THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A MONOGRAPH
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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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ABSTRACT

Title: THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES IN THE 21st CENTURY

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In 1981, then Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege published an article that examined the conventional military education system of mid-career field grade officers. This paper not only created significant debate regarding the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) curriculum, it became the genesis for the formation of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). SAMS officially began in 1984 at Fort Leavenworth under the operational control of CGSC and was planned as a rigorous year-long academic program for selected officers. By conceptual design SAMS would provide a broad military education in the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels beyond the CGSC course in terms of theoretical depth and application.

Since the time of Wass de Czege's initial study in 1981 the environment of potential global conflict and the personnel and professional demands placed upon the army as an institution have changed. In 1983 most military analysts predicted that any crisis that would require the significant employment of US military forces would be conducted against a Soviet adversary on the plains of Northern Germany. Yet, in the past 15 years the Department of Defense has been engaged in eleven major military operations and only one (the Gulf War) resembled the type of conflict anticipated in 1983. Additionally, when the US Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) in 1987 and the army adopted the Officer Professional Military System (OPMS) XXI in 1997, army officer career rules have significantly changed. Combined, joint and reserve component duty requirements have severely restricted the amount of time that most mid-career army officers will be able to spend in either branch or service assignments. As assignment guidance has changed, so has the resource pool of available field grade officers who can afford an additional year of study after CGSC at SAMS. Despite the implementation of the OPMS XXI and the joint duty requirements of the GNA, the SAMS curriculum, selection process, and post-SAMS assignment policies have remained virtually unchanged from the 1989, Cold War levels.

The purpose of this monograph is to determine the influence of the GNA and OPMS XXI on the School of Advanced Military Studies. It will attempt to answer the question regarding the impact of both the GNA and OPMS XXI on the army officer assignment policies and the SAMS program. The monograph will conclude with possible SAMS curriculum changes and will provide assignment policy alternatives.

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Chapter 1-Introduction

In 1981, then Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege published an article that examined the conventional military education approach of mid-career field grade officers.[1] This paper not only created significant debate over the entire US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) curriculum, it became the genesis for the formation of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). In January 1982 when Wass de Czege was selected to attend the Army War College, he applied and was subsequently selected to be an Army War College Fellow with duty at Fort Leavenworth. During his Fellowship year, he researched and wrote a thesis that documented the need for an additional year of intermediate level education for staff officers within the Army.[2] This was not a new concept. Remarkably, the army implemented a second year of advance military studies at Fort Leavenworth in 1904 and continued the program intermittently through 1936 when limited resources led to its discontinuation.[3]

Based on Wass de Czege's suggestions, Brigadier General Crosbie Saint (CGSC Deputy Commandant at the time) recommended that an Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP or SAMS; both terms will be used interchangeable throughout the remainder of this paper) be implemented at Fort Leavenworth that would follow the 10-month long Command and General Staff College. By conceptual design AMSP would provide a broad, deep military education in the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels beyond the CGSC course in terms of theoretical depth and application.[4] Ironically, Wass de Czege's description of the intellectual demands of the professional officer corps has not dramatically changed in the ensuing fifteen years:

> . . . we demand more of our leaders than ever before. They now need to do more with less, at a faster pace, and under more complex and dangerous battlefield conditions. Better training and more education will be required to maintain an edge over our potential enemies (who devote much more time and resources to both than we do).[4]

What has changed since Wass de Czege's 1981 study is the environment of potential global conflict and the personnel demands placed upon the army as an institution. In 1983 most military intelligence analysts predicted than any crisis that would require the employment of military forces would be conducted on the plains of Northern Germany against a Soviet adversary. Yet, in the past fifteen years the army has been engaged in eleven significant military operations and only one (the Gulf War) resembled the type of conflict anticipated in 1983.

Today it is impossible to predict, with any reasonable accuracy, any potential beligerants, the geographical location of a conflict, or the type and size of the military force required for employment. Military operations in Somalia, Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia Republic were inconceivable in 1983. The National Defense Authority's (NCA) strategic defense policy of "Engagement and Enlargement" has essentially made the possibility of a military deployment to any region of the world a distinct possibility. Additionally, the definition of a successful military career and the sequencing of requisite assignments to attain that success have changed. Where the 1983 field grade army officer could be reasonably assured of career success through multiple repetitive tours of duty in a myriad of service or branch duty assignments, the assignment path leading to career success for the1997 field grade officer remains ambiguous.

In 1997 army officer career rules have significantly changed. Combined, joint and reserve component duty requirements have severely restricted the amount of time that

most mid-career army will be able to spend in either branch or service assignments. As assignment guidance has changed, so has the resource pool of available field grade officers who can afford an additional year of study after CGSC at the School of Advanced Military Studies.

In 1987 Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (GNA). Subsequent legislation (Title IV) mandated that officers of all the military services (unless assigned to a specified technical skill) as a stipulation for promotion to flag rank (brigadier general or rear admiral lower half), would complete a tour of duty in a joint assignment. Additionally, in order to get full joint duty credit the assignment tour length would be a minimum of three years (anything less would require Secretary of Defense approval) and had to be completed as a field grade officer. Time spent as a field grade officer in either service or branch assignments in 1983 would, in 1997, be spent in a joint duty assignment. Obviously, a mid-career officer's quest for future flag rank could, potentially, look at the additional year of study at SAMS after CGSC and the subsequent SAMS utilization tour as time better put to use in a joint assignment. The number of applicants to SAMS may provide an indication of the impact of the GNA and joint duty assignments.[5] Additionally,



Figure 1-AMSP Applications

it is unknown what will be the consequences (either intended or unintended) when the Department of the Army (DA) ultimately implements the OPMS XXI program on the overall attractiveness of AMSP to future candidates.

1984 marked the last formal study of the US Army officer personnel management system (OPMS). Several significant events have occurred since 1984. The 1986 GNA and the evolution of joint military doctrine and operations have resulted in major changes in the responsibilities within the Department of Defense (DoD), the combatant commands and the services. Since 1990, the army has undergone a major restructuring and the active component force has decreased from 18 to 10 divisions. Resources provided to train, equip, support and sustain the army have declined sharply. The strength of the officer corps has decreased by almost 20,000 men and women or more than 27% of the total force. During the same period both congressional mandated and DoD directed support for reserve component positions has increased the demand for officers of all ranks.

Following a detailed Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) study of OPMS in 1996 it was determined that the current system required extensive modifications. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) directed that an OPMS XXI Task Force be formed to continue the study of the officer personnel management system and the officer development system. Simply stated, OPMS XXI is little more than an attempt to align the officer career management system with the realities of the 1997 US Army and the joint strategic environment. Yet, despite the implementation of the OPMS XXI and joint duty requirements of the GNA, the SAMS curriculum, selection process, and post-SAMS assignment policies have remained virtually unchanged at the 1989, Cold War level.

The objective of this monograph is to determine the influence of the 1986 Goldwater-

Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and OPMS XXI on the School of Advanced Military Studies. It will examine the historical background of the SAMS program, to include the purpose and rationale for its origin (and if the same purpose and rationale is applicable to the 1997 army). It will show the impact of SAMS graduates (to include expectations from the field army) over the past fifteen years. Additionally, the monograph will discuss the evolution of joint history, doctrine and concepts. It will examine the design, purpose and requirements of both the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act and OPMS XXI. The monograph will attempt to answer the question regarding the impact, negative and positive, of joint duty assignment requirements of the GNA and the OPMS XXI on the army officer assignment policy and the SAMS program. If the GNA and the OPMS XXI adversely influences SAMS, the monograph will conclude with possible SAMS curriculum changes and post-SAMS assignment policy alternatives.

Chapter 2-The School of Advanced Military Studies

The idea of an advanced military education system to cope with the complexity of warfare is not new to the US Army. By the late nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution had altered the technological, organizational and tactical nature of warfare. These changes necessitated an educated, well trained and professional officer corps. This thought did not escape the United States Army. To help train the officer corps, the US War Department established The School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1881.[6] Historians have characterized the period between the end of the American Civil War to the start of the School of Application as the "dark ages" of the US Army.[7]

With the end of the Civil War came rapid military demobilization, massive reductions in defense expenditures and reduced manpower. Promotions for career soldiers and officers were slow and the absence of any immediate threat to the security of the nation encouraged widespread indifference by the populace toward the military. The single opportunity to gain any experience or education regarding the profession of arms was found in the Indian campaigns. Service against Indians required little knowledge of what officers at the time called "civilized warfare"; that is, war as waged by the Europeans or by the North and South in the Civil War.[8] Proficiency in Indian fighting came by fighting Indians, not by reading books on the subject. The immediate needs of the Army required officers to sustain a basic understanding of weapons and tactics and to possess a moderate level of common sense. By all accounts the army of 1881 was intellectually and tactically stagnant. The School of Application was designed to correct these deficiencies by training junior officers in professional military subjects and the primary emphasis of the curriculum was devoted to small unit tactics.

Despite the intent of the program, many senior officers within the army considered any time spent away from troop duty as wasted. Lacking guidelines for the selection criteria of students, field commanders varied in the quality of their officers chosen for attendance at The School of Application. Some sent the least qualified, the regimental "idiot", or their biggest troublemaker, just to rid themselves of the problem.[9] Lack of funding for academic buildings, books and housing limited the number of officers the Army could send to the school. Over time, the reputation of the institution within the Army improved, funds were appropriated and the curriculum was modified and enhanced. Yet, this resistance by senior officers to a formal military education system, as opposed to an

education solely through application or "field duty," would become a reoccurring theme within the army. The School of Application remained in existence until personnel requirements of the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection temporarily forced its suspension until 1902.

The concept of a second year of advanced military studies conducted at Fort Leavenworth was not introduced in 1983, or even as late as 1985 when it was formally recognized by TRADOC (US Army's Training and Doctrine Command) as a course of instruction. Rather, it begins in 1901 when Secretary of War Elihu Root, along with other senior military advisers, analyzed strengths and weaknesses of the American military system. They determined that the army had an inefficient system of reserves, an unworkable command structure, and the lack of any centralized planning agency.[10] Organizational obstacles, not the quality of troops, impeded the Army's efforts during the Spanish-American War. Secretary Root recognized the "rapid advance of military science" and consequently the growing importance of a "thorough and broad education for military officers".[11]

William H. Carter, Root's closest adviser on the subject, advocated the systematic education of all officers. In 1902 he wrote that the "great and essential point" of postgraduate military education was to train all officers to react quickly and alertly in all emergencies.[12] Additionally, Root determined that the army school system should be reinstated along more comprehensive, efficiently organized lines, and directed that the former School for Application of Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth be given a more expanded mission. Accordingly, a plan for officer education was devised which was

to receive more definitive guidance, emphasis and supervision.

By September 1902 regulations and a program for instruction were completed and a permanent faculty assigned for the one year long General Service and Staff College. In 1903, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell (Commandant of the College) further reorganized the General Service and Staff College into two schools; an Infantry and Cavalry School and a Staff College.[13] The conduct of the two courses and selection criteria for attendance were similar to what we have today at the one year long Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).

In 1903, General Bell directed that the first year of instruction at the Infantry and Cavalry School be administered concurrently with the second year of advanced instruction at the Staff College. Recommended graduates from the Infantry and Cavalry School and selected graduates from other service schools became students at the Staff College. Course curriculum in both colleges continued to be modified over the years. Academic activities at Fort Leavenworth proceeded without interruption until 1914 when the War Department directed an early graduation of all classes to help meet the personnel requirements for the Mexican Border campaign.[14] As the situation along the border stabilized, all courses reopened in the fall of 1914. The schools closed once again in May 1916 as the crisis in Europe made it apparent that US intervention would soon occur. Leavenworth graduates were assigned to critical positions throughout the War Department during both the Mexican-American War and World War I and performed admirably during both conflicts. During his address at the Army War College in 1924, General John J. Pershing commented about the contributions of Staff College graduates during the war:

> During the World War, the graduates of Leavenworth and the War College held the most responsible positions in our armies, and I should like to make it of record, that in my opinion, had it not been for the able and loyal assistance of the officers trained at these schools, the tremendous problems of combat, supply and transportation could not have been solved.[15]

Similar remarks, regarding the advantages of a Leavenworth' education, would be made, once again, following Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

By the fall of 1919 the War Department reinstituted the advanced military education system at Fort Leavenworth. Once again in 1922 the course of instruction was reduced from two years to one to satisfy the demand for graduates. It was generally believed that the program would be reinstated when conditions permitted. By 1927 plans were developed for the two-year course and the school opened during the 1928-29 academic year. The army's demand for graduates by the army caused the school to return to the one-year course during the 1936-1937 academic year. The second year of advanced academic and military studies would remain dormant for the next fifty years.

In 1981 when LTC Huba Wass de Czege recommended a second year of academic studies to follow the Command and General Staff College, the nature of warfare was changing. With the end of the Vietnam conflict in 1974 came massive US military reductions in both manpower and expenditures. With Ronald Reagan's presidential election victory in 1980, the DoD budget increased and weapon systems were modernized. Although significant, the single perceived external military threat to US interests came from the Soviet Union and monolithic communism. Strategic intelligence analysts predicted a better equipped, trained and manned Soviet adversary. Central Europe would, undoubtedly, be the location of the next major war and the army, as the

prominent service, would be supported by the air force and navy. To emerge victorious on the future battlefield, the US Army would fight outnumbered with limited resources and would rely heavily on the professional excellence of its officers corps.

> The conditions of modern battle differ vastly from those of earlier wars. . . .We must be prepared to fight campaigns of considerable movement, complemented by intense volumes of fire and complicated by increasingly sophisticated and lethal weapons used over large areas. . . .Such conditions are difficult to replicate short of actual combat against a major power. Neither field training exercises nor simulation based command post exercises can acquaint us with all dimensions of modern battle. . . In the next war, the prize will go to the side which has best thought through the implications of such battlefield conditions and best prepared its force to deal with them.[16]

Better training and more education would be required to maintain an operational and tactical advantage over any potential enemy. According to Wass de Czege, the Army required an education system that developed a common cultural perspective on fighting and would facilitate the rapid adaptation to changing battlefield conditions.[17] The implementation of the Advanced Military Studies Program would "enhance the ability of selected officers to think clearly, logically, and rapidly, to conceptualize and innovate, to teach and develop subordinates, to integrate the work of specialists and to create high performing staffs that would anticipate and adapt to change".[18]

After numerous briefings by Wass de Czege, BG Saint, LTG Richardson (CGSC Commandant) and others, TRADOC formally recognized AMSP as a course of instruction in 1984. The first class graduated on 18 May 1984. Within two years AMSP became a separate department within CGSC, a permanent civilian faculty was assigned, and the course curriculum continued to be refined. The purpose of the program, however, remained consistent throughout the period:

The purpose of AMSP is to develop in officers the military judgment, operational

> planning skills, leadership competencies and professional ethics required of future US Army division and corps principal staff officers. Additionally, the program will infuse the US Army division and corps staffs will enhance the combat readiness of the Army in the field and assist it in fighting successfully in combat.[19]

By June 1988 five AMSP classes had graduated, the course had expanded to accommodate 52 students (48 Army and 4 Air force and Marine), and the Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship (AOSF-War College Fellowship) had been established. AMSP faculty members (specifically, Drs. Bob Epstein, a military historian, and Jim Schneider, a military theorist) received widespread recognition as experts in their field of study. AMSP graduates were found in key positions throughout the army and their performance on promotion and command selection boards far exceeded that of their peers. The competition for entrance to AMSP became fierce. Both the classes of 1988 and 1989 had nearly one hundred and fifty applicants. During Operation JUST CAUSE, AMSP graduates performed superbly in both staff and command positions. By most accounts AMSP had exceeded all expectations. The reputation of the program reached its zenith during the Gulf War. In his best selling autobiography, It Doesn't Take a Hero, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf describes the reputation and expectations of SAMS graduates:

> Not satisfied that we were thinking creatively enough (about the operation), I sent a message in early September to the Army requesting a fresh team of planners. A four-man team of graduates from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the ***elite*** year-long program at CGSC that concentrated on campaign planning arrived in the middle of the month. . . On October 6, the planning ***wizards*** (SAMS) delivered their proposed battle plan.[20]

The demand for AMSP graduates throughout the field army would remain high. Regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) would specifically request AMSP graduates to assist in the planning of military operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. Even today, the AMSP officer distribution plan for the next graduating class is meticulously managed by

the Army's Personnel Command (PERSCOM), and would often require months of negotiations to guarantee that every command received its fair share. By 1993, despite the program's popularity, the number of applicants for the program would start an irreversible trend of decline.

Thus in eight short years AMSP grew from a creative image of Huba Wass de Czege to the premier military education program in the army. Both the air force and marines adopted similar programs within their respective services. AMSP graduates continued to perform at a much greater level than their peers on a variety of selection boards. For example, over 90% of the AMSP class of 1990-1991 would eventually be selected to command at the battalion level. The normal selection rate for resident CGSC graduates is somewhat less than 40%. If one was looking for flag rank in the future, it appeared that a SAMS diploma would certainly assist the pursuit. After a high of nearly two hundred potential candidates for the AMSP classes of 1991-1992 and 1992-1993, applications began to decline slowly and support for the program from the various army branches decreased.[21] By 1996 and 1997 there would be fewer than one hundred applicants.[22] Was there any possible explanation for the decrease in popularity of the AMSP program? What had changed within the Department of the Army or Department of Defense to make AMSP seemingly less attractive to prospective applicants?

As the military services continued through its day-to-day activities in the 1980s, congressional reformers were watching. A combination of the botched 1979 Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt, the 1983 bombing of the US Barracks in Beirut, and the significant command and control problems during Operation URGENT FURY (the

invasion of Grenada) confirmed interoperability problems within the services. If the military services were incapable or unwilling to introduce necessary DoD changes, Congress would. As early as June 1983, members of Congress already were considering changes within the Department of Defense. Senators John Tower and Henry Jackson directed the Senate Committee on Armed Services to conduct a study of the organization and decision-making process of the Department of Defense.[23] In January 1985 Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn directed that a more formal and vigorous study be undertaken. Both reports addressed a wide range of issues affecting the performance of the Department of Defense and both recommended that massive reforms be implemented. In June 1985 out of concern that Congress, if left to its own devices, might impose ill-advised changes upon the Department of Defense, President Reagan established the "Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management", informally known as the Packard Commission (after its chairman, David Packard). As a result of the bipartisan Packard Commission, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) was easily passed in both the House of Representatives and Senate. "Business as usual," within and between the military services, would never be the same. By Congressional action, joint duty assignments as a prerequisite for promotion to flag rank, would significantly influence the type of assignment considered "career enhancing" by the military services. This would not be the first time congressional oversight of the military mandated and implemented service interoperability reform within the DoD.

Chapter 3-The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act

The importance of joint operations in the history of the US military is not new. Captain Thomas MacDonough's naval operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor

in the success of the ground campaigns of the War of 1812.[24] During the American Civil War, Union General in Chief Winfield Scott's "Anaconda Plan" effectively blockaded ships of war on the Confederate seaboard. By the end of the nineteenth century the character of war was clearly changing. Joint military operations were often conducted simultaneously, rather than sequentially, within a theater of war. The Spanish-American War (1898) involved overseas, joint army-navy operations and the mobilization of state militias. In the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War (1898), operations between the Navy and Army were both disorganized and uncoordinated.[25] The war exposed an inefficient means of mobilizing reserves, an unworkable command structure at the highest level, and the lack of a strategic planning agency.[26] By the turn of the century, war had become too complex for ad hoc joint planning to be successful.

After his appointment as Secretary of War in 1899, Elihu Root sought to rectify the problems of the military. He introduced legislation that increased the federal authority over the state militias, replaced the commanding general with a Chief of Staff, and established the General Staff. In addition, he strengthened the lines of authority and responsibility among the President, the Secretary of War, and the Army. He established a joint board composed of the military heads of the army and the navy. The Joint Army and Navy Board was intended to plan for joint operations and resolve problems of common concern between the two services.[27] Despite Root's efforts, the Joint Army and Navy Board and the War Department General Staff had little or no impact on the conduct of World War I.[28]

After World War I, the two service secretaries agreed to reestablish and reinforce the

Joint Board. Membership was expanded to include the Chiefs and deputies of the two services, and the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and the Director of Plans Division for the Navy. A working staff (named the Joint Planning Committee) made up of members of the plans divisions of both service staffs was authorized.[29] Yet, the Joint Board was ineffective in either rectifying disputes between the two services or in establishing mutually acceptable joint procedures and doctrine. Be it the resulting military demobilization and downsizing, service parochialism, or a prevalent apathy toward the military after World War I, little progress was made in the evolution of joint warfare in the period between the two world wars.

In response to the requirement for coordinated staff work between the services after the start of World War II, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was created. The first members included the military service chiefs (to include the Army Air Corps) and Admiral William D. Leahy (President Roosevelt's Chief of Staff). Throughout the war the JCS grew in influence and became the primary agent in coordinating and providing strategic direction to the Army and Navy. By the end of the war, it was apparent that there was a requirement for a more formal structure of joint command, and the wartime JCS provided a workable model. The first congressional legislative step was the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 which formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff and laid the foundation for a series of legislative and executive changes that ultimately produced the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (the GNA).[30]

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first reorganization legislation that attempted to unify the military services under the Secretary of Defense. Yet, the act gave the Secretary of Defense no authority over the Secretaries of the Army, Navy or Air

Force. It would take the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (amending the 1947 National Security Act) to give the Secretary of Defense real authority over the military services, to include the power to reorganize the Department of Defense.[31] These 1958 reforms were based upon lessons learned from World War II, the start of the Cold War, and the Korean War. Specifically, the 1958 legislation directed:

> . . . .further subordinated the Military Departments to the central authority of the Secretary of Defense, established the chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the unified and specified commands, and provided for the central direction and control of research and development.[32]

Despite the rhetoric of the 1958 DoD Reorganization Act, the military services retained their traditional individual autonomy. Each service continued to operate independent of the other. The JCS became, primarily, a forum to settle disputes between the services, without the authority to enforce any decision. This lack of unity was an obstacle in providing military advice to the President and created operational problems. Equipment procurement, training conducted or administrative procedures were rarely coordinated between the services. As the services bickered with each other, military operations were significantly impaired while Congress watched and took notes. In calling for defense reform, Senator Sam Nunn told the story of an Army officer during the1983 Grenada invasion who used his American Telephone and Telegraph calling card to call Fort Bragg in order to coordinate Navy air support for the Army troops on the ground (Army and Navy communication systems were incompatible).[33] Similar interoperability and functional problems had plagued the ill-fated Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1979, the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut in 1983, and during the Grenada intervention.

If the services were incapable of reform, Congress would complete the task with or without their input.

Throughout the first half of 1986, discussions within the legislative and executive branches continued over the necessity to reorganize the DoD. Clearly, there were two sides of the debate. On one side was Congress, convinced that defense reform was necessary. On the other side stood the Secretary of Defense and the military services. The bipartisan Packard Commission help remedy the impasse. The President sided with Congress. By the summer 1986 each house passed its version of the reform bill by an overwhelming majority.[34] With the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President collectively agreeing the necessity for defense reform, the joint conference to resolve issues went quickly. By 1 October, 1986, the GNA (Public Law 99-433) was law.

The scope of the legislation clearly showed congressional dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of the US armed forces.[35] Congress saw a dysfunctional relationship between the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Regional and Functional CINCs, and the services. By passing the GNA, Congress intended:

1. To reorganize the DoD and strengthen civilian authority within the Department.
2. To improve the military advice provided to the president, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.
3. To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishments of missions assigned.
4. To ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands.
5. To increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning.
6. To provide for more efficient use of defense resources.
7. To improve joint officer management policies.
8. To enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.[36]

The fundamental purpose of the GNA is to improve the ability of the military services to work together and, in the long run, to promote a more efficient and effective warfighting capability. While all the areas addressed above are intended to strengthen joint warfighting, the focus of this study is on the provisions in Title IV of the GNA, which specifies very clear procedures for officer personnel management.

Title IV of the GNA has considerably altered the management of mid-career and senior officers. It created a joint specialty officer (JSO) program that provided incentives to become a JSO. The law provided specific education requirements (Joint Professional Military Education II-JPME II: twelve week long course conducted at Norfolk, Virginia), training requirements, and tour length requirements for officers to be considered joint specialists or "joint qualified". To receive full joint duty qualification credit the officer had to be, at a minimum, a field grade officer and had to have serve for a tour of duty of three years. The Secretary of Defense may waive up to 10% of the total number of Joint Staff officers three-year duty requirement to twenty-two months for field grade officers and fourteen months for flag rank officers. To ensure compliance, two key incentives were directed. One, promotion opportunities for joint duty officers would be equivalent to opportunities for officers remaining in positions within their own service. Two, by 1992 all officers had to pass the joint duty criteria in order to be promoted to flag rank.[37] Although some joint duty waivers still exist, others will expire in the near future.

There are five types of waivers that can be used to get an officer promoted to general/flag rank if he is not already joint qualified. The "Serving in Waiver" may be used by any officer who is serving in a Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) position and has

been in the position for 180 days prior to the convene date of the promotion board. The "Scientific and Technical Waiver" may be used for an officer for which the JDAL positions do not exist (i.e., Military Police, Ordnance, Finance, Chemical, Acquisition Corps, etc.). The "Professional Field Waiver", like the "Scientific and Technical Waiver", may be utilized by doctors, chaplains and lawyers (non-JDAL positions). The "JDA Prior to 1987 Waiver" can be used by any officer who served in a JDAL position as a Captain (Navy lieutenant) or above, prior to 1 January, 1987 (this waiver expires 31 Dec, 1998). The "Good of the Service Waiver" may be used for an officer who does not have credit for a full joint duty assignment. The number of "Good of the Service Waivers" that can be used in any selection board has decreased substantially over the past ten years and is now rarely used. Obviously, the vast majority of officers within the military services are not eligible for the available technical waivers. Since the number of other joint duty waivers has declined, unless an officer has completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, his potential for promotion to flag rank has been significantly reduced.[38]

The time that a US Army major will remain in grade is approximately 5 ½ years. A lieutenant colonel will also spend 5 ½ years in grade prior to his selection to colonel. A colonel will routinely spend three years in grade before being considered for selection to brigadier general (See Figure 2). Ordinarily, most army officers will spend fourteen years in the field grade ranks. However, a small group of high performing officers often receive accelerated promotions (below the zone) and could spend as little as eleven years in the field grade ranks.

Regardless of the branch of the army, the great majority of field grade officers who will be competitive for promotion to flag rank will spend four of those years commanding

at the battalion and brigade level, two years in advanced military studies (one year at CGSC and one year at the Senior Service College (SSC), and three years in a joint duty assignment.). However, to be competitive for selection for battalion command, most majors will spend two years in a branch qualifying job (battalion or brigade level operations officer or battalion executive officer). The year devoted to pursuing an AMSP education coupled with the mandatory utilization tour has made it more difficult for an AMSP graduate to complete a joint assignment prior to consideration for selection for flag rank. When looking strictly at field grade officer timelines, the implementation of Title IV may have made the attractiveness of time spent at AMSP decrease and joint duty increase. Further changes in the army's officer personnel management system may also influence field grade career timelines. Additionally, it has the potential of making the time spent at AMSP and at the AMSP follow-on assignment, unattractive to potential applicants.



Critical Assign.	Critical Assign.	Critical Assign.
CGSC	Bn Cmd	Bde Cmd
Br. Qual	Div/Corps	SSC
FA/nonbranch		

Figure 2-Field Grade Officer Career Progression

Chapter 4-OPMS XXI

In addition to the impact of the GNA on an officer's career timeline, the Army is currently considering other changes in its officer personnel management system (OPMS).

Revision of the army's officer management policy over time is not new. In fact, to be relevant in times of increased personnel turbulence, due to changes in the organizational structure of the DA or DoD, it has remained a progressive and evolutionary process. The first OPMS review was convened in 1971 as a result of a study on professionalism conducted by the Army War College in 1970.[39] Since then two former Chiefs of Staff of the Army have directed additional officer management policy reviews.

The 1971 study (OPMS I) examined command assignment policies and procedures, assessed the promotion system and reviewed other officer management issues. The centralized command selection process, which designated command tour types and lengths and the establishment of primary and secondary specialties for officers, were all products of the study.[40] The 1983 study (OPMS II) resulted in single branch development, instituted functional areas, defined multiple career tracks and revised the officer classification system.[41] Changes to the system, based upon the study, were implemented in 1985 and remained in place until the adoption of OPMS XXI.

Under the 1985 OPMS II strategy an officer was assigned a basic branch upon entry into the military. Upon his selection for promotion to captain (about four years active duty), he would receive a functional area designation. A functional area (FA) is a technical skill or function that is required by the army. For example, FA 45 (Comptroller) centralizes the accountant and budget management requirements of the army, and FA 41 (Personnel) directs army personnel management. The majority of army officers are required to serve in a basic branch assignment (i.e., armor, infantry, field artillery, etc.) assignment, followed by a FA assignment on a rotational basis. Additionally, the officers

must achieve qualification status and proficiency in both specialties. Army officers are expected to develop and maintain the knowledge and skills required to perform effectively within their basic branch, their functional area, or in a branch immaterial (branch nonspecific) positions. Under OPMS II, an officer's career path was divided between assignments in his basic branch, functional areas, or in branch immaterial positions.

By 1995, the Army had undergone a major restructuring, and the active component force had decreased in size from 18 to 10 divisions. Resources provided to train, equip and sustain the Army were drastically cut. Title IV, of the GNA provided a new but far-reaching stamp on the professional development, assignment, and promotion policies for army officers. Additionally, congressionally mandated support for reserve component positions greatly increased the demand for officers, especially field grade officers. Starting in 1991, there was a notable increase in high priority, field grade officer requisitions for assignments other than in troop units, and many divisions and corps were being filled at a level well below 70%.[42] By 1995 the total size of the officers corps would decrease 27% relative to 1991 officer strength figures. Yet personnel requirements, especially at the grade of Major had not significantly reduced from the 1991 level. Obviously, the 1985 officer management system was not satisfying the personnel requirements of the army. It was time, once again, for a major OPMS overall.

In 1995 the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) conducted a review of the OPMS II as it has evolved over time.[43] Following the DCSPER's review, an OPMS XXI Task Force was formed to study OPMS II and the officer development effort in 1996. The Task Force was directed to provide comments to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) by July 1997. Upon completion of the CSA's review, implementation of

the new OPMS XXI program is anticipated to begin sometime during 1998. The CSA envisioned that the results of the study would establish the conditions for building an officer corps that would shape, train and lead the Army into the next century. Specifically, the CSA directed that the OPMS XXI Task Force to focus on three tasks:

1. Recommend appropriate changes to ensure the Army Develops officers whose behavior reflects army values and who possess the right skills, knowledge and attributes.
2. Recommend an executable conceptual framework for OPMS XXI that integrates the Task Force work with the ongoing Leader Development XXI, Character Development XXI, and new OER initiatives.
3. Design an implementation strategy for Task Force recommendations that provides a mechanism for periodic reviews and updates.[44]

Among the OPMS XXI Task Force's recommendations was to retain the current basic branch and functional area system currently being used for the development and management of company grade officers. In fact, OPMS XXI will have only a limited impact on company grade officers. The vast majority of company grade officers will continue to be developed, managed, and promoted under the OPMS II process. Some functional area changes were made, however, to ensure that the Army develops officers in areas were expertise will be required in the future.[45] The professional goal for each company grade officer would continue to focus on qualification within their basic branch. The major OPMS II revisions will extensively modify the management policies of field grade officers.

The principle features of OPMS XXI and its potential impact on the field grade officer population is immense. A "Career Field" (CF) based officer development and management system will be implemented for field grade officers. Four distinct CFs will be created by grouping a specific set of branches and functional areas into each CF:

Career Field	*Branches*	*Functional Areas*
Operations (66% of Field Grade Pop.)	All	Psyop/Civil Affairs-FA 39 Logistician-FA 90
Information Operations (9% of Field Grade Pop.)		Public Affairs-FA 46 Automation Systems-FAs 53 A,B,D Information Operations-FA 30* Strategic Intelligence-FA 34* Space Operations-FA 40* Simulations Operations-FA 57*
Operational Support (15% of Field Grade Pop.)		Foreign Area Officer-FA 48 Acquisition Corps-FAs 51,53B&C,97
Institutional Support (10% of Field Grade Pop.)		Comptroller-FA 45 USMA Permanent Professor-FA 47 Operational Research-FA 49 Nuclear Weapons-FA 52 Strategy/Force Development-FA 50* Human Resources-FA 43*

(*new or revised functional area-note FAs 41 and 54 are eliminated)

Figure 3-Career Field Design

Following their selection for promotion to Major, each officer will be assigned to one of four CFs for both management and promotion.[46] Individual selection of a particular CF will be the result of a PERSCOM organized and controlled "Career Field Designation Board". To ensure that warfighting remains the preeminent skill within the army, approximately two-thirds of the total field grade officer population will be selected for the Operations CF. Following their designation into a CF, the officer will be managed and promoted in that CF for the remainder of his career.

The OPMS II promotion system will be adjusted so that the majority of field grade

officers will compete for promotion to lieutenant colonel, and colonel based on their CF affiliation.[47] Guidance to future promotion boards will include a minimum selection percentage standard in order to provide all officers in all career fields a "reasonable opportunity for success".[48] Future officer assignments will be either to a basic branch or functional area position within a specific CF, or to a functional integrator (FI) position ("branch immaterial" position under OPMS II). A FI position is not tied to a specific functional area within a career field and support a wide variety of functions within the army (i.e., CGSC instructor, DA Staff, Joint Staff, etc.).[49] Field grade officers will only compete for promotion within their respective CF. Only those officers (the only notable exception is commands within the Army Acquisition Corps) in the Operations CF will be eligible to compete for selection for battalion level command and higher. Additionally, for officers in the Operations CF it is anticipated that each will have an opportunity for a two year "branch qualification" tour at the rank of major.[50] Field grade officers in the remaining CFs will serve in either a CF position within their specific functional area or in a FI position.

OPMS XXI will attempt to reduce assignment and personnel turbulence among field grade officers. Officers will be expected to maintain knowledge and proficiency in their basic branch, assigned functional area, and, potentially, in a FI position. By reducing assignment turbulence and increasing tour lengths, it is anticipated that OPMS XXI will provide field grade officers the opportunity for repetitive CF assignments and to develop more in-depth knowledge and expertise within their CF. It appears, at first glance, the OPMS XXI proposals will correct the inherent deficiencies of the current OPMS II

system. Unfortunately, this belief may be deceptively incorrect. OPMS XXI may exacerbate the personnel policy problems of OPMS II since it will not resolve the larger personnel management problem (too many requirements and too few officers) and could further reduce the attractiveness of AMSP as a career enhancing activity.

Regardless of the personnel management system adopted by the army, the amount of time that an individual will spend as a field grade officer will remain, approximately, fourteen years (as low as eleven years for officers selected "below the zone"). OPMS XXI does not rectify the challenge that during this period an officer in the Operations CF (to be competitive for promotion to flag rank) must still complete two years of advanced military education (CGSC and War College), become branch qualified (approximately two years), complete four years of command (Battalion and Brigade), and complete three years in a joint duty assignment (a functional integrator position under OPMS XXI). The OPMS II requirements for instructors (branch component, CGSC, War College, USMA), reserve component, and high level staff positions (DA, TRADOC, Major Commands etc.) will not change under OPMS XXI. In fact, it appears the OPMS XXI personnel "bill-payers" for FI positions will come primarily from the Operations CF. Even if the personnel requirement for FI positions are equally distributed throughout the four CFs, OPMS XXI does not resolve the challenge of increasing the supply of field grade officers to satisfy all FI requirements. With the elimination of functional areas 54 (Operations) and 41 (Personnel), the implementation of OPMS XXI may reduce the attractiveness of a SAMS education and the amount of potential applicants to AMSP even further.

Under the OPMS II system, the vast majority of AMSP graduates maintained a functional area designation of 41 or 54. Moreover, upon completion of the program,

AMSP graduates who were not previously managed in the functional area, were reassigned to functional area 54. Through this process, graduates could obtain functional area qualification while they completed their mandatory AMSP utilization tour. Under the current OPMS II system, AMSP graduates were centrally controlled and managed by functional area. With the elimination of the 41 and 54 functional areas under OPMS XXI, it is uncertain how AMSP graduates will be assigned, or under what CF they will be managed.

Under OPMS II, AMSP graduates were managed by their basic branch. For example, an armor officer would receive an additional skill identifier (ASI) to distinguish, in his personnel records, that he is an AMSP graduate. Today, when a PERSCOM Armor Branch Assignment Officer receives a personnel requisition that requires an AMSP graduate, he simply conducts an ASI computer inquiry to identify all potential candidates. With the OPMS XXI proposal to eliminate FA 54, it is uncertain how AMSP graduates, as a group, will be managed, and what FA or CF they will eventually be classified into.

The OPMS XXI study group is considering an option that will provide a resident CGSC education (Military Education Level 4, or MEL 4) for all army officers (with few exceptions) selected for promotion to major. Implementation of this option may further obscure the AMSP curriculum and selection process. The proposed CGSC program would modify the current course of study to a common core curriculum coupled with an additional phase tailored for each CF. Under the existing OPMS II, approximately 50% of all officers in any specific year group are selected for resident attendance at CGSC. Since CGSC provides the basic core curriculum or educational foundation for the AMSP

program, any revision to the curriculum will require a reciprocal change to the AMSP course of study. Currently, the CGSC program is one year in duration, and the Fort Leavenworth installation, family housing, infrastructure, and college facilities are designed to accommodate approximately 1000 CGSC students and families annually. To achieve the OPMS XXI goal of 100% attendance at CGSC, the Army will either be forced to greatly expand the current education and quality of life facilities at Fort Leavenworth (unlikely in a military with severe budget constraints) or reduce the length of CGSC (to approximately six months) to accommodate the increased student population. Regardless, the implementation of either course of action will impact the AMSP curriculum and selection process.

Chapter 5-Analysis

In examining the impact of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and OPMS XXI on the School of Advanced Military Studies, two key assumptions were made. One, the material and data used are representative snapshots in time, and that field grade officer assignment requirements will not radically increase or decrease. Two, a conflict that would require either temporary or large scale national military mobilization, the legislative revocation or any substantial revision to either the GNA or OPMS XXI, unexpected major force reduction, or a major shift from current joint or service officer management policies, would modify or significantly alter the conclusions of this paper.

In accordance with the GNA legislation the needs of the service (to include branch personnel assignment, requisitions and requirements) and the officer's personal preferences army personnel managers will continue to ensure that career, education opportunities and assignments will enhance an officer's upward mobility potential. Clearly,

an assignment decision made today will shape an officer's career and the army of the future. To accomplish this goal of leader and technical development, army personnel management specialists will continue to establish recommend career paths for each branch.

Regardless of the system adopted (a revised OPMS II or OPMS XXI), career paths include a mixture of institutional training and education and operational assignments. Operational assignments consist of both branch specific and nonspecific (OPMS II branch immaterial, or OPMS XXI functional integrator) positions. Branch assignment officers attempt to develop career paths designed to ensure officers earn requisite technical and tactical skills .



Figure 4-OPMS II Critical Career Path

Conversely, the expectation from the officer in the field is that as success is attained at one career grade level, he becomes fully qualified for selection to the next higher career grade. An officer has approximately fourteen years to complete all necessary or critical tasks to be considered eligible for selection to general/flag rank. Figure 4 shows a typical

officer's critical career path under the current OPMS II.

Converting Figure 4 into a chronological chart (Figure 5) shows the amount of available time (career path flexibility) an officer can devote to assignments away from a basic branch or functional area (branch immaterial positions). From this example, a major who elects to attend AMSP could use the two-year available FA time period block without any detrimental impact on his career timeline. A two-year period is also available for promotable majors to attend AMSP, or to complete a tour of duty in a functional area in a non-branch specified position, or in a joint assignment. However, this timeline may be simplistic and, more often than not, will not satisfy the army's personnel assignment policies or controlling factors.



*Select for promotion

Critical Assign.	Critical Assign.	Critical Assign.
CGSC (1 yr.)	Bn Cmd (2 yr.)	Bde Cmd (2 yr.)
Br. Qual (2 yr.)	Div/Corps (1 yr.)	
FA/nonbranch (2 yr.)	SSC (1 yr.)	

Figure 5-OPMS II Career Path Chronology

The career path outlined in Figure 5 is conditional. First, it is applicable only to those officers identified to attend CGSC during the first selection board (only 40% of the total resident CGSC population). An officer is considered for selection to CGSC four times. The OPMS II Career Path essentially starts upon attendance to CGSC. Unless an

officer is serving in a position that will allow him to attain branch qualification status, his timeline decreases each year that he delays entry into CGSC. Recently, the number of officers who have completed and received credit for branch qualification status prior to attendance to CGSC has declined. Approximately 40% of the CGSC class of 1990 were branch qualified prior to attendance. This figure has dropped to less than 20% by 1997.[51] Additionally, assignment tour lengths may further invalidate this model.

OPMS XXI is designed to reduce field grade officer personnel turbulence and increase stability by providing three year tour lengths.[52] Clearly, this goal is commendable but certainly not possible with current personnel assignment requirements. Today tour lengths are approximately 24 months for majors, 27 months for lieutenant colonels, and 23 months for colonels.[53] In order to complete all necessary assignments, or "gates", and to be competitive for promotion to flag rank, a field grade officer must have the capacity for high career mobility. In other words, as soon as one critical assignment is completed, the field grade officer must have the opportunity to move to the next "gate" assignment. OPMS XXI tour length stability would significantly impair an officer's ability to successfully achieve all "gates" in the available fourteen year field grade officer time line. A three year assignment tour length policy, the OPMS XXI elimination of FAs 41 and 54, and the GNA Title IV requirement for completion of a joint assignment prior to selection to flag rank, has influenced and will continue to influence an officer's decision to attend AMSP.

Theoretically, an AMSP graduate could be moved to a Joint assignment every time there is a two-year "hole" open in his career path, such as after Battalion Command but

before Senior Service College (See Figure 6) or immediately after Brigade Command. This option assumes that minimum tour lengths could be waived continually. Not only



*Select for promotion

Critical Assign.	Critical Assign.	Critical Assign.
CGSC (1 yr.)	Bn Cmd (2 yr.)	Bde Cmd (2 yr.)
AMSP (1 yr.)	Div/Corps (1 yr.)	***Joint (2 yr.**)***
AMSP Util. (1 yr.)	SSC (1 yr.)	
Branch Qual (2 yr.*)	***Joint (2 yr.**)***	

*Assumes Branch Qual. the same installation as AMSP utilization.
**2 year Joint assignment requires tour length waiver

Figure 6 AMSP Career Path

would this prove expensive, both in the cost to move the officer and in "quality of life" terms (how many army colonels have children with 2-3 high schools to their credit?). Programs such as "joint domicile" in which officers attempt to be stationed with their military spouse would prove unworkable.[54] Because of their GNA Joint duty requirement exclusions for many officers in the service support and technical fields are not subject to the same milestones as those in the combat and combat support arms. Thus, while the "warfighters" are enduring significant personal, financial and familial stresses, the "technicians" are not. Such a system encourages a "we/they" outlook and the danger of creating a "class system".[55] Furthermore, there is a very limited number of approved JDAL positions for those officers who wait to get joint qualified after brigade level command. This more senior officer may be put in the unenviable position of having the

available time to attain Joint qualification, but there are no positions available to assign him to.

Attendance at AMSP is a mutual decision made by the officer and his PERSCOM assignment officer. Our example above (Figure 6) is deceptive in that it is not relevant to the entire AMSP population. The majority of officers selected for AMSP attendance have entered the field grade officer career path sometime later than this model may reflect. Remember, only 40% of a particular officer year group is selected their first year of CGSC eligibility. Of that group, a percentage of officers will delay to a later CGSC class because of the requirement to complete an operational (i.e., officers in joint, overseas, or reserve component positions) assignment to receive credit for that position. Additionally, a percentage of officers (albeit a relatively small percentage today) will attend CGSC and AMSP having already receiving assignment credit in a branch qualifying position. However, despite the model's limitations it does provide a graphic portrayal of this assignment selection dilemma.

Branch assignment officers today and in the future, regardless if OPMS XXI is implemented or not, are chartered to meet the needs of the army with quality officers. To accomplish this mission, they must select the best qualified officers in the right positions. Today's available officer inventory is capable of filling only about 70% of its field grade authorizations, and many organizations are being filled at a level well below 70%.[56] There is a chronic shortfall of field grade officers in all the divisions and corps. OPMS XXI will not resolve the challenge of too few personnel to fill the numerous, mandatory field grade officer requisitions. Branch assignment officers, as they attempt to keep their heads above

water, have the option of recommending that a branch qualified field grade officer attend AMSP or be assigned to a critical functional area or branch immaterial position (functional integrator under OPMS XXI). The answer is obvious. More often than not, assignment officers will not recommend (in fact, violently oppose) branch qualified officers attendance to AMSP.[57] Quite frankly, the advice against AMSP attendance may be in the best interest of the officer involved. Despite the career success of former AMSP graduates, a SAMS education today may put an officer in an unfavorable position during future flag officer selection boards if he has not completed the requisite joint assignment.

Since the number of joint duty waivers are decreasing over time, joint assignment credit will, certainly, become a major board selection discriminator. Without question, the time is nearing (it may already be here!) when a highly accomplished army officer with multiple tough and demanding assignments cannot be selected for promotion to brigadier general because he was unable to wicker that one joint qualification assignment. In the minds of the branch assignment officers, decisions to assign an officer to a joint billet or AMSP are simple. Where AMSP "may" help, Joint credit "will" help in the ultimate selection of an officer to flag rank. If the assignment choice is to either AMSP or Joint, branch assignment officers will normally recommend joint. In fact, AMSP attendance could be a bad career move, and a number of assignment officers are advising this very thing.[58]

There is little evidence that the OPMS XXI will rectify any of the numerous field grade officer career management issues. An army that has reduced 40% in size over a seven year period cannot fulfill personnel requirements at the 1991 level. The army can now only fill about 70% of its field grade authorizations. Unless OPMS XXI can reduce the

number of personnel requirements or "magically" increase the field grade officer density by 30%, we will rush forward into the twenty-first century with a new name to the same problems. Clearly, the "smoke and mirrors" of OPMS XXI does not solve this crucial issue. OPMS XXI cannot change the fact that a field grade officer has only fourteen years to pass through all the prominent assignment "wickets" for an officer to be considered eligible for selection to flag rank. OPMS XXI has not reduced the number of field grade officer branch immaterial positions that must be filled (DA staff, Congressionally mandated position, reserve component, army major commands, ROTC, USMA, installation staff requirements, etc.). The combined impact of Goldwater-Nichols with OPMS XXI will certainly make the cost of an AMSP education extremely high. Yet, the GNA and OPMS XXI are not new concepts and a study to determine their influence on AMSP is long overdue. To be viable as a future personnel assignment option, AMSP must evolve and adapt to the personnel assignment realities of the 1997 Army.

Chapter 6-Conclusions and Recommendations

The analysis of the impact of the GNA and OPMS XXI on the Advanced Military Studies Program demonstrates, without question, that the SAMS program must evolve and be revised to conform to the officer personnel management realities of the 1997 military. This monograph has examined the impact of the GNA joint officer assignment provisions (Title IV) and the impact of these requirements on field grade officers' critical career paths. Additionally, this paper has analyzed the OPMS XXI program and its potential AMSP impact. Although the provisions of OPMS XXI remain in the developmental stage, there is little available evidence that this program will provide any

substantive changes to relieve the personnel demand for field grade officers. In fact, the stated objectives and policies of the OPMS XXI program make the time period dedicated to an AMSP education counterproductive, relative to an officer's career progression.

While the research shows that the full implementation of the GNA and OPMS XXI will make it disproportionately more difficult for AMSP graduates to fulfill all the congressionally and service mandated assignment requirements, one must highlight the advantages of an AMSP educated and trained corps of officers. Clearly, the demand for AMSP graduates has remained as high as ever and the supply of AMSP graduates has never exceeded the demand. An illustrative example is the delayed distribution plan for the class of 1997-1998. Normally, the current AMSP class will receive their follow-on assignment orders in December of the academic year. This year (1997-1998), assignment orders were delayed because the Commanding Generals of Forts Riley and Carson believed that they were not receiving their fair share of AMSP graduates.

Since 1986, AMSP graduates have been principle campaign planners and operational commanders in every conflict that the US military has been involved in. Singularly and as a group, regional CINCs have recognized that AMSP graduate labor as indispensable in the eventual success of these operations. To this day, whenever a global situation occurs that may require US military intervention, the regional CINC continues to depend on the ability of his AMSP graduates to develop the operational planning strategy for the conflict. The School of Advanced Military Studies has undeniable achieved Huba Wass de Czege's vision, purpose and goal of providing the Army a group of officers who are better prepared to serve as principal staff officers at divisions and corps:

The pay-off to the Army will be long term but considerable. In short, a leavening

> core of officer with refined military judgment, greater competence in tactics and operations, and a more fully developed professional ethic will help produce better plans, better force structures, better training and better units and therefore will increase the probability of future tactical and operational success.[59]

If the current or proposed officer personnel management systems cannot resolve the AMSP career path quandary, prospective future AMSP applicants may discard the option of attendance. However, there may be potential AMSP modifications options that will help to rectify this challenge and still provide an officer cadre competent in military tactics and operations. It must be noted, however, that any recommendations to change the existing AMSP is beyond the scope of this paper. The AMSP alternatives provided in the following discussion should be considered as little more than points of departure for further study and analysis. Any option contemplated for implementation must be meticulously analyzed to ensure that the change is relevant to the Army of the twenty-first century, is not prohibitively expensive, and that the change resolves a contemporary personnel assignment challenge, without creating new ones.

Joint AMSP

There are 50 students enrolled in the 1997-1998 AMSP program (normally there are 52 students). The size of the AMSP student body has not changed since the 1985 class. Of the 50 students, 42 are in the Army and the remaining 8 officers are from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. Upon graduation, all 42 army officers will be assigned to a division, corps or an army staff. With a force structure of 18 divisions and 4 corps in 1986, the AMSP officer distribution plan assigned two new AMSP graduates per division and three per corps (total of 48 Army officers in the class). Although the army has reduced to 10 divisions and 3 Corps, AMSP acquisitions remain at the 1986 level. Yet, the

1997 AMSP officer distribution plan has changed. While some divisions will receive four graduates (i.e., 1st Cavalry Division, 82nd Airborne Division), others will receive three (i.e., 4th Infantry Division, 2nd Infantry Division) or less. In fact, some 1998 graduates will be assigned to units (8th Army in Korea, USAREUR in Germany) or positions that may or may not put his AMSP education to use. Clearly, utilization of AMSP graduates in this manner does not comply with the original intent of the program.

> Phase II (Initial Post-Course Assignment-Internship): consists of a tour of duty with one of the Army's divisions and/or corps. The AMSP graduate is assigned to a key developmental position in his primary or additional specialty as a part of his continuing education.[60]

Currently, there are no joint billet assignment opportunities for any of the graduates. This inability of assigning new AMSP graduates directly to a Joint staff as a utilization alternative, has limited the amount of potential CGSC applicants and has, in many cases, forced PERSCOM assignment officers to recommend against AMSP attendance.

In addition to the army's AMSP program, the air force and marines (implementation of a navy program is under study) have similar programs and education options in their services (selected army officers attend these courses). The air force and marines utilized Wass de Czege's AMSP model when they established their programs. Their course curriculum and design are relatively comparable to the army's School of Advanced Military Studies (albeit there is a distinct service flavor) program. In fact, the current Deputy Director of the air force program (LTC (R) Hal Winton) was instrumental in the development and implementation of the original SAMS program. Three service schools administering similar programs appears to be unnecessarily redundant.

A possible solution to the assignment challenges of the 1997 military is to make AMSP

a Joint education opportunity and assign graduates to both service and joint positions. This option, though at first glance, is attractive and could, potentially, solve many of the existing personnel management and assignment challenges. It would require a consolidation of the existing three AMSP-type institutions, require JPME II accreditation, have an expanded faculty and student body, and would require a major revision to the curriculum. The ***Joint AMSP*** could be conducted at either Fort Leavenworth or Norfolk, Virginia (location of the JPME II accredited Armed Forces Staff College). Selected graduates could be assigned to either service (division or corps) or a JDAL position in a regional CINC Headquarters.

Reduced Size AMSP

PERSCOM assignment officers continue to complain that they are unable to fulfill the demand for field grade officer personnel requisitions requirements and AMSP attendance quotas.[61] Additionally, Huba Wass de Czege's original intent or stipulation for AMSP selection consideration is that the AMSP candidate be a graduate of the previous year's CGSC class. As the amount of AMSP applicants has recently fallen, the AMSP Director has been forced to expand selection consideration to non-resident CGSC graduates and graduates from other CGSC equivalent courses. The problem with this selection alternative is that the basic entry skill and education levels to AMSP are not the same. Additionally, since selection to the resident CGSC program is a competitive process (only 50% of any officer' year-group will attend), the consideration of officers who are not selected for resident CGSC for AMSP, runs the risk of reducing the quality of the student population and the program:

A graduate of the advanced military studies program if first a highly selected

member of his peer group (in certain personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics specialties) with unusual growth potential. He is a bright, selfless, and thoroughly competent team player with unusual commitment to a full 30-year career.[62]

Currently, officers not selected for resident CGSC attendance have a very limited career path. It is very rare that this officer will be selected for battalion level command. Since battalion level command is a key career critical path assignment, those officers not selected will be fortunate to complete a 20-year career. CGSC selection is a quality cut. For what ever reason, CGSC selection board members have determined that officers not selected to CGSC have not performed professionally as well as their peers who have been selected for the resident course. Despite the OPMS XXI proposal that would provide a resident CGSC opportunity for all Army officers selected to major, it will not change the army's promotion and education "pyramid based" selection reality. A "pyramid-based" selection process is simply that over time some officers will be selected for advanced military schooling and promotion and others will not. Not every army officer can expect to be selected for colonel or brigadier general. OPMS XXI does not change this selection reality. Rather, it will make it more difficult in AMSP attendance selection.

A reduction of the size of the AMSP class may rectify this challenge. In accordance with the original intent for the size of the class, the AMSP class could be reduced to 33 students. Two AMSP graduates would be assigned to each division and three graduates to each corps. The four remaining graduates would come from the other military services.

Reduced AMSP Length

One of the OPMS XXI military education proposals under consideration is to provide a resident CGSC education for all officers selected for promotion to major. As was previously discussed, this option would require either an expansion of the education and

quality of live facilities at Fort Leavenworth or a reduction in the length of CGSC from ten to six months. Provided that the army adopts the later option (budgetary constraints would make the expansion of facilities option highly doubtful), AMSP could reduce its curriculum to six months and conduct two AMSP classes annually. This option is, essentially, a compromise (and not a particularly good one).

A reduction in the length of CGSC and SAMS would require truncated curriculums for both institutions. The resident CGSC course provides the educational foundation for AMSP. The inevitable modification and reduction of the CGSC curriculum required to conform to a six-month course length would simply mean that the entry level skills to AMSP would be lower. The combined effect of lower entry level skills and a reduced course length would be AMSP graduates less trained and prepared to assume tactical and operational planning challenges. Additionally, a six-month SAMS would necessitate a reduction or potential elimination of part of the AMSP curriculum. Clearly, this AMSP option is not in compliance with Wass de Czege's original intent for the program

Eliminate AMSP

Discontinuing a second year of advanced military instruction due to personnel requirements of the Army is not new. Prior to both World War I and World War II, a two-year course of instruction was taught at Fort Leavenworth, but it was discontinued due to the exigencies of Army expansion and preparation for war. Elimination of AMSP may be, in fact, warranted today. Clearly, the Army cannot fill all of its field grade officer personnel requirements and, as this paper points out, the time devoted to an AMSP education may put an officer at a distinct disadvantage in future promotion selection

boards. Perhaps extreme, though realistic, elimination of AMSP would provide personnel managers an additional group of field grade officers to satisfy other personnel requirements.

ENDNOTES

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[2]Wass de Czege, Huba. *Army Staff College Level Training Study, 13 June, 1983.* (US Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 13 June 1983).

[3]US Army Command and General Staff College. A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College 1881-1963. (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1964), p. 79.

[4]Wass de Czege, Huba. *Army Staff College Level Training Study, 13 June, 1983.* p. F-4.

[5]Interview with Ms. Jackie Kania, AMSP Secretary since 1985. Among other duties, Ms. Kania is responsible for compiling the AMSP candidate packets. 5 January, 1998. Since there are no records of AMSP applicants, accuracy of numbers per year are +/- 10.

[6]Nennniger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools: Postgraduate Military Education and Professionalization in the US Army, 1880-1920. (University of Wisconsin, 1974), p. i.

[7]Ibid, p. 7.

[8]Ibid, p. 8.

[9]Ibid, p. 31.

[10] Nenninger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army. Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918. (Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut. 1978), p. 54.

[11]Nennniger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools: Postgraduate Military Education and Professionalization in the US Army, 1880-1920. p. 98.

[12] Nenninger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army. Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918. p. 55.

[13]US Army Command and General Staff College. A Military History of the US Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1881-1963. (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1964), p. 15.

[14]Ibid, p. 20.

[15]Ibid, p. 21.

[16] Wass de Czege, Colonel Huba. Army Staff College Level Training Study. 13 June 1983. (US Army War College Fellowship, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1983), pp.21-22.

[17]Ibid, p. 2.

[18]Ibid, p. 11.

[19]Memorandum of Understanding Between Command and General Staff College and US Army Military Personnel Center. *Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) Acceptance and Follow-on Assignments.* (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 31 December, 1984), p. 1.

[20]Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman. It Doesn't Take a Hero. (Bantam Books, New York, 1992), pp. 354, 356.

[21]Interview with Colonel William Bristow, CGSC Dean of Academics. Col. Bristow has been assigned to CGSC from 1992 to the present. Since 1992, he has been a member of the AMSP Selection Board.

[22]Interview with Ms. Jackie Kania, AMSP Secretary since 1985. Among other duties, Ms. Kania is responsible for compiling the AMSP candidate packets. 29 December, 1997.

[23]Lovelace, Douglas C. Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1996), p. 9.

[24]Joint Chiefs of Staff Fact Sheet. History of the Joint Staff. (The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 1996), p.1.

[25]Ibid, p.1.

[26]Nenninger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918. p. 53.

[27]Joint Chiefs of Staff Fact Sheet. p. 1.

[28]Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918. p. 55.

[29]Joint Chiefs of Staff Fact Sheet. p. 1.

[30]Ibid. p. 2.

[31]Lovelace, p. 5.

[32]Ibid, p. 5.

[33]Medlock, Kathleen Van Tre. A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership. (UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1993), p. 52.

[34]On May 7, 1986, the Senate approved its version of the reorganization bill by a vote of 95 to 0. On August 5, 1986, the House approved its version by a vote of 406 to 4. US Congress, *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99the Congress. 2d Session, Washington, DC:* US Government Printing Office, September 16, 1986, p. S12652; *US Congress, 2d Session.* Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 17, 1986, pp. H7005-H7008.

[35]Lovelace, p. 15.

[36]*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 3.

[37]Medlock, p. 60.

[38]Infantry Officer Branch Newsletter, Colonel's Desk. (Infantry Branch, US Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), Alexandria, Virginia, August, 1997).

[39]US Army, OPMS XXI Home Page (Internet). OPMS/ODS XXI Historical Information. (Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 1997), p. 1.

[40]Ibid, p. 1.

[41]Ibid, p. 2.

[42]Ibid, p. 3.

[43]US Army, OPMS XXI Home Page (Internet). OPMS/ODS XXI Study Chronology. (Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 1997), p. 1.

[44]Ibid, p. 1.

[45]Ibid, p. 4.

[46]Ibid, p. 6.

[47]Ibid, p. 9.

[48]Ibid, p. 14.

[49]Armor Officer Branch Newsletter, *Colonel's Desk.* (Armor Branch, US Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), Alexandria, Virginia, 8 December, 1997).

[50]OPMS/ODS XXI Study Chronology, p. 7.

[51]Interview, Colonel William Bristow, 31 December. 1997.

[52]OPMS/ODS XXI Study Chronology, p. 7.

[53]Infantry Officer Branch Newsletter. p. 1.

[54]Medlock, Kathleen Van Tre, p. 129.

[55]Ibid, p. 130.

[56]OPMS/ODS XXI Study Chronology, p. 3

[57]Interview, Colonel William Bristow, 31 December. 1997.

[58]Ibid. p. 54.

[59]Wass de Czege, Huba. *Army Staff College Level Training Study*, 13 June, 1983. p. F-5.

[60]Memorandum of Understanding Between Command and General Staff College and US Army Military Personnel Center. *Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) Acceptance and Follow-on Assignments.* (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 31 December, 1984), p. 3.

[61]Interviews with PERSCOM assignment officers. The author visited PERSCOM and interviewed the PERSCOM Artillery, Infantry, and Armor Branch Chiefs and Assignment Officers in Alexandria, Virginia. 4 December, 1997.

[62]Wass de Czege, Huba. *Army Staff College Level Training Study, 13 June, 1983.* 13 June, 1983, p. 44.

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