STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT

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LOGISTICS:
JV 2010, FOCUSED LOGISTICS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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This paper focuses on what is required of logisticians to be able to support Joint Vision 2010. It looks at examples that we have learned from in the past, and why we the military needs to look at new joint concepts. It points out some new efforts such as the new concept on a Joint C2 command structure, technologies, and education. These enablers are the ways and means to reach the objectives of Joint Vision 2010.

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PREFACE

Thanks to all the great soldiers who have served as logisticians and made their efforts count in support of the warfighters. And to the families, who have stood by their soldiers as they deploy, train, and service in the best military in the world.

LOGISTICS: JV 2010, FOCUSED LOGISTICS

Logistics is the bridge connecting a nation's economy to a nation's warfighting forces.[1] One of the four operational concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010 is Focused Logistics— " the fusion of information, logistics and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations."[2] With the end of the Cold War era, planners and we leaders are learning how to deal with operations that range from major and lesser regional contingencies to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).In past military operations we have had to develop *adhoc* logistics support organizations in order to support the warfighter. We as planners are faced with tasks that commit U.S. forces on short notice to hostile areas for unknown duration. "The changing threat requires that logistics be flexible, mobile, integrated, compatible, and precise in targeting support to the point of need."[3] During Operation Desert Shield/Storm we were able to build up the logistics base, establish logistics operations, and stockpile large quantities of supplies before the hostilities commenced. In future operations we will not have that luxury, with the drawdown completed, we have to be leaner and able to response with logistics efforts on time and in the right place.

This paper will focus on the need for logisticians to look at operations from a joint perspective to insure our efforts as a military can support the warfighter, without waste or duplication of logistics efforts within theater. Leaner, meaner, tougher, and workable systems that support the joint warfighter, should be the logistics goal. The success of Focused Logistics in Joint Vision 2010 will be determined by the extent to which the joint community can pool its resources and make it happen.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS MILITARY OPERATIONS

DESERT SHIELD/STORM

The Strategic Logistics Plan that was developed for the largest combat operation since WWII was done by an *adhoc* planning cell headed by LTG Pagonis and 4 field grade officers (all Army) and was developed enroute to the theater. Operation Desert Shield was the largest, fastest, farthest, and most successful military deployment ever recorded in history. Between 8 August 1990 and 16 January 1991, approximately 300,000 Army troops and their equipment were deployed from the United States and Germany to Saudi Arabia.[4] There is no need to criticize the great effort that was conducted by the logisticians both reserve and active duty but there are some great lessons learned from this operations. GAO conducted some follow-up studies of this operation, which have shown the lack of asset visibility for supplies and equipment going into the theater.

There were millions of dollars of supplies and equipment that were unaccounted for, plus the large amounts of excess items that were stockpiled and never used. The large amounts of excess and loss of accountability can be traced to the development of the plan. The development of the logistical infrastructure and plan was done in house by the Army and did not include any type of joint/service coordination. During this operation, Service components used their Service-unique "stove-piped" systems to requisition, receive, store and issue the massive amounts of materials that were shipped from CONUS. With Service components utilizing the stovepipe supply system there were large amounts of supplies that could have been used by the other sister service (i.e. medical, class IX, rations, and ammunition). Further, there were large quantities of materials stored in containers that could not be identified unless opened and inventoried, in the Army alone over 600 containers were either never opened or had to be inventoried again.[5] This resulted in redundant requisitions for material already on-hand, thereby straining resources at supporting depots in CONUS, and choking transportation channels already reeling from scheduled force deployment.[6]

There are two areas that we need to focus on here in the development of future Joint operations: First, as we look at this operation we see there was three different services requisitioning and storing supplies and no one from the theater

level reviewing the redundancies in the logistics efforts or having the visibility on supplies in the theater. Next we need to develop and test the concept of the Theater Support Command (TSC); the TSC commander must look at it in a joint view. The joint C2 operation is essential to monitoring and developing a logistics effort for the theater.

Operation Uphold Democracy

In Operation Uphold Democracy the prior planning by the COSCOM staff at Ft. Bragg and USACOM allowed for the logisticians to develop plans for various contingency operations. The road to Haiti actually began long before at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Eustis, Virginia; and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. At these installations, during the XVIII Airborne Corps' Super Thrust I and Super Thrust II exercises in April and June 1994,the group formed its concept of logistics support for the operations in Haiti.[7] One thing that has been noted was that the COSCOM Commander and his staff reviewed the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm.[8] This really helped early on in their planning efforts. There were plans developed for both forced entry and peacekeeping operations. As the Haiti situation developed American soldiers found themselves in a new role. Instead of engaging in combat, soldiers become peacekeepers, which forced a change in the log support concept. Logisticians now had to look at rebuilding the country initially and then be prepared to turn

over the mission. During this operation, for the first time the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) employed a contingency support team (CST) which allowed the wholesale planners to be in on the development of the logistics plan.

Also during this operation, the COSCOM developed a Joint Logistics Support Command (JLSC) which oversaw the sustaining support packages that arrived in country. This JLSC developed an effective C2 system that was established to control resources introduced in country, to include establishment of a system enabling in-transit visibility of all resources.[9] Both the commanders and action officers also used the VTC during this operation. This allowed logistics issues to be worked at the action officer level quickly. The VTC sessions allowed for the planning of the follow-on logistics operation, which was the use of LOGCAP (logistics augmented contractors). LOGCAP had been used before during Somalia. The benefit of this LOGCAP effort is that the COSCOM planners had brought them in early on in the planning efforts to insure a smooth transition.

With the establishment of the JLSC this allowed the logisticians to monitor supplies and eliminate stovepipe and redundancies of support by the services. These efforts also showed how USACOM and COSCOM reviewed past lessons learned and insure that other services, contractors, and agencies were involved in the prior planning and also had a place in the JLSC

structure. It was our first effort at utilizing the spirit and intent of "jointness".

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

The Bosnia Mission started off in December of 1995, probably the coldest and wettest time of the year in this region. The logistics framework was set up mainly with a Divisional set and divided the area into Brigade sectors; the logistics pipeline at Echelons above Corps (EAC) was fragmented. This fragmentation caused problems with the initial flow of supplies and equipment, mainly because it was hard setting up the LOC's from Germany and CONUS. The DISCOM was trying to monitor the flow of supplies and requirements but the pipeline at the EAC still was being developed which caused some resupply problems early on in the deployment.

A key lesson learned in the development of the plan was not including the LOGCAP folks early on in the planning. We have worked with LOGCAP before (Haiti, Somalia), even had them under contract for planning these type operations. During the planning it was understood that there was going to be a requirement for some of the services that LOGCAP could provide, but they were not utilized in the early planning efforts. GAO discovered that contracting officers were developing contracts with private contractors for services that could have been provided by LOGCAP at half the price.[10]

One thing that worked very well was the sharing of information between the two divisions who transferred the support mission (1st Infantry Division had the follow on mission starting in November of 1996). The DISCOM Commander and his staff shared all types of lesson learned and also were allowed several visits into the theater of operations. These visits and lessons learned allowed the follow on units to transition without any break in support and allowed the 1st Armored Division to redeploy on time. 1st Infantry Division was able to provide support with a modified Forward Support Battalion and cut the support requirements in theater by half. This allowed for a smaller logistical footprint and allowed us for the first time to push supplies forward from the BSA to the base camps throughout Bosnia. This mission in Bosnia has continued to improve primarily because of lessons learned from previous units and the utilization of the LOGCAP contractor.

Three areas that evolve from the Bosnia mission are the following: not utilizing the LOGCAP planners early in the development of the plan, the lack of development of the support structure above the Division, and the teamwork and sharing of information between the two Divisions.

COMMON LOGISTICS SHORTFALLS

We, the military, are developing the foundation for Joint Vision 2010 and the Focused Logistics effort (A Joint Logistics

Roadmap). Focused Logistics integrates a host of initiatives designed to improve support to the warfighter. The success of the program will be determined by the extent to which the joint logistics community can pool its resources to make it happen. We need to continue to improve our business practices designed to make our weapon system more reliable, our planning more effective, and our logistics systems more responsive.[11] As we look at these three operations there are some recurring problem areas that continue to surface. The military must look at supporting various type operations from the joint view. As seen in these operations that have been discussed there is a need for a Joint Theater Support Command (TSC), a need for technology that provides the visibility of supplies and equipment, and a need for officers and soldiers to understand Joint Doctrine.

In order to be leaner and more flexible we need to know what each service can bring to the fight and that we are a joint warfighting team.

Some of the common shortfalls that still need to be fixed are as follows: Command and Control at Echelons Above Corp (EAC); insuring new technology is on track and not ahead of our soldiers; and the development of joint education and doctrine. The last one is the cornerstone for jointness; education is the building block for the whole process. These are three areas that are common problems in every past operation that we need to solve in order for jointness to work.

Command and Control Above Corp (EAC)

Having looked at Desert Shield/Storm we saw the problem of how the 22nd Support Command was established to help control the flow of logistics into theater. The Army currently has the lead in developing the Theater Support Command (TSC). This logistical command will be a joint operation and will oversee the logistical requirements in the theater. The TSC will be a multifunctional Command, which will have modules that can be inserted to incorporate service representation and supported/supporting CINC's requirements. A Theater LOG C2 organization would exist primarily to manage common user requirements.[12] The most positive points about this concept is that the CINC would have one logistical commander at the EAC level and that the early deployment of the EAC C2 support structure would be significantly reduced. Lastly, the greatest benefit is that all the common logistical requirements will be an assigned mission of that service, which will reduce the logistical footprint. For example we still have too many items that are common logistics items that are being procured by all the services and these efforts must be planned for in a joint environment; we need to streamline the process. The TSC will also insure that Joint Logistic Center and Boards look at common logistics requirements and insure they are streamlined and tasked to a service.

The TSC will also be linked to the materiel managers at the Army, Navy, and Air Force to insure the visibility of what is in system and in the theater and that the leadership knows that items can be crossleveled to support a sister service combat system. We will also need to review the funding requirements and make the monies available in some type of Joint Program, Plan, Budget, and Estimate, Process (PPBES).

The Army will finish up on the CASCOM study in FY 00 and should include this test command in upcoming joint exercises. The CASCOM study proposal for a jointly staffed Theater Support Command is a much-needed concept, struggling for survival in the world of "rice bowls." The Army leadership supports the TSC development, but this effort must be supported by the other services. We as a military must get rid of the barriers between services and look at these in joint concepts; including funding, streamline functions, and understand and operate within the doctrine.[12] The idea has both gone too far and not far enough toward solving the problem of unity of logistics effort in a theater.[13]

Technology

The main concern here is as we develop all these new types of technology is that we insure that they are user friendly and understood by the soldier. In the initial development of the Global Combat Support System (GCCS), which is to provide

universal access to information across the battlefield, some shortfalls were noted. During the fielding of Army XXI test in Ft. Hood, contractors had to be available to work issues that arose from software problems and systems problems. Our soldiers were not properly trained or had not been trained. We need to insure that the training of our soldiers takes place as we field these technologies and that we are not trying to field items to fast. Currently we are training soldiers on how to operate these systems. But alot of these who soldiers are getting trained are getting out after their first enlistment; they find that they will make better money in the civilian world.

One area that effected my unit personally was the fielding of system that was not on the same time line as the force structure requirements. The system was the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SAARS-O). This process allowed supplies to flow directly to the Forward Support Battalion via ALOCS and bypass the other Direct Support Units (DSU) who in the past would double handle and reship these items forward. The new technology (SARRS-O) was on the ground in Europe in early 1996 but the changes to the force structure were not even completed prior to my Change of Command in June of 1998. What this did was overwork the supply soldiers (some 18 hours a day) and we even moved 10 to 15 soldiers from elsewhere in the Battalion or borrowed soldiers from within the Brigade. During my two years we averaged more ALOC's than the Main Support Battalion and had a third the

workforce. So my point here is that we must phase in the technology with the soldiers and insure that the young soldiers are properly trained.

Another area of concern is how services initially started off on their own Total Asset Visibility (TAV) efforts. The services developed these stovepipe functions and they were not linked to joint operations, this wasted a lot of RD monies that might have been saved if we had started off with a joint effort. There are a lot of great technologies being developed (JTAV, GTN, and GCCS) in the military, we are also exploring the private sectors for new technology. We just need to insure we take our time and must train and teach the soldiers how to use these important pieces of logistics multipliers. The GCSS vision encompasses six essential attributes: 1) any box, 2) any user, 3) one net, 4) one picture, 5) common among services, and 6) robust communications infrastructure.[14] One automated structure should help eliminate duplication in this area.

This focus of the information fusion of Focused Logistics will allow all services, staffs, and commanders the visibility of assets and information required for winning. We need to insure our soldiers are trained and that we are able to keep a sustainment base of soldiers in the force. We need to insure that as we develop it and understand this information that the overall goal is visibility throughout the Defense Department and Agencies

to insure we are on target and have the right amount of stuff in the right place for the warfighter.

Education

In preparing for the 21st Century, we need to mandate that our young officers and soldiers understand Joint Doctrine, this doctrine must be useful, understood, and employed. Military officers need to know how the other services operate. In the Army alone the Officer Corp has been preoccupied with Branch qualifying slots, and retaining the competitive edges for promotion via the command track route.[15] Thus making joint billets almost a certain dead end for promotions, until the Goldwater - Nichols Act provide some requirements to the military insisting on development of Joint doctrine and education. Under Officer Personnel Management System (OMPS XXI) the Army has relooked career fields and insured that joint education is a part of the Officer progression process. We need to introduce our junior officers to an overview of Joint operations in their Advance Courses. This will allow them to learn and plan their future and also see how important joint requirements are for their success in the military and the mission. We need to insure that officer understand sister services and what they can bring to the operation, especially concerning common logistics functions. Even at the War College we need to broaden our study of joint logistics.

The War College is for our future Warfighters, but it would be good to develop some more classes for the logisticians to understand their sister service support requirements. Before a Joint Task Force or a theater level operations is established it is important to those who support to know and understand what everyone brings to that operation. "War colleges must equip leaders to function in a world where rapid change is the norm".[16]

Conclusion/Recommendation

" In order to make assured conquests it is necessary always to proceed within the rules: to advance, to establish yourself solidly, to advance and establish yourself again, and always prepare to have within reach of your army your resources and your requirements".[18] This statement was made by Fredrick the Great in 1747 and it is still true. This statement describes what is always required by ever-great Army, resources and requirements within reach, keys for success.

In concluding we must operate as Joint Logisticians, we must look at every operation in the joint concept. That means if we are going to meet the intent of "Joint Vision 2010" we have to get rid of the stovepipe operations and systems and develop purple concepts and doctrine. "This is primarily to meet our nation's global responsibilities; our ability to move and sustain combat forces virtually anywhere in the world must be maintained".[19]

There are three areas that we must review prior to undertaking any joint campaign:

- We must develop and support the Theater Support Command concept (TSC) that the Army is currently developing. It is key that we have one logistician that the CINC can look to for support and to insure that the priorities for the warfighters are met. The ability to put all the services under one logistics C2 structure will streamline and make the support requirements more efficient. We must insure that we have visibility of all assets (GCCS) and that common logistical requirements are tasked to one service. We must utilize Joint Logistic Centers (which is already outlined in Joint Pub 4-0) early in the planning to insure we coordinate logistic effort, look at single service provider, and to coordinate possible LOGCAP requirements. We must also review the funding requirements, this might call for a review of the PPBES system. If we can get the funding to be purple then we can streamline the requirement on common logistics requirements and other functions.

- Technology and the soldier will be two terms that must go hand and hand as we proceed on this path to Joint Vision 2010. The Army is currently funding and developing a lot

of new technology that will allow better support for the warfighters. As we hit the fielding milestones, funding needs to continue be on time. In the past we have made funding cuts to critical logistics enablers, this will cause major shortfall on our objects in reaching the "Focused Logistics" Joint Vision 2010. USACOM as they develop must be the integrator on all these different types of technologies; we can no longer afford new systems that can not operate together in the same theater. Our systems must be developed jointly and stovepipe needs to word of the past. We must insure that the soldiers who are in the field understand and are trained on these pieces of equipment. As we develop these new technologies and field them, force structure changes must be made in a timely manner.

- We must train as Joint logisticians. Education is the cornerstone to understanding how we will fight and support in the future. Officers must attend joint schools and learn about the doctrine. We must use JCS readiness assessments such as the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMMR), Joint exercises, and lessons learned form previous campaigns both in warfighting and MOOTW experiences. Currently at the Army War College they have introduced an exercise, the Strategic Crisis Exercise

(SCE) which is a wargame for the students at the strategic level. The SCE develops scenarios that have warfighting and MOOTW events occurring worldwide. In the SCE they also include the JMRR process to look at capabilities and shortfalls as the scenarios develop, this event is right on track for joint learning. Events like the SCE need to continue and we need to insure we include all the agencies that play a key part in this process. Then BG McDuffie and his staff, prior to Haiti, reviewed all the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm to insure the same shortfalls would not be recreated. As USACOM develops as the Force Provider to various theaters, that a Joint Logistics event could be held at the War Fighting Center at Suffolk, Virginia. This could be sponsored by the Joint Staff and with the use of that great training/communications building some great scenarios could be built and exercised. The JCS could sponsor this utilizing the JMMR structure for crisis development? Education is key and one of the most important things that we need to review and develop. We must learn joint operations (JTF's, sister services capabilities, and doctrine). A recommendation to develop logistics classes at the War College that allow us to look at these issues with all services and agencies

involved. This could be an environment that could look out and develop solutions for the military in the future.

- Finally we must be the logisticians who are also warfighters. We must understand what our fellow warfighting soldiers sisters are doing upfront in the Division, Echelons above Corp, and what the other services can bring to the event. We must understand the total structure and have awareness on how the system works and be able to influence the process. We must be able to improvise at all cost to insure that the warfighters mission is a success and that we are prepared for follow-on missions. Sometimes as logisticians, we lose sight of the objective and develop a lot of red tape when it is never required.

In closing if we can review and insure that these three areas are developed, then we are ready to support anywhere and any time. There are a lot of other efforts that are being developed in the " Focused Logistics" but the ones discussed earlier are needed for the military to build on. The current military leadership is behind the concept and the government and Congress is starting to insure funding is available for these future efforts. We have just got to insure we are telling the right story and continue to develop our joint concepts. We have

the greatest soldiers and leadership in our military and as we head towards Joint Vision 2010 we just need to get in the mind frame that we are jointed and be ready to fight that way.

Word Count 4566

ENDNOTES

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[12] ibid. pg. 16-17

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