STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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PROPOSED RESERVE COMPONENT STRUCTURE AT THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

BY

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by

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ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT: The Reserve Component's (RC) structure and integration are not standardized within the Unified Commands. This paper proposes a structure, which places the Reserve Component Full Time Staff (FTS) as a Directorate or Special Staff under the management of a Reserve Component General or Flag officer responsible for coordinating mobilization and demobilization in conjunction with the Joint Staff. This paper seeks to:

-Recommend a RC FTS staff model, which can best synchronize intra-command augmentation needs.

-Offer a standardized model for the Unified Command's Reserve Component Full Time Support staff.

-Address the roles, responsibilities and duties of the RC Program Manager.

--Capture utilization efficiencies and standardize the Program Manager's responsibilities in support of the command and Individual Mobilization Augmentee's (IMA's).

The draw down in the Active Component force, the steady increase in RC utilization and the number of IMA's assigned to the Unified Commands provides sufficient reason to look at program functional alignment and reserve integration. By standardizing RC FTS staff responsibilities under a functionally aligned RC, much like the J-Staff directors are aligned, each CINC will have his reserve expertise centric to its role of RC management.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT III

PREFACE VII

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS IX

PROPOSED RESERVE COMPONENT STRUCTURE AT THE UNIFIED COMMANDS 1

UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE 2

INCREASED USE OF IMA'S 3

PROPOSED UNIFIED COMMAND RC INTEGRATION MODEL 4

DMRR'S DUTIES 5

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MOBILIZATION AND RESERVE READINESS 6

PROGRAM MANAGER DUTIES 6

PROGRAM MANAGERS AND PERSONNEL CENTER INTERFACE 8

RESERVE COMPONENT FULL-TIME-STAFF DUTIES 8

STREAMLINED MOBILIZATION/UTILIZATION CONSTANTS 9

CONCLUSION 10

ENDNOTES 13

BIBLIOGRAPHY 17

PREFACE

Through DESERT THUNDER, DESERT FOX, DESERT STRIKE, Kosovo air operations, the 1999 USAF Stop Loss and twice mobilizing Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) to support Operations in and around South West Asia, I was the Headquarters United States Central Command (CENTCOM) J-1, United States Air Force Reserve Component (RC) Program Manager (PM). Based upon these experiences mentioned above, I learned that the CENTCOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, SOCOM and PACOM RC programs are structured and integrated within the each respective Unified Command differently. While each may have advantages, it was difficult and very time consuming to coordinate cross utilization of IMAs, and foreign to one accustom to standardized organizational models. While the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) showed certain AFSC/MOS billets filled at the commands, the commands manning document proved billets were either manned with a different AFSC/MOS or were vacant. This raised the issue of IMA's not trained to match the job they will be asked to do upon mobilization and certainly compounded the dysfunctional reserve to reserve interoperability and coordination. My thoughts are to standardize the RC programs and offer a structure, which gives the commander a one-stop-shop for the RC. I propose placing the expertise of the RC FTS as special staff within the Unified Commands. In effect working directly for the Commander and almost as an interagency coordinating body. Perhaps the answer to better RC integration is to change Joint Doctrine and update the Joint Publications.

The RC FTS is to reserve utilization (who, where and for how long?) as the Intelligence analyst is to bomb damage assessment and the J-5 is to deliberate planning. They are the subject matter experts and should be used where this functional expertise can best serve the command. Though I mostly use USAFR quotes and statistics many of the RC issues are applicable to each service and the Guard as well. The reader must be aware that numerous other augmentation issues exist and I have focused my efforts on Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) assigned at the Unified Commands. The organizational structure and responsibilities can easily be extrapolated to all RC augmentation support requirements. My premise is simple, put the expertise where it can be best utilized.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 - DMRR 5

FIGURE 2 - PM INTERFACE 7

PROPOSED RESERVE COMPONENT STRUCTURE AT THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

Introduced in this paper is a proposed integration model for the Reserve Component Full Time Support (RC FTS) Staff within the Unified Commands. The steady increase in Reserve Component (RC) utilization and in the number of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA's) assigned to the Unified Commands is sufficient reason to warrant a look at program and functional efficiency and RC FTS integration. In a three-year study culminating in Fiscal Year 1998, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) met with the nine Unified Commands.[1] "The purpose of the meetings was to solicit the views of the CINC's of these commands concerning the impediments to full realization of the Total Force Policy."[2] A common thread throughout showed:

> -"The need to streamline the process for accessing individual Reserve Component members."[3]
>
> -A "perception that Reserve component forces are not adequately aligned with Active Component forces to support warfighting, engagement, and contingency operations."[4]
>
> -"The need to standardize joint manning documents so that the training received by Reserve Component members will match the jobs that they are likely to be asked to do upon mobilization."[5]

The CINC's recognize that to truly achieve a "Total Force", the need for standardized training and closer RC alignment to the Active Component (AC) is fundamental to supporting the warfighting and engagement operations.

> "In the decade after the Vietnam War, the reserve forces underwent the most radical change in fortunes imaginable. From enforced non-involvement, they were incorporated under the "Total Force" policy, which implied, at least for selected elements, meeting readiness and deployability standards as stringent as those for the active forces. Priorities on top-of-the line equipment, training time and facilities, and cooperation with active force units seemed to underscore the credibility of this new posture."[6]

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM drew a new line in the sand with regards to reserve utilization and the Total Force initiative. In the nine years since DESERT SHIELD and STORM, the reserves have been involved in more than fifty contingencies.[7] This is a nearly a five-fold increase in RC utilization compared to eleven operations over a 47-year span from 1953-1990. "Upon implementation of the Total Force Policy, high-priority reserve forces became, it seems fair to say, more capable, better trained and equipped, more closely integrated with the active force, and better supported by that force than ever before."[8]

Although there have been strides made toward integration, RC functional alignment differences still exist among the Unified Commands. A look at CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, JFCOM, and SOUTHCOM structure (Joint Staff Officer's Guide) will show the RC staff integrated in differing ways. These differences make for a confusing and laborious way to conduct business. By standardizing RC

FTS responsibilities under a functionally aligned Reserve Component directorate, much like the J-Staff directors are aligned, each CINC will have his reserve expertise centric to its role of RC management. One-stop-shopping. RC functional alignment similar to the J-Staff alignment serves to simplify tasking and enhance synchronization of the centralized planning process. This is important considering the Secretary of Defense's emphasis on the increased use of the RC forces.[9]

The differences in RC command alignment is confusing and has caused delays in Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) mobilization/augmentation for the USAFR during DESERT FOX, DESERT STRIKE and the Kosovo air campaign.[10] The proposed RC integration model looks to simplify and streamline intra-command relations and standardize the RC structure by discussing:

-The flexibility the Unified Commander has to structure his command.

-The increased use of the RC as an impetus to gain efficiencies.

-The RC staff function and roles of:

--The Director of Mobilization and Reserve Readiness as a RC General or Flag Officer.

--The Deputy Director of Mobilization and Reserve Readiness.

--The Program Manager, and the RC FTS staff.

--A suggested internal mobilization format and business practices.

-Standard terminology to define the RC FTS personnel.

--Active Guard Reservist (AGR's) are the RC Full-Time-Support (FTS) positions within the command.

--Program Manager (PM) identifies the services expert, facilitator and focal point for Individual Mobilization Augmentee management, augmentation support and mobilization issues.

--RC FTS other than the service PM can be any service RC (Army, Air Force, Marine, Navy or Coast Guard) member.

UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

There are differences in both the support functions and location of the RC FTS staff within the Unified Commands.[11] At some of the Unified Commands the RC FTS staff is located in the Joint Reserve Unit (JRU). The JRU is a self-contained unit providing personnel, administration and training support much like a traditional reserve unit or a component command. There are differing variations even among the JRU's location, staff and alignment within the command. Some Unified Commands have the RC FTS staff dispersed throughout the Directorates. Some RC FTS staffs work synergistically while others are stove-piped. The Unified Command's staffs are functionally aligned to maximize efficiencies. Since the RC has been incorporated within the Unified Commands under the Total Force policy, the RC FTS structure should be functionally aligned to capture efficiencies as well. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997, AFSC PUB 1, The Purple Suit, illustrates the CINC's Joint Staff Organization (JSO). The JSO's are diagramed and designated by Joint-staff (J-Staff) function with some variation focusing on functional

alignment. The commander (CINC) may organize the staff as necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities. Many combatant commands have taken advantage of this flexibility as illustrated in the internal staff diagram found in the Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997. For example, CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM have consolidated Security Assistance (SA) with the logistical function J-4/7, while SOUTHCOM has integrated the SA function within the J-5.[12] It is reasonable to align these functions under a single Director or J-Staff since various duties and functions overlap thereby increasing interoperability. The commander's ability to respond to contingencies is enhanced because his command relationships are supporting and simplified. Why not simplify and standardize the RC FTS staff into a functional organization or as a Special Staff?

INCREASED USE OF IMA'S

The IMA category is the largest RC force assigned to the Unified Command and utilization of this force has increased since 1992.[13]

> "The Air Force Reserve has more than 12,900 funded IMA positions. Air Force Reserve IMAs either train or work in positions that ultimately support a combatant commander. In Fiscal Year 1998 almost 800 IMAs were assigned directly to the staffs of the war-fighting CINCs. The Chief, Air Force Reserve, considers supporting the CINCs his number one priority when evaluating IMA funding distribution requirements. The demand from the CINCs for more Air Force Reserve IMAs continues to grow. In response to these requests, the Air Force proposed an expansion of DOD's validation criteria for IMA positions, to include those primarily supporting operations other than war and other peacetime contributory support. The new criteria were approved, and the Air Force is implementing the change."[14]

While the Active Component has drawn down approximately 315K personnel (18.5%) since FY93 the Unified Commanders have continued to utilize IMA's:[15]

-To support day-to-day operations.

-As a Headquarters manpower bridge during the initial ramp-up prior to conflict operations.

-For Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and under mobilization at an increasing rate.

-At a 10% average increase since FY96.[16]

-At a 17% increase in FY99 for USAFR IMA support.[17]

-By increasing the amount of IMA's assigned to the Unified Commands.[18]

As utilization increases, the RC FTS staff must ensure the command's reservists are accessible and that the force is appropriate in what the J-Staff need's to meet the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan (TEP).

> "Our IMA's are an integral part of the Total Force personnel resource and, as such, provide significant contributions to the Active forces across the full range of Air Force specialties. My end strength distribution priorities emphasize the requirements of the warfighting CINC's staffs as well as those of their supporting Air Force commands.

> Priority number one are the Unified Command CINC's as the employers of our warfighting forces. Without qualified personnel trained in multi-service support and force projection, the CINC's are handicapped in meeting their tasks."[19]

It is important to note that the Reserve Components are essential participants in the full range of military operations as a backfill or rotational force to ease the tempo of AC unit and individual deployments. "The post war strategy of containment is yielding to a new regional defense strategy crafted to preserve the hard won gains of the Cold War and safeguard our interests in the future."[20] In other words, as the U.S. moves away from the containment to the engagement strategy the military will be used more frequently as seen in today's high operations tempo. How can the RC deal with greater utilization? Adapting to the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept is one way the RC is changing to work within a more predictable augmentation and deployment framework. "One of the cornerstones of the AEF is predictable theater rotations for all airmen. In order to make this a reality, the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) must play a significant role in the deployments."[21] AFRC (primarily through the Unit Program) is able to meet the changing military mission by dovetailing into the AEF deployment packages. The advantage to the Air Reserve Component (ARC, a combination of Air Reserve and Guard assets) is the predictability of knowing where, when and for how long. This predictability applies to virtually all missions deemed to be of national interest. The AEF plan covers rotational missions, Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSC), and Major Theater War (MTW), with an "On Call" AEF to respond to Humanitarian Assistance and other requirements. Whether deploying or not, the ARC knows when it is "on the hook".

The RC's mission in support of the Unified Commands is changing from the cold-war mobilization plans to more frequent augmentation supporting a myriad of SSC's and any of the sixteen types of MOOTW as defined in Joint Pub 3-07. "As the military operations tempo increases and the military mission evolves from cold-war containment and the Major Theater War (MTW) model to more frequent and smaller scale contingencies, the question is no longer "whether" the president will call the Reserve but "when, and for how long."[22] While IMA utilization has increased since DESERT SHIELD/STORM the integration process has remained relatively unchanged. Finally, the RC FTS staff must ask what are the effects caused by this increased utilization?

PROPOSED UNIFIED COMMAND RC INTEGRATION MODEL

As the ARC has changed to a standard business practice as an adaptation to increased use, what lessons can be applied to the Unified Command's RC FTS program? The following is a look at the proposed structure for the integration of the Reserve Component.

A Reserve Component general officer/flag officer (GO/FO) as the senior reservist on the CINC's staff should direct the Unified Command's integrated RC FTS staff as the Director of Mobilization and Reserve Readiness (DMRR). The DMRR position description is nearly synonymous to USCENTCOM's Deputy Chief of Staff for Mobilization position.[23] Although the RC GO/FO billets are not FTS, the DMRR, under the "Chairman's 10" RC GO/FO initiative, could be a FTS billet.[24] The proposed RC FTS staff

diagram as depicted below places the DMRR (O-8) in a Directors position with the Deputy Director for Mobilization and Reserve Readiness (DDMRR) an O-6 FTS (any service) as the deputy. Following the DDMRR are four PM's (O-5's), one from each service reporting to the Deputy Director of Mobilization and Reserve Readiness. On a solid report line to the DDMRR, parallel to and on a dotted line with the PM's is the RC FTS (O5/O4) assigned within each Directorate. Because of the many special staffs (Public Affairs, Provost Marshal, Protocol, Public Affairs and other special staffs) and the smaller augmentation requirements, one RC FTS would be assigned special staff responsibility. This model permits the augmentation needs of each directorate to be accurately reflected through an appointed representative. This simple integration model within the Unified Commands utilizes the RC General Officer/Flag Officers (GO/FO's) (O-8) already assigned to the command to assist in operations, planning and Title 10 responsibilities. By making the DMRR a Director or Special Staff (rather than a division within a directorate), offers the advantage of peeling away an unnecessary staff layer (offering unfiltered communications with the CINC and DCINC). Logically, the CINC would utilize the DMRR to work reserve issues directly with the RC senior leaders and policy makers. The CINC's Top 20 RC Issues, Chairman's Reserve Component Conference and the Joint Guard/Reserve Initiatives/Issues Process (J GRIP) a two-star steering group are some examples of policy initiatives concerning both the RC and the Unified Command's.[25] This proposal recommends that the DMRR and the RC FTS staff be responsible for all Reserve matters at the command under the command integration model below.



FIGURE 1 - DMRR

DMRR'S DUTIES

Because of the limited number of FTS RC GO/FO's, the DMRR is not normally a FTS member. However, if the "Chairman's 10" initiative is implemented, there would be enough FTS RC GO/FO's to perform DMRR duties at the Unified Commands. Either way, the DMRR should be the Reserve

Mobilization Director charged with (all-service) RC matters. The DMRR brings service policy and mobilization expertise to bear on force rotation and augmentation issues and assists as required in:

-Monitoring, coordinating, tracking and reporting force requirements against (AC/RC) TPFDD flow.

-Coordinating RC requirements during rotation, reconstitution and sustainment.

-Meeting the CINC's TEP augmentation needs.

-Managing the RC FTS staff responsible for assisting the J-Staff to plan, coordinate and execute, the RC's Redeployment/Demobilization strategy in accordance with DOD Directive Number 1235.10.[26]

-Representing the CINC's issues to the RC community, negotiating brokerage of RC dollars, personnel, structure and other resources.

-Providing RC expertise to the J-3 and J-5 directorates and assist in monitoring the readiness of war-trace RC and Guard units.[27]

-Providing budget oversight.[28]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MOBILIZATION AND RESERVE READINESS

The Deputy Director of Mobilization and Reserve Readiness is the Deputy to the DMRR and is a RC FTS member of the Unified Command. The DDMRR is responsible for:

-The daily oversight and management of the Unified Command's RC FTS staff.

-Assisting the J-3 and J-5 staff in establishing formal links with war trace units.

-Coordinating with J-1 ensuring the requirements for IMA Forces are fully coordinated with the Military Departments.[29]

-Advising the DMRR on policy and legislation and assists with force structure plans and programs.

-Coordinating on RC JMETLS input and RC FTS staff members who deploy forward.

-RC operational planning and the TPFDD coordination.

In lieu of an FTS DMRR, the DDMRR is the senior RC (O-6) FTS staff and is responsible for the DMRR's duties when the DMRR is not present.

PROGRAM MANAGER DUTIES

The PM, as part of the DMRR FTS staff, and service specific expert, should be the focal point to facilitate RC augmentation requirements during peacetime operational support and mobilization activities such as Presidential Reserve Call-up Action (PRC) for the assigned IMA's. The PM's duties are to:

-Assist the J-Staff in deliberate planning as identified in the commands strategic planning documents and for crisis action planning in time-sensitive situations.

-Assist the J-Staff during periodical review and testing of these plans.

-Assist the DDMRR to ensure the Unified Commands requirements for IMA Forces are fully coordinated with the Military Departments.[30]

-Provide the daily, on-site management of IMA's.

-Monitor the deployment readiness of the IMA's in accordance with command directives.

-Oversee the respective program standardization with service and Reserve Command regulations and budgetary functions within the Unified Command Headquarters, and for the Sub-Unified Special Operations Command, if applicable.

-Be the mobilization facilitator coordinating with the J-1 for command IMA Mobilization/Demobilization and in-processing/out-processing.

-Manage the annual budget submission to the appropriate service.

-Be responsible for the execution/expenditure of the Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA) and Reserve Personnel Appropriation (RPA) budgets, which are centrally managed by the Program Manager and the Operational and Maintenance budget (Centralized budgetary control under Comptroller, Decentralized execution under the PM).



FIGURE 2 - PM INTERFACE

-Coordinate and ensure the full utilization of IMA In-active Duty (IDT), Annual Training (AT), exercise support days, RPA and MPA.

-Act as the primary recruiting point of contact.

-Provide ongoing reserve utilization and orientation to the AC staff and IMA's (RC 101).

-Establish methods to track and forecast RC utilization data covering historical and contributory support to the command and service specific RC's participation in the AOR.
-Publish and track budget execution, augmentation and mobilization statistics, and provide RC readiness input to the CINC's Joint Monthly Readiness Report (JMMR).
--Command readiness issues should include the status and number of reservists qualified for worldwide deployment, end strength comparing assigned vs. authorized and problems addressing recruiting.

Included in these responsibilities are those activities (involving entitlements, maintaining mobilization folders and reservist's employer problem resolution) that get the IMA "on-the-job" while being mindful of reserve culture, reservist's commitment to duty, and the family/job-balancing act.

PROGRAM MANAGERS AND PERSONNEL CENTER INTERFACE

The PM coordinates the command's augmentation support with the Individual Mobilization Augmentee's various personnel centers. As with the USAFR, dealing with the multiple personnel centers adds time and layers to conducting daily business and sometimes serves to detriment IMA management. "The Air Reserve Personnel Center came into being as a separate entity by an accident of history. I believe that the average reservist has been ill served by the failure of the Air Force Reserve leaders to subordinate the center to Headquarters Air Force Reserve [now Air Force Reserve Command, Robbins AFB, GA] when sundry management studies gave them the opportunity to do so."[31] This point illustrates the need for the PM and staff to remain vigil in their advocacy while managing the CINC's IMAs. The personnel centers are functionally designed and more appropriately staffed to provide cradle-to-grave or accession-to-retirement support functions otherwise the RC FTS staff would have the additional responsibility as a reserve personnel office. The personnel management centers can best support the PM's at the Unified Commands by providing career monitoring services and Title 10 functions. The PM must remain in contact with these management centers ensuring that the IMA force is trained and ready in accordance to the CINC's requirements and that the Unified commander is getting the most "bang for his buck" in Title 10 support.

RESERVE COMPONENT FULL-TIME-STAFF DUTIES

The command's RC FTS (any service) structure should have a (single) RC FTS member located within each directorate. The primary functions and duties of the RC FTS are to provide RC input to the respective Directors on mobilization, integration, augmentation, training and utilization issues. The RC FTS staff will be the single point of contact representing all RC services as the coordinator and daily management link between each Director, Special Staff and the DMRR via the PM's (shown in DMRR Organizational Illustration).

STREAMLINED MOBILIZATION/UTILIZATION CONSTANTS

"Advanced planning and commitment are required to ensure that augmentation puts the right people with the right experience in the right assignments at the right time."[32] As RC augmentation is used to fill the gap left by the draw down of the Active force and as the RC utilization for daily, MOOTW and mobilization increases, the more the RC FTS needs to engage in the efficient program management. As the Unified Command program grows in both assigned IMA's and contributory support reserve issues will surface more frequently. Instead of the J-1 "coordinating early identification of personnel requirements under a Reserve Component Callup, when appropriate"[33] almost as an adjunct to its primary duties, IMA mobilization should be the responsibility of the DMRR staff in coordination with the J-1. This represents an excellent mix falling in-line with daily RC FTS duties and expertise lending to functional alignment. To formally standardize the RC mobilization process the Joint Publications/Doctrine should make the RC FTS staff responsible for RC Mobilization. If the DMRR is tasked as a Special Staff to request mobilization of the IMA's, then the following method will be coordinated through the J-1. Upon DCINC or DMRR (through DCINC) notification the DDMRR (in coordination with PM's) will send to each Directorate RC FTS member, via the internal Local Area Network (LAN), a pre-formatted mobilization/augmentation (email) message. This internal message is an electronic "tabbed" yes/no version of the command's RC manning document. The RC FTS member returns the mobilization (requirement) message, which has been "flagged" yes/no by the IMA supervisor and validated by the respective Director/Deputy. This query determines the mobilization/augmentation mix and requirement for that operation (by individual and AFSC/MOS) and is returned via the RC FTS staff to the PM/DDMRR for action. In-conjunction with the RC FTS member input from each directorate, the PM uses the manning document or Joint Table of Mobilization Distribution (JTMD) to work the augmentation/mobilization issue with the J-1. This method gives the CINC a quick accounting of the augmentation forces required and a standardized and measurable Directorate validation process for each operation. It also gives the command an accurate picture of the commands integrated, trained and culturally (countries/command) oriented IMA requirements. This concept was in development in 1999 between CENTCOM J1-XRA and J1-XPP. It shows promise for command standardization and was supported by the Directors. By exercising this process periodically, it will increase continuity during the active duty personnel turn over and keep the mobilization plan well oiled.[34] Recognizing and employing certain constants in utilization, such as the annual RC support provided to the command, the command's RC FTS staff can better forecast, schedule and utilize RC augmentation while adding flexibility to the program. These training/utilization constants can be wrapped-up in Annual Training, In-Active Duty Training and MPA/RPA personnel funding programs. For planning purposes then, what forecast or annually quantifiable amount of contributory support can the CINC expect? Each IMA dependent on service funding and policy is able to perform up to:

-48 periods of In-Active Duty Training (IDT).

-12-15 days of Annual Training (AT).

-179-days (MPA/RPA) of exercise support and active duty for special work.

-Mobilization (when authorized under PRC for 270 days).

-GO/FO funded participation.

-Distant intelligence production.

--Accomplished by command IMA's through approved connectivity sites.

The PM should encourage the active duty supervisor to take advantage of the full complement of RC support. Each AC supervisor should coordinate with his/her IMA to determine:

-An annual augmentation schedule.

-Formal training and Professional Military Education and orientation courses.

-The IDT, AT and exercise support needs.[35]

In other words, the RC FTS staff ensures the AC supervisor is knowledgeable of the many forms of IMA utilization and what support is available to keep the IMA fully trained. This formal plan or augmentation requirement is then forwarded to the PM for centralized coordination with the management centers. By streamlining infrastructure (eliminating dual/segregated personnel management functions) and integrating IMA and AC training functions (annual physical fitness testing, Chemical/Biological and weapon qualifications) we move closer to the efficiencies of Total Force integration. Because the command's IMAs reside throughout CONUS, the PM must utilize an electronic medium to enhance communications and coordination through a RC Web page. The command should provide on-line connectivity or IMA work sites to facilitate IMA scheduling, orders and travel voucher processing and personnel actions and updates.

CONCLUSION

The quote from British theorist J.F.C. Fuller should keep the warrior mindful of situational and organizational evolution.

> "The only way to prevent ossification of the mind is to accept nothing as fixed, to realize that the circumstances of war are ever changing, and that consequently, organization, administration, strategy and tactics must change also..."[36]

This proposed RC structure at the Unified Commands has been presented with a look at the increased use of the RC as an impetus to gain efficiencies and to forecast that more issues regarding the RC will present themselves as RC utilization increases. As a result of the Total Force initiative, reservists are now expected to meet the same readiness standards as their active duty counterparts. The system however, that supports the engagement strategy remains relatively unchanged from the pre-DESERT STORM containment mobilization model.

> "The Total Force mission remains to fight and win the nation's wars, and the force structure is built to support this mission. For the next ten to fifteen years, Reserve forces will be in high demand for many non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, domestic preparedness for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Homeland Defense, counter-drug and other non-combat operations. Collectively, these missions-other-than-war and small-scale contingencies are known as MOOTW and SSC. Reserve forces today are not structured for MOOTW and SSC. They are still structured

> for mobilization in the event of general war. The challenge to integrate Active and Reserve forces is therefore far more complex than in the past. Finding the proper balance between peacetime contributory support, crisis response, emerging missions, and wartime mobilization is particularly difficult. The focus must be on policies and procedures creating the best mix of Active and Reserve forces to meet our National Military Strategy."[37]

This proposal recommends a closer alignment to the J-Staff, moving closer to a structure better able to support SSC's and MOOTW. The RC structure within the Unified Commands was presented with a definition of the Director of Mobilization and Reserve Readiness, Deputy Director of Mobilization and Reserve Readiness, Program Manager, and RC FTS staff responsibilities, followed by a recommendation to streamline present business practices. By functionally integrating the RC FTS staff as a Directorate or Special Staff, each CINC will have a single efficient vehicle to access the command's assigned IMAs and the Reserve Component force providers will have a clearer definition of the roles and mission of the Unified Command's RC FTS staff. Knowing that other augmentation issues exist other than the IMA force issues, this paper seeks to address the Unified Command IMA issues separately. This model identifies the Program Manager as the service expert, facilitator and focal point for Individual Mobilization Augmentee management, augmentation and mobilization issues and recommends the adaptation of standard terminology to define the Reserve Component Full Time Support personnel. By re-aligning or standardizing the RC FTS structure and functionally aligning and integrating the RC FTS within the Unified Commands we gain continuity and simplicity which contribute to unity of effort.

As The U.S. Military becomes more and more the world's "Police Force" and with no foreseeable PERSTEMPO slowdown, the RC is now regularly deployed with the AC as an element or means of our National Power and National Will. Because of this increased role and usage, it has become easier to employ/deploy the RC as a means of military power. Maintaining our Total Force capabilities is also an impetus for seamless integration.

> "Integration is essential for our Post–Cold War strategy to succeed. In the Post-Cold War era, the Reserve Components have become an ever-larger percentage of the Total Force and are essential participants in the full spectrum of operations, from the smallest of smaller-scale contingency operations to major theater war. Guard and Reserve forces provide trained units and individuals to fight in wartime and to support the wide range of DOD operations in peacetime. Reserve forces are part of all war plans. No major operation can be successful without them."[38]

The Program Mangers and IMA's are the backbone of the RC Joint experience and culture. The RC FTS staff and IMAs add organizational continuity to the commands operations. As a general rule, reservists do not change assignments as frequently as the AC. Therefore, IMA's are a source of embedded institutional knowledge bringing historical and experienced perspectives to the commands operations.

> "We weren't spawned by the side of the river; we came out of your system, we run no technical schools. You run those. All of us came out of your force. I came out of your force with about 14 years of active service.... If you don't like what you see, you'd better take a good look in the mirror because that's what you've created, because you're

> responsible for each and every one of us. You are responsible for the training we've received. You are responsible for the character, the integrity, and everything else that we display.... So don't look at the reservists and say, Boy, where did those guys come from?... You're going to find we fly airplanes better than you and we maintain them better than you do. We maintain our facilities better than you do. That's not because we are smarter than you are. That's because our maintenance people have about 15 years experience. Yours have 4. My pilots have about 3,500 hours of experience. Yours have 1,500.... so that's the kind of force you're getting and that's what we are."[39]

This paper presents one option to integrate and tap the embedded RC knowledge and experience for planning, mobilization and augmentation. This model combined with doctrinal change can bring the Unified Command's closer to seamless AC/RC operations and more efficient use of the RC.

> "The almost forgotten mobilization for Vietnam was an example of lack of planning, an unready Reserve component force and lack of procedures. The Desert Shield/Desert Storm mobilization was the largest since the Korean War and came after a decade of mobilization planning and exercises; it was the last Hurrah for the Cold War Force. It was not planned nor executed very well."[40]

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ENDNOTES

[1] MG Robert McIntosh, "Air Force Reserve Command Briefing, Contingencies and Real World Operations, briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, D.C. 8 July 1999.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs March 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1998), 153.

[6] Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime", Parameters 21 (Summer 1991): 35.

[7] MG Robert McIntosh, "Air Force Reserve Command Briefing, Contingencies and Real World Operations, briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, D.C. 8 July 1999.

[8] Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime", Parameters 21 (Summer 1991): 36.

[9] William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 4 Sep 97, Integration of the Reserve and Active Component

[10] HQ U.S. Central Command USAFR Program Manager from 1995-1999, Exercises Bright Star '95, '97 and '99, Operations in Support of Southwest Asia, Desert Thunder I, Desert Thunder II and Desert Fox, Interface w/HQ USAFE during Kosovo Air Campaign. This is tied to the experiences I had as the CCJ1-XRA at HQ USCENTCOM. Each time I attempted to fill an AFSC/MOS for the command from another CINC, it was a confusing deal. Who was in charge, the PM? Or was there a Joint Reserve Unit? In which directorate did the PM work? Dealing with each command's PM was cumbersome and bureaucratic. The command Joint Manning Documents were different than what the personnel center listed. There was no one-stop-shopping. If the organizational structure was difficult for another PM, what did it do to the AC end user?

[11] Ibid.

[12] Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997, PUB 1, Variations in joint staff divisions, (National Defense University, Norfolk, VA 1997), 2-49.

[13] Office of Secretary of Defense Mr. Dan Kohner, "MOBEX '99 Information Paper, Subject: Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) – Use and Resourcing." Washington, D.C. December 1999.

[14] Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs March 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1998), 55.

[15] Air Force Magazine, 1999 USAF Almanac, People, Armed Forces Manpower Trends, End Strength in thousands (May 1999, p50)

[16] Office of Secretary of Defense Mr. Dan Kohner, "MOBEX '99 Information Paper, Subject: Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) – Use and Resourcing." Washington, D.C. December 1999.

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[19] Chief of Air Force Reserve, "FY 96 IMAAT Guidance," Memorandum for Individual Mobilization Augmentee Allocation Team (IMAAT) Members. Washington, D.C., 3 April 1995.

[20] Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, "Integration of the Reserve and Active Component," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, D.C., 4 September 1997.

[21] MG Sherrod, "Command to rely on volunteers for most EAF deployments," Citizen Airman, October 1999, p. 5.

[22] Donald B. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force, Reshaping the Future: Report of the Air Force to the U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1992, 3.

[23] Joint/Outside-Service Billet Position Description, JS Form 148, HQUSCENTCOM

[24] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff Action Processing Form, "Establishment of the "Chairmans 10" Reserve Component General/Flag Officer Positions" memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Unified Commanders", Washington, D.C. 19 Oct 1999.

[25] MG Robert McIntosh, "Air Force Reserve Officer Resident PME Orientation", briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, D.C. 8 July 1999.

[26] Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 1235.10, July 1, 1995, SUBJECT: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, p6 para 8-9

[27] Ibid.

[28] Joint/Outside-Service Billet Position Description, JS Form 148, HQUSCENTCOM

[29] Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 1235.10, July 1, 1995, SUBJECT: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, p6 para 8-9

[30] Ibid.

[31] Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History of the Air Force Reserve (United States. Air Force Reserve-History. 1997), x.

[32] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2 (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 January 1999), V-6, 4.o.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 1235.10, July 1, 1995, SUBJECT: Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, p6 para 8a

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[36] J.F.C. Fuller, Armored Warfare, (Harrisburg, Pa The Military Service Publishing Co., 1951), xix.

[37] Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs March 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1998), 75.

[38] William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington D.C.: OSD, 1997), 32.

[39] Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History of the Air Force Reserve (United States. Air Force Reserve-History. 1997), 334.

[40] Glenn O. Cassidy, "Mobilization of the Reserve Components of the Army 1968-69," The Joint Staff Exercise Positive Response 2000-1 Manpower Mobilization Case Study, Not dated, Title page.

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