban populace with health care, jobs, and social and economic well being.²⁵ If the citizens of Cuba are no longer able to work and make some money to support even a meager existence, there is the possibility of social unrest.

The situation begins with a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, that strikes the island of Cuba causing massive destruction to the civil infrastructure. The high winds, waves, and rising water have knocked down power lines, made streets impassable, contaminated water supplies, and left a large portion of the population homeless. The Cuban people believe that, as in times past, the Castro government will provide relief for their plight and will rapidly restore essential services. However, the level of destruction is so extensive that the Cuban government is unable to provide timely restoration of public services. The population becomes restless after several days without power, water, and other essential services. Demonstrations, riots, and looting overwhelm the

ability of the police to maintain law and order. The military is called in to quell the riots and restore order. This crackdown only infuriates the populace and the world as CNN and other news agencies worldwide televise pictures and descriptions of the violence. Eventually the Cuban military is overwhelmed by the magnitude of the uprising and, being unable to protect the government any longer, the government implodes causing a complete breakdown and slow spiral towards anarchy throughout the island.

The resulting anarchy and human suffering results in an outcry of popular support within the world community for the restoration of order and an end to the suffering of the Cuban populace. The United Nations holds a special meeting of the General Assembly to debate the options available to bring the situation under control as rapidly as possible.

The United States representative to the United Nations expresses concern about instability in Cuba. Other organizations that will become involved in the situation include the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). Cuban-American immigrants within the United States will begin high profile demonstrations in support of the plight of their relatives in Cuba to force government action within the United States.

Historically when things get bad in Cuba, many of Cuba's citizens begin constructing boats and attempt to float to the United States and a better way of life. The Mariel Boatlift, as mentioned earlier, was a good example of this situation. These boat people cause additional burden for U.S. Coast Guard and Navy ships that will be involved in the rescue missions. U.S. social welfare programs will also have to support the refugees until they are either deported or granted political asylum and allowed to become citizens of the U.S.

While the United Nations debates are continuing, the United States alerts a U.S. Army corps, under the command of the United States Southern Command, to respond to the crisis. This corps will perform as the headquarters for a force with the mission to deploy to the island of Cuba, restore law and order, and provide/facilitate humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people. SOUTHCOM will provide oversight of the operation and maintain CINC responsibilities within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.²⁶

Generally, the responsibility for declaring a foreign disaster that would require U.S. humanitarian assistance rests initially with the Department of State and the U.S. ambassador in that country. Since diplomatic ties with Cuba were cut many years ago, there is limited U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba.²⁷ Thus, the National Command Authority (NCA) may deem the humanitarian situation serious enough that the employment of U.S. armed forces is necessary.

In most cases, the NCA will commit U.S. military forces for humanitarian relief based on the following considerations:

- The situation is beyond the host nation's capability
- A strong possibility exists that there will be large scale human suffering unless outside intervention occurs
- Nonmilitary national and international agencies are unable or unwilling to provide the necessary resources to solve the crisis
- Either the host nation has invited the U.S. military intervention or an appropriate international organization, such as the U.N., has approved intervention
- U.S. military assets would make a critical contribution to the relief effort and are available and readily transportable to the location
- It is expected that the U.S. military intervention will be of short duration and that civilian authorities will shoulder the responsibility as soon as possible.²⁸

Initially, the U.S. Army corps will deploy with a military response force to establish law and order and disarm or neutralize the military forces of the island nation. Prominent threats that the U.S. military force can expect to face include the Cuban military, local armed militias, members of the displaced government, the Cuban people, and Cuban exiles returning from the United States. Other, more subtle threats the U.S. military may face include toxic and septic environmental diseases and air/food/water-borne illnesses.

For many years the Cuban people have harbored an animosity towards the U.S., based upon the propaganda that was given to them.²⁹ To help bridge the gap between truth and propaganda, a heavy information operations campaign will be required to ensure that the Cuban people understand the intent of the military force that has landed on their shores. With the Cuban government collapsed, the corps headquarters must establish a military governorship as the framework for a new government. This framework organization, with United Nations oversight will then begin to establish laws, provide enforcement of those laws, and mediate legal disputes.

Once the island has been stabilized, U.S. military specialists, in concert with Non-Governmental Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations, International organizations, and United Nations commissions, will begin the process of restoring essential services and providing temporary housing to the populace. Simultaneously, an interim government will be established and a transition of power will occur from the military governor with oversight from the U.N. and the international community. The final step in the process will be the holding of a democratic election and transition from

the interim government to the newly elected government. After the newly elected government is fully in control of the nation and reconstruction and restoration is well underway, the military mission will have been accomplished.

The situation U.S. forces will face when entering the Island Nation of Cuba to conduct humanitarian assistance operations is very complex. There are many unknown elements that will affect the conduct of the operation. These unknowns include: the initial disposition and potential hostility of the Cuban Military forces, the reaction of the populous to the presence of U.S. forces in their country, the behavior of the populous in the aftermath of this natural disaster, and the criminal elements preying on the misfortune of their fellow citizens. After understanding the environment and realizing the magnitude of the variables he will encounter, the U.S. Army Corps commander must compile the tasks and objectives to be performed during the deployment.

Chapter Four.

Humanitarian Assistance Functions

Under normal circumstances, if a disaster is either impending or underway, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) sends a Disaster Assessment and Response Team (DART) to the area to make an initial assessment of the damage and provide recommendations for assisting the affected area.³⁰ The overall purpose of an initial assessment is to provide the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) with information and recommendations to make timely decisions on the U.S. Government disaster response. This initial assessment will:

- Identify the impact which a disaster has had on a society, and the ability of that society to cope.

- Identify the most vulnerable populations that need to be targeted for assistance.
- Identify the most urgent food and non-food requirements and potential methods of providing them most effectively.
- Identify the level of response by the affected country and its internal capacities to cope with the situation.
- Identify the level of response from other donor countries and PVO's/NGO's/IO's.
- Make recommendations which define and prioritize the actions and resources needed for immediate response, to OFDA and to USAID/Embassy.³¹

Based upon these initial assessments, the DART makes recommendations back to USAID that include possibilities for facilitating and expediting recovery and development. Further, the DART will identify which types of in-depth assessments should be undertaken and highlight special concerns that would not immediately be evident to OFDA or non-emergency persons. These initial assessments then become the baseline data to reference for further monitoring and to determine if a situation is improving or deteriorating.

In the case of a natural disaster in Cuba, however, the DART would be unwelcome. Based upon the United States' political stance towards Cuba, the only diplomatic presence in Cuba is the U.S. Interests section of the Swiss Embassy in Havana, Cuba. Without the ability to push a DART team into Cuba early in this disaster and the subsequent dissolution into anarchy, the situation must be assessed by other means. The assessment of the situation must be done using national intelligence assets, limited human intelligence assets on the island, limited intelligence provided by the United States Military presence in Guantanamo Bay (that presumably has been affected by the hurricane), and the Corps commander's staff.

After the decision has been made by the National Command Authority to commit U.S. military forces in support of a humanitarian assistance operation, the military commander must first form, train, and deploy his force to shape the environment. Once the environment is conducive for humanitarian assistance operations, the military commander has six major life support missions to accomplish. Beneath these life support missions are various humanitarian assistance sub-tasks. Once the humanitarian crisis is under control the military commander, in concert with other non-partisan organizations, will set the conditions for and execute local and national elections. After the civil and military conditions are complete and the elected officials are in power, the military commander will be given orders to redeploy from Cuba.

The military commander has six broad life support missions to conduct once conditions are set to begin the humanitarian assistance operation. These missions include:

- * Search and rescue.
- * Safe and adequate water supply and disposal.
- * Adequate food.
- * Sufficient shelter (including clothes).
- * Medical care.
- * Protection from violence and harassment.³²

The humanitarian assistance tasks that fall beneath the six broad life support missions include:

- * Locate and provide HA tasks to victims of natural or man-made disaster (search and rescue).
- * Production, storage, and distribution of potable water (safe and adequate water).
- * Provide public health education in elementary sanitation (safe and adequate water).
- * Assist in waste disposal (safe and adequate water).
- * Ensure the timely and orderly distribution of available food supplies (adequate food).
- * Provide a secure environment that discourages the generation of displaced civilians (sufficient shelter & clothing).
- * Facilitate the establishment and administration of appropriate displaced civilian handling and housing facilities (sufficient shelter and clothing).

- * Facilitate the distribution of clothing (sufficient shelter and clothing).
- * Assist operations of NGO medical groups (medical care).
- * Conduct medical and dental care programs (medical care).
- * Mass immunizations.
- * Education programs.
- * Deliver high-value medical supplies (medical care).
- * Provide security for population, refugee camps, and collection facilities (violence and harassment).
- * Provide security for NGOs (violence and harassment).
- * Storage facility security.
- * Convoy security.
- * Distribution site security.
- * Provide for mob control (violence and harassment).
- * Provide for weapons control and confiscation (violence and harassment).
- * Provide for friendly force security (violence and harassment).³³

These missions and tasks fall into five broad categories in order of execution.

Prior to beginning the humanitarian assistance functions, the force must first form, train, and deploy to the region. Second, the force must compel any armed factions or military forces to disarm and comply with U.S. military force demands. Third, law and order must be established within the civilian community. Fourth, essential services must be restored and humanitarian assistance rendered in cooperation with private voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international relief organizations. Last, the U.S. military must set the conditions for local and national elections and monitor the implementation and establishment of that elected government. The accomplishment of these five missions provides the prerequisite for redeployment of the military force back to its base of origin unless otherwise directed by the National Command Authority to terminate the operation.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted numerous deployments of forces overseas in response to military or civil emergencies. These deployments include countries and regions such as the Arabian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti,

Panama, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.³⁴ Clearly, after the number of deployments the U.S. Army has conducted over the past ten years, there is little problem moving this force rapidly over the short distance from the United States to the Island of Cuba. The military commander will have to determine what his force structure and combat capability should be to accomplish the mission. Once the commander has determined the balance between firepower and humanitarian support capability, then the force must be moved to ports and airfields and transported to Cuba using Navy and Air Force sea and air assets.

As part of the force package design and training, the military commander must determine whether entry into the territorial waters and landing ashore on the Island of Cuba will be permissive or semi-permissive. This determination will be made using various forms of intelligence, including special operations forces, indigenous human intelligence assets, satellite and aerial imagery, and signals intelligence. If the entry is expected to be semi-permissive, the corps commander may require the capabilities inherent within the U.S. Marine Corps to perform an amphibious assault and establish a beachhead. The Marines would then protect the corps landing forces until such time as they can bring sufficient combat power and support assets ashore to be self-sufficient. In either of these cases, the landing would most likely be away from populated areas and the military force would then move to seize a port and airfield capable of supporting the debarkation of the remainder of the corps units.³⁵

Once ashore, the corps commander must begin the systematic clearance of the island, compelling any armed persons, factions, or military force to surrender their weapons and return to their homes peacefully. An intensive information operations

campaign will have to be waged early in the entry operation and continue for the remainder of the operation.³⁶ The information campaign must focus on the United Nations mandate, under which the U.S. Army corps is operating. The message must be one of peace, assistance, and unity while making it perfectly clear that the U.S. military force is not an occupation force, nor that the citizens of Cuba have fallen under the rule of the United States. Within the U.N. mandate there must be a clear purpose, endstate, and rules of agreement under which the citizens of Cuba will be controlled until such time as an elected government is seated.

Nearly simultaneous with the elimination or minimization of armed opposition, the military commander must establish law and order throughout the island. This can be accomplished with military forces, international police task force, local police forces, or a combination of these forces.³⁷ During the initial phases of the operation, it may be preferable to use military forces, such as infantry and military police forces to begin reestablishment of law and order. After the majority of the armed forces and insurgents are controlled then it will be easier for international police task forces and local police forces to maintain law and order.

Depending on the training and previous use of the local police forces, they may or may not be used prior to reevaluation and training. If the local police forces are seen by the populace as being corrupt or ineffective, then military forces or international police task forces may need to screen out the undesirable policemen and conduct extensive retraining using U.S. police training techniques and regulations. Once they have been retrained the local policemen will be gradually placed into supervised service in the local communities.

Restoration of essential services is a critical part of population stability.³⁸ If the population is unable to receive electricity, water, and shelter there is a reasonable expectation that there will be civil unrest. Compounding this unrest is the probability that local stores will be closed for business because of the absence of these essential services and the unrest of the population. Without stores available to purchase food, over time the population will begin to suffer malnutrition. When these elements are placed together the population, without services, food, or shelter will begin to cause friction in the streets. This friction will eventually lead to protests, riots, lawlessness, and looting. Once this process begins, it is difficult to stop without escalation of violence to force the crowds off the streets by intimidation.

It is critical for the military commander to incorporate the efforts and assets of private voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international relief organizations into the plan for restoring essential services and providing humanitarian assistance to the population.³⁹ Many of these organizations are hesitant to openly cooperate with any military organization for fear that they will be seen as partisan. To prevent or mitigate this, the military commander must establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) where these organizations and the military can come together to coordinate their efforts to avoid duplication, interface with local government and police officials, and provide the best humanitarian relief possible with the assets available.⁴⁰

The military commander is able to provide security and transportation assets for the humanitarian relief operation. The NGO/PVO/IO organizations can provide technical expertise for repairing the infrastructure, establishing and operating feeding stations and temporary living areas, and operating medical aid stations for displaced civilians. The

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) organization, among others, will provide more long-term relief to the residents of Cuba. This includes resolution of legal claims stemming from expulsion from land during the violence. UNHCR also will serve as one of the focal agencies for funding and construction of homes destroyed by the hurricane or the violence that ensued afterwards.⁴¹ The military and civilian organizations can best operate in this symbiotic relationship and provide the most rapid humanitarian relief to the population of Cuba; to do otherwise will result in a disjointed and duplicative relief effort.

With the Cuban government in a state of disarray and incapable of publicly exercising its authoritative power over the Cuban military or populous, the U.S. military commander is required to establish a military governorship. This requirement is generated by both Geneva and Hague Conventions and is addressed in FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare. According to these references, if a military force is dispatched to another sovereign nation where the government is no longer existent the military commander is required to establish framework government to administer to the needs of the nation. Although in these references, there is the distinct flavor of the military commander being a conqueror, the essence of the responsibilities are still the same in this situation except that the missions and functions performed are deemed to be for the good of the Cuban people vice purely military necessity.⁴²

Before any effort can be made to begin local and national elections, the Cuban society must be under control. This means civil unrest has ceased, essential services restored, the population is housed in either permanent or temporary quarters, and food, water, and health care is being provided. Once these conditions are met, then the

groundwork for elections can begin. This includes educating the population about what democracy is, establishing an interim constitution, and allowing the formation of political parties and leaders to represent each party. After a set period of time for campaigning, the election, supervised by United Nations observers, will be conducted and the ballots counted.⁴³

Following the announcement of the election winners for both local and national elections, a date for seating the elected officials must be set. The military commander, in conjunction with police forces, will be required to provide initial security for the elected officials to ensure that they are emplaced into their positions. After the officials have been seated, the military commander must determine the point at which all military objectives have been met and that the operational environment is conducive to the redeployment of military forces back to the U.S.

Within this chapter, the author has described the general humanitarian responsibilities of the military commander in providing humanitarian assistance to the population of Cuba. These included: deploying to the region, compelling any armed factions or military forces to disarm and comply with U.S. military force demands, reestablishing law and order within the civilian community, restoring essential services and rendering humanitarian assistance in cooperation with private voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international relief organizations, and lastly setting the conditions for local and national elections and monitor the implementation and establishment of that elected government. Having established the critical missions that must be performed and detailing the missions and duties of the critical staff sections of the corps headquarters, the next chapter will provide an analysis

of the capabilities of that staff to conduct this humanitarian assistance mission without augmentation.

Chapter Five.

Corps Staff Structure Analysis

The posited environment the U.S. Army Corps will face upon entering the Island of Cuba is very different from the high intensity combat environment it was designed to operate in. Although there are some similarities in functions, there are also many diverse tasks that will be required to successfully complete this humanitarian assistance operation. This chapter defines any critical shortages that may exist in the corps staff structure that will impair the execution of a humanitarian assistance mission on the Island of Cuba. The intent of this chapter is to examine the existing corps staff functions against the requirements for conducting a humanitarian assistance operation. The resulting disparity will identify possible staff structures or functions that must be added to best perform the required tasks within the corps headquarters.

The corps staff requirements for this Cuban humanitarian assistance operation can be encapsulated into five broad requirements. The requirements include deployment, disarming the military and citizenry, establishing law and order, restoration of essential services, and reestablishing a Cuban government. Each area will be analyzed using three criteria that measure corps staff responsiveness and effectiveness in this Cuban scenario.

Three criteria measure staff effectiveness in coordinating or facilitating the corps' response to the demands of the operational environment. One is the ability to eliminate civil disturbance while simultaneously providing for the needs of the local populace. The

number of reported crimes and incidents of lawless behavior measure this criterion.

Second is the ability of the corps to deal with civilians, including the remnants of local government and law enforcement, and non-governmental organizations (NGO). This criterion is measured subjectively by the ability of the corps to influence and provide a united, efficient effort towards the common goal of restoring essential services for the people of Cuba. The last criterion is the rapidity of progress towards accomplishing military tasks that support the political end-state, which is measured in time. The result of this analysis is an identification of key players, structures, and procedures to conduct humanitarian assistance operations.

After the decision has been made by the National Command Authority to commit U.S. military forces in support of this humanitarian assistance operation, the corps commander must form, train, and deploy his force to shape the environment. The first step in forming the force is for the corps staff to make an assessment of the situation and determine what forces that they estimate will be required for the mission. This estimate will encompass the requirements for the initial phases of the operations with follow-on forces for subsequent phases, as required.

The corps staff uses the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to examine the current situation and reach logical decisions. The MDMP process allows the staff to apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgement, logic, and professional knowledge to a situation to reach a decision.⁴⁴ During the initial phases of this operation, the corps staff will have very little difficulty in planning and conducting the entry and containment operations, since they are relatively similar to tasks associated with high intensity combat operations.

Once the initial entry and containment operations are completed, the military force must begin to disarm any armed factions and military forces. This task, like the entry and containment phase, is a purely military operation. The corps staff will plan the operation, bound by rules of engagement and specific objectives, and will accomplish this portion of the mission with very little difficulty. While this task should provide no difficulty in execution, there remains some debate about how to deal with the Cuban military force.

In Operation Just Cause, a decision was made to disband the Panamanian Defense Force, sort the good from the bad, and retain the good soldiers and officers to form the basis for a new police force. The President of the United States made the decision in concert with various International organizations. Using the US operation in Costa Rica as a precedent, the standing army was not required to defend Panama.⁴⁵ This new police force was then trained by the corps military police units using a 120-hour course to provide basic instruction in the roles and functions of the police force, police professionalism and ethics, service to the public, community relations, conflict resolution, criminal law, reporting, patrolling, arrest procedures, traffic enforcement, crowd control, weapons familiarization, and first aid.⁴⁶ The course was given to selected personnel from each major police unit in Panama City and the provinces, who then returned and acted as instructors for the rest of the police force.

There also is a legal issue in the training of a foreign police force. Under section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the US military is prohibited from training foreign police.⁴⁷ However, this restriction can be waived if a formal request is made to the

Congress and the Congress votes to allow it. During this operation, section 660 will not apply because the US military forces are still technically involved in a military operation.

Once the military is demobilized, armed factions neutralized, and police forces trained, the next task is to restore law and order to the nation of Cuba. The U.S. military becomes a supporting effort during this phase; providing response forces in the event that there is mass rioting or the formation of an armed faction that is above the capabilities of the local police forces to defeat. The corps staff would use local and US national intelligence assets to provide intelligence estimates and report hostile activities observed throughout Cuba. The staff will use this information to evaluate the success of the operation and to vector US military forces into area where the local police are unable to maintain law and order. Clearly, with the initial use of military policemen and combat soldiers of an army corps, there is every expectation that law and order can be maintained on the island of Cuba.

Nearly simultaneous with the institution of police training and military imposition of law and order is the restoration of essential services and rendering of humanitarian assistance. The corps staff will be required to establish a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to integrate and coordinate the efforts of the military, non-governmental organizations, private organizations, and international organizations.⁴⁸ Unlike conventional military operations, the G5 becomes the central focus during this phase of the operation.

Without the active involvement of the G5 in the operation of the CMOC, the efforts of the NGOs, PVOs, and IOs will be disjointed and possibly duplicative. Further, the CMOC becomes the principal staff organization that will interact with Cuban

civilians and the newly trained police forces. The CMOC will also informally collect information from the NGOs, PVOs, and IOs concerning the conditions in the communities and countryside.⁴⁹ This data is passed to the G3 to provide situational awareness of the operations outside the purview of military forces. The CMOC will monitor the humanitarian relief efforts and evaluate the measures of effectiveness to provide the Corps commander with an assessment of progress towards mission accomplishment.

From the onset of this operation, the forming, training, deploying, landing on the shores of Cuba, disarming factions and the Cuban military, establishing law and order, and conducting humanitarian relief operations will take a very short amount of time.⁵⁰ During this time, the island will be under the control of a military governorship headed by the U.S. Army Corps Commander. Although this form of military control has not been exercised since the end of World War II in Germany and Japan, the existing corps staff structure with infusion of State Department and United Nations personnel can accomplish the tasks.⁵¹ The military governorship is formed to provide direction and leadership to the people of Cuba during the tenuous period of time that the disaster is being mitigated, law and order reestablished, and essential services restored. The next step, the campaign and elections phase, will take more time to complete.

After the humanitarian crisis has abated and the police forces have established law and order, the next step is to provide the populous with the opportunity to campaign for and hold local and national democratic elections. Although the military can set the conditions for holding these elections, they are not organized to hold and administer the

elections. This is where international agencies, such as the United Nations, are better suited to organize and supervise these elections.⁵²

International agencies will provide the ground rules for campaigning and holding the elections and will supervise the conduct of the elections. Once the elections are held, these agencies will perform an impartial ballot counting duty. The military's involvement in the local and national elections is contained to support for transportation and security of blank and completed ballots, secondary security for polling places and the seating of the newly-elected officials into office behind the local police force. The military will also provide armed forces in the event that there is civil unrest before, during, and for a specified time after the election results are announced and officials are seated. These tasks are very similar to the tasks that military staffs are tasked to do during peacekeeping operations in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo.⁵³

The corps commander has conducted five missions thus far; formed, trained and deployed the force, disarmed civilians and the Cuban Military, restored law and order, restored essential services, and held local and national democratic elections. Once these missions have been accomplished and the corps commander has determined through intelligence estimates and the current situation that the situation is stable and firmly under the control of the elected government, he will recommend to the President that the military mission to Cuba be terminated.

Once the President gives the termination order, the corps commander will slowly redeploy his forces from Cuba, ensuring that a vacuum is not created by the departure of his military force. Upon the closure of the corps force back at home station, the military operation will be terminated. The accomplishment of these five missions provides the

prerequisite for redeployment of the military force back to its base of origin unless otherwise directed by the National Command Authority to terminate the operation.

The tasks related within this chapter for the US Army corps to accomplish are within the scope of the current staff structure. Forming, training and deploying the military force is a set of tasks inherent within any operation and involves the corps staff in areas familiar to any military operation. Disarming and neutralizing any armed factions and the Cuban military are tasks that would be expected in any urban combat operations. If the corps force were to enter into a hostile urban environment, the military would have to compel the surrender and disarmament of any military forces and other armed factions.

Challenges for the corps staff arise during the establishment and maintenance of law and order, restoration of essential services, and conducting democratic elections. Although it is possible for the military can use their organic military police and combat forces to establish law and order in what could be considered the formation of a police state. It would be more practical for the military to be the supporting effort to the trained local police forces with police monitoring by external organizations, such as the International Police Force or United Nations Civil Police Force.

Restoration of essential services is a task that the military is not well suited to perform. For this reason, the military will rely upon the CMOC to integrate the efforts of the NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. These organizations are able to bring in the right types of expertise for the restoration of essential public services such as power grids, water pumping stations, and medical facilities. The Operations, logistics, and civil-military

staff agencies can monitor the situation and provide military resources and manpower to the restoration as necessary to supplement the civil effort.

The US Army corps staff is not staffed and competent to monitor the local and national campaigns and democratic elections in Cuba. The military staff is better suited to monitoring the operational environment to provide secondary security throughout the island and to provide forces to prevent any tampering with the election process. United Nations agencies and other regional organizations, including the Organization of American States will provide the organization and legitimacy of the election process.

Once the operational environment is stable and the elected officials are seated, the corps commander will forward an assessment through the chain of command to the President on the feasibility of terminating the humanitarian assistance operation. The stable environment consists of a functional government, economy and essential services operating, and a state of peace and calm in the streets. Until the environment meets these criteria, the corps commander will likely continue to operate in Cuba. After the termination of operation order is given, it is critical that the military force conducts a slow and deliberate redeployment of forces to prevent a vacuum effect for the police and government agencies on the island of Cuba.

Thus far, the analysis of the current corps staff competency against the basic tasks required for this humanitarian assistance operation in Cuba reveals the ability of the staff to perform some of the core tasks with no problem. The U.S. Army corps staff has the competency to perform tasks associated with forming, training and deploying the force, and disarming and neutralizing armed factions and the Cuban military. Law and order will be established and maintained using the newly retrained Cuban police forces with

support from international police forces and US military forces as necessary. Using a robust Civil-Military Operations Center, the corps can coordinate and manage the relief efforts of government, non-government, private, and international organizations to restore essential life support services and conduct humanitarian assistance missions.

The challenge for the corps staff will be to form the military governorship eventually transfer the responsibilities for administration of the Island Nation by planning and managing the conduct of local and national elections. The corps staff structure does not have the training and competencies to perform these missions by themselves. In order to form the military governorship, the corps staff will need to be expanded. There is the potential that the SOUTHCOM staff could be used to augment the corps staff for these excess requirements, although the SOUTHCOM staff is currently unable to discuss any plans dealing with this issue.

By forming a second staff, this would allow one military staff to focus on the military humanitarian assistance mission while the other staff would fall into civil positions to operate the fledgling administration for Cuba until the elections are held and elected officials are seated. These civil positions would include such positions as public works, economic advisor, political advisor, public affairs, logistics manager, civil emergency response official, and transportation manager. Local and national elections will, most likely, be organized and monitored by an international, non-partisan organization such as the United Nations. The US Army corps staff is best able to provide logistics and security support to the effort as necessary, but again, the lead agent for these elections would have to be an international agency with previous experience and credibility as a non-partisan agent.

Chapter Six.

Conclusion

Through the analysis of U.S. Army Corps staff composition, duties, and responsibilities in comparison with the required tasks and functions to conduct humanitarian assistance operations, a shortfall has been identified. The current corps staff is unable to perform the duties associated with the formation of a military governorship and the subsequent transfer of the military governorship to a democratically elected government. Of course, every situation is different but within this posited situation, there is no government to restore order and services for. As discussed in an earlier chapter, the resulting military occupation requires the establishment of a military governorship.

The process used to identify any shortfalls required an analysis of the current capabilities of the staff overlaid with the requirements of the posited humanitarian assistance operation. To identify the potential shortfalls in the current staff structure the composition, duties, and responsibilities of the current U.S. Army corps primary staff and special staff sections were explained. This explanation included the competencies of the staff sections in a combat operation. The intent of the study of the current corps staff is to provide a baseline of duties and responsibilities in combat that were later overlaid upon the operational scenario.

Using this as the baseline for core competencies within the corps headquarters in combat operations, the author then detailed the operational environment that the U.S. Army corps would face as the natural disaster and subsequent breakdown of the Cuban government unfolds. The author has provided some background on Cuba, its leader, and

Cuban military forces. With this background, the author set the stage for involvement of the United States military and the general guidelines for the use of the military to intervene in foreign humanitarian assistance missions.

Next, the author described the general humanitarian responsibilities of the military commander in providing humanitarian assistance to the population of Cuba. These responsibilities included: deploying to the region, compelling any armed factions or military forces to disarm and comply with U.S. military force demands, reestablishing law and order within the civilian community, restoring essential services and rendering humanitarian assistance in cooperation with private voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international relief organizations, and lastly setting the conditions for local and national elections and monitor the implementation and establishment of that elected government. Having established the critical missions that must be performed and detailing the missions and duties of the critical staff sections of the corps headquarters, the author compared the current corps staff competency against the basic tasks required for this humanitarian assistance operation in Cuba.

The author found that the US Army corps staff has the competency to perform the tasks associated with forming, training and deploying the force, and disarming and neutralizing armed factions and the Cuban military. Law and order will be established and maintained using the newly retrained Cuban police forces with support from international police forces and US military forces as necessary. Using a robust Civil-Military Operations Center, the corps can coordinate and manage the relief efforts of government, non-government, private, and international organizations to restore essential life support services and conduct humanitarian assistance missions.

The challenge for the corps staff will be to form the military governorship eventually transfer the responsibilities for administration of the Island Nation by planning and managing the conduct of local and national elections. The corps staff structure does not have the training and competencies to perform these missions by themselves. In order to form the military governorship, the corps staff will need to be expanded. This will allow one military staff to focus on the military humanitarian assistance mission while the other staff would fall into civil positions to operate the fledgling administration for Cuba until the elections are held and elected officials are seated. These civil positions would include such positions as public works, economic advisor, political advisor, public affairs, logistics manager, civil emergency response official, and transportation manager. Local and national elections will, most likely, be organized and monitored by an international, non-partisan organization such as the United Nations. The US Army corps staff is best able to provide logistics and security support to the effort as necessary, but again, the lead agent for these elections would have to be an international agency with previous experience and credibility as a non-partisan agent.

In summation, the current US Army corps staff is capable of forming, training, and deploying the force and disarming factions and the Cuban military force since these are tasks similar to combat tasks. The establishment of law and order will require the screening, selection, and retraining of former Cuban military and police forces to form the new police force. After the police force is formed, the US military and international civilian police will monitor the police performance. Humanitarian assistance operations will rely heavily on a robust CMOC cell to coordinate and manage the efforts of military resources and NGO/PVO/IO organizations. Military governorship will require a large

outlay of personnel to fulfill the responsibilities inherent in the administration of the interim national government. Local and national elections will be the primary responsibility of an international, non-partisan organization with only logistics and security support responsibilities for the US Army corps staff.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), iv. The trend at the time of this Field Manual's publication saw an increase in the trend towards using the armed forces of the United States in missions other than war. This trend has continued to the present.
- ² Ibid, iv-v.
- ³ Ibid, 4. Without an agreement between the sides in a conflict to separate and abide by a set of principles in that agreement, the operation becomes peace enforcement.
- ⁴ Department of the Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 1-1. The Staff provides the commander with a complete but brief picture of the battlefield and the expected decisions that the commander will need to make as the fight progresses. By limiting the commander to only the information necessary to make informed decisions and project a common shared understanding of the battlefield, the staff will shelter the commander from the myriad of information that technology today can provide.
- ⁵ Ibid, 2-1. The commander may organize his staff into any form that is conducive to the accomplishment of the mission. Beyond the considerations of mission are the broad fields of interest and regulations and laws. Generally, however, the commander will maintain the core staff agencies the way they are unless there is a compelling reason to deviate from it.
- ⁶ Ibid, 2-1. This listing portrays the doctrinal staff structure. It can and will change based upon the situation and the commander's needs for information and situational awareness.
- ⁷ Ibid, 4-30. The Inspector General, Staff Judge Advocate, and Chaplain are personal staff positions that are required by regulation.
- ⁸ Ibid, 4-10.
- ⁹ Ibid, 4-11. The SWO is a critical player in the battle staff. It is the SWO's ability to read the current weather patterns and predict the future weather trends that will help or hinder the military mission. This read of future weather conditions will impact not only friendly but enemy capabilities and battle field actions.
- ¹⁰ Ibid, 4-13.
- ¹¹ Ibid, 4-14 to 4-15. Logistics is critical to any military plan. The G4 is the general staff officer responsible for all matter concerning logistic support to the army in the field.

¹² Ibid, 4-15 to 4-16. In this fictitious situation, like any situation involving the potential impact of civilians on the conduct of the military operation, the G5 is critical in interfacing with the various organizations and local community leaders. The G5 will establish the CMOC to better communicate and coordinate with other agencies in the theater of operations.

¹³ Ibid, 4-16 to 4-17. A military force that is unable to communicate within its structure is ineffective. The G6 is the staff officer responsible for ensuring that a communications plan is effective and deconflicted to support the corps operation.

¹⁴ Ibid, 4-18 to 4-19. As more Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are participated in by US forces, the reimbursement for expenses becomes more critical. Often this reimbursement comes from the United Nations or other such agencies. The RM is responsible for establishing the budget, maintaining the force within the confines of that budget, and advising the commander of the force's financial status on a periodic basis during operations other than war.

¹⁵ Ibid, 4-21.

¹⁶ Marta san Martin and Ramon L. Bonachea, "The Military Dimension of the Cuban Revolution," Cuban Communism, (New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 3rd Edition, 1977), 391.

¹⁷ Andres Suarez, "Cuba: Ideology and Pragmatism," 25 Years of the Cuban Revolution: Continuity and Change, (Miami, FL, Miami Institute of the Interamerican Studies, 1986). These five principals of the Castro ideology can be readily seen in the Cuba of today; social change was made through a revolution in Cuba, the state apparatus is still a monopoly of power, the state was seized through a guerilla war and commanded by a politico-military leader, victory requires a popular mobilization, and anti-imperialist nationalism is very elaborate.

¹⁸ Jorge I. Dominguez, United States-Cuba Relations: From Cold War to Colder War, (New York, Grove Press, 1989), 316. The specifications of this act will make the ending of sanctions very difficult for Cuba. Even if Castro is deposed, the sanctions will not be lifted, according to the Act, until all confiscated property is returned to the US businesses and Cuban citizens it was seized from, including reparation for losses incurred.

¹⁹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C., 5 January 2000, 39-40.

²⁰ Gillian Gunn, Cuba in Transition-Options for United States Policy, (New York, Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993), 56. The US national interests are eluded to in the National Security Strategy and intend to make Cuba a better place for the Cuban people to live. This will provide more incentive for Cuban citizens to stay in Cuba and not attempt to illegally migrate into the US. Further, having a democratic government in Cuba may help to prevent the flow of illegal drugs through Cuba into the US.

21. Jose Luis Llovio-Menendez, Insider, (New York, Bantam Press, 1988) 386. The huge burden that is caused by floods of Cuban citizens fleeing their homeland is what the US wants to avoid. The only way to keep Cubans in Cuba is for their lifestyle and living conditions to improve.

22. "The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces," Jane's Defense Weekly, June 30, 1987, 1066-1073. Recent cuts in military funding for the FAR has reduced the training opportunities for the Cuban Armed Forces. With less training, one would have to assume that military competencies will erode over time. It is uncertain how these military funding cuts will impact on the FAR weapon system modernization and maintenance.

23. Andres Suarez, "Civil-Military Relations in Cuba," Presentation for a seminar on the Cuban Armed Forces, University of Miami, August 16, 1985. The FAR has historically been the driving force in the success of Castro and other political officials in Cuba. With the support of the Cuban military, there are few citizens that will attempt to go against the directions and objectives of the favored official or organization.

24. Manuel Moreno Fraginals, Transition to What? Toward a New Cuba-Legacies of a Revolution, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 213. Fraginals believes that the communist society in Cuba has totally destroyed the family structure and replaced the family with the communist apparatus. With complete reliance on the communist system, the inability of the government to supply for the needs of the people will cause unrest among the populace.

25. *Ibid*, 213. As the supposed benefits of communism erode, the populace will become more discontent with the government in power and demand changes. The FAR are currently able to maintain the populace under control. That may change in the future if funding cuts sway the FAR away from supporting the current government.

26. The author has attempted to gain insights from SOUTHCOM on what plans it currently has on the shelf and roles it would have in this scenario if it were to happen today, however, they are not willing to discuss the scenario. These discussions took place on March 23 and April 6, 2000. This may be due to the sensitivity of relations and actions between the U.S. and Cuba but the particular reasons were not given. Broad areas of interest and assumed roles in the scenario were taken from the National Defense University's Strategic Assessment that can be found at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa99/sa99cont.html>; Internet, National Defense University Homepage, accessed 12 April 2000.

27. Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Washington, D.C., 1994, 2-1. With no formal diplomatic ties with Cuba, communicating with the leadership of Cuba becomes very difficult. Additionally, with no State Department representation in Cuba, assessing this potential natural disaster will have to be done using intelligence systems rather than on-the-ground disaster assessment teams.

²⁸ Ibid, 2-1. Although this is not a complete listing of situations which would compel the NCA to commit US forces to a humanitarian operation, it does include the most common and applicable situations.

²⁹ Jorge I. Dominguez, United States-Cuba Relations: From Cold War to Colder War, (New York, Grove Press, 1989), 316. The propaganda given to the Cuban people by the Castro government represents the US as an imperialist state bent upon the destruction and exploitation of Cuba.

³⁰ "Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response," FOG Version 2.0, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, 1993, 25. The DART team is a critical part of the assessment and action recommendation process.

³¹ Ibid, 25-26. This listing of areas of assessment is a general list of things the DART team will look at and provide responses back to USAID for actions and prioritization of resources and effort.

³² Michael C. Mitchell, "Coordinating Humanitarian Assistance," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1995, 34. Mitchell lists the six broad life support missions the military commander will be required to perform as part of the humanitarian assistance mission.

³³ Ibid, 34. The humanitarian assistance tasks are listed to provide a perspective of the scope of the humanitarian effort the military will have to help accomplish.

³⁴ Andrew S. Natsios, "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of complex humanitarian emergencies," Parameters, Summer 1996, 96. The US military is being used increasingly for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations since the end of the Cold War. This trend is likely to continue so long as there is not an emerging threat that would be comparable to the USSR prior to the end of the Cold War in 1989.

³⁵ F.M. Lorenz, "Confronting Thievery in Somalia," Military Review, August 1994, 14. Lorenz details the capabilities of the Marine Corps to land and establish a beachhead for the protection of the remainder of disembarking forces. The USMC is responsible for establishing beachheads to facilitate the passage of follow-on army forces further inland.

³⁶ G. Peterson, "Psyops and Somalia-Spreading Good News," Australian Defence Forces Journal, Jan-Feb 1994, 38-40. Information operations is a critical part of gaining the support of the populace and making sure they understand what it is the military force is attempting to accomplish during the humanitarian operation.

³⁷ Briefing by MG Charles A. Hines, Commandant, United States Army Military Police School, Fort McClelland, Alabama, August 10, 1992. The commandant addressed the issues and capabilities of the military police force to establish law and order in conjunction with other police forces.

38. "A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations", United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Headquarters, January 1995, 32-33. Until such time as essential services are restored, the population will continue to be restless. Without power, water, and medical services the society will not feel that there is enough being done to care for them and will cause people to mass together to present a united front to force progress in the repair of essential services.

39. Ibid, 23. The UN and other organizations acknowledge the essential nature of the G5's Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to integrate and provide focus to humanitarian relief efforts.

40. Andrew S. Natsios, "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of complex humanitarian emergencies," Parameters, Summer 1996, 57.

41. "A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations", United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Headquarters, January 1995, 23. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the focal agency for the relocation and settlement of refugees and the rebuilding of destroyed homes. They also rely heavily upon other organizations to provide funds and materials for the home building.

42. Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956), 138-164. Although the FM states that the military commander is responsible for the establishment and administration of a military governorship, portions of this duty may fall onto other US government agencies, including the US State Department. There is a question of the legal authority of the US to go into a communist nation, albeit in a state of anarchy, and establish a democratic government. There is the hope in the posit situation that the UN mandate for the relief effort would include the provision for establishment of a democratically-elected government for the Nation of Cuba.

43. "A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations", United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Headquarters, January 1995, 44.

44. Department of the Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 5-1.

45. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama following Just Cause, (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL, August 1993), 5-7.

46. Ibid, 14.

47. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1991 can be found at <http://law2.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe>; Internet, accessed 22 Mar 00.

⁴⁸ Department of the Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 4-15 to 4-16.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 4-15 to 4-16. Also see "A UNHCR Handbook for the military in Humanitarian Operations," UNHCR HQ, January 1995, 27.

⁵⁰ It is the author's opinion that the operation will be relatively quick up until the point where the campaigning begins for local and national elections. The deployment should take a matter of days, the disarming of armed factions and the Cuban military should take no longer than one week, with minor incidents thereafter. Simultaneous with the disarming action will be the restoration of law and order and the retraining and monitoring of the new police force. Restoration of essential services will take about 4-6 days to get minimum services restored and approximately 10-14 days for full restoration. The construction of new homes, supervised by international agencies, will obviously take quite some time.

⁵¹ Robert H. Dorff, "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability," Parameters, Summer 1996, 17-21. Not since WW II Germany and Japan has the US military instituted military governorship. This is not a task that is trained in Today's Army. The author is concerned about the appropriateness and international legality of US military intervention and institution of a democratic form of government into a former communist government in a state of anarchy, even if there is a mandate from the United Nations.

⁵² Information on UN election mandates and activities can be found at the United Nations Election Support home page at <http://www.un.org/deptd/dpa/ead/eadhome.htm>; Internet, accessed 19 Mar 00.

⁵³ The military tasks for the Bosnia intervention can be found at the NATO General Framework Agreement for Peace home page at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-home.htm>; Internet, accessed 12 Feb 00.

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