STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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THE ARMY'S AND MARINE'S AFLOAT PREPOSITIONED FLEET - SHOULD DOD CONDUCT MAINTENANCE AT A JOINT FACILITY?

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 94 requires the U.S. Army to establish a prepositioned maintenance facility in Charleston, South Carolina. The authorization also prohibits the closure of the U.S. Marine Corps afloat prepositioned maintenance facility in Jacksonville, Florida. Congress and DOD continue to search for innovative ways to reduce duplication within the Defense Department. The operating costs for two facilities are over $135 million dollars annually. DOD's budget will not get any larger. DOD continues to seek ways to combine similar functions throughout the Services. Should the Army and Marines establish a joint afloat prepositioned maintenance facility to facilitate efficiencies and economies?

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> Power projection is the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain U.S. forces in and from multiple, dispersed locations. Complementing overseas presence, power projection strives for unconstrained global reach. Power projection assets are tailored to regional requirements and send a clear signal of U.S. commitment. The ability to assemble and move to, through, and between a variety of environments, often while reconfiguring to meet specific mission requirements, is essential to offsetting an adversary advantages in mass or geographic proximity.[1]

The ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to project military forces and supplies worldwide rapidly and effectively is an increasingly important component of U.S. national military strategy in the new world order. DOD requires sufficient strategic mobility to deploy and sustain a measured range of military force to support operations in any region of the world. The new focus increases reliance on strategic mobility and afloat prepositioning to project forces, equipment, and supplies efficiently and effectively anywhere in the world.[2]

DOD's afloat prepositioned program consists of strategically located ships with equipment and supplies prepositioned for U.S. Marine and U.S. Army forces. While afloat preposition enhances the ability of the U.S. to dispatch quickly an overwhelmingly decisive force anywhere in the world,

equipment loaded aboard each vessel must receive periodic maintenance. Each service provides maintenance facilities at different ports within the U.S.

The congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) recommended procedures to enhance the strategic mobility capability of U.S. forces. The study validated the need of additional prepositioned ships to support the rapid deployment of U.S. forces. As a direct result of the study, the U.S. Army increased the number of prepositioned ships from four to fifteen. The significant increase in the size of the prepositioned fleet and quantity of equipment requiring maintenance compelled the U.S. Army to establish an afloat prepositioned maintenance facility.[3]

Congress and DOD continue to search and eliminate duplication within DOD. It is envisioned that elimination of duplication may save dollars within the budget. It appears that separate U.S. Marine and U.S. Army maintenance facilities are duplication in effort.

This study will examine if there is a critical need to consolidate the maintenance of the U.S. Marine and U.S. Army afloat prepositioned equipment. This study will address whether functional consolidation and interaction between each service could lead to economies and efficiencies.

CHAPTER II

INITIATION OF MARITIME PREPOSITION

A force projection force is not a new strategy for U.S. military services. Since World War I military forces deployed from the U.S. or other theaters, to a theater of conflict. DOD used foreign land based facilities to store prepositioned equipment. For more than thirty years, the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army recognized the importance of prepositioning combat materiel forward within a potential theater of operations. The land based prepositioned sites were in or near countries considered the most likely location of hostilities such as; South Korea, Guam, and Western Europe.

Secretary of Defense MacNamara began the use of maritime storage with the initiation of the Forward Floating Depot (FFD). Anchored in the Pacific Ocean Region, the FFD contained equipment configured in three-brigade task force. In the early days of the Viet Nam War, the U. S. Army used equipment and supplies loaded aboard the FFD.[4]

During the Carter presidency, the U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA) realized the military had a significant problem. The U.S. did not have strategic forces or strategic ship assets designated to respond to the Iranian hostage crisis. President Carter announced that the Persian Gulf region and the free flow of oil from the region were a vital interest to the

U.S. In response to the new vital interest, the President established a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).[5]

Marine General P.X. Kelley commanded the RDJTF headquartered in Tampa, Florida. The RDJTF was later designated as a warfighting CINC and renamed Central Command (CENTCOM). General Kelley did not have combatant forces assigned to his command. In the event of a crisis, supporting CINCs would provide forces to General Kelley. Other than Navy carrier battle groups, General Kelly desired combat equipment prepositioned in his area of responsibility (AOR).[6] Efforts to establish land base prepositioned sites in the Persian Gulf region proved futile. Persian Gulf countries were not willing to risk the retribution from neighboring countries for assisting the U.S.

General Kelly recommended Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels for the prepositioned equipment in the Persian Gulf region. July 1980, seven MSC vessels loaded with a Marine Amphibious Brigade's (MAB's) equipment and supplies, headed to British Island Indian Ocean Territory, (BIOT) Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is approximately two thousand nautical miles south of the Persian Gulf. The prepositioned ships anchored at Diego Garcia became known as the Near Term Preposition Force (NTPF).[7] From Aug 81 through Aug 82 three Army prepositioned ammunition ships and three Air Force prepositioned ammunition ships were

added to the NTPF at Diego Garcia. In 1985 the NTPF name was changed to the Afloat Prepositioned Force (APF).[8]

In Nov 1989, after the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War, DOD began a new military strategy of force projection and removed forces from forward-deployed locations.

The new strategy required additional maritime assets, with equipment and supplies, to be strategically located around the globe. In 1993, based on the MRS results, the Army began to increase the afloat prepositioned force package from 0.85 million square feet to two million square feet of combat and combat support equipment; equivalent to one heavy brigade.[9]

CHAPTER III

AFLOAT PREPOSITIONED FORCE

The Afloat Prepositioned Force (APF) consists of three categories: Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS), Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-3), and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS). All afloat prepositioned vessels are U.S. flag vessels and must maintain U.S Coast Guard certifications.

APS

APS are seven dry cargo and tanker ships used to position afloat Air Force and Navy prepositioned materials. These seven ships primarily loaded with ammunition and fuel will not be addressed in this study. Neither Charleston, South Carolina nor Blount Island has the adequate port capacity to accept vessels with such large quantities of fuel and ammunition. These vessels currently receive their maintenance at shipyards on the West Coast. The APS fleet maintenance schedule does not alter the conclusions of this study.

APS-3

APS-3 consist of thirteen vessels loaded with ammunition, equipment for five battalion task forces, a port opening package, and sustainment cargo. **Table 3-1.**[10]

The initial draw down of the U.S. Army overseas forces began in Germany. Deactivating units transported unit equipment and supplies to the port of Antwerp Belgium. At the port the

equipment was loaded aboard U.S. flag vessels and prepositioned in Diego Garcia. Realizing the prepositioned equipment would require maintenance, the U.S. Army contracted with the U.S. Marine Corps to have the maintenance performed at the U.S. Marine Corps' maintenance facilities in Blount Island, Florida.[11] The Army than began to search for a location to conduct a complete maintenance program for afloat prepositioned equipment.

Table 3-1

U.S. ARMY Prepositioneded Stocks - APS-3

SHIPS	EQUIPMENT	PREPRO SITE
SS Green Harbour -LASH	Ammo/Supplies	Diego Garcia
SS Green Valley -LASH	Ammo/Supplies	Diego Garcia
MV Jeb Stuart-LASH	Ammo	Diego Garcia
MV Am Cormorant-FLO/FLO	Port Opening Equip	Diego Garcia
USNS Gordon-LMSR	Battalion TF	Diego Garcia
USNS Shughart-LMSR	Battalion TF	Diego Garcia
USNS YANO-LMSR	Battalion TF	Diego Garcia
USNS GILLILAND-RO/RO	Battalion TF	Diego Garcia
MV Cape Douglas-RO/RO	Battalion TF	Diego Garcia
SS Gopher State-T-ACS	Transportation Group	Guam/Saipan
MV SP5 Eric Gibson-Cont	Sustainment	Guam/Saipan
MV LTC Calvin P. Titus-Cont	Sustainment	Guam/Saipan
MV Strong Virginian-Cont/RO/RO	HLPS	(Delivers Jun 98)

Key:

LASH- Lighterage Aboard Ship
FLO/FLO - Float On/Float Off
LMSR - Large Medium Speed Roll On/Roll Off
RO/RO - Roll On/Roll Off
T-ACS - 1 Ton Class Auxiliary Crane Ship
Cont - Container
HELPS - Heavy Lift Prepro Ship

In June 1992, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics commissioned the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to conduct a study to determine the best and most cost effective port to conduct maintenance on APS-3 equipment and supplies.[12] The study recommended the port of Charleston, South Carolina, as the most cost-effective location to conduct the maintenance.

On 18 Aug 93, the Secretary of Defense concurred with the results of the LMI study. He directed the Secretary of the Army to establish the U.S. Army's afloat prepositioned maintenance site in Charleston, South Carolina. The Secretary of Defense also directed the Secretaries of Army and Navy, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to study the feasibility of establishing a joint maintenance facility for the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps.[13]

MPS

The MPS consist of thirteen vessels deployed in three squadrons, each squadron located strategically throughout the world, carrying unit equipment and supplies for 30 days. **Table 3-2.**[14] Each squadron consists of four to five ships. The ships provide all the equipment and supplies to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of approximately 16,500 personnel. Since the inception of maritime prepositioning the U.S. Marine Corps viewed it as a strategic deployment tool. MPS has no

inherent forcible entry capability, but provides an immediate and credible force in time of crisis.[15] In July 1980, the U.S. Marine Corps loaded its afloat prepositioned cargo at Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, North Carolina. Understanding the importance of maintaining the loaded equipment and supplies, the U.S. Marines immediately began to search for a U.S. port, which could accommodate portside maintenance of equipment. In 1985, the Marine Corps leased a portion of a commercial port, Blount Island, in the state of Florida.[16]

Table 3-2

U.S. MARINE CORPS Prepositioned Stocks - MPS

SHIPS	EQUIPMENT	PREPRO SITE
MV 2ND Lt John P. Bobo	II MEF (MAGTF)	West Med.
SS PFC Eugene A. Obregon	II MEF (MAGTF)	West Med.
SS SGT Matej Kocak	II MEF (MAGTF)	West Med.
SS MAJ Stephen W.Pless	II MEF (MAGTF)	West Med.
MV CPL Louis J. Hauge, Jr.	II MEF (MAGTF)	Diego Garcia
MV PFC James Anderson, Jr.	I MEF (MAGTF)	Diego Garcia
MV PFC William B. Baugh	I MEF (MAGTF)	Diego Garcia
MV 1st Lt Alex Bonnyman	I MEF (MAGTF)	Diego Garcia
MV PVT Franklin J. Phillips	I MEF (MAGTF)	Diego Garcia
MV 1st Lt Jack Lummus	III MEF (MAGTF)	Guam/Saipan
MV SGT William R. Button	III MEF (MAGTF)	Guam/Saipan
MV 1st Lt Baldomero Lopez	III MEF (MAGTF)	Guam/Saipan
MV PFC Dewayne T. Williams	III MEF (MAGTF)	Guam/Saipan
USNS 1st Lt Harry L. Martin	II MEF - MPF (E)	West Med. (Del. Sep 99)
USNS LCPL Roy M. Wheat	I MEF - MPF (E)	Diego Garcia (Del. Jul 99)
MPF (E)***	III MEF- MPF (E)	Guam/Saipan (Awd. Feb 98)

Key:

MEF - Marine Expeditionary Force
MAGTF - Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MPF (E) - Maritime Prepositioned Force (Equipment)

CHAPTER IV

SITE COMPARISON

Blount Island

The U.S. Marines rotate their prepositioned ships to Blount Island Command (BIC) for the maintenance of prepositioned equipment. The command consists of approximately 144 DOD military and civilian personnel. The mission of the command is to offload equipment for the testing, inspection, exercise, and organizational maintenance. If equipment requires depot-level maintenance it is performed at the Marine Corps depot in Albany, GA.

Blount Island is a government leased, deep-water, commercial port. The lease, signed in 1985 and renegotiated in 1990 for fifteen years, calls for the exclusive use of one berth for the Marines. The total cost of the lease is ten million dollars annually. The lease expires in the year 2004 and includes a five-year renewal option. The lease has no breaking provisions.[17]

Blount Island consists of a 762-acre complex with 262 acres dedicated to the exclusive use of the Marine Corps operations. Seventeen concrete acres are used to stage rolling stocks. Sixteen acres are designated as an intermodal yard to switch containers from one conveyance to another. There is a 1000-foot pier, dredged to 38 feet, to accommodate one MPS vessel. There

are two rail spurs with a forty-railcar capacity. Ammunition throughput is limited to 1.2 million net explosive weight (NEW).[18]

Ammunition and watercraft maintenance is not conducted by the BIC on Blount Island.[19] The BIC operates under an ammunition certification granted by the Secretary of the Navy. The certification limits ammunition handling on Blount Island to nights and weekends. The ammunition is downloaded and immediately transported, by rail, to Charleston, S.C. for necessary maintenance and storage.[20] Given the change of Administrations and coupled with the additional cost for the transportation of ammunition, it is questionable if the Secretary of the Navy will continue to grant the ammunition certification.

To meet U.S. Coast Guard certification, U.S. flag vessels must have a complete inspection of the hull twice in a sixty-month period. Certified hull inspectors can inspect the hull while the vessel is in the water, but at a minimum, one hull inspection must occur, during the sixty-month cycle, when the ship is in drydock.

Based on the hull inspection criteria, the U.S. Marine Corps established a thirty-month inspection cycle for the maintenance of the prepositioned equipment. The ship arrives at BIC and all equipment and supplies are downloaded. The ship is then released to travel to a shipyard for a hull inspection or any other needed repairs. With thirteen ships in the MPF inventory and three

additional ships projected by FY 98, the rotation allows sixty days per vessel to complete the download, inspection, maintenance and upload of all equipment and supplies. 16 ships x 2 months ≅ 32 month cycle. It is envisioned the U.S. Marines will request a waiver for inspection time limits and the U.S. Coast Guard will grant the request.

Charleston, South Carolina

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 94 required the Army to establish an Army Prepositioned Maintenance Facility at Charleston, SC.

> Sec. 317. Location of Certain Prepositioning Facilities.
>
> (a) Site for Army Prepositioning Maintenance Facility. - The Secretary of the Army shall establish the Army Prepositioning Maintenance Facility at Charleston, South Carolina.
> (b) Limitation. - During the two-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that separate but complementary prepositioning facilities are maintained in Charleston, South Carolina, and Blount Island, Jacksonville, Florida, for the Army and Marine Corps, respectively.
> (c) Report Before Subsequent Relocation. - After the end of such two-year period, the Secretary of the Navy may not relocate the Marine Prepositioning Forces from Blount Island, Jacksonville, Florida, until the Secretary of Defense has submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a detailed cost analysis and operational analysis explaining the basis of the decision for such relocation.[21]

This was done primarily for two reasons: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) hearings were ongoing at the time and Charleston Naval Base was a target for closure. The U.S. Army had no location, in CONUS, to conduct maintenance on afloat prepositioned equipment.[22] Congress wanted assurances that DOD would not spend additional funds on another commercial port facility and abandon the port of Charleston, South Carolina.

Congress also wanted to ensure DOD would not relocate from Blount Island until a complete analysis of a joint facility could be presented. In March 1996, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) directed the formation of a management structure for all APS assets. Combat Equipment Base-Afloat (CEB-A) has the mission for Charleston. The mission of CEB-A is to plan, manage, and execute port operations and other logistics support for the establishment, maintenance, and reconstitution of APS-3. The CEB-A command is authorized 52 military and civilian personnel and 556 contract personnel. OMA budget for APS-3 for FY 96 was $80,541,500.[23]

Charleston is a 17,000 - acre DOD owned facility. The APS-3 uses approximately 385-acres to perform maintenance of APS-3 equipment. The maintenance area encompasses 300 acres with a total of forty-seven buildings. There are thirty-six acres reserved for staging equipment, and an additional twenty-five acres are reserved for ammunition staging and repair. The port has a pier that is not dedicated to the afloat prepositioned ships. Charleston's port operations personnel must coordinate with the scheduler of Navy resupply ships to avoid berthing conflicts.

The APS-3 ships schedule for Charleston follow the same routine as those of BIC. Once all the LMSR vessels enter the fleet, only eight will travel to Charleston for the maintenance of loaded equipment. The remaining eleven vessels, loaded with

ammunition, will sail to ports in California for maintenance. The cycle enables the APS-3 to meet U.S. Coast Guard's standards and provides time for vessels to receive any needed repairs.

CHAPTER V

EQUIPMENT

The U.S. Army will continue to expand the APS-3 to 2.0 million square feet of unit equipment. The expansion program is scheduled for completion in FY 03. It is estimated the U.S. Army will load over 1000 unique line items totaling 72,000 pieces of equipment. The U.S. Marine Corps will also continue to increase the size of its MPS. **Table 5-1** provides an estimated number of selected pieces of equipment that what will be on the APS-3 and the MPS after expansion.

Table 5-1

U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Prepositioned Equipment

APS-3	EQUIPMENT	MPS
123	M1A1 TANKS	88
154	BRADLEYS w/TOW	0
100	APC/AAV	109
24 self propelled	155mm HOWITZERS	30 Towed
9	MLRS	0
0	Light Armored Vehicle	21
40	Armed HMMWVs	84 w/TOWs
377	Other Tracked Vehicles	0
3585	Wheeled vehicles	2584
2825	Trailers	1259

CHAPTER VI

It is possible to conduct maintenance of equipment at a joint facility. During the infancy of the afloat prepositioned program the two services conducted maintenance at the same location. With the exception of ammunition maintenance and storage at Charleston, South Carolina, neither service performs unique maintenance at either of the facilities. Is there a compelling need to establish a joint facility? Are there savings to be achieved from a joint facility? DOD may not receive more funds to expand either site. The Services must have the ability to rapidly react to a world wide contingency. Operational effectiveness must remain constant. What are the risks of a joint facility?

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Each service sized their respective facilities to discharge, perform maintenance and re-load one ship at a time. This procedure will ensure that equipment offloaded from a specific vessel will return to the same vessel. One vessel on birth at one time will reduce the number of vessels away from a CINC's AOR. In the event of a crisis a CINC does not want assets tied up in a port waiting for a priority of maintenance. One vessel on berth will also still allow the U.S. flag vessels to meet the U.S. Coast Guard requirements to have a hull inspection twice in

a sixty-month period.

FUNDING

An upgrade of facilities at either of the two ports would meet the requirements of a joint maintenance facility. The options include: the alternative of continued leasing or the purchase of Blount Island and investing in the capital improvement of Charleston. The U.S. Army has previously awarded Charleston $53.3 million Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) dollars to upgrade the infrastructure in support of the APS-3 program.[24] Table **6-1**[25] illustrates the annual operating costs, in FY 94 dollars, of a single service and a joint service maintenance facility.

Table 6-1

Annual Operating Costs

$ Millions

	Single Service Blount Island (Lease)	Single Service Charleston	Two Separate Facilities	Joint Service BIC (L)	Joint Service BIC (B)	Joint Service Charleston
Single Site Totals	$72.9	$62.1	$135.0			
Joint Site Totals				$122.1	$107.3	$105.6

BIC – Blount Island Command (L) – Lease (B) - Buy

Consolidation to a joint maintenance facility will require one-time cost with the requirement of a move by one of the services. **Table 6-2**[26] compares the existing facilities and the one-time, base case, of relocation and six months of parallel

operating during transition. The analysis indicates that a joint facility in Charleston, South Carolina would save DOD $35.8 million dollars in up front cost. Although the cost to establish joint maintenance operations at Charleston, South Carolina vice Blount Island includes higher site improvement cost, and Marine Corps lease breaking, moving and ship modifications costs, those costs are quickly recaptured in the lower annual operating costs at the Port of Charleston, South Carolina.

Table 6-2

One time costs: Base Case ($M)

	Separate Siting	**Joint Facility at CHS**	**BI**
Facility MilCon	--	$53.8	$62.7
Site improvements	--	$22.1	$8.3
BI refurbishment	$6.0	---	$6.0
Movement of Personnel & Things	--	$12.4	$4.6
Personnel transition hedge	--	$13.2	$8.3
BI purchase and lease termination	$90.0	$37.6	$90.0
Ship modification costs*	-----	$5.0	----
	$96.0	**$144.1**	**$179.9**
One time cost of collocation		**$48.1**	**$83.9**

*Ships of the MPF must be modified to fit under the Cooper River Bridge. The bridge does not have the ability to move or span to accommodate the vessels from the MPF. The Cooper River is located at the mouth of the harbor to the Port of Charleston. All

of the APS-3 vessels were built or configured to fit under the bridge.

There are some recurring costs associated with the consolidation of a joint maintenance facility. **Table 6-3**[27] illustrates the base case recurring costs.

Table 6-3

Recurring costs: Base Case ($M)

	Separate Siting	**Joint Facility CHS**	**Joint Facility BI**
Depot transportation and repair	$11.6	$11.6	$11.6
Maintenance spares and repair parts	$28.5	$28.5	$28.5
BOS and RPMA	$5.5	$4.4	$4.7
Other operations	$9.9	$9.9	$9.9
Stevedoring	$6.5	$7.2	$5.6
Transportation of things	$6.6	$4.1	$6.5
Government workforce	$9.4	$7.9	$7.9
Contractor workforce	$76.6	$70.9	$69.9
TOTAL	**$154.6**	**$144.5**	**$144.6**

One-time costs of $44 million and an annualized operating saving (20 years) of $6.9 million results in an annualized net saving of $4.7 million or 4.2% of total costs under separate siting. Using these calculations the break-even point is five years. Up-front costs are more certain than long-run savings.

There were projected savings from previous BRAC that have not materialized. The savings are optimistic at best. There is no guarantee DOD will realize any savings from a joint maintenance

facility. If there are any saving from a joint facility, this will not guarantee that the savings will remain in the DOD budget.

RISK

There are risks associated with a joint maintenance facility. With the drawdown of the services and the advancement of technology it is conceivable that afloat prepositioned stocks will increase. A major concern for the continued use of Blount Island is expansion in the commercial sector. The civilian companies in the Jacksonville Port Authority have enjoyed an economic boom. Access to roads and facilities have become congested and space is at a premium. At the end of the U.S. Marine Corps lease, a lucrative commercial price may negate another long term lease or purchase by DOD.

One port supporting both services has vulnerabilities from asymmetrical threats. Acts of God will play a critical role in arguing to keep two ports open. Hurricanes are known to hit the East Coast and cause billions of dollars of damage. With two ports, the ships can move to a safe heaven until the hurricane has passed or until the damage has been repaired. Strikes by the International Longshoremen Association can cause delays in the unloading and loading of vessels. If a strike occurs in a port, the ship could move to the port, which is not effected by the strike.

For many years DOD used the Port of Galveston, Texas as the

port of choice for U.S. Army equipment deploying from Texas and Oklahoma. Galveston Port Authority recognized an economic boom in the movement of commercial cargo and did not renew the lease for DOD cargo. DOD quickly negotiated a lease with the Port Authorities of Beaumont and Corpus Christi Texas.
While Charleston presents room to expand, it also has disadvantages for the establishment of a joint maintenance facility. Vessel modification to MPS vessels to get into the port of Charleston adds additional expense to a move. There is not adequate pier space to conduct pier side maintenance operations.

Two separate facilities will ensure that there is always one port available to perform maintenance on afloat prepositioned cargo. DOD should insist that the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army continue to conduct maintenance at separate facilities. DOD should also direct each service to share management improvements programs and cost savings initiatives between the two sites.

A joint facility will increase the bureaucratic layers of management and will be less responsive to the CINCs. A joint maintenance command would have to be established to coordinate the maintenance of both services. This could violate the Title 10 responsibilities of the Service Chiefs. Title 10 mandates that each Service Chief maintains a credible fighting force and the maintenance of all equipment in support of the warfighting CINCs. In addition to Service Chief's Title 10 responsibilities, The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 4310.01 outlines the maintenance of afloat prepositioned equipment for the Services.

> The Service owning the prepositioned cargo will determine cargo contents and cargo maintenance requirements. Cargo maintenance should be scheduled concurrent with vessel maintenance whenever possible. Every effort should be made to minimize vessel offstation time and limit ships from having concurrent maintenance. The Service will schedule cargo and vessel maintenance after ordination with USCINCTRANS (as appropriate) and the affected CINCs.[29]

In the existing structure of maintenance, each Service has a clearly defined chain of command. A joint facility could add as many as three additional levels of management to the existing structure: TRANSCOM to coordinate vessel schedules, the component commander, to ensure facilities and a workforce are available and a joint command or executive agent to fix a priority of maintenance. This new structure will not enhance efficiency, but only make it more cumbersome.

CONCLUSION

DOD should not establish a joint maintenance facility. Clearly there are similarities between the U.S. Army's and the U.S. Marines Corps' afloat prepositioned maintenance programs. With the exception of ammunition maintenance and storage at BIC, there is not any special maintenance program, which could not be performed at either port.

Two afloat prepositioned maintenance facilities will negate operational risk of one port. Two facilities will provide DOD with the flexibility of moving to either port in the event one port is damaged or closed. If consolidation of the afloat prepositioned maintenance facilities were to become a reality, there would be a disruption in operations during the transition period of consolidating the facilities.

The total cost differences in maintaining one afloat prepositioned maintenance facility is not great enough to overcome the advantages of two ports. Cost savings are not a certainty they are a projection. DOD projected savings from other consolidations, such as BRAC and the outsourcing services, failed far short of expected outcomes. Pending budget battles between the Congress and DOD could make a joint maintenance facility more viable in the future.

There are no compelling reasons to establish a joint maintenance facility. The additional funds required to maintain two separate facilities is a national insurance policy to ensure afloat prepositioned maintenance facilities will be available when needed. DOD must insist the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps continue to perform afloat prepositioned maintenance at separate facilities.

4,481

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