STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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DEVELOPING A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

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The world is clearly moving towards a market economy and the next decade will see a huge amount of development. Notwithstanding this clear trend the nature and number of conflicts has remained at the same level. The United Nations has undertaken yeoman service, bringing about peace, in a large number of countries of the world. On a number of occasions this deployment assistance came about too late and severe loss of life and colossal damage had already taken place. There is need to examine this from a standpoint of the future. Can we foresee trouble spots and timings of such events and also assess their likely intensity beforehand. To this end there is a requirement of having a good decision making body at the UN, which should include the political and bureaucratic machinery to authorise immediate deployment. At the member nations level appropriate forces must be mentioned to quickly deploy and minimize loss of lives and restore order. The paper aims to examine the decision making process and the mechanism necessary for developing a rapid reaction force capability for United Nations peace keeping operations.

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PREFACE

The paper is focussed on the need for developing a Rapid Reaction Capability for United Nations peacekeeping operations. Various types of operations conducted by the UN need to be considered in the light of implications for each of them. The mechanism of decision making is a major factor in quick deployment. Then is the most important factor of having requisite levels of peace forces in different member countries. These forces must be evaluated for deployment in various parts of the world. Force deployment may be sequential with the immediate move of a part to get a toehold and the balance quickly following thereafter. The whole mechanism of rapid deployment is complex and needs to be considered in totality.

DEVELOPING A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

The United Nations was established 50 years ago. The envisaged task of the United Nations was to "establish a postwar order that would secure the peace, advance global prosperity, alleviate poverty and unemployment, and promote human rights worldwide".[1] During the following years the cold war dominated world events. Since the demise of the cold war the UN's intervention role assumes a greater significance. When the United Nations Charter was promulgated in 1945 peace keeping operations under its' aegis were not foreseen. The charter only contained provisions in its Chapter VII for use of military force under control of United Nations when a threat to the peace or an act of aggression exists. Peace keeping operations and its changed states occurred out of necessity.

The world is moving towards a market economy and there is a desire for wellbeing in all strata of societies. Notwithstanding this, the number of conflicts between countries and within failed nations has remained at a high level. Possibly (and optimistically) viewing the world, none of these conflicts would turn into major conflicts or nuclear wars. Intelligentsia all over the world recognize the need to foresee such conflicts and possibly take precautionary measures to prevent them from erupting and if conflicts develop then have an ability to contain them. The United Nations and its peace keeping forces can play the major role in such prevention and containment. There should be a good decision making body at the UN (which incorporates political and bureaucratic machinery) to authorize force deployment in an early time frame. At the member nation levels minimal and appropriate forces must be maintained to quickly deploy in the affected area to control the situation. Additional forces, if necessary, can follow on to restore total normalcy.

The UN response to the Rwanda crisis was a clear example to the world for the need to develop a rapid reaction capability. Despite a major internal conflict with large number of resultant casualties it took several months for the Security Council to authorise a UN mission to Rwanda. At the end of the day governments all over the world realized that with forethought such a catastrophe could have been limited in extent.

An important lesson learnt during peacekeeping operations is the need to respond rapidly to a crisis. Rapid deployment of forces is critical to a mission's success. The Canadian Government report on a UN rapid reaction capability identifies the needs at various levels of the UN if it is to possess a rapid reaction capability. There is need for prompt action to improve the UN Secretariat's strategic planning capability if it is to react quickly to a crisis. Measures, which are fundamental, are "enhancing the effectiveness of the decision making process in political councils of the UN and strengthening the UN Secretariat's capacity to conduct comprehensive, strategic planning in advance of the crisis[2].

AIM

This paper aims to examine the mechanism for developing a rapid reaction force capability for UN peacekeeping operations.

LIKELY NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICTS/CONDITIONS

Intrastate conflicts are now the dominant challenge to the United Nations and the international community. They may not be easily resolved by traditional peace keeping methods. Intrastate conflicts lack clarity. It is difficult to determine who are the aggressors and who is the aggrieved, who is a civilian and who is a combatant. It is equally difficult to determine as to which group is the legitimate authority in the country.

There are a number of States, which are failing. The growth of self-determination and anti-colonial movements led to the explosive emergence of many new states after the 1945 period. An increasing number of these states have failed or are failing. Most have never possessed the national elements of power necessary for survival. Competing factions now vie for control. These failed states have become a huge burden for the United Nations.

A history of ethnic, religious or other rivalry makes restoring the status quo ante extremely difficult. Aspirations of one group directly conflict with control by another, with no ground for compromise between warring sides.

Internal conflicts pose risks for the UN's impartiality and credibility. The UN must be extremely careful in how it gets involved in a conflict and the nature of its involvement. Each operational decision may give the impression that one group or one faction is favored over the other. Impartiality is difficult to maintain and if it is lost then UN credibility is put to question. The latter affects future operations.

The complex nature of intrastate conflicts requires accurate and reliable intelligence, which generally due to its apparatuses, is not available. Such intelligence is an inescapable need.

APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

The erstwhile UN Secretary General Boutras Boutras Ghali in a report "An agenda for Peace" (in 1992) proposed major changes to the UN's approach to employing military force for peace keeping operations. He called for member states to identify what military personnel they were prepared to make available for a UN peace keeping operation. Agreements were to be established between the Secretariat and the member states to confirm the number and type of military personnel, which would be made available to the UN for peace operations.[3]

The erstwhile Secretary General also proposed that the Security Council should consider using peace enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances, which would have terms of reference and employment specified in advance. These member state units would be available on call to the UN. They would be more heavily armed and have extensive training. They would be deployed under the authorization of the Security Council and be under the command or ambit of the Secretary General. It was also seen that the UN had no stock of its own equipment to support peacekeeping operations. It was

established in the report that there was need to have pre-positioned stocks of basic peace keeping equipment. As an alternative member states could commit to keep stand by stocks of designated equipment available for the UN. The Secretary General asked that air and sea lift needed to support peace operations be provided to the UN either free of cost or at lower than market rates and with an assured capability to deliver in time of need.

"An Agenda for Peace " also considered the aspect of financial support for peace keeping operations. It called for the immediate establishment of a revolving peace keeping fund of 50 million dollars, and an agreement that one third of the estimated cost of peace keeping operations be appropriated by the General Assembly as soon as the Security Council approved the operation. It also sought an acknowledgement by member states that under exceptional circumstances it might be necessary for contracts to be placed without formal tendering.[4] It was also reiterated that member states pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

The Secretary General released a supplement to the "Agenda for Peace " on 3 January 1995. This report served as a position paper of the Secretary General on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations.[5] In discussion of peace keeping the Secretary-General indicated that problems concerning the availability of troops and equipment were more serious. Even with the expanded stand by arrangements, there was no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation. When the Security Council decided to expand the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda in May 1994, not one of the nineteen governments with stand by troops agreed to contribute to the mission. The Secretary General proposed that the United Nations should give a serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force which would act as a strategic deployment reserve for the Security Council when there was an emergency need for peace keeping troops.[6]

The Secretary General's proposals in the 1992 and 1995 reports were part of his recommendations on how to improve the UN's capacity to maintain peace and security. His initiatives were well-reasoned solutions to challenges posed to the UN that they were too slow in responses to crisis. The expanded capabilities he proposed were the answers to make the UN a more relevant player in the international arena. The Security Council did unfortunately not adopt these initiatives. As admitted by many member nations there would come a time in the foreseeable future when these or similar proposals would have to be accepted to prevent holocausts and wanton killings of humans.[7]

As an organization the United Nations must also evolve and adapt itself to a rapidly changing environment to better serve the core needs of the international community. The crisis that confronts the United Nations manifests itself in many ways. The United Nations also has a financial crisis that has resulted from the inability of some to fulfill their charter commitments and from laying down of preconditions to meet them. The UN does not have the means to execute programs that respond to the felt needs and priorities of its members, precisely at a time when these are sorely needed. As a result the UN is in danger of being marginalised as the global forum for decision making and their execution. The solution lies not in piecemeal reform, but in building trust between nations.[8] The United Nations needs to

undertake a holistic review of its decision-making apparatus especially in relations to peacekeeping operations.

DECISION MAKING MACHINERY

Another major consideration in quick deployment of forces is the structure of the decision-making machinery for sanctioning employment of forces. The basic purpose of the UN (which is relevant) is to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations and achieve cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charter. To achieve these goals principle organs were established, a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.[9] The system over a period of time has become a labyrinth of autonomous agencies and not a single coordinated one for quick military deployment. The Security Council is the central focus for all UN peace support operations. The decision process for peace support operations needs to be smoothened out. There are two main methods in which the Security Council receives strategic advice and recommendations on international peace and security matters. These are the Secretary General's report and the Council Member's national sources. Advice or recommendations from neither method are comprehensive to ensure foolproof decision-making. To ensure a credible and legitimate decision making process especially when military forces are involved, requires that advice and recommendations that are received from the Secretary General have been quickly been put through a rigorous political and military analysis. It is important that this is done quickly and fairly, as the UN must be correct, fast and selective when employing military forces. An institutionalized planning process needs to be put into place which should have a systematic approach and is simple. Quick decision making at the politico-military level will go a long way in early deployment of peacekeeping forces.

DEPARTMENT OF PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

Currently the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), other than the Military advisor and his small staff, has no organic military structure. The Military Advisor has a difficult function, as he is the head of the Planning Division within the office of Planning and Support. Placing the Military advisor within the DPKO and giving him the task in the planning division does not establish a credible and legitimate political-military organization. Although he has a Brigadier General Deputy, his current role and size of his staff preclude him from functioning effectively in any structured strategic planning process necessary of a true political-military organization. An important test in establishing a Military Staff Branch is its ability to undertake strategic planning and develop quality inputs for political decision making process. They need to translate political objectives into credible military missions and develop military command and control aspects. To minimize UN organizational changes the Military Advisor should head an independent Military Staff branch within the DPKO. He should be brought up to an Assistant Secretary General's level and have direct access to the Secretary General. The Military Advisor must be an officer of international reputation and sufficient stature to deal effectively with the military and civil leaders at the

UN and around the world. The number of permanent members of his staff need not be extensive, but structured to undertake functions of advice and planning.

The Military Assistant, his deputy and the Chief of Staff should be permanent personnel positions. To minimize financial considerations the remainder should be qualified long-term loan personnel from member states. Although most peace operations will involve a preponderance of ground forces the staff should be a cross section of all services. It must be capable of operating as a joint forum and would not be a typical battle staff but undertake all necessary planning functions required to be an integral part of the UN political decision making process. It would also undertake the function of an interface for initial and transition military planning between the UN headquarters (strategic level) and the Force Commander (operational level).

There are four types of staff within the DPKO. They are permanent, support, and temporary and loan staff. The permanent staff is as their name implies paid from the UN operating budget. The support staff is funded and employed under contract on a ratio according to the number of current peace operations. The temporary staff is limited to short term employees. Loan staff as the name implies is provided by the member states at no cost to the UN. Clearly the DPKO relies heavily on support and loan staff. This reliance restricts its ability to undertake strategic planning, frame resolutions for Security Council considerations, develop policy and support operations in a more effective way. Adding difficulties to this, is the point that, permanent staff are not posted to these appointments, which need greater amount of stability. Realistically speaking no additional funds may be made available to recruit additional permanent military staff, as the number of peace support operations keep changing. The need is to examine permanent staff positions at the UN and carry out readjustments within the organization based on past experience with a view to making the DPKO more contributory and dynamic to the nature of changing peacekeeping operations.

TYPES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Before proceeding any further it is necessary to examine the type of operations the UN will be possibly required to undertake in the future. It is necessary to examine the definitions of peace keeping or peace enforcement operations. The definitions as given out by the United Nations are given in succeeding paragraphs.

Peace keeping involves the use of military forces in a non combatant capacity to monitor a cease fire, serve as a buffer between adversaries, or help with disarming of rival forces pursuant to a wider peace agreement. The essential pre requisite of peace keeping is the consent of the hostile parties. Peacekeeping forces are stationed to help keep a precarious peace once the belligerents agree to stop shooting at each other. Lightly armed, they may fire only in self-defense when fired upon. Because peacekeeping units are unequipped to defend themselves against a determined military opponent, their position is untenable when one of the warring parties rejects their presence.

Peace making refers to the full range of activities involved in the peaceful resolution of disputes. It is the process by which an outside agent helps warring parties to make peace i.e. to reach an agreement

not only on an end to the fighting but also on a settlement to resolve their disputes. Peace making involves a wide range of activities, such as mediation, conciliation, shuttle diplomacy and confidence building measures as envisioned in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A peace settlement will often call for the deployment of peace keeping forces during its implementation.

Peace enforcement refers to actions taken to compel a recalcitrant belligerent to take steps demanded by the international body - the function dealt with in Chapter VII of the UN charter. The means of coercion may be political or economic. (The complete or partial interruption of economic relations, transportation and communication links and diplomatic relations). Or the means may be military as envisaged in Article 42.[10]

The definitions provide details that one needs to take into account. In the case of peacekeeping operations, the definition clearly mentions the necessity of consensus among warring parties. The missions of such operations would be to monitor compliance with such arrangements or to protect the delivery of relief. Peace enforcement operations on the other hand envisage the application of different measures including use of military force to resolve a conflict that constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

The main characteristics of peacekeeping forces are –these are troops deployed under control of the United Nations with the consent of the parties involved in the conflict and the consent of the international community.

THE NEED FOR UN FORCES AND ASSOCIATED ASPECTS

The United Nations has proven to be the most effective body available in the direction of collective security. The Security Council's resolutions are the main instruments to highlight international opinion and to provide legal sanction and legitimacy for enforced actions in resolving international conflicts. A coalition of willing member states of the United Nations are the right means, as much as a collective defense organization as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The most important element to success is to establish an international consensus in resolving a conflict by agreeing on the ends, ways and means. The United Nations with the General Assembly and Security Council is the only instrument capable of creating worldwide support for crisis management. In deciding on military means, the mandate is of major importance. Not the mandate alone but how it is transformed into missions task and rules of engagement. In peace operations how means are used is in a different context from war because the borders between tactical, operational and the strategic levels are blurred. In peace operations the decision-makers and the commanders on the ground are the key players, as they have to take decisions in a cloudy atmosphere. Most of the time they take decisions without clear inputs and guidelines. In the field there is no time to make reference to higher authority and the local commander on the scene has to take a quick decision before it is too late and possibly before more lives are lost in the absence of action on the part of security forces.

In view of these experiences the whole process of developing the mandate and creating a strategy for resolving conflicts must be strengthened. The United Nations' reactions to conflicts are by nature crisis

driven. This implies that the reaction is reactive and time consuming because troop-contributing countries must commit troops to a new mission on a piece meal basis. That means identifying the ends and being able to decide on the ways so that the right means can be used to resolve the situation. That also includes the identification of the role and mission of each of the means i.e. military, political, diplomatic or economic.[11]

The main problem in a peace operation is often the involvement of a third party like liberation groups. Some peace observation missions in the past were successful even with a few soldiers but that cannot be made the norm for future operations as it is demoralizing for United Nations peace keepers to lose life without adequate force protection measures being effected. The reasons for failures or successes are many and one mission cannot be compared with another. However one factor that is of major importance to all-peacekeeping operations is the consent of conflicting parties. With consent the requirement in the quantum of peacekeeping forces goes down. When consent is uncertain or absent the mission perforce becomes one of enforcement.

As during the 1990s when the nature of conflicts changed from inter state to Intra State, the degree of consent has become a major determinant of the threat level of peace keeping/enforcing operations. Even if strategic or operational consent can be reached between the main belligerents or warring parties and the United Nations, a major headway has been made towards restoration of normalcy. There may however continue to be differences at the tactical level between various factions or groups. Consent therefore can be divided in three levels, which are strategic consent, operational, and tactical consent. The latter even if temporarily absent is acceptable. The uncertainty of consent must be taken into consideration during the decision making level as well as rapid reaction force deployment levels.

The other question that needs to be simultaneously discussed is the military force issue. Should the UN have its own military capability that can rapidly deploy to support peace operations? To understand the military dilemma, in which the UN finds itself today, it is necessary to look back at the original intent of the UN founders. The original intent of the UN charter was for the UN to be able to able to enforce its decisions through Article 43. A Military Staff Committee, composed of members from the five major powers, was to develop a plan for the mobilization of UN forces under the auspices of Article 43. These would be held ready to enforce UN decisions. However the Military Staff Committee failed to agree on the need and composition of an enforcement force. A deliberate decision was taken to avoid any attempt to subject major powers to collective coercion. Negotiations on Article 43 collapsed in 1947. With the demise of Article 43, the UN failed to obtain the special enforcement capability that would have separated it from its predecessor the League of Nations. The need for a standing force has been an ongoing discussion point.

Torsten Orn, the erstwhile Swedish Ambassador writes that the concept of a small standing rapid reaction force at the disposal of the Secretary General and the Security Council was put forward by the first Secretary General, and discussed again in Dag Hammarskjold's days.[12] In 1992, the French President Mitterand proposed the creation of a 1000 man stand by force and in 1993, Sir Brian Urqhart,

the former Under Secretary General of the UN for Special Political Affairs proposed establishing a force of approximately 5000 individual volunteers rather than national contingency forces.[13] In 1994 the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van Mierlo, and the Canadian Foreign Minister, Andre Ouellet, both suggested to the 49th General Assembly of the UN that it should consider creating a permanent military force.[14] The logic for these calls is clear. The UN needs a force that can immediately respond to international crisis. Rwanda is sighted as an example where a standing UN force might have made the difference in saving thousands of lives. One of main drawbacks of the UN has been that it needs too much time to ready and deploy forces. [15] In normal circumstances if forces are identified and kept ready for employment immediately a much lesser force can control the situation to a considerable extent. As governments ponder over the decision making process, potential tragedies turn into disasters.

Command and control, is another highly contentious issue. It goes beyond the incompatibilities in communications and other equipment that normally exist between forces from different nations. National policies interfere. Commanders of national units often consult with their own governments before implementing any significant order from a UN commander.[16] These issues need to be resolved prior to nomination of a rapid reaction force.

There are also new conditions to the nature of peace operations. The nature of peace operations has undergone a change. Traditional peacekeeping developed from principles established in response to the Suez crisis in 1956. Under these principles peace keeping was conducted with the consent of the parties involved. This has undergone change and in the post cold war years peace operations have taken an enforcement turn.

We may broadly state that UN peacekeeping /enforcement operations could be placed under two generations of development. The first generation of peacekeeping operations could be typified to include the period from 1948 to 1990, which entailed routine and traditional peacekeeping methods. The second generation from 1990 onwards was operations, which were expanded in scope to the ground situation and were in the category of peace enforcement operations to include the operations in Somalia. These operations were more complex and beyond the scope of traditional peace keeping.

There have been many setbacks to UN peace keeping /enforcement operations in the past to include Somalia, Bosnia-Herzogovina and Rwanda. The reasons for these failures on the part of the UN are very many to include late deployment, lack of understanding of the local situation, inability to enforce the peace differences amongst deployed forces or their leaderships and many other associated factors. What is relevant for the future is that we do not repeat our past mistakes. It is therefore necessary to have a foolproof mechanism to ensure early deployment of rapid reaction forces, which should be followed up by the balance forces envisaged for the operation.

The arming of peace keeping /enforcement is another major factor which needs to be thought of in great detail before hand. Purely peacekeeping forces need to be lightly armed and should have their personal and basic weapons for self-defense. They should be capable of defending themselves in case of an extreme situation. Peace enforcement operations would require that the units be heavily armed. This

arming may include weaponry as available for armored and mechanized type of operation. These forces should be capable of conducting mid level to high intensity level operations. The formation of a United Nations Army, no matter what form it takes, will be a very complicated one and is unlikely to come up in the foreseeable future. It is therefore necessary for sovereign nations to make a commitment to the UN for a minimal force, which would be available for immediate employment and the balance part of it for subsequent employment. The strengths and types of forces would vary from one country to another. Such forces need to be identified after member nations have indicated their willingness and force availability. Various types of contingencies need to be evolved for different continents and countries.

Another important factor, which needs merit, is intelligence gathering before UN rapid reaction forces get deployed. In its desire to be impartial in the field the UN has not been undertaking pro-active intelligence gathering. There have been some noteworthy changes as emphasized by the erstwhile Secretary General Boutras Boutras Ghali in "agenda for Peace". He states that if preventive diplomacy is to be effective then intelligence gathering is essential. He envisages that in some circumstances preventive deployment of United Nations forces may take place "to alleviate suffering and to limit or control violence". [17] These actions presuppose that sufficient information is available to allow the UN to act in a timely manner. The Secretary General does not refer to intelligence gathering directly; however he does say that "the information now must encompass economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to dangerous tensions".[18] As to how this intelligence will be gathered is left rather vague. Diplomatic missions of fact finding, representation and good offices are the information gathering tools normally employed by the United Nations. These missions unfortunately rely on the cooperation of host nations to be effective, which is not always the case. It is also emphasized that "there are and can be situations in which one or another party to a potential impending conflict does not choose to bring the issue to the attention of the Council".[19] The Secretary General does go beyond these measures when he allows that he "will supplement my own contacts by regularly sending senior officials on missions for consultations in capitals and other locations. [20]

Most sovereign states will not divulge information based on intelligence, particularly sensitive information. There does exist within the United Nations structure an organization which, if employed intelligently could prove to be an invaluable source of information. That is the Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee was established under Article 47(1) of the UN charter. Its duties, as prescribed, are to advise and assist the Security Council with regard to the Council's military requirements. The composition of the Military Staff Committee was to be at the Chief of Staff level of the five permanent members of the Security Council.[21] The committee was designed to be similar in scope to the one at NATO. Military representatives of the five permanent members meet often. However it is usually at the Colonel's level with no responsibility being given to the group. There is a clear need to formalize intelligence inputs for rapid deployment of forces and these needs to be undertaken urgently NATO provides the model of an appropriate role of the Military Staff Committee. The rejuvenation of this Committee with an effective intelligence wing would be very useful in quick deployment of forces.

SEQUENCE OF EMPLOYMENT

Having examined the politico military processes of decision making which should lead to quick employment of military forces we should examine what form such employment will take. In terms of responses to developing or developed crisis situations the requirement of United Nation forces could be in the following sequential manner.

Forces for Immediate Response. Such forces from nominated countries are kept in standby state within the member but are directly under the control of United Nations peacekeeping Force Headquarters. The host countries need to accept this arrangement as only then can immediate deployment takes place. Orders for employment of these forces would be passed directly to the force with information being given to the host nation government. There should be no other formality or inter agency involvement or clearance, as that could be self-defeating in terms of time. As an example a light infantry battalion consisting of about 500 personnel could be kept ready in Argentina for immediate deployment in South or Central America wherever the UN operation has been sanctioned. The Argentina Joint Peace Keeping Operations Center at Buenos Aires could serve as a model and the infantry battalion there after training is kept as a rapid reaction force for immediate deployment.[22] There are adequate facilities available in this training establishment to include training fields, shooting ranges, driving circuits, language laboratories, seminar rooms, military hospital and ancillaries. The nominated force must be kept ready in all respects to include logistics, weapons, ammunition, and aircraft on immediate call. For all continents and countries of the world such immediate response forces need to be identified and located. This needs to be done in detail to cater for demography of the region, probability of crisis developing, the nature and intensity of conflict and the acceptability of nominated reserve force by affected countries. These standing forces must be small, highly trained, easily deployable and ready for immediate dispatch to trouble spots for peace keeping and secure a toe hold for peace enforcement operations. A recent success story has been the early deployment of peace keeping forces in East Timor. The quick response in East Timor was to send an infantry battalion immediately from Australia and later additional forces moved in. This greatly helped in containing the situation. Such deployment in a phased manner could serve as a template for future planning for other areas as well.

Forces for Build up. The subsequent stage after the initial forces have deployed and hopefully brought matters under partial control would be to move heavier armed forces into the area. Such forces may be from the same country (of initially deployed forces) or could be from other nominated countries. These forces would be much larger in strength and weaponry wise would be able to tackle the worst contingency. Based on the size of the member nations who agree to provide such forces these could be of upped a brigade strength (4000 troops) suitably armed. As an example India of its own accord had nominated an infantry brigade for immediate deployment for UN contingencies based on its peace keeping experiences in Somalia. Such individual initiatives by member nations need to be approved and formalized by the UN. There are a number of countries, which are keen on participating in UN peace operations as these provide them an opportunity to gain more combat experience for their armed forces.

Based on the envisaged needs of the continents volunteer forces should be listed and approved for employment under UN aegis.

The above mentioned forces when they deploy need to remember lessons from past peace operations. Despite the fact that each situation is unique some of the necessary lessons to be borne in mind are as follows: -

(a) Complete involvement, planning, and identification of all players will contribute to success. If possible a thorough reconnaissance must be made. Forces must know the cultures and the players. It is necessary to coordinate with everybody and establish mechanisms where viewpoints of the warring parties are expressed.

(b) Planning should include thorough mission analysis, determination of end states, centers of gravity, commander's intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, cost, and time factors. The mission must remain focussed; avoiding mission creep, but allow for mission shift which is a conscious evaluation that responds to the changing situation. The military tasks must be aligned with political objectives, which have been spelt out during early stages.

(c) Execution should be decentralized whereas planning should be centralized. The key institutions need to be started or restarted early and the momentum must be maintained No enemies must be made but if they do get made by default then they should not be treated gently. Mindsets must be avoided. Innovation and non-traditional approaches must be encouraged. Take care of personalities, they should be the right people and in the right place.

(d) Great care must be exercised on who should be empowered with resources, positions and control.

(e) Unity of effort and command must be sought and the minimum number of seams must be created.

(f) Information management must be centralized. The image should be decided upon and the command element must stay focussed on it. Political, cultural, and military compatibility must be built up among the member nations. Senior commander and staff education and training for non-traditional roles must be assured to include negotiating, interagency operations etc. Troop understanding and awareness of these roles must be assured.

(g) The above could be easily adapted to acronyms easily recognizable to peacekeeping or peace enforcing forces. These could be stated as situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal.[23]

The nations after they have been identified in different continents and regions need to nominate forces beforehand for immediate employment as well as follow on forces. After these forces have been nominated at respective country levels they need to be trained on a basic syllabus as made out at the UN PKO level and be fully practiced and rehearsed on various contingencies. The time element in training is a minimum of four months and could be more for some lesser-trained armies. The model for central placement and training as followed in Argentina is a sound one and needs to be replicated by others.

CONCLUSION

A clear example of the United Nation's inability to respond to a crisis rapidly was in Rwanda. Several studies and analysis have identified the reasons for the lack of this rapid reaction ability. The detailed analysis in the Canadian Government Report "Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations" is noteworthy. The report identifies the needs for a rapid reaction. They are the need to enhance the UN political decision making process and the strengthening of the Secretariat's capacity to undertake strategic planning. There is an urgent need for institutionalized political–military machinery. This machinery should enable military advice to be incorporated in the political decision making process. It should be capable of undertaking complete analysis and translating political objectives into credible military missions and maintain and exercise political control over subsequent activities post deployment. To achieve this political-military mechanism, there is the need for good strategic level military advice to the political decision making authority. The task of this military advice has virtually fallen on the Secretary General or his Secretariat. The Secretariat suffers a drawback, as its' military wing is not adequately staffed nor focussed on providing strategic level advice and planning. To add to this problem is the lack of interagency strategic planning process in the department for peacekeeping operations. Such omnibus problems lead to delays and difficulties in rapid deployment of forces.

The United Nations faces a peace operations dilemma. The post cold war period has witnessed conflict over cultural, ethnic and religious causes. The international community has failed to achieve peace. The UN Security Council has authorized multiple peace operations to force order and terminate intra state conflicts. The results are in many cases disappointing. Intra state conflicts pose new and complex challenges to international peace and stability. Traditional peace keeping methods are not resolving these. Also the financial costs of such peace operations are staggering. The UN Secretary General's initiatives, proposed in 1992 and 1995 to strengthen its peace operation capability, focus on developing a military capability to support the United Nations. The United Nations needs to improve its military decision making and implementation capability.

To overcome these problems an inter agency planning process is required in the Secretariat. The organization must include a military staff branch, a formalized strategic planning network, and established staff procedures. A functional political–military organization will ensure the input of good military advice into the Security Council's decision-making processes.

After this logical improvement is effected, then there is need for member nations to work out on a continental and regional basis the forces that must be assured to the United Nations for its peace operations. Such forces would be in two parts, one, which is immediately available for response and the other, which is a follow on force. The strengths and the arming of these forces would be dependent upon past profile of intra state conflicts in the respective regions. It is only such a holistic earmarking and placements of forces, which can ensure that maximum contingencies are catered for. Such a rapid response mechanism will ensure that a fair number of precious lives are saved. It is the duty of United

Nation peacekeepers to quickly deploy and bring about normalcy. The United Nation's soldiers have a difficult duty to perform but there is no one else in the world that is better suited to perform these. This is aptly stated in the unofficial motto of the United Nations soldier " Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."[24]

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