

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

"Winning MOOTW's in 2010"

The future relationship between the U.S. military and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)

By
Christopher A. Dour
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the interviewed organizations.

Signature: Christopher A. Dour

5 February 1999

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

19990520 083

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): Winning MOOTW's in 2010: The future relationship between the U.S. Military and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) (UNCLASSIFIED)			
9. Personal Authors: Christopher A. Dour, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 5 February 1999	
12. Page Count: 25			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Military operations other than war, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), Joint Vision 2010, humanitarian emergencies, presidential decision directive 56 (PDD 56), United Nations, peacekeeping, joint task force, communications equipment, engagement.			
15. Abstract: <p>Military operations other than war (MOOTW) have gained prominence since the end of the Cold War and are taking their toll on the military services. Cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) will become essential in order for the U.S. military to achieve their objectives during these operations. Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) attempts to set the stage for how the military should be conducting business in the next decade. Presidential decision directive 56 (PDD 56) was passed in 1997 in an attempt to steer an interagency process of cooperation across U.S. governmental institutions but does not include NGO's in the formal process. This paper offers three recommendations on how the U.S. military should engage, cooperate and interact with NGO's now in order to fulfill JV 2010 as well as carry out the direction given in PDD 56 - (1) use a compatible communication system during these operations, preferably a cell phone satellite network, (2) begin an orientation program for NGO's so that they may become familiar with military structure, hardware and operations and (3) establish an NGO joint task force which can train with NGO's and deploy to a particular region without the ambiguity currently encountered by military forces.</p>			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. MOOTW's are increasing exponentially: Can JV 2010 and PDD 56 be achieved? 1

II. NGO'S ARE PLAYERS

1. Controlling the agenda and purse strings 3

III. CURRENT RELATIONSHIP

1. Are we doing enough? 5

IV. TODAY'S TECHNOLOGY

1. Leveraging today's technology for tomorrow 7

V. NGO ENGAGEMENT

1. Getting proactive and familiarizing NGO's with the military 10

VI. OPERATION NGO

1. Standing up a permanent joint task force dealing with NGO's 14

VII. CONCLUSION

1. Taking the initiative 16

VIII. ENDNOTES

18

IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY

21

"Exclusion of NGO's and other organizations from joint planning and rehearsing in Washington, D.C. causes the U.S. to miss an opportunity to use private resources, NGO operational know-how and NGO insight into intricacies of local situations." David W. Bowker¹

INTRODUCTION

With the recent proposal in the FY 00 defense budget to readjust the retirement system and significantly increase pay, the senior military leadership has taken a giant leap in trying to keep mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers from leaving the military in droves. General dissatisfaction with pay and benefits, lack of spare parts, poor maintenance and the increase in operations tempo (OPTEMPO) can be cited for this phenomenon. But where the statistics really indicate a course change is with the increase in military operations other than war (MOOTW), "...the number of small-scale conflicts, humanitarian emergencies, and other similar contingencies rapidly grew in number, from 16 (1947-1989, the Cold War period) to 45 (1989-1997)."² While they may have been called something else in the past, the military has always been conducting MOOTW and now thanks to the post-Cold War foreign relations policy, or lack thereof, traditional combat has been relegated to operations outside of the normal realm of what the military is use to. But it's not the issue of getting involved that draws an alarm, it's the frequency with which the military has become involved which should be of concern.

Winning MOOTW's in 2010

Therefore, the military needs to improve it's relationship with the one player who can make the most difference during MOOTW -- non governmental organizations (NGO's).

NGO's are not the only new acronyms the military has added to its tool kit. Interagency coordination and unity of effort are the buzzwords which are now part of the commander's lexicon. And these days, one can not discuss MOOTW's without taking the United Nations into consideration. Joint Vision 2010 takes a look at how the military may or may not be doing business in ten years through four concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics. Presidential decision directive 56 (PDD 56) was issued in order to improve interagency coordination during peace operations. However, both JV 2010 and PDD 56 fail to address the unique situations the military may be facing. Implementing JV 2010 and PDD 56 with a modernized, interagency task force with realistic training is one thing, but the U.S. military and government institutions will not be the only actor in 2010.

Given the fact the U.S military will be deployed around the world far more often than they are now and for roles less dealing in combat than that of humanitarian missions, the military must look for ways to maximize our efforts during MOOTW. This paper will offer three recommendations on improving the relationship with the military and NGO's.

Through closer scrutiny of each other, compatible technology and a focused training effort, a framework for conducting tomorrow's operations will be achieved. First, the reason why the military needs to consider the "NGO effect" and where the relationship stands today must be addressed.

NGO'S ARE PLAYERS

Charitable organizations with altruistic ideals of making life better for mankind is certainly a noble cause and have been around for decades. They have been instrumental in providing relief services to the impoverished during a variety of operations. The U.S. military is typically called on by our national leaders to provide emergency relief during these operations as well since they are well-equipped to handle crisis situations. In 1997, President Clinton issued PDD 56 to get U.S. institutions together before a crisis occurs. But NGO's were not included as part of the equation. "Unfortunately, operations that have employed PDD 56 processes have not included NGO's or any outside international organizations in the U.S. interagency process, training, planning, rehearsing, decision-making or crisis management."³ The military is a frequent abuser of this notion and fails to actively seek out those who usually do more of the work during these crises. "Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGO's and private volunteer organizations (PVO's) are frequently on scene before US forces and are

willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed."⁴ Somalia, Northern Iraq and Haiti are just several of these operations where NGO's and the military became entangled in providing relief to foreign nationals. Problems arise namely due to a mutual distrust between the two simply because of a broad ignorance of the respective operations. NGO's are suspicious about close involvement with the military and the military wants to avoid being sucked into "mission creep".

But what the military needs to recognize and acknowledge is that in the last decade, NGO's have significantly increased, numbering in the hundreds of thousands worldwide. While those with legitimate credibility within the international community are far less, in just the last five years, they have taken control of the agenda in many countries leading the way in many of these operations. By 2010, national governments may be replaced by NGO's as the sole agency involved in providing relief efforts. And the money which these NGO's bring to the table is quite staggering. "In fact, NGO's and PVO's provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Their worldwide contributions total between \$9 and \$10 billion each year -- more than any single nation or international body (such as the UN)."⁵ Through these donations by either wealthy businesses or by philanthropic organizations or

individuals, NGO's have assumed a role in the international debate by buying a seat at the table.

CURRENT RELATIONSHIP

Although the military is slowly becoming more knowledgeable about the role NGO's play in MOOTW, it has done little to actively engage them prior to the time when cooperation becomes necessary. This is actually understandable to a point. The military is typically in the reactive mode, instituting crisis management procedures only when necessary. One of the lessons learned from Operation Restore Hope in Somalia may explain the need to change this mentality, "The real peacekeepers in a peace operation are the humanitarian relief organizations (HRO's) that provide both aid for the present and hope for the future. The HRO's can be our allies, but they must at least be part of our planning and coordination efforts."⁶ In the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, it states "As a joint task force commander, you must grasp the nature of the operating environment in order to successfully complete the mission."⁷ In JV 2010 language, this may be translated into dominant battlespace awareness. What better way to gain a clear perspective than to seek out the assistance of the people on the ground day in and day out. While a doctrinal shift has not yet occurred, there are encouraging signs from within the military.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) has

held several conferences over the past couple of years addressing this issue. And according to their research, "This effort has already contributed to an increased understanding of this dimension of peace operations among members of U.S. civilian and military agencies as well as international and nongovernmental organizations."⁸ A more specific and recent example illustrates this point. In September 1998, an Army officer from the Third Special Forces Group attended the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). "ACRI was conceived as a result of the crisis in Rwanda and Burundi, when U.S. leaders were dismayed to realize their apparent options were to do nothing or to commit U.S. troops, a step they did not want to take. The September 24th meeting was an opportunity for NGO's to receive an update on the ACRI and for the United States government representatives to obtain NGO feedback on their activities and plans."⁹ While this is a step in the right direction, this is not widespread throughout the military. And in this case it is more political since the United States received a scolding from the international community for its lack of involvement and prompted President Clinton to apologize to the respective countries during a 1998 trip to Africa.

So assuming for a moment that MOOTW do become the leading form of deployment next century, it will be too late to consider NGO's as a player only after a famine hits or a

civil war breaks out. And almost three years after JV 2010 was issued in July 1996, major discussion continues across the services as to how to specifically tailor the military to be an effective force in this arena. JTF commanders will certainly be called on. Command post exercises (CPX's) will probably play a vital role. And implementing those lessons in real live fire exercises prove essential as well. But the military must act now, exploring new ventures between the two to be ready for 2010 or even sooner. The three recommendations offered in this paper will hopefully discard ideologically opposing views for mutually benevolent actions.

TODAY'S TECHNOLOGY

The military touts itself as a pretty fair contender when it comes to innovations. But current military communication systems are inadequate to operate with NGO's. The military must be using the same technology as the NGO's are using since we can't expect them to be using state of the art military systems. "Communications equipment and procedures vary widely among different military establishments, more so among different civilian organizations such as WFP, ICRC, UNHCR, United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), and various NGO's, and even more widely between the civilian and military components."¹⁰ With information for the 21st

Winning MOOTW's in 2010

century (IT-21) and network centric warfare, the military is beginning to capitalize on emerging technologies and concepts. Commercial satellites, cellular phones and the internet all play a major role in our daily lives. This should be no exception when it comes to developing the relationship between NGO's and the military.

NGO's have begun taking the lead themselves and have sought out the commercial sector to see how off the shelf technology can benefit their operation. Some of the NGO's operate in the worst conditions in Third World nations and do not have palatial communications centers like the military. The military and NGO's need to explore the use of a massive cell phone network. *Iridium*, a wireless communication corporation has a constellation of low-earth orbiting satellites which would make communications available around the world in the near future using hand-held cellular phones. With their criss-cross network of satellites, the NGO's could immediately communicate with those taking part in the relief effort, regardless of where they are in the region. Wheat International, another high-tech firm is promoting voice, data and VTC technology via satellites and cellular phones which can be quickly set-up in a disaster area. It would also make email available to rural areas via the low-earth orbiting satellites.¹¹ "In Provide Comfort, Restore Hope and Support Hope, civil-military and humanitarian operations centers progressively

improved to reach a high level of effectiveness in coordinating military and civilian humanitarian operations. Still, greater effectiveness can be achieved with more work on communications compatibility and coordination."¹²

Websites have also impacted every form of business and that is also true in the international relief community. *Interaction*, a conglomerate of approximately 160 NGO's maintains a valuable website which provides pertinent information regarding ongoing crises around the world as well as the number of supplies flowing into the region. It provides a forum for NGO's to discuss solutions which may or may not work in traditional or unique circumstances. The United Nations also has it's own website for these operations, called Reliefweb. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) maintains the site with the sole purpose " to enhance logistical, tactical and strategic decision-making in the delivery of humanitarian assistance."¹³ It provides country situation reports and ongoing emergencies worldwide and logistical support which is enroute to those areas. Clearly, website technology is in full use today. The military is so reliant on this technology as well, it can't conduct an exercise these days without establishing a homepage! Who knows where it will be in 2010. At the very least, military and NGO's websites should be linked together during a crisis for those interested in the information.

Winning MOOTW's in 2010

The technology which is being developed today will be in place by 2010 and must be user friendly to all the parties involved. The ideal scenario in incorporating this new technology would be that while JTF "X" is enroute, the staff can surf the various NGO websites becoming familiar with the region and current issues. Step two would be to arrange a VTC with those NGO's on the ground to iron out the relevant details. Once in country, the coordinated use of cell phones would enable seamless communication among the participants. No one discounts the benefits of this technology; it's the coordination between the military and the NGO's which must take place now in order to work effectively next century.

NGO ENGAGEMENT

During relief operations, the military will typically set up a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) to coordinate efforts between the international organizations involved. Only then do the two sides begin to formulate a strategy which meets their respective objectives. But even then the military is behind the power curve. "Even though the Army claims to have growing capability for what they call civil affairs, basically nation-building, they couldn't begin to touch the kind of work that the NGO's are doing. The Army recognizes this and has been trying to work more closely with NGO's and I think this is a recognition that NGO's will play a larger role in the future in those kinds

of operations."¹⁴ If the technology described above is to be of any significance, something must be done to bring both parties together before the CMOC is established.

Geographic combatant commanders or CINC's now produce theater engagement strategies as part of their overall effort to influence American philosophies on the countries within their area of responsibility (AOR). Cooperation and engagement translates into port visits, military to military exchanges and visits with foreign dignitaries. NGO's have become an internationally recognized entity because they are engaged with every level of government in their respective country. Yet the military will typically only engage itself with local community leaders, politicians and military authorities. Little to no exchange with NGO's is conducted until of course the crisis du jour occurs.

Orientation programs are one way to help bridge the gap between NGO's and the military. The military conducts numerous information visits for community leaders, business executives, members of Congress, and journalists throughout the year. NGO's as a whole rarely get a close up look at an amphib or C-130 until they themselves are being evacuated. As a guest of the military at various installations, the NGO's could view the training which the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines would actually be using. Viewing operations such as the use of non-lethal weapons or riot control agents would go a long way in dispelling myths about

the implementation of these types of weapons. Regardless of sometimes conflicting views, NGO's do realize the importance of the military and familiarization trips may help drive away the anxiety of working together. NGO's have been responsive to recent military operations and do see the merit in a closer working relationship. Recently, thirteen NGO's called for a continued U.S. presence in Bosnia stating that "a powerful NATO military force remains essential for maintenance of the peace and for further progress on implementation of the Dayton Accords..."¹⁵

NGO's have even done research on the military and are trying to emulate some of the standard practices. Taking examples from the diplomatic corps, corporations and the military, *Interaction* has held several conferences over the past two years discussing security management issues in order to meet the needs of NGO's. In 1996, twenty-five NGO's signed the "NGO Field Cooperation Protocol." The protocol calls for NGO's to follow certain guidelines when operating with international agencies including the U.S. military. But at the same time when there appears a glimmer of hope to improve the relationship, several NGO's have called on the United States to decrease the level of military spending and shift it toward U.S foreign aid programs in the fight against global poverty.¹⁶

Interestingly, it appears the business community is competing with the military to solve the NGO puzzle.

Corporations have taken an enormous interest in NGO's knowing full well their investment may return two-fold when one of their overseas offices or subsidiaries are in need of assistance. CEO's have played a role in molding the emerging leaders in the NGO community attending lectures and conferences focusing on the future. The business world may indeed call on NGO's for advice on certain regions of the world, much like the military should be doing.

An easy adjustment which could have a lasting impact is to assign an NGO liaison on those military staffs who would function as JTF commander. A recommendation to amend PDD 56 is similar in nature. "...the Clinton administration should formalize and legitimize the NGO role in complex contingency operations by creating NGO liaison offices in DOS and DOD, giving these NGO coordinators a seat on the Executive Committee (EXCOM) and contracting institution building tasks out to private companies and NGO's."¹⁷ For example, the Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet acts as a CJTF in the Pacific AOR in case of MOOTW. The plans and policy department (N-5) should have a full-time officer interacting with and attending conferences in the region with NGO's. The JTF commander would have a direct link to the NGO's and the NGO's would become familiar with potential military scenarios. This is just a simple solution but needs to be looked at if the military is to take NGO's seriously.

OPERATION NGO

With a cell phone network in place and an environment where the NGO's and the military know each other, only a credible trained force is missing. The creation of a permanent JTF which can respond to worldwide crises where the military knows the NGO players involved once they arrive in the particular country could be quite effective. JTF's themselves are not actually a new concept. Most geographic CINC's have a half dozen three star level flag officers who are designated as a CJTF in addition to their normal duties. And permanent JTF's are not actually as radical as it may sound either. General Dennis Reimer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army has advocated such an approach to facilitate cooperative efforts among the services. "A standing JTF is the only efficient way to conceptualize and develop genuine joint forces. Through simulations, a JTF could create a synthetic battlefield to design and test doctrine and organizations."¹⁸

A clear example of this trend is the Joint Task Force on Computer Network Defense (JTF CND) which DOD just stood up in December 1998. "The JTF CND will serve as the focal point with the Department of Defense to organize a united effort to defend its computer networks and systems. It will monitor incidents and potential threats to DOD systems..."¹⁹ To translate this in to how it would apply into an NGO military scenario is quite simple. "JTF NGO" would study a

particular region or country, become knowledgeable about those NGO's which operate there. After simulation in classrooms and conducting mock scenarios, utilizing the commanders estimate process, the permanent JTF could deploy for a one to two week period and conduct the exercise with an NGO or group of NGO's. As General Reimer proposes, "The second level of experimentation and integration would include joint field exercises and maneuvers. A JTF would experiment with the best ideas on the ground to see if they really work in the hands of troops."²⁰

If NGO's and senior military leaders sit down at the strategic level, training at the operational level could be effective. This would eventually trickle down to the tactical level when the soldier on the ground can seamlessly incorporate an NGO representative into the squad. AS PDD 56 stipulates, "One of the most important aspects of PDD 56 is that it mandates a training process, which, if implemented well, will help provide 'the necessary skills through experimental learning' and civil-military coordination."²¹

Broadly speaking, NGO's would welcome this opportunity. As stated in a recent look at the NGO military relationship, an NSA official suggests, "Increasingly, NGO's realize the critical need to coordinate actions in country with the military and see such cooperation as beneficial to their mission. In the final analysis, both NGO's and the military want to solve the root cause of the crises and each is

essentially working toward that end."²² The question remains is will the military take this bold step and take a proactive approach to this growing issue.

CONCLUSION

In October of this year, the Seoul International Conference of NGO's will discuss the role of NGO's in the 21st century. The Manager for General Affairs, Mr. Sungho Kang, has indicated that there will be no U.S. military participation in this year's conference indicating that the U.S. military has not yet reached that stage of cooperation.²³ If the military is serious about JV 2010, how can it not participate in this type of forum especially since NGO's are also becoming very media savvy. When a crisis occurs somewhere in the world, NGO's are requesting the assistance of the mass media to bring attention to the plight of the citizens. Norwegian professor Helge Ronning believes that "if reporters get powerful stories and the NGO's receive the fund raising publicity, both the media and NGO's may compromise their principles for the short-term gain."²⁴ In so doing, NGO's will in effect be able to dictate which country is in need of assistance.

Regardless of whether the military achieves JV 2010 or for that matter conforms to PDD 56, if the U.S. military does not start now, they will lose the initiative in influencing their own participation in future operations. The military needs the senior leadership to promote a closer

Winning MOOTW's in 2010

cooperation between the NGO's at the grass roots level. One example which hopefully is a premonition for the future is that a West Point cadet recently spent a summer in Africa working with the American Refugee Committee (ARC). Both the NGO and the cadet came away from the summer program with a positive view of things to come. The director of the international programs for ARC stated "ARC got a well-prepared, willing volunteer with a strong work ethic and the flexibility that's required in this business."²⁵ The cadet acknowledged, "My internship was very effective in demonstrating to me the difficulties the U.S. government and the NGO's face in dealing with poor, developing nations. I know I will be a better army officer because of my experiences."²⁶

ENDNOTES

1 David W. Bowker, "The New Management of Peace Operations Under PDD 56," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (Medford, MA 1998), p. 64.

2 "1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power For Peace," National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU Homepage, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98>.

3 David W. Bowker, "The New Management of Peace Operations Under PDD 56," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (Medford, MA 1998), p. 64.

4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08 Vol II, (Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996), p. II-18.

5 IBID.

6 Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, National Defense University Press, (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: January 1995), p. 66.

7 Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: June 1997), p. i.

8 "1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power For Peace," National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU Homepage, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98>.

9 "NGO's meet on African Crisis Response Initiative as 1998 Funding Awaits Congressional Approval," Interaction Homepage, 3 November 1997, <http://www.interaction.org/ia/sitrep.military.html>, 22 Jan 99.

Winning MOOTW's in 2010

10 "1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power For Peace," National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU Homepage, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98>.

11 "NGO's Attend Technology Conference," Interaction Homepage, September 1997, <http://www.interaction.org/ia/pub/md/articles.html>, 22 Jan 99.

12 "1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power For Peace," National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU Homepage, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98>.

13 "Basic Facts About OCHA," ReliefWeb Homepage, 28 Jan 98, http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/about/facts.html, 26 Jan 99.

14 "Getting Haiti Back on It's Feet," Interaction Homepage, April 1995, <http://www.interaction.org/ia/pub/md/articles.html>, 22 Jan 99.

15 "Aid Groups Call For Continued U.S. Military Presence in Bosnia," Interaction Homepage, 4 Sep 97, <http://www.interaction.org/ia/sitrep.military.html>, 22 Jan 99.

16 "NGO's Attend Security Training," Interaction Homepage, May 1998, <http://www.interaction.org/ia/pub/md/articles.html>, 22 Jan 99.

17 David W. Bowker, "The New Management of Peace Operations Under PDD 56," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (Medford, MA: 1998), p. 66.

18 Dennis Reimer, "Leaping Ahead to the 21st Century," *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., Autumn/Winter 1997-98), p. 22.

19 "Joint Task Force on Computer Network Defense Now Operational," Defenselink, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1998>, 2 Feb 99.

Winning MOOTW's in 2010

20 Dennis Reimer, "Leaping Ahead to the 21st Century," *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., Autumn/Winter 1997-98), p. 23.

21 David W. Bowker, "The New Management of Peace Operations Under PDD 56," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (Medford, MA: 1998), p. 68.

22 Mark G. Dearfield, "The CJTF and NGO's -- One Team, One Mission," Unpublished Research Paper, (Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 1998), p. 5.

23 Interview conducted via email on 10 Jan 99 with Mr. Sungho Kang, Manager for General Affairs for the Seoul International Conference of NGO's conducted.

24 "Journalists and Aid Workers: An Unholy Alliance," Alertnet, Reuters homepage, 25 Nov 98, <http://www.alertnet.org/AlertNet>, 22 Jan 99.

25 "West Point cadets Learn About NGO Relief Work Overseas," Interaction Homepage, 24 Feb 97, <http://www.interaction.org/ia/pub/md/articles/westpnt.html>, 22 Jan 99.

26 IBID.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allard, Kenneth Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 1995.
- Bissell, Richard The United Nations Development Program: Failing the World's Poor, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1985.
- Black, Todd "Commercial Satellites: Future Threats or Allies?", Naval War College Review, Newport, RI, Winter 1999.
- Bowker, David W. "The New Management of Peace Operations Under PDD 56," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, 1998.
- Callum, Robert "Will Our Forces Match the Threat," Proceedings, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, August, 1998.
- Chilcoat, Richard A. "1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power For Peace," National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU Homepage, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98>
- Clark, John S. "Keeping the peace: regional organizations and peacekeeping," Air University, U.S. Air Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1997.
- Dearfield, Mark G. "The CJTF and NGO's -- One Team, One Mission," Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 1998.
- Flor, Leonardo V. "Operations with NGO's, The International Army of the Future." Unpublished Research Paper, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1997.

Winning MOOTW's in 2010

- Grant, Bruce D. "U.S. Military For Sales: Private Military Consultants As A Tool of Foreign Policy, Unpublished Research Paper, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1998.
- Greco, Thomas F. "Unity of effort in peace operations: a monograph." Ft Leavenworth, KS, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.
- Hornburg, Hal M. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, Joint Warfighting Center, June 1987.
- Layfield, Stephen R. "A crisis of strategy: the United States military and non-governmental organizations," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1998.
- Packard, Scott E. "Bottom Line: It's Infantry," *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, November, 1998.
- Princen, Thomas Environmental NGO's in world politics: linking the local and the global, London: Routledge, 1994.
- Reimer, Dennis J. "Leaping Ahead to the 21st Century," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 1997-98.
- Seiple, Chris "Square-dancing into the future: the U.S. military/NGO relationship and the EMOC in the times of humanitarian intervention," Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1995.
- Seiple, Chris "The U.S. military/NGO relationship in humanitarian interventions," Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996.
- Shalikashvili, John M. Joint Vision 2010, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., July 1996.
- Shalikashvili, John M Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I and II, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., October 1996.

Winning MOOTW's in 2010

- Shalikashvili, John M. Users guide for Joint Operation Planning, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., September 1994.
- Shalikashvili, John M. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1995.
- Simpson, Stephen A and Carlson, Steven G. "Training for measured Response, *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, September 1998.
- Steele, Martin R. "Deep Coalitions and Interagency Task Force, Naval War College Review, Newport, RI, Winter 1999.
- Swan, Guy C. "Uneasy partners: NGO's and the U.S. military in complex humanitarian emergencies," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996.
- Swan, Guy C. "Strengthening military relationships with NGO's during complex humanitarian emergencies," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996.
- "Welcome to Brown University." Nongovernmental Organizations, the United Nations, and Global Governance. <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Activities>, (8 Jan 99).
- "Welcome to the Department of Defense.", DefenseLink, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1998>. (2 Feb 99).
- "Welcome to Interaction." <http://www.interaction.org>. (22 Jan 99)
- "Welcome to ReliefWeb." United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <http://www.notes.reliefweb.int>. (27 Jan 99).