STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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FORCING GOLDWATER-NICHOLS TO THE GRASSROOTS: TRAINING FUTURE JOINT CRISIS RESPONSE FORCES

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Forcing Goldwater-Nichols to the Grassroots: Training Future Joint Crisis Response Forces

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Executive Summary

Although service specific training is not fundamentally broken, there currently exists no synchronized training regimen for joint initial entry crisis response forces. Simply stated, combat units that will ultimately fight together are not systematically training together.

The uncertainties of future crises provide impetus for improving the preparation of crisis response forces, especially those that will find themselves first on scene. Operation Uphold Democracy, engineered by Atlantic Command as the unified command and the XVIIIth Airborne Corps as the Joint Task Force headquarters, provides a model for the forging of habitual relationships through a systematic scheduling alignment, and training, of joint initial entry crisis response forces.

This paper advocates that Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG), Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG), Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)), Division Ready Brigades (DRB) and Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) adopt an aligned schedule with training and deployment cycles based on the Carrier Battle Group's 18-month cycle. The length of the cycle is due to ship maintenance and deployment cycles that are the least flexible to scheduling fluctuation among the services.

To facilitate the proposed alignment, it is recommended that the Air Force and the Army change the length of their current training and deployment cycles. The Air Force would lengthen its current 15-month AEF cycle to 18 months by adding 3 months to the deployment cycle, thereby keeping the same AEF(s) on call and deployed as the CVBG(s) with which they trained. The Army would lengthen its current 18-week training management and readiness system (three

6-week support, training and mission cycles) to 36-weeks (three 12-week support, training and mission cycles). Such a move would reduce to two the number of brigades on mission during the CVBG/AEF deployment phase. This would allow the Division Ready Brigades to familiarize and train with their associated units while preserving the fundamentals of the Army's proven training regimen.

Achieving these force alignments would pave the way for better linking the training schedules of forces that would ultimately fight together. Linking the Western US training ranges located at The National Training Center, Twenty-Nine Palms, Naval Air Station Fallon, and Nellis Air Force Base would allow initial entry force packages assuming deployment/mission cycle to train to critical joint tasks, execute a CINC specified mission rehearsal on a relevant operations plan, and be assessed on their ability to conduct service specific and joint tasks.

There are precedents for the recommended habitual relationship and training schedule links to include aligning Navy CVBGs, ARGs and Marine Corps MEU(SOC)s, and Army mission cycle changes for Joint Special Operations Command. U.S. Pacific Command is currently testing a similar concept that aligns forces and links training of assigned and transit forces. Ultimately, Joint Forces Command must take the lead for designing and implementing this plan. The military simply does not train today as it intends to fight in the future. Further steps must be taken to provide even better training to the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who must execute the most demanding missions of initial entry combat.

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Introduction

"The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow."

General Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010

The National Command Authority had delivered the order to execute the mission several days prior to the helicopter task force's departure from its home station. Altogether the assemblage of rotary wing aircraft totaled 58, each belonging to one of two major subordinate aviation commands. Their mission was to self deploy to an austere base of operations and then rapidly support combat operations shortly after arrival.[1] The deployment phase was particularly hazardous because it involved a significant over water leg prior to arriving at what could best be called an infrequently used runway. To complement the deployment package, fixed wing U.S. Air Force aircraft were used to deliver critical supplies to the task force. Upon arrival at their base of operations, the aviation task force had two days to prepare for combat operations.

Kosovo? Task Force Hawk?

Despite the similarities to Operation Allied Force's aviation task force, the scenario actually describes a phase of Operation Uphold Democracy, the invasion of Haiti in September of 1994. Uphold Democracy is a shining example how a diverse joint force, well trained to essential tasks, can successfully work towards a common goal in a contingency operation. In contrast to Uphold Democracy, last year's Operation Allied Force may be remembered less for its limited successes and more for the inability to effectively deploy Task Force Hawk. Uphold Democracy and Allied Force, like many other operations this decade, were executed in an era

where joint military operations are both congressionally mandated and necessary. Contrasting the media reported performance of 1999's Allied Force and Task Force Hawk with that of 1994's Uphold Democracy and Task Force Pegasus, one could draw the conclusion that joint interoperability has stalled or possibly regressed.[2] This regression could point to a deficiency in joint training that the Goldwater-Nichols Act, now 15 years old, has not been able to attenuate.

The question this paper will analyze is whether there are further steps the services can take in the way of force packaging and joint training of crisis response forces to be better prepared for future contingency operations. The hypothesis is that the alignment of joint, initial entry, crisis response forces and the subsequent linking of their training and mission cycles will significantly enhance the outcome of early entry combat operations. Expected benefits of this recommendation would include improved interoperability, identification of duplicative capabilities, development of multi-service solutions to individual service problems, and the elimination of other impediments to joint teamwork in a compressed environment such as crisis response.

Further, this paper will propose that the best way to increase the readiness of joint initial entry combat forces is to align the training schedules and deployment cycles of specific forces and link their training. As such, the methodology is to first identify and define the requirements for responding to crises and then link those requirements to the 1985 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Following a historical analysis of the Operation Uphold Democracy training and deployment plans the paper will explore the current capabilities and force structure composition of each service's initial entry forces. After examination of the each services generic scheduling and training process, the proposal for force alignment and future training of joint crisis response forces will be offered. Lastly, the paper will analyze possible challenges to the proposal

including such issues as budget, personnel and operations tempo, the breaking of service paradigms and the assignment of clear responsibility for implementing joint training.

Chapter 1: Moving Toward a Joint Vision for Crisis Response

Crisis Response

The wide spectrum of possible contingency operations leads to requirements that encompass a large portion of our current force structure. As is often the case, perceived imprecision resides in not only the definition of requirements, but also in the definition of terms around which those requirements are framed. As currently defined in U.S. military doctrine, a crisis is "any incident or situation involving a threat to the United States ... that creates a condition ... that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives."[3] An essential element of crisis response is the "need to be able to respond rapidly" across a wide spectrum of potential military operations.[4]

The requirement to respond rapidly to a crisis is a consistent element of US National Security Policy. The National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly states the need "to be first on the scene with assistance in ... crises" with "forces in the United States at the appropriate level of readiness to deploy when needed," able "to respond ... to the full spectrum of threats and crises that may arise."[5] The principal supporting document of the NSS, the National Military Strategy (NMS), is even more definitive in its statement of the requirement for US military forces. Based on the concepts of shaping the global environment, responding early to threats and challenges to US security, and preparing now to meet those future challenges, the armed services are charged with having ready military forces that can provide the flexibility to rapidly respond across the full spectrum of crises and threats.[6]

Due to the uncertainty inherent in every crisis, it is nearly impossible to divine the capabilities, and thus the force structure in which those capabilities would be resident, required

for every specific response. The best one can hope to achieve is development of a reservoir of ready military capability from which to tailor a crisis response force. When focusing on 'initial entry' crisis response forces (i.e. those forces tasked with responding first to crisis), however, the challenge is somewhat less daunting. While the entirety of the crisis response force may vary widely as the mission profile moves along the operational continuum, the capabilities required when initially responding are remarkably similar regardless of the situation. The forces must be at a level of training readiness to respond on very short notice (anywhere from several hours to a few days),and must possess or have ready access to the means by which to respond. These forces must also have the inherent capability to operate in an austere environment for limited periods of time (normally 15-30 days), to defend themselves during that timeframe, and to act in an enabling role for anticipated follow-on forces.[7]

This paper purposely focuses on a narrow spectrum of the force structure: joint, initial entry, crisis response forces. The diverse nature of the joint units conducting the mission coupled with the compression of time make initial entry, crisis response the most challenging of environments.

The question remains as to why the services have yet to embrace a systematic joint training regimen that best prepares joint forces for early entry contingency operations in spite of evidence that such a system is in the best interests of the troops that have to execute the missions. Part of the answer is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act does not adequately address the issue and in these budget constrained, high tempo times the service chiefs are forced to maintain their focus on readiness within their own services.

Goldwater-Nichols

In 1985 the United States Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act aimed at increasing the joint interoperability of the armed services by mandating joint assignments for officers prior to being promoted to flag rank and by establishing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the senior member of the military. Though progress has been made at the staff level, joint integration at the operating levels has been more problematic. Some even argue that we have regressed in joint capabilities where it matters. "We are decreasing in our joint capabilities," said General (Retired) Gary Luck, former Commander in Chief U.S. Forces Korea and Commander XVIIIth Airborne Corps.[8]

A review of the Fiscal Year 1999 CINC Exercise Schedule, a listing of 200 plus joint exercises, confirms General Luck's assertion as it reveals that only 10% of the exercises trained joint forces in combat contingency operations. The great majority of the exercises were engagement activities designed to foster relations with foreign militaries and to ensure access to foreign facilities, but not train to combat skills or exercise critical joint interoperability tasks.[9] General Luck points to a lack of synergy across budgets, acquisitions, doctrine and training that results in "the specs being wrong so that we can't operate together."[10] Understanding that the services have been busy conducting shaping and engagement activities, and not jointly training for crisis response, it becomes clearer why service interoperability may not have been maximized during Operation Allied Force.[11]

The Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) has augmented Joint Vision 2010 as the DoD master plan for increasing jointness among the services. The CFJO is "looking at the doctrine, looking at the implications of future organizations, looking at how we train the future force, looking at the leadership required for the future force."[12] JV2010 maps out a plan through

acquisition, doctrine and training to reach an end state that achieves synergy in four basic areas: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection.[13] While the Concept for Future Joint Operations and JV2010 provide good discussions of many important ideas, both fail to adequately cover the proven requirement for joint contingency forces to train together on a routine basis or make a case for achieving that level of integration by 2010.

Goldwater-Nichols has its roots in the joint interoperability miscues found in Operations Desert One and Urgent Fury.[14] Malfunctions discovered in joint tactics, techniques and procedures spurred congress into revolutionizing the way the military operated with the catalyst for change being the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The temporary gains achieved in joint staff organization have been considerable and high profile, yet, as stated by General Luck, there is atrophy beneath the surface, which Goldwater-Nichols does not address.[15]

The resistance to change is buttressed by successes in operations such as Just Cause and Desert Storm and more recently perceived successes in Allied Force.[16] The institutional resistance to change can be found flourishing in the training, budgetary and acquisitions realms. While all three areas require significant revision in pursuit of true joint effectiveness, an idea that could potentially provide the most immediate payoff in readiness would be to align training and deployment of crisis response forces through long-term scheduling and focus their training through exercises based on combatant CINC requirements. Before another serious "malfunction" such as that which contributed to the catastrophic failure of Operation Desert One occurs, the revolution toward a more joint operating force could be re-energized and the momentum regained by pursuing an aggressive strategy of aligning and training joint crisis response forces.

The next chapter outlines Operation Uphold Democracy and draws lessons that can be applied to the training of initial entry, crisis response forces. Although in planning for a year, the operation demonstrated how training a diverse, joint force to specific tasks can be successfully accomplished.

Chapter 2: Operation Uphold Democracy

In October of 1993, Haitian military and paramilitary forces fired upon the USS Harlan County as it was approaching the pier at the seaport of Port au Prince. The Harlan County had been carrying members of the U.S. Haitian Assistance Group that was prepared to perform stability operations in Haiti in order to prevent mass Haitian migrations to the United States and facilitate the return of a democratic government to Haiti. President Clinton ordered the Harlan County back to the U.S. and ordered US Atlantic Command to plan a military invasion of Haiti with the twin objectives of defeating pro government Haitian forces and restoring democracy to the beleaguered nation. The XVIII Airborne Corps prepared the overall invasion plan while the 82d Airborne Division developed the ground tactical plan which required a large aviation task force to provide pre-assault fires and tactical mobility.

The Aviation Task Force, codenamed Pegasus, was commanded by the Aviation Brigade Commander of the 82d Airborne Division and included 33 UH-60s, 17 CH-47s and eight OH-58D Kiowa Warrior (KW). In September, 1994, three days prior to the beginning of the operation (D minus 3), the task force self deployed from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida to refuel and rest for one night. Before dawn the following morning Task Force Pegasus discretely slipped off the coast of Florida and followed a 650-mile flight path above a series of U.S. Coast Guard and Naval vessels until successfully landing all 58 aircraft on a small, improved airfield on the remote island of Great Inagua.[17]

Two days later, while the 113 Air Force transport aircraft carried the paratrooper assault force toward two drop zones in Haiti, Task Force Pegasus had rotors turning on Great Inagua. The aviation force was shortly to begin a series of combat operations to support the invasion,

including having aeromedical evacuation capability in country at the time of the airdrop. As history shows, the invasion was aborted in the air at the 11th hour once the Haitian dictator capitulated in the face of the impending attack. Yet it is important to study how Task Force Pegasus, and its parent Joint Task Force 180, seamlessly deployed to the Joint Area of Operations as a joint force trained and ready to conduct the largest and most complex combat contingency operation since Operation Market Garden in World War II.

While Atlantic Command issued the Warning Order for Operation Uphold Democracy on 9 September 1994, the XVIIIth Airborne Corps began updating its plan for a military operation in Haiti a full year earlier. According to General Henry H. Shelton, who commanded JTF-180 at the time, "We had almost a year of planning for this particular operation and knew that we'd be doing it as a Joint Task Force. And on top of that we had some great training opportunities for the last year ... starting in September of 1993."[18] The Corps headquarters established a joint planning group and worked closely with the components in establishing a joint training plan. The Corps conducted a contingency operation as a JTF evaluated by the Army's Battle Command Training Program in September 1993 where the Corps headquarters overlaid an exercise atop the 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division's Joint Readiness Training Center rotation. Later, the Corps conducted a joint exercise called Agile Provider. General Shelton further describes the Corps train up as a comprehensive one. "We had three communications exercises ... did about fourteen rehearsals ... conducted three big rock drills, or rehearsals, as a JTF with everybody from the Coast Guard, Navy, Air Force, Marines being present for that."[19] Clearly, the plan provided a training focus and that focus involved all of the services. Hence the training involved the units that would execute the mission and was centered on combat operations as opposed to peace enforcement despite uncertainty about the nature of the mission.

When discussing joint training, it is important to identify the level to which the training is effective and provides realistic returns on investments of time and resources. Task Force Pegasus was a brigade size element and was subordinate to the 82d Airborne Division, which was the de facto Army Component (ARFOR) of General Shelton's Joint Task Force. As such, analysis of its preparation and execution provides insight into the depth to which joint training is useful. For example, it was necessary for the Coast Guard and Navy to support the aviation task force during its over water flight. Given the complexities and risks of extended overseas helicopter movement, it was necessary to train in detail some of the more complex aspects of the mission, including communicating with the Coast Guard and Naval vessels that would be tracking the deployment. Then 82d Airborne Division Chief of Staff, Colonel John Marcello, says of the preparation of the aviation task force, "In order to get our helicopters into the theater of operations we had to fly all the way down there … a good case in point is flying over the ocean, under goggles, at night. Very difficult."[20] Analyzing the mission, the Aviation Brigade developed a list of tasks which required joint training such as: performing deck landing on coast guard or naval vessels; communicating with other service aircraft; conducting rapid wet wing refueling; and airdropping fuel pallets from U.S. Air Force aircraft. Clearly, these tasks ranged from headquarters level command and control to individual skills. Hence, when training joint crisis response forces it is critical to conduct the mission analysis that identifies those tasks and implement training plans that penetrate to the proper level for each task.

Having identified the key tasks, the 82d Airborne Division set about developing a training plan and aligning training schedules of supporting units to accomplish the essential training. "Over the process of a year, we built ourselves up to the plan … it was a very thoughtful approach to what had to be accomplished."[21] Every month the division exercised a

portion of the plan beginning in October of 1993 with an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise to Northfield, South Carolina. In conjunction with a battalion airdrop, the division airdropped two palletized fuel bladders and pumping equipment from C-141 aircraft, while the fuel handlers parachuted with the personnel airdrop. A Kiowa Warrior troop self-deployed from Fort Bragg in association with a battalion airdrop and refueled on the drop zone. The operation involved tight coordination between the Air Force and Army, yielding invaluable lessons learned in the after action reviews. Nine months later, after a series of increasingly complex exercises, the division had graduated to an exercise called Big Drop where the Aviation Task Force actually flew four hours over the Atlantic Ocean with Coast Guard and Naval assistance. The task force then refueled using air-dropped aviation fuel before flying to another drop zone to pick up a brigade of paratroopers that had been dropped two hours earlier by Air Force aircraft. Without any true expectation that they would have to execute the plan for Uphold Democracy, the 82d Airborne Division still extracted from a developed contingency plan the mission essential tasks that required training. Further, they trained in a joint fashion with the specific units with which they would most likely execute the contingency operation.

By all accounts Task Force Pegasus' deployment and follow on missions were successful. Though the President chose to abort the airdrop in mid-air less than two hours from time on target, the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters finished the overseas leg into Haiti to support the permissive entry of the 10th Mountain Division and the JTF headquarters. Task Force Pegasus' successful experience provided four major lessons learned:

- First, proactive development of integrated joint contingency plans by the JTF headquarters, XVIIIth Airborne Corps and the component ARFOR, the 82d Airborne

Division, exploited the capabilities of each service a full year prior to any execute order.

- Second, the plans defined the most demanding mission essential tasks allowing subordinate units to focus their training on the most challenging missions, especially those that required inter-service coordination.
- Third, the headquarters of the components worked hard to align the training schedules of the prospective participants in the plan, enabling the accomplishment of joint training exercises such as Big Drop, Agile Provider and monthly emergency deployment readiness exercises.
- Fourth, the components chose to train on the more difficult deployment and combat related tasks as opposed to peacekeeping types of missions, despite uncertainty about the nature of the mission or if there would be a mission at all.

In order to transfer these lessons to the joint training of initial entry crisis response forces a cursory review of the capabilities of the forces available for such a response is required. The following chapter will briefly discuss the characteristics and capabilities of each of the services crisis response forces.

Chapter 3: Initial Entry, Crisis Response Forces

The major premise underlying the organization of US armed forces is that each service contributes unique capabilities that provide for the security of the nation. Further, each service has a different approach to readiness due to unique force characteristics, contingency plans, response requirements, peacetime forward deployment levels, and the availability of training infrastructure and perishable skills.

It is precisely these different approaches that give impetus to the need to synchronize the services' capabilities, especially given the challenges of initial crisis response. However, before proposing a model through which to achieve this, it is necessary to examine the current service capabilities, force structure, and training cycles for initial entry crisis response operations.

The Army

As stated in its service vision statement, the US Army commits itself to the development of "the capability to put combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff—in brigade combat teams for both stability and support operations and for warfighting."[22] Units of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps have the capability to deploy within 18 hours of initial notification. This capability is founded on a training strategy that certifies units are trained and ready for combat upon assumption of mission cycle. Once alerted, the Army rapidly tailors CONUS-based units to quickly deploy, directly into combat if required, as part of a joint force.[23] The initial entry crisis response capability currently provided by the Army is resident in the lead elements of the division ready brigade (DRB). The Army has designated light divisions designed to respond rapidly to crises and perform initial entry tasks such as those the 82d Airborne Division and the

10th Mountain Division performed in Operation Uphold Democracy. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 25th Infantry Division (Light) are also designed to perform initial entry tasks in conjunction with a joint task force. All Divisional Ready Brigades train to tasks such as: alert/marshal/deploy; secure lodgment; attack; air assault; defend; command and control the force; and sustain the force. Figure 1 diagrams the basic organization of a DRB.



Fig. 1: Army Division Ready Brigade Composition

In the 82d Airborne Division for example, the DRB is composed of 3,200 paratroopers with a full combined arms capability.[24] The three DRBs rotate "mission" (i.e. first aircraft with embarked troops departing within 18 hours of notification) every six weeks, with each of their three battalion task forces designated the lead element for a two-week increment during that time.[25] While one brigade is the mission unit, another is training to assume mission while the third is supporting both the training and mission brigades. Each brigade entering the mission window has recently completed a six-week intensive training cycle and readiness inspection which certifies it is trained and ready for combat.

The Navy and Marine Corps

In its operational concept, the naval service focuses on the advantage of forward-deployed naval forces to provide capabilities that "are ideally suited for the many contingencies that can be deterred or quickly handled" due to its on-scene presence and rapid response.[26] The principal initial entry crisis response capabilities are resident in two task-organized naval

formations—the carrier battle group (CVBG) and the amphibious ready group (ARG) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC)).

Carrier Battle Group

While the ships and squadrons assigned to a particular CVBG will vary according to anticipated missions and available shipping, its surface and sub-surface ships combined with carrier and land-based aircraft will generally provide capabilities and organization across the warfare areas illustrated in Figure 2:



Fig. 2: Navy Carrier Battle Group Warfare Capabilities[27]

Normally, a CVBG will operate together for an 18-month cycle--12 months of predeployment training followed by a six-month forward deployment. Currently, there are ten battlegroups with two to four forward-deployed at any one time, and one permanently forward-based in Japan.[28]

Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

An ARG (Figure 3) is normally composed of three amphibious ships and is supported by a Naval Support Element composed of various support units (Naval Special Warfare forces (SEAL, which stands for Sea, Air, Land), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Assault Craft Unit, Naval Beach Group, Fleet Surgical Team). These forces provide a cross-section of capability to conduct and sustain a broad range of forward presence and amphibious missions.



Fig. 3: Navy Amphibious Ready Group Composition[29]

The embarked MEU (SOC) is a self-sustaining, general-purpose expeditionary force that possesses the capability to conduct a wide spectrum of conventional and selected maritime special operations. The capabilities of the MEU (SOC) are divided into the four broad categories: amphibious operations, direct action operations, military operations other than war, and supporting operations.[30] Unique to the ARG/MEU (SOC) team is the immediate response capability which requires it to be prepared to commence mission execution with six hours of receipt of a warning or alert order.

The MEU (SOC) (Figure 4) is a Marine Air Ground Task Force manned by two thousand Marines and sailors. It is composed of four elements: a command element; a battalion landing team as the ground combat element; an aviation combat element of a medium lift helicopter squadron reinforced with heavy transport and attack rotary wing assets as well as fixed wing vertical and short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) attack aircraft; and a MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) which provides logistics support and up to 15 days of sustainment in an expeditionary environment.[31]



Fig. 4: Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Organization

Generally, the Navy ARG and Marine Corps MEU (SOC) operate together for 12-months of the 18 month cycle period, with six months dedicated to intensive pre-deployment training followed by a six-month forward deployment. Currently, there are seven ARG/MEU (SOC)s with two to four deployed at any one time, and one forward-based in Japan.

The Air Force

In its current vision statement, the US Air Force identifies the need to rapidly project aerospace power encompassing a broad range of capability from the continental United States (CONUS) in response to crises that span the operational spectrum.[32] In response to the dramatic increase in contingency operations, the Air Force has developed an operational concept that organizes its assets and capabilities into Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF). The AEF is structured to include the combat (fighter/bomber), mobility, combat support, crisis response and humanitarian relief capabilities shown in Figure 5.[33]



Fig. 5: Air Force Air Expeditionary Force Capabilities

Currently, the Air Force has designated ten AEFs operating within a 15-month cycle, plus two already established Air Expeditionary Wings (AEW). During each cycle, two AEFs are on-call for each three-month period, with each on-call period preceded by three months of predeployment training. The remaining nine months are dedicated to recovery time and normal training/exercises.[34]

The Air Force's rapid response requirements are currently filled by each of the two AEWs, who rotate on-call status every 90 days. Eventually, as the AEF concept matures, the forces resident in each of the AEWs will be assimilated into the AEFs, and the crisis response requirements will be filled by the on-call AEF units and personnel.[35] Once called to respond, the disparate forces will deploy, forming a deployed Air Expeditionary Wing, Group or Squadron depending on the numbers of forces deployed.

The Air Force's total force concept emphasizes the inclusion of Air Reserve Component (ARC) forces in its operations. Thus, the Air Force relies heavily on ARC forces to round out the AEFs. This will require the participation of over 25,000 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel in the training and deployments of the ten Air Expeditionary Forces as they complete their training and deployment cycles.[36]

Current State of Training for Initial Response Forces

Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps

As it implements the AEF schedules, the Air Force uses a 15-month cycle for training, exercises, and evaluations, in contrast to the Naval Service that typically uses an 18-month cycle. Both services use approximately 12 months for training, exercises and evaluations at all levels from unit-sponsored local training up to, and including, large force exercises. The additional three months used by the Naval Services are the result of a six-month forward deployment as compared to the AEF three-month deployment period. The chart at Figure 6 provides a generic overview of several AEF training, deployment preparation and deployment/on-call life cycles combined with the same generic overview of typical CVBG/CVW or ARG/MEU (SOC) life cycles. Although the chart is greatly oversimplified in detail, the general timing and organization of the life cycle is accurate.



Fig. 6: Generic AEF and Naval Forces and ARG/MEU(SOC) Life Cycles

Army

The Army has light infantry divisions that are designed to respond rapidly to crises and perform initial entry tasks. These divisions use the DRB readiness system and employ a six-week training cycle. Each DRB will have at least 2.5 training cycles in a year. Once a DRB has completed a training cycle, it also assumes mission cycle twice annually and each time undergoes a series of checks and readiness inspections to ensure it can rapidly deploy to meet the demands of initial entry combat. Army divisions train on a "three to make one" system where one brigade is on two hour recall mission status, the next is training to assume mission and the third is supporting the other two as depicted in Figure 7.



Fig. 7: Army Division Ready Brigade Life Cycle

Figure 8 compares the current Division Ready Brigade life cycle with that of a current Air Force AEF and of a Naval CVBG and ARG/MEU (SOC). The similarities between the Navy and Air Force cycles demonstrate that through scheduling we can begin to achieve alignment between the deployed naval components and the Crisis Response Force within the AEF. What is also clear is that alignment of forces and linking training will require compromise across the services. The Navy and Air Force training cycles do not mesh with the Army's doctrinal training regimen nor is the Army's short mission cycle compatible with the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force deployment/on-call cycles. This is the fundamental issue to breaking the phalanx of meaningful joint training.



Fig. 8: Comparison of Current AEF, CVBG/ARG/MEU (SOC) and DRB Life Cycles

As highlighted above, each of the armed services has a type of unit that is currently designed to meet the requirements of initial entry during crisis response. Each of these units is organized, equipped and trained to execute designated joint tactical tasks found in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL is a document produced by the Joint Staff identifying tactical tasks to be "performed by more than one service component … to meet the standards of the combatant commands." However, the vast majority of pre-crisis preparation is based on a service-specific mission essential task list (METL) which, while generally supportive of the UJTL, may not fully address the required joint capabilities. Any pre-crisis joint training involving these units is usually the result of a CINC tasking his service components in his Joint Training Plan to participate in joint exercises. These commitments are not focused on development of habitual relationships among tactical-level crisis response forces, but rather seek to exercise the application of joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures through the planning and execution of joint operations normally at the headquarters level and above.[37]

Other than these occasional exercises, many of which are focused on training JTF staffs and not the operational forces which might be assigned to them, there has been no consistent institutionalized attempt to realize gains in efficiency, effectiveness, or speed of execution. The development of inter-service habitual relationships will enhance the synchronization of these units' pre-crisis preparation. The next chapter will propose a method for achieving these gains.

Chapter 4: Force Alignment Proposal

During the review of Operation Uphold Democracy, the effectiveness of focused joint training of crisis response forces was readily apparent. In order to make progress toward Joint Vision 2010, the services must accept challenges to the status quo and break down the barriers inherent in individual service planning, scheduling and training. Some of the inter-service difficulties surrounding Task Force Hawk during Operation Allied Force might be a warning sign that the drive toward greater combat readiness for crisis response forces is off course.[38] The success of Task Force Pegasus in Operation Uphold Democracy demonstrates it is possible to have meaningful joint training at the appropriate levels and to have, at least, de facto habitual alignment of involved crisis response units. This paper recommends formalizing habitual relationships between designated joint crisis response forces and aligning the scheduling of their training and mission cycles so that JTFs responding to crises will have a higher likelihood of success in combat.

The establishment of habitual relationships leads to increased trust and cohesion between units and organizations. The success of Operation Uphold Democracy was due in large part to the habitual relationships formed in the year leading up to the actual employment of the participating forces. Thus, it can be concluded that forging habitual relationships across the services in peacetime would be a useful tool for increasing the readiness of rapid response forces.

While theater CINCs have a menu of forces from which to select for specific missions, the initial entry forces that should forge those habitual relationships include those illustrated in Figure 9.



Fig. 9: Employment of Initial Entry Crisis Response Forces

As illustrated, the specific forces that should be linked on a rotational basis include: the Crisis Response Force within the numbered AEFs; an Army DRB from one of the four light divisions; an ARG/MEU (SOC); and a CVBG. Because of the Global Naval Force Presence Plan (GNFPP) that directs deployments of naval forces based on forward presence requirements, the long lead-time required for ship overhauls, and the travel requirements for surface naval forces, the current 18-month life-cycle of a CVBG or ARG/MEU (SOC) is the least flexible to change. Therefore this proposal is based on an 18-month life cycle.

The Air Force implemented the AEF concept for several reasons, one of which was to replace the ad hoc fashion with which units and individual personnel were deployed for various contingencies around the world. A by-product of replacing this ad hoc scheduling addressed a strong desire to get the frequency of operations (OPTEMPO) and personnel deployments (PERSTEMPO) within a predictable schedule. This proposal recommends extending the

deployed/on-call period for the two active AEFs from the current 90 days to 180 days. Appendix I discusses this concept further and offers several variations which would preserve Air Force PERSTEMPO goals. Appendix I also briefly discusses the effects of this proposal on the Air Reserve Component forces attached to each AEF.

Likewise this paper proposes an expansion of the current Army Training Management System to a 36-week cycle (three 12-week training, mission and support periods vice the current 6-week periods), which would better facilitate habitual relationships at the brigade level. The expected improvement would come from a reduction in the number of brigades on mission status while the other services' forces are deployed/on-call. While this represents a fundamental change in the long established Army Training System and is discussed further in chapter 5, the US Army Ranger Regiment has already adopted a similar cycle to facilitate their interaction with the Joint Special Operations Command.[39]

Through changes in service specific training management, a schedule such as that depicted in Figure 10 is proposed. The chart demonstrates how the AEFs and Naval Forces would be closely aligned, while each DRB would have at least one opportunity to train with the designated rapid response forces. The generic length of the Joint Exercise/Evaluation period allows for some flexibility in scheduling training resources and aligning forces just prior to deployment. It is not intended to recommend a Joint Exercise or Evaluation for the entire length of the period.[40]



Fig. 10: Proposed Generic Schedule for Aligned Forces

Besides force alignment, the formation of habitual relationships relies on the linkage of their pre-crisis training. Chapter 5 will discuss a linked training proposal for the aligned forces.

Chapter 5: Linking Joint Training

History has demonstrated in Operations Desert One, Urgent Fury and Allied Force that when we do not train as we intend to fight, the services will encounter significant problems when forces come together rapidly to achieve common objectives. Once the services have solved the alignment of rapid response forces as previously discussed, the scheduling of meaningful joint training becomes paramount. As JV 2010 states:

> Realistic and stressful training has been the primary way to keep readiness high and prepare our men and women to face the challenges of combat. Such training, consisting of carefully balanced programs of individual, crew, and larger organizational training and assessments, is central to training the way we will fight. From individual or crew mission simulators, through full-blown field exercises at home or abroad, realistic, evaluated training is and must remain our best combat multiplier. Joint, coalition, and combined training and exercises have improved our interoperability and understanding of the strengths of each individual service as well as allies and coalition partners.[41]

Just as aligned forces would begin their training cycles with unit level proficiency training, the same forces should make their final preparations in graduate level exercises and evaluations which would demonstrate the capabilities to meet the CINCs' joint mission essential tasks (JMETs) for initial entry crisis response. For example, synergistic effects could be achieved by scheduling associated joint crisis response forces to exercise together at many of the large maneuver ranges in the Western United States. These ranges include Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Marine Corps Base

Twenty-Nine Palms, California; the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada; and the Southern California Operations Area. These ranges and maneuver areas are used every month of the year and, while difficult, the benefits of rearranging the exercise schedule to include one or two joint capstone exercises a year would be significant. By using these bases for joint exercise and evaluation, our forces could get much of the same training they now receive with the additional benefit of gaining experience with a Joint Task Force.

All of the bases mentioned in the preceding paragraph are used for large-scale exercises on a routine basis. Nellis Air Force Base, the home of the Air Force Weapons School, hosts several Red, Green and other Flag events during the year. The air-to-ground and air-to-air ranges enable some of the most realistic training available anywhere in the world. The sophisticated aircraft tracking systems ensure aircrews will be thoroughly and competently debriefed after each mission. These Flag events use primarily Air Force participants and will eventually be used for training AEF forces together just prior to their on-call/deployment period.[42] Likewise the NTC has ten brigade rotations annually where the DRB fights a professional, full time opposing force and is evaluated by an active duty observer/controller cadre outfitted with state of the art instrumentation throughout the maneuver area. Just as Nellis AFB has the sophisticated capabilities for aircraft and aircrew training, the NTC has those same types of capabilities for its combat maneuver training. Naval Air Station Fallon is the home to the Naval Strike Fighter Weapons School and rivals Nellis Air Force Base in sophistication and training capabilities. During their training cycles, each carrier air wing deploys to Fallon for several weeks of combined training, just as the AEFs will use Flag events for their combined unit training. Finally, nearly every Marine infantry battalion conducts a major live fire and maneuver exercise

at the MCAGCC prior to forward deployment. While Twenty-Nine Palms is the least sophisticated of all the ranges discussed here, the base does have large areas for live-firing of weapons and could be used for large joint exercises in some scenarios.

Ideally, all of these ranges would be scheduled for use at the same time by the aligned forces slated to be on-call or deployed at the same time. The exercises and evaluations would be conducted under a pseudo-JTF umbrella, most likely staffed by an Army Corps or Marine MEF headquarters with Joint Forces Command observer/controllers, and would be primarily joint in nature with all the services contributing forces for CINC specific training objectives. To further enhance these exercises, scenarios could be tailored to train to the requirements contained in theater level operations plans.

Once again, Operation Uphold Democracy provides a model where training benefits were realized from the individual/crew/team level all the way through the Joint Task Force Headquarters. Though this training took place along the East Coast from Virginia to South Carolina, the concept of integrating all services in a mock area of responsibility and focused on common objectives is the same. For example, all of the Army helicopter pilots trained extensively with naval forces to become qualified on ship deck landing procedures. The Kiowa Warrior crews routinely practiced with the Air Force C-141 crews the uploading and offloading of their OH-58Ds until they reached a thirty-minute time standard. The Air Force C-130 and C-141 crews conducting the airdrops trained extensively on the upload, transport and accurate night airdrop of troops and equipment. This included modifying their heavy equipment drop procedures to facilitate the ground tactical plan execution. Air Force A-10 pilots routinely accompanied the lift formation during night airdrops, practicing night vision goggle procedures. Finally, the JTF staff practiced its command and control from the Air Force Airborne Command

and Control EC-135 aircraft. Clearly, focused joint training exercises train forces at all levels of command and execution.

Ultimately, it would be logical to build a network that would link all of the Western Ranges. Such networking would further enable a JTF Commander to exercise his staff while also providing extensive debriefing tools after each exercise. This would be critical where face-to-face debriefing would not be possible. The Joint Forces Command has begun some very basic and preliminary studies into the feasibility of such networking.[43]

An example of the synergy generated by efficient combination of multi-service forces through scheduled joint training is illustrated by the Navy's Fleet Battle Experiment Delta (FBE-D). The Navy conducted FBE-D in the fall of 1998 in the Korean Theater of Operations and in conjunction with Exercise FOAL EAGLE '98, an annual joint and combined exercise sponsored by Combined Forces Command Korea. Although there were four phases of FBE-D, the particular phase of interest was the requirement to counter enemy maritime special operations forces. The defeat of waterborne infiltration of thousands of North Korean Special Operations Forces via hundreds of fast vessels challenges the resources and coordination of all components. A successful defense was achieved by the efficient use of Army Apache (AH-64) helicopters, Air Force AC-130 gunships, and Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft, all typical elements of initial entry, crisis response forces.[44]

Besides the uncharacteristic use of Army Apaches and Air Force gunships to defeat a seaborne maritime threat, perhaps the most significant result of the experiment was the Navy's maritime adaptation and application of the Army's Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS). LAWS is a system designed to enhance situational awareness and command and control of Army forces engaging with the enemy.[45] Using a rapid prototype process, a mission management tool

was developed which enabled a network that provided seamless coordination between the Naval, Air and Ground Component Commanders. The system was successfully implemented and was so effective that all of the experimental LAWS stations installed for the experiment were retained by the theater for further use in actual situations.[46]

There are two lessons to be taken from FBE-D that apply to the proposal put forth in this paper:

- First, joint training will continue to expose gaps in joint capabilities and the necessity to fill those gaps will foster multi-service solutions using already available technology and capabilities.
- Second, habitual relationships and linked training will foster innovative tactics and techniques for integrating joint force capabilities that would not normally be discovered during intermittent participation in joint training.

While there is currently no joint training plan that attempts to align the preparation of joint, initial entry crisis response forces, there have been attempts below the CINC level to align units that might ultimately have to operate together, or to take advantage of multi-service capabilities to solve unique problems. The following chapter discusses two such initiatives.

Chapter 6: Current Initiatives

Two notable examples which serve as a precedent for alignment of forces at the joint level are the current agreement between the US Third Fleet and I Marine Expeditionary Force, and a CINCPAC initiative which began in the Fall of 1999.

3d Fleet-I MEF Efforts

Since the mid-1990's, West Coast CVBGs and ARG/MEU (SOC)s have routinely conducted integrated predeployment training with a goal of developing mutual understanding of capabilities and a habitual relationship during planning and execution across a wide spectrum of naval operations, to include strike, amphibious, non-combatant evacuation, sea control and humanitarian assistance.

While deployment schedules might vary from several days to several weeks, the CVBG and ARG/MEU (SOC) staffs have been routinely successful in synchronizing their six-month predeployment training schedules, with integrated training scheduled at all levels. At the command and control level, all three staffs participate in at least three major events (Rapid Planning Workshop; Battle Group Integrated Training; Battle Group Team Trainer). Integrated training among various elements of the CVBG and ARG/MEU (SOC) occur on numerous occasions (e.g. Marine Tactical Recover of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) forces supporting Carrier Air Wing (CAW) strike training at NAS Fallon, and Naval Surface Fire Support Ships (NSFS) and CAW support of Marine fire support coordination exercises). Finally, all elements of the CVBG and ARG/MEU (SOC) participate in at least two major at-sea exercises (FLEETEX and JTFEX) which seek to fully integrate their full range of capabilities as well as certify them as being prepared for deployment.[47] As a result of the integrated work-up, each CVBG and

ARG/MEU (SOC) develops and promulgates jointly-developed standard operating procedures designed to facilitate integrated operations when forward deployed.[48] One need only look to several forward deployments during the past six years to validate that this formal effort to integrate predeployment training has paid dividends during actual contingency operations, with carrier airwing aircraft flying in support of Marine forces ashore in Kuwait and ARG ships operating directly with battlegroup assets.[49]

USCINCPAC Initiatives

The United States Commander in Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC) has proposed and begun development of the systems required to achieve habitual force alignment and linked training schedules for forces in his theater. USCINCPAC's Joint Mission Force (JMF) concept seeks to exploit the capabilities of each service using the GNFPP deployment cycle as the standard and also seeks an extension of Army training cycles.

USCINCPAC currently uses a variety of forces to conduct Joint Task Force (JTF) operations. It stands up a JTF headquarters on a mission by mission basis and uses the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) as its principal theater communications backbone. In addition, each service prepares itself independently then operates within the confines of the JTF command and control structure, giving each service its own "battle rhythm."[50] This independent preparation leads to a requirement for a period of time at the establishment of the JTF for the staff and assigned forces to establish relationships.

USCINCPAC envisions future JTFs as "seamlessly joint and combined forces which operate with remarkable speed to shape and respond across the Pacific Theater."[51] It believes there are two tenets underlying its Joint Mission Force (JMF) concept and to achieving this vision: (1) developing the teamwork that comes from habitually aligned forces who frequently

and routinely interact; (2) developing a robust theaterwide networked C4ISR system which facilitates and enables those interactions.[52] USCINCPAC expects the changes in force alignment, command and control, and training to enable significant advantages in speed of reaction, mission effectiveness, force robustness, rigorous decision making, and cost savings. It also expects its forces will be able to execute simultaneous missions faster, more efficiently and with greater chance of success.[53] USCINCPAC is currently conducting aggressive study and significant experimentation to further evaluate the implementation of its proposal. Appendix II outlines the USCINCPAC vision in greater detail.

USCINCPAC's visionary initiative can be adapted to any theater and will provide the baseline to meet the requirements for any theater CINC. Several of the issues addressed by USCINCPAC will require funding of new or different programs and/or changes in funding levels. Virtually all of the issues involve some level of service paradigm change. While this paper remains narrowly focused on force alignment and linked training schedules, and the efficiencies expected to be gained, the other issues surrounding USCINCPAC's vision, such as C4ISR and a standing JTF, also warrant continued research and evaluation.

Joint training and the habitual relationships forged between units that could fight together will ensure the most effective crisis response forces possible. The task, then, is to align the schedules of forces, bases, exercises, and evaluations to best use our precious time, range space and national resources. This would maximize the readiness of joint crisis response forces while preserving their desired operations tempo and personnel tempo. There are, however, several challenges to effective implementation that need to be addressed.

Chapter 7: Challenges of Implementation

When implementing a proposal that departs from an established norm, there are numerous challenges that must be overcome to realize success. Some of the more significant include operations tempo, budget requirements, extending the Army training cycle, and measuring the effectiveness of the changes. Other issues that must be addressed include synchronizing the efforts across the various warfighting CINCs, and assigning clear responsibility for implementing joint training.

Operations Tempo

Alignment of training schedules must be accomplished in tandem with reduction of other competing requirements. The military has seen a 300% rise in missions coupled with a 30% reduction in personnel and budget over the past seven years. It is this calculus that is leading the services to lower levels of joint readiness. The assignment of rapid response forces to non-combat missions such as the Multination Force Operations (MFO) in the Sinai and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia has resulted in an increase in operational tempo. These assignments cut into the forces available for true crisis and reduces the amount of time rapid response forces have to prepare for combat operations. If more force structure and money are not forthcoming, as most would argue, then the Defense Department and the services must begin to be more discerning about which missions to embrace. The scatter fashion in which missions are determined and delegated today must give way to an approach that shields initial entry, crisis response forces from the resource draining engagement activities that have become the norm. Because there is little to no preparatory time for crisis response, these forces require the fenced time, resources and opportunity to train in a focused joint environment before the crisis occurs.

Budget Requirements

Coupling a refocusing of service training priorities to support joint warfighting imperatives with the economies of scale to be realized through the integration of service-specific training and exercises, it is anticipated that there would be no significant increase in budgetary resources required to implement this proposal. Further, with the shift of a small percentage of resources currently dedicated to non-crisis response joint training (i.e. only 10% of current JCS-directed exercises address crisis response preparation), sufficient funding can be found to meet the requirements of this plan.

An additional budgetary challenge lies in the current "pay to play" system of service exercise participation. A crucial element is the shifting of adequate budgetary resources to fully fund joint training events so as to remove the stumbling block presented by the current system. Under this system units participate in joint exercises only if they have the budget to support it.[54] Participating units should be funded through joint channels, most likely through Joint Forces Command and the warfighting CINCs, so that exercise participation will not be affected by lack of individual service or unit funding.

The Army Training Cycle

As proposed, the Army's current 18-week training cycle would be extended to 36 weeks. Predictably, this extension could create higher peaks and lower valleys between the training and support units as more continuous training time would increase readiness, while more time on support cycle would erode the entry level into the next training cycle. These second and third order effects of moving from an 18-week cycle to a 36-week cycle are beyond the scope of this paper and deserve further research and analysis. In addition, variables such as the number of

brigades in a division and competing requirements such as MFO and other deployments require study.

Extension of the mission, training and support cycles would still maintain all of the fundamental tenets of Army training doctrine while affording better opportunities for joint linkage. Additionally, as demonstrated by Army units assigned to Joint Special Operations Command, a precedent for extended training and mission cycles similar to that proposed here already exists.[55] Importantly though, the opportunities for joint interaction and training with habitually associated units is a benefit that may provide promising returns.

Measuring Success

One of the challenges in determining the effectiveness of this plan for force alignment and training synchronization is the identification of a metric by which to measure its success in improving readiness to respond to crisis. It appears from the record of crisis response over the past ten years that US armed forces have yet to optimize their ability to conduct joint operations. There exists no formal joint system to prepare joint initial entry crisis response forces for combat other than at the JTF headquarters level at Joint Forces Command. Rather, by default, such training is currently relegated to the service components. While United States Code Title 10 gives the service components responsibility to train and equip their forces, as operations have become increasingly joint, there has been little effort to institutionalize the training of crisis response forces. The challenge is realizing the efficiencies inherent to training together before heading into 'the fight.'

A starting point for measuring success lies with the effort to refine the Universal Joint Task List and synchronize service-specific mission essential tasks. Through the very process of design and implementation of the proposed plan, the unified commanders working with their

component commanders should be able to capture, to a level of specificity heretofore unseen, the tactical requirements inherent to joint operations. Comparison of the results of these efforts (i.e. a revised UJTL with supporting service tasks) with what currently exists will provide some measure of success.

A second area in which to measure the effectiveness of this proposal can found in the assessment of joint training and exercises. Based on a refined UJTL, evaluation of the performance of tactical level units during joint exercises should provide a clear measure of whether readiness has increased as well. Further, the overall number of crisis-response units participating in joint exercises and training, as well as the percentage of their overall training that is conducted jointly, will provide additional indications of the success of this plan.

In the final analysis, the one true metric of the success of force alignment and synchronized training will rest with the historical record yet to be written. Only with the success of future initial entry, crisis response forces can this proposal be ultimately validated.

Synchronizing the Requirements of the Warfighting CINCs

One of the principal challenges of addressing the requirements for joint, initial entry crisis response forces is that, while the services organize and train forward-deployed and rapidly deployable CONUS-based force packages to respond to crises, it is Unified Commanders-in-Chief (such as US European Command, US Pacific Command, US Central Command), facing a broad spectrum of mission requirements, some which may be unique to their area of responsibility, who employ these units. The Joint Staff does provide guidance, in the form of the UJTL, to the service components in terms of the joint tasks that are to be performed by the forces they provide to the CINCs. Specifically, the UJTL lists six major tactical-level tasks (deploy/conduct maneuver; develop intelligence; employ firepower; perform logistics and

combat service support; exercise command and control; and protect the force), with each being supported by several joint interoperability tactical tasks and respective service tasks.[56] The intent of the UJTL is that it be used by the services in developing service-specific mission essential task lists, as well as by the CINCs in the design of their joint training program.

While this may provide a good starting point, the UJTL must be validated to ensure that it does, indeed, address the spectrum of joint capabilities that will be required of initial entry crisis response forces. Further, service-level mission essential tasks must be aligned to remove the possibility of a gap in capability as well as to facilitate the rapid integration of crisis response units on the eve of a crisis response.

Responsibility and Authority for Joint Training

Currently, while each unified commander has the responsibility for ensuring that component forces can be effectively integrated into a joint organization in response to crisis, only limited tools are provided to the CINC with which to realize this objective. The CINCs, who are charged with the scheduling of joint training and exercises, must be provided with the authority to ensure that participation in them is given the appropriate level of priority by the service components providing the required units. This could be enabled and enhanced by the previously mentioned changes in the current pay to play requirements.

In addition to sufficient budgetary resources, an integral requirement for the success of this proposal is the assignment of assessment responsibility to the CINCs coupled with the attendant authority to oversee the alignment and integration of training. With very few exceptions, the responsibility for assessing the overall readiness of initial entry crisis response forces rests principally with the service components. While this remains a valid concept for validating service-specific mission essential tasks, it does little to foster the integration of these

capabilities in the joint arena. In addition, assessment of joint-specific tasks generally rests with the service component that validates the capability to the unified commander. As evidenced by a current validation review of the UJTL underway at US Forces Command, however, there are numerous joint tasks to which the service components are incapable of training without outside assistance that is only resident at the CINC level.[57] An additional benefit of vesting assessment responsibility and authority at the CINC level is that it provides an additional incentive for the service components to participate in joint training and train to those joint interoperability tasks required for successful integration a joint task force.

A Role for US Joint Forces Command

In 1993, US Atlantic Command was assigned major new responsibilities of training and integrating CONUS-based multi-service combat forces for the conduct of joint operations overseas. On 1 October 1999, US Atlantic Command was redesignated US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). As mentioned by the current CINC, Admiral Gehman, the name change highlights a "move toward more functional responsibilities and away from being a typical geographic CINC … the chief advocate for jointness among the military services."[58]

In a move that seemingly further enhanced its role, the new Joint Chiefs of Staff Unified Command Plan, published in October 1999, confirmed USJFCOM's authority to assess Joint Task Forces.[59] Each component must report on its readiness to execute joint interoperability tasks contained in the UJTL in its monthly readiness report to the CINC.[60] Under this charter, USJFCOM recently conducted JTFEX 99-1 during which it assessed the joint missile defense capabilities of a joint task force operating within the framework of a CVBG and ARG/MEU (SOC) certification exercise.[61]

Although Goldwater-Nichols mandated "joint," it is still up to the JCS, CINCs and the services to design and implement joint operations. The force alignment and synchronized training proposed here have precedents in the recent activities of Navy and Marine Corps units, and separately USCINCPAC. Chapter 8 briefly explores those examples and discusses the benefits to be gained.

While proposed force alignment and training portends improved efficiencies during the employment of joint, initial entry, crisis response forces, it is not without some major challenges. Stabilization and reduction in OPTEMPO, appropriate budgetary support and further study of the Army's training system will be required. Efforts need to be directed toward a continued refinement of joint tactical tasks and their supporting sub-tasks. Current service-specific METL must be validated and synchronized. Finally, assessment responsibility and authority must be clearly vested at the warfighting CINC level.

Chapter 8: A Final Thought

While discussing the future of the military and noting the services were beginning to take steps to transform themselves, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman challenged the services with the following:

> *While each service is moving to reorganize ... they still seem to be acting mostly alone with relatively little coordination or even, if I can put it this way, exchange of observers. This is a problem.* Because to successfully transform our military will require that we move to the next level of jointness. ... virtually every respectable thinker believes that future operations will be increasingly joint, interagency, and combined. *And that while competition among the services can assist in determining how best to exploit new capabilities or solve emerging challenges, there just has to be greater collaboration.* [italics added][62]

While Senator Lieberman's concern was directed at the more macro level of fundamental collaboration, his concerns about the lack of coordination between the services and the apparent willingness of each service to act alone can be tied to training issues. As was previously noted, although the Air Force's schedule for its AEFs closely resembles the Navy's schedules for its CVBGs, there have been no known attempts by either service to synchronize training or exercise schedules.[63] In fact, current plans only call for the AEFs to conduct integrated training with other indigenous AEF units at exercises such as Red Flag, Maple Flag and Cope Thunder, all with traditionally heavy Air Force participation.[64] Additional training during these events will include AOR orientation, Rules of Engagement testing, Command Post Exercises, and more.[65] While meeting the immediate needs of the AEFs these exercises and additional training encompass

important joint interaction and could be used to exploit the current strengths and weaknesses in our joint interoperability.

It appears from this study that *service specific training* is not broken, as is evidenced by the continuing success enjoyed by all service specific units during recent contingencies. What is equally clear, however, is that there exists no synchronized training regimen for joint contingency forces, causing combat operations to continue to suffer due to the general lack of force alignment and training synchronization. The uncertainties of future crises provide further impetus for improving the preparation of crisis response forces, especially those that will find themselves first on scene. As stated in Joint Vision 2010, "all organizations must become more responsive to contingencies, with less 'startup' time between deployment and employment," with success resting on "decisive speed and tempo" with which to gain decisive advantage.[66] We owe it to the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who will comprise the initial entry crisis response force during our next crisis to provide them with every possible advantage during their pre-crisis training; to provide them with anything less is unacceptable.

Appendix I: Variations on AEF Schedules and Air Reserve Component Participation

This proposal recommends that the AEF deployment/on-call time be extended from the currently planned three months to six months in order to match the deployed time of aligned naval forces. This would then break the Air Force goal of only 120 deployed days per year, which helps to keep OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO in check. However, it is possible to average 120 deployed days per year. Because there are 10 AEFs and each one would be extended, an AEF would not return to deployed status for as long as 24 months, instead of the planned 12 months. The charts at Figure 11, 12 and 13 show three variations. Table 1 is a comparison of the three variations.

The first chart at Figure 11 shows how each AEF would go on deployed status back-to-back with the previous AEF. There is no overlap at all in deployed status. In reality, this is a highly unlikely situation but is shown to illustrate the concept. It is unlikely because the units of the previously deployed AEF would not leave the theater before their replacements arrived in theater.



Fig. 11: Thirty-month AEF life cycle with no overlapping deployments

Figure 12 shows an overlap of one month for each subsequent AEF. This is a more realistic scenario that accomplishes several things. First, it would be more reasonable to expect

some overlap due to the requirement to maintain deployed forces in theater at all times and in order for the newly arriving forces to receive adequate theater indoctrination prior to assuming the watch. Second, the GNFPP typically does plan for a theater to be without naval forces for an extended period. Therefore, any subsequent naval force would be required to deploy with some overlap in order to transit to the theater. An aligned AEF would be required to assume deployed/on-call status at the same time its associated/aligned naval forces deployed.



Fig. 12: Twenty-five month AEF life cycle with one month overlapping deployments

Figure 13 shows a two-month overlap. This would be the worst case expected.



Fig. 13: Twenty-month AEF life cycle with two month overlapping deployments

The following conventions were used to build Table 1: A standard 360-day year with 30-day months; and the number of days on deployment was always 180 days. The timing began the first day of the Recovery, Training and Exercise period and progressed through the last day of the

deployed period. The average number of days deployed per year was then calculated. Days deployed only accounts for days on deployed/on-call status, not for Temporary Duty away from home station during the Recovery, Training and Exercise period.

Table 1: Comparison of AEF Scheduling Variations

	Figure 11: No Overlap	Figure 12: One month overlap	Figure 13: Two month Overlap
Months in cycle	30	25	20
/12 = years	2.5	2.08	1.67
Deployed Days	180	180	180
Deployed Days/Year	72	87	108
Days available for TDY	48	33	12

It can be seen that there would be somewhere between 12 and 48 days per year still available for training away from home station. Therefore, if the Air Force would compromise on the calculations for deployed days per year and average those days across the entire life cycle of the AEF, it would allow AEFs to assume a longer on-call period. This, in turn, would facilitate alignment of forces.

Air Reserve Component Participation

Participation of Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve units is critical to the successful implementation of the Expeditionary Air Force vision. The ARC has been heavily integrated into Air Force plans and forms a substantial portion of the Air Force "Total Force." A substantial portion of the Air Force's tanker, airlift and fighter assets are assigned to the ARC.[67]

In addition, the relationships forged through the years with civilian employers have enabled ARC personnel to deploy when needed to support national military requirements.

The AEF concept has both helped and hindered the participation of the ARC forces. The fixed schedule has enabled ARC personnel to positively notify their civilian employers when they will be on active-duty. In the same vein, the long periods of deployment, and the consequent length of time the member is away from his/her civilian job, put strains on the same civilian employers.[68]

The ARC manages these long periods by rotating personnel through the deployment, thereby maintaining the commitment, but not always with the same personnel. This personnel rotation has effects on habitual relationships both in and out of the unit. More time must be given to training personnel who arrive in theater during the middle of deployment, etc. However, in order to maintain a strong ARC component, these compromises must be made.

The ARC prides itself on its ability to get the job done. It likes the Air Force to tell it what needs to be done, not how to do it.[69] It is felt that this doctrine, combined the fact that the initial entry crisis response forces within the AEF are made up primarily of active-duty forces, would not be adversely affected by this proposal. AEF assigned ARC units must take every opportunity to participate in joint training whenever and wherever possible. This will form the basis for habitual relationships that will enhance any role the ARC force would play in rapid crisis response. During the deployment period, compromises given to rotational ARC forces would be overcome by the strong habitual relationships maintained by active-duty forces.

Appendix II: Details of USCINCPAC Vision of Joint Mission Force

The following outlines show the comparison between USCINCPAC's current force interpretation and its vision for future forces, command and control, and their interactions.[70] Note that in the future vision there is no mention of forces available by service and it relies on the much discussed, but not yet implemented, concept of a standing JTF Headquarters. The forces are tailored to the mission and used for the effects they cause instead of the capabilities they bring to the fight.

Although it is very early in its design stages, the alignment of forces is critical for USCINCPAC's JMF concept to work. USCINCPAC started with a generic timeline for rotational maritime forces whose long-term rhythms are set by the GNFPP. As previously discussed, Naval and Marine Corps forces in the theater are generally aligned and work up together through their training cycle. Deploying maritime forces transit the USCINCPAC theater enroute to and from tours in other than USCINCPAC theaters but are available for mission taskings during these deployment periods. USCINCPAC would like to align an appropriately structured Army headquarters with these rotational maritime forces for their Certification Exercise and transiting mission periods. Air Force Air Expeditionary Forces would also align air packages, and Air Force planning teams, with sister service forces.

When rotational maritime forces are out of theater, forward deployed naval and Marine forces in Japan, Okinawa, and Hawaii, aligned with a different Army headquarters and the other Air Force packages would conduct a certification exercise and assume mission status. This rotation limits OPTEMPO for CONUS-based non-deployed forces. One rotational JTF headquarters would cover this entire period, from running a joint preparation exercise through the time transiting maritime forces return to home station. The mission cycle duration for the

JTF HQ would therefore be about 6 months. Other rotational JTF headquarters would be aligned with different groupings of service component forces.[71]

Current Status – JTF 1999

I Available Forces
- A. Naval/Marine Forces
  1. Aligned
  2. Apportioned by GNFPP & Forward Deployed Naval Forces
- B. Army Ready Forces
  1. Initial Entry Forces
  2. Division Ready Brigade
- C. Air Force
  1. AEF/AEW
  2. Deployable Air Operations Center
- D. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Force Alignment
  1. Based on OPLAN 5027
  2. 5077 in development

II Command and Control
- A. JTF HQ assigned by mission
- B. GCCS with worldwide variants

III Exercises and Other Interaction
- A. Predominantly Bilateral
- B. Routine interagency liaison limited to and focused on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)

Future Vision – JTF (JMF) 2003-2013

I Available Forces
- A. Seamless joint/combined theater shaping-response force (JMF)
  1. Aligned forces
  2. Synchronized schedules
- B. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Force Alignment
  1. OPLAN 5027
  2. OPLAN 5077

II Command and Control
- A. Established JTF HQ
- B. Radically improved C4ISR systems

III Exercises and Other Interaction
- A. Command Post Exercise (CPX) staff training
- B. Routine multilateral & interagency operations and exercises

In order to reach its vision, USCINCPAC is further analyzing and refining the following initiatives and concepts:[72]

(1) Refine development of JTF HQ structure and mission tailored force employment methodology.
(2) Initiate discussions of service ready force alignment and training schemes (incl. initial coord with defense modeling and simulation (DMSO) to develop simulation support for distributed mission training and Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) for CPX support).
(3) Initiate identification of JMF theater C4ISR requirements and issues.
(4) Introduce JMF logistical support concept and issues.
(5) Introduce coalition/interagency interoperability concept
(6) Define the direction of the JMF way ahead for subsequent presentation/review at the CINC component Cdr [Commander] conference in Feb 2000 and ultimately the JTF CDR conference in Jun 2000.

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Endnotes

[1] Self-deploy means that the aircraft would be flown, vice carried by strategic or theater lift, to the deployed location. Supplies and support personnel would rely on the traditional airlift or other means of transportation to travel to the deployed location.

[2] See Dana Priest, "Risks and Restraint: Why the Apaches Never Flew in Kosovo," Washington Post, 29 December 1999. This article was a good summary of "failures" of Task Force Hawk as reported by multiple press reports. Task Force Hawk was beset by a confusing array of problems: command and control; risk of casualties; extensive lift requirements; inter-service misunderstandings; and national and international political and military policy and decision making.

[3] Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 10 June 1998) 116.

[4] The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 16 July 1997) 219.

[5] A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999) 11-14.

[6] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997) 1-2.

[7] One of the challenges in identifying crisis response capabilities is that there are several planned future capabilities that may potentially herald a fundamental shift in the way the US deploys and employs its forces. However, given the relatively long lead times required to develop and integrate new technologies, even those of which procurement has already begun, this

study assumes that current force capabilities and structure is that which will be available for the foreseeable future to meet the requirements for initial entry crisis response.

[8] Gary Luck, General (Retired), personal interview with authors, Joint Forces Command, Joint Training and Simulation Center, Suffolk, VA, 12 January 2000.

[9] CINC Exercise Schedule, FY 1999. This is a classified document held by JCS/J-7, Pentagon, Washington, DC.

[10] Luck.

[11] Preist.

[12] Robert Dees, Brigadier General, Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), The Joint Staff, DoD News Briefing, Thursday, 19 June 1997, 1425 hours.

[13] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM, February 1999, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office).

[14] Operation Desert One (1979) was the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran. Operation Urgent Fury (1983) was the Grenada invasion.

[15] Luck.

[16] Operation Just Cause (1989) was the Panama operation while Desert Storm (1991) was the operation to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

[17] Operation Uphold Democracy, After Action Review, (Ft. Bragg: 82d Airborne Division, 02 October 1994) 4.

[18] Henry H. Shelton, LTG, JTF-180 Oral History Interviews, (Fort Bragg: XVIIIth Airborne Corps, November 1994) 60.

[19] Shelton 60-61.

[20] John J. Marcello, Colonel, JTF-180 Oral History Interviews, (Fort Bragg: XVIIIth Airborne Corps, November 1994) 76.

[21] Marcello 76.

[22] Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of US Army, The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation ... Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999), 2.

[23] Chief of Staff of US Army, Army Vision 2010, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1996) 11.

[24] The full combined arms capability of a division ready brigade includes the following: for anti-tank, 60 TOW missile systems and 60 Javelin systems; for air defense, 21 Stinger man portable systems and 12 Avenger systems; indirect fire includes 18 howitzers, 46 50-caliber machine guns, 12 81 millimeter mortars, 18 60 millimeter mortars; the aviation task force possesses 16 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and 13 UH-60 helicopters.

[25] 82d Airborne Division Readiness Standing Operating Procedures, (Ft Bragg: 82d Airborne Division) A1

[26] Department of the Navy, Forward ...From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, 1997) 2.

[27] Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56: Composite Warfare Commander Manual, (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations).

[28] A carrier air wing (CVW) consists of approximately 3,500 to 5,000 personnel aboard the aircraft carrier and provides the following capabilities: strike and air superiority, one squadron of 12 F-14 and up to four squadrons of 12 F/A-18 aircraft; anti-submarine warfare, S-3

fixed wing aircraft and SH-60 helicopters; command and control, E-2; and suppression of enemy air defenses, EA-6B.

[29] LHA, LHD, LPD, and LSD are all amphibious landing ships employed by the ARG. The LHA (Landing Helicopter Assault) and its replacement class, LHD (Landing Helicopter Dock) have the capability to embark up to 2,000 landing force troops as well as a complete reinforced helicopter squadron to include AV-8B Harrier fixed wing aircraft. Additionally, its wet-well deck capability allows it to embark a combination of air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) and utility landing craft (LCU) for surface borne ship to shore movement. The LPD (Landing Personnel Dock) and the LSD (Landing Ship Dock) have the capability to embark two infantry companies of landing force troops. They are also configured with a flight deck which can embark a 2 to 3 helicopter detachment for limited periods of time and their wet-well decks can embark either and LCAC or LCU for surface borne ship to shore movement.

[30] A Marine Expeditionary Unit consists of 2,000 Marines and sailors; the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is built around a medium helicopter squadron of 12 CH-46s reinforced with 4 CH-53E, 4 AH-1W, 2 UH-1N, and 6 AV-8B Harrier fixed wing aircraft. The ACE also has anti-air capability with a Stinger detachment and maintains command and control with an Air Control detachment. The Ground Combat Element is built around an infantry battalion, reinforced with an amphibious assault vehicle platoon, combat engineer platoon, reconnaissance platoon, artillery battery, light armored reconnaissance company or platoon, and may include an M1A1 tank platoon. The Combat Service Support Element contains all logistics capabilities necessary to sustain landing force operations ashore for up to fifteen days. The Command

Element provides all necessary command, control and communications and is augmented with a force reconnaissance platoon, communications and intelligence assets.

[31] Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 3120.9A: Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 24 November 1997) 9.

[32] Department of the Air Force, Global Engagement: A Vision of the 21st Century Air Force, online, address: www.xp.hq.af.mil/xpx/21/competencies/global.htm.

[33] An AEF consists of 10,000 to 15,000 people and a cross section of Air Force weapons systems. Each AEF consists of approximately 150 dissimilar aircraft providing the following capabilities to a theater CINC: air-to-ground with general purpose and precision strike by up to four F-16 and/or F-15E squadrons with 18 or 24 aircraft each and one heavy B-52, B-1 or B-2 squadron; air superiority with a squadron of 24 F-15C; and suppression of enemy air defenses with a squadron of 24 F-16. In addition, each AEF provides expeditionary combat support with tactical leadership, civil engineers, security police and more. Strategic and theater airlift is provided to each aligned pair of AEFs and is managed by a designated mobility wing.

[34] David Aldrich, Lt Col, USAF, "Expeditionary Aerospace Force, Concepts and Implementation," Electronic Briefing to USAF Fellows, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., July 1999 18.

[35] Aldrich 17.

[36] Raymond Rees, Lt General, Army National Guard, "The National Guard," briefing to National Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 06 April 2000.

[37]LtCol Gerke, Joint Task Force Training and Doctrine Division, US Pacific Command, e-mail to author (O'Keefe), 20 Jan 2000.

[38] Preist. Referring to a confidential military after-action report, "The Army and Air Force did not work well together, according to the report: There was friction ...Individuals in both services neither understand nor appreciate the capabilities of one another."

[39] US Army Ranger Regiment, Command Briefing to Brigade Commander's Pre-command Course, Fort Benning, Georgia, 20 April 2000. This briefing addressed the current 13-week training and mission cycles and showed how they are being adapted to integrate forces better with Joint Special Operations Command requirements.

[40] Of course the key to adding training events to already packed training schedules is eliminating other events not focused on mission requirements and then fencing these crisis response units from training distractions, a topic covered later in the paper.

[41] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 6.

[42] Aldrich 18.

[43] James Diehl, Colonel, Chief, USJFCOM Joint Interoperability Training (J-74), personal interview with authors, Joint Forces Command, Joint Training and Simulation Center, Suffolk, VA, 13 January 2000.

[44] Director, Maritime Battle Center, Fleet Battle Experiment Delta (FBE-D) Quicklook Report, (Newport RI: Naval War College, 02 November 1998) 3.

[45] Although the technical specifications and capabilities are beyond the scope of this paper, LAWS provides a multitude of information for the user which includes: automatic updates

of target location/course/speed; status of engagement assets (time on station, weapons loads) and other mission planning information.

[46] Paul James, CDR, USN, Navy Warfare Development Center, Newport, RI, personal interview with authors (Gildner/Tata), 29 March 2000.

[47] Commanding Officer, 13th MEU (SOC), 13th MEU (SOC) Predeployment Training Schedule, Oct 95-Apr 96, (Camp Pendleton: Commanding Officer, 13th MEU (SOC)). Personal copy held by the author (O'Keefe).

[48] Commander, Abraham Lincoln Battle Group, Commander, Amphibious Squadron Five, and Commander, Fifteenth Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), Memorandum of Understanding for Operations Involving Abraham Lincoln Battle Group, Amphibious Squadron Five, and Fifteenth Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), 07 Sep 98. See entire document which is held at each author's headquarters.

[49] See 11th, 13th, 15th MEU (SOC) Postdeployment Briefs, 1995-1999, for details of CVBG and ARG/MEU(SOC) operations in the Arabian Gulf. These are classified documents currently held by 1 MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA.

[50] USCINCPAC J30E, "Joint Mission Force Concept," Electronic briefing to Mr. Paul Davis of RAND, Inc., 21 December 1999 4

[51] USCINCPAC J30E, "Joint Mission Force Concept" 5.

[52] USCINCPAC J30E, "Joint Mission Force Concept" 5.

[53] USCINCPAC J30E, "Joint Mission Force Concept" 6.

[54] Due to insufficient exercise budgets at the CINC level, participation in joint training and exercises, while directed by the unified commander, must normally be funded by component

level headquarters often at the expense of service specific training, thereby fostering a reticence to participate fully.

[55] Ranger Regiment Command Briefing.

[56] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task List, Version 4.0, CJCSM 3500.04B, 01 October 1999, (Washington DC: Joint Staff) 2-437 - 2-451.

[57] Diehl.

[58] Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Chief Advocate for Jointness," Armed Forces Journal, December 1999 32.

[59] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Classified Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense of 25 June 1999. Subject: Unified Command Plan Revision. Held at Joint Chiefs of Staff/J7, Pentagon, Washington, DC. The sections and portions quoted in this note are unclassified. The new Unified Command Plan 21 Vision contains numerous references to the lead role of Joint Forces Command in joint training, interoperability, experimentation, doctrine and deployment. Specifically, on page 7, section 16b, the Unified Command Plan assigns Joint Forces Command to serve as the "lead agent for Joint Force Training," and makes JFCOM responsible for "conducting and assessing joint and multinational training and exercises for assigned forces."

[60] Fred Clapp, Colonel, USA, Deputy Chief, USJFCOM Joint Interoperability Training (J-74), personal interview with authors, Joint Forces Command, Joint Training and Simulation Center, Suffolk, VA, 12 Jan 2000.

[61] US Atlantic Command, Capabilities Based Interoperability Assessment Report, Joint Task Force Exercise 99-1, (Norfolk: US Atlantic Command).

[62] Joseph I. Lieberman, "Transforming National Defense in the 21st Century," Conference on Strategic Responsiveness, Marriot at Metro Center Hotel, Washington DC, November 2, 1999.

[63] Joseph J. Fletcher, Lt Col, USAF, and Lt Col Lambert, Lt Col, USAF, AEF Center, Langley AFB, VA, personal interview with authors (Gildner/Tata), 05 November 1999.

[64] Aldrich 18.

[65] Aldrich 18.

[66] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 20, 31.

[67] Rees.

[68] Rees.

[69] Rees.

[70] USCINCPAC J30E, "Joint Mission Force Concept" 5, 6.

[71] USCINCPAC J30E, "Joint Mission Force Concept" 13.

[72] USCINCPAC, Electronic Message, Subject: USCINCPAC Joint Mission Force (JMF) Workshop, Date Time Group 140305Z JAN 00.