



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
PARADIGM IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL T. BROWN
United States Army**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

USAWC CLASS OF 1997

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050



19970623 247

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public
release. Distribution is
unlimited.

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Within the United
States: Asymmetric Warfare Paradigm in the 21st Century**

by

**Lieutenant Colonel Michael T. Brown
United States Army**

**Colonel Joseph C. Bowen
Project Adviser**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5050**

UNCLASSIFIED

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Michael T. Brown, LTC, US Army

TITLE: Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Within the United States:
Asymmetric Warfare in the 21st Century

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 24 March 1997 **PAGES:** 26 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

The use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by terrorists within the United States presents a clear and present danger to national security. In virtually every region of the world, nation states are arming themselves with WMD. Coupled to the rising spread of WMD is the growing list of nations sponsoring worldwide terrorism. The proliferating nature of this combined threat of WMD and terrorism is changing the paradigm of asymmetrical warfare as we approach the new millennium. Reviewing the U.S. Government responses to terrorism and WMD reveals a fragmented framework that addresses these threats separately, without one federal agency in the lead. The world witnessed this new paradigm of asymmetrical attack when the Japanese religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo or Supreme Truth, attacked the Tokyo subway system using the chemical nerve agent Sarin on 20 March 1995. The Department of Defense should take action and assign this critical mission to a Joint WMD response force to support the federal, state and local crisis response framework.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Clarity of Terms-----	2
Proliferating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat -----	4
Paradigm of WMD Terrorism-----	5
Current Administration Counterterrorism Policy and Organization-----	7
Implementing the WMD Counterproliferation Initiative-----	8
Who is in Charge-----	10
Conclusion-----	12
Recommendation-----	15
Endnotes-----	21
Bibliography-----	25

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) used by terrorists within the United States would create a crisis that cuts across lines of responsibility for many government agencies and departments at all levels, from federal, state and local. Each has a share of the problem, but planning and policymaking activity is split.¹ The thesis of this paper postulates that terrorist use of WMD in the United States can cause catastrophic destruction and loss of faith in the government. While many aspects of the national counterproliferation initiative against WMD are being developed, it is time the U.S. Government takes action to focus on the role of the military in countering terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction within the United States.

This strategy research project will review the proliferating WMD threat, key definitions, and the current national policies, organizations, and processes available to counter the terrorist and WMD threat. The paradigm of threat from terrorism and WMD need to be fused and addressed together, with assigned responsibilities within the military department to support the federal response framework. The Department of Defense responsibilities and programs will be reviewed with an eye to potential solutions for responding quickly and effectively as a joint and interagency WMD response team.

The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and Enlargement states that the U.S. government is responsible for the protection and safety of Americans, maintaining our political freedom and independence. The NSS states the government will take all actions necessary to prevent the destructive forces of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from endangering U.S. citizens.² To accomplish this end, a comprehensive, all-hazard emergency preparedness process by Federal departments and agencies continues to be a crucial national security requirement.³

Clarity of Terms

Clarity of terms is vital in understanding the clear and present danger from terrorists and in designing a national plan against the use of WMD within the United States. There are various forms of terrorism, as defined by domestic, transnational and international terrorism. These simple definitions, however, become blurred as we approach the 21st century, as nation states covertly coopt or buy surrogate rogue groups to wage terror against target nations. These asymmetric attacks against national power and legitimacy threaten democratic nations where they are weakest- striking at the chords of personal freedom.

Terrorism is violence, or threat of violence, calculated to create fear and undermine the psycho-social stability and political governability of pluralist states with representative governments⁴. Governments have employed a variety of nonmilitary strategies in their fight against terrorism, including diplomacy, co-optation, negotiations and concessions. Nations that are proponents of using military force to fight terrorism note that Article 51 of the UN charter affirms the inherent right of self-defense in the face of armed attack.⁵ Terrorism is a dynamic strategy predicated on relentless offense, whereas counterterrorism has traditionally been a static, or defensive strategy by nation states.

Transnational terrorism is carried out by groups that operate without regard for national boundaries.⁶ International terrorism is supported and controlled by nation-states as part of waging asymmetric surrogate war against their enemies.⁷ Finally, domestic terrorism is defined as actions being carried out by indigenous groups within a country

normally based on domestic political grievances or conflicts.⁸ The CIA further defines terrorism as “the threat, or use, of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups with the intent to shock or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims.”⁹

Terrorism, then, is principally a *political problem*¹⁰ viewed as a means to an end, and not an end unto itself. It concerns more the ‘why’ of an act than the ‘what’. Terrorism is aimed at the people, the political constituents, and the political will of a nation such as the United States.

The Posse Comitatus Act affects the ability of military forces to assist in domestic crisis, and needs clarification at this point. By the constitutionally mandated checks and balances of power within the federal government, the control of the military was divided between the states and the federal government, as well as between the Executive and Legislative branches of the government.¹¹ Title 18, Section 1385, of the U.S. Code, use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus (power of the country) provides the constitutional and statutory limits of military forces in domestic situation. The Secretary of the Navy clarified the Navy position in 1974 by issuing a directive forbidding Navy and Marine Corps personnel from acting in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.¹²

Posse Comitatus Act thus prohibits the federal military forces from an active role in direct law enforcement, such as arrest, seizure of evidence, search of crime, interviewing witnesses or pursuit of prisoners. Passive activities that indirectly aid law enforcement officials are permissible, such as presence of military personnel, contingency planning, technical advice, delivery of materiel, or training on military equipment. Thus, within

tightly constrained legal parameters, the Posse Comitatus Act provides for employment of DOD forces during civil emergencies involving WMD and terrorists.^{13,14}

Proliferating WMD Threat

Despite the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that banned the first use of chemical weapons, nations around the world continue to pursue developing this technology and using these weapons against other nations. Within the past 60 years, eight nations have elected to use chemical agents or biological toxins on other nations in battle, most recently marked by the Iraqi use of chemical weapons on it's own Kurdish people in 1988.¹⁵

A significant portion of the WMD proliferation amounts to a form of arms race among regional nation states, viewed as an effective deterrent to conventional attack by aggressive neighbor states.¹⁶ Treaties and conventions alone can not stop the WMD proliferation. The recent experience of UN inspectors in Iraq give credence to the proposition that verifying compliance with chemical weapons conventions will be difficult if not impossible.¹⁷

As we approach the dawn of the new millennium, significant threats from the production, weaponization and sales of WMD and associated technology are evident around the world. There are currently five declared nuclear nations, and over 20 that have potentially acquired or attempting to acquire biological or chemical weapons.¹⁸

In the Pacific/ Asia region, North Korea and China continue to produce both chemical and biological agents. Both nations likely have the capability to produce chemical agent precursors, needed for self sustaining production. Additionally, both nations maintain a robust missile development program as evidenced by China having an

ICBM capability and North Korea flight testing the NODONG missile in 1993 with a range of 1000 km. Most alarming, however, is their continuing sales of missile technology and components around the world, providing the capability of delivering WMD payloads extended ranges.¹⁹

In the Middle East/ North Africa region, Iran, Iraq and Libya remain the rogue WMD proliferates. These countries have aggressively pursued technology to produce chemical and biological WMD, and are suspected of allowing their citizens to study abroad to bring their biochemical/ nuclear knowledge back for exploitation. After Operation Desert Storm, Iraq was found to have achieved chemical precursor production for chemical weapons, and even admitted in 1995 to producing and weaponizing biological agents and toxins.²⁰

The nations of India and Pakistan sustain the WMD proliferation race in the South Asia region. India is a nuclear capable nation, and is continuing work in the space launch program, which can be converted to ICBM capable systems. India maintains these actions are necessary to deter aggression by China, but in the process, provides initiative to Pakistan's work on WMD weapons as a counterweight to India's growing WMD capabilities.²¹

Paradigm of WMD Terrorism

"I do not demand any right; therefore, I need not recognize any right"

Red Army Faction, 1973.

Coupled to the rising spread of WMD is the dangerous trend of using terrorist groups as mercenaries by sponsor nations to conduct proxy terrorist wars against enemy states. State sponsored terrorists gain access to training, weapons, equipment and supplies that vastly increases the firepower of the terrorist groups. The sponsor nations find that proxy wars are significantly cheaper than maintaining standing military forces, with less risk of retribution if the connection is deniable.^{22, 23}

The United States currently lists Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state supporters of terrorism²⁴, many of which also possess WMD. In 1995 Iran was the world's most active supporter of international terrorism, funding such groups as the Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Iranian terrorist support also provided a safehaven for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a terrorist group fighting for an independent Kurdish state in Turkey.²⁵

Democratic societies thus have a paradox: terrorists can attack anywhere at anytime, while the government's security forces are powerless and unable to protect every conceivable target all the time.²⁶ In 1995, there were 99 attacks by terrorists worldwide, with over 70% targeted by bombing against businesses. These attacks resulted in 12 deaths and 60 wounded.²⁷ State-sponsored terrorism targeted against the United States is

on the rise as evidenced by the suspicious transfer of funds from banks in Iran and Germany to terrorist accounts in the United States just before the Trade Center bombing in New York.²⁸ Many terrorist groups aim to change the existing political order through violence unconstrained by political, moral, or practical constraints.²⁹

The specter of terrorists waging asymmetric war against a nation state using WMD materialized on 20 March 1995 when the Japanese religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo or Supreme Truth, attacked the Japanese citizens in the Tokyo subway system using the chemical nerve agent Sarin. The attack killed 12 persons and sent 5,500 to area hospitals for treatment. After additional Japanese police investigations, the Aum was also charged with the June 1994 chemical attack in Matsumoto that killed seven and injured 500.³⁰ The threat of terrorist use of WMD has been unleashed.

Current Administration Counterterrorism

Policy and Organization

Terrorism capitalizes on the paradox of modern democracy that the very strengths are also its weaknesses; namely in the belief in innate personal rights, respect for human life and the rule through the will of the majority.³¹ To fight terrorism, President Carter's administration devised the four basic components of counterterrorism, namely prevention, deterrence, reaction, and prediction.³²

The Clinton Administration added to the counterterrorism framework, and sought to increase the use of extradition as a counterterrorist tool in 1995, with five new extradition treaties pending Senate consent to ratification and nearly 20 being negotiated.³³ Current US counterterrorist policy follows three general rules:³⁴

- * Make no deals with terrorists or submit to blackmail.
- * Treat terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law.
- * Bring maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions.

The existing interagency process in fighting terrorism within the United States is split among various departments. The State Department has lead for foreign acts of terrorism and the Department of Justice has lead for terrorism within the United States. The numbers of Departments and agencies having a role in fighting terrorism continues to grow, and now include the Defense Department (DOD), National Security Council (NSC), Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

The DOD's counterterrorism role is primarily designed for dealing with terrorists outside the United States. All paramilitary operations by DOD forces inside the United States fall under the jurisdiction of the FBI once the President has waived statutory restrictions.³⁵ The FY 97 Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 104-201, directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team. It is significant to note that this team would be composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of the DOD who are capable of aiding Federal, State and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment,

dismantlement, and disposal of WMD containing chemical, biological or related materials.

Implementing the WMD Counterproliferation Initiative

"One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear, chemical, biological and the ballistic missiles that can rain down on populations hundreds of miles away"

President Clinton's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, Fall 1993)

The horror of terrorists using WMD against helpless citizens provides great leverage against powerful nations and their national interests. To enhance America's security against the looming threat from WMD, the President issued a Directive in December 1993 to the Department of Defense to implement a WMD counterproliferation initiative.

Countering the proliferation of WMD and related technology continues to be a national emergency, vividly seen through the linkage flowing from the National Security Strategy to the National Military Strategy. Three Presidential Executive Orders, 12735 (November 1990), 12930 (September 1994), and 12938 (November 1994) declared nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, as direct threats to the security of the United States.³⁶ The threat that WMD presents to United States security and other allied countries was published in the 1995 Presidential National Security Strategy.³⁷

The DOD Counterproliferation Initiative hinges on preventing WMD proliferation, dealing primarily with weapons and technology. The SECDEF mandate on the counterproliferation initiative charged the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lead the CINCs in WMD counterproliferation planning and military contingency operations, ensuring major equipment shortfalls in deployed military capabilities were addressed.³⁸ The President revised the Unified Command Plan on May 24, 1995 to reflect the mission to counter the proliferation of WMD.³⁹

Despite slow, but significant progress made to organize the DOD efforts against the proliferation of WMD, a significant risk remains unanswered concerning the domestic vulnerability to WMD attack by terrorists or rogue groups. Attacking US constituents with WMD by terrorists threatens to splinter political consensus, unbalancing the National Security Strategy and potentially influencing the worldwide positioning of economic investments, US forces and political will.⁴⁰ Given the rising worldwide trend of using terror tactics to gain public attention, the active role of DOD forces in supporting domestic defense against WMD terrorists remains uncertain.

Who is in Charge

“While the President and Secretary repeatedly cited proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the most serious national security concern, the operational and administrative sides of DOD took several years to formulate an organizational response to this priority mission.”

Senator Sam Nunn

Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996

Determining who is in charge after a terrorist attack using WMD within the United States is difficult, and generally depends on the circumstances and response plan used. In practice, the federal government uses the lead agency concept with established boundaries of responsibility depending on the type of crisis.⁴¹ In general, the State Department has operational responsibility for international incidents; the Department of Justice and the FBI have federal jurisdiction for domestic incidents; and the Federal Aviation Administration has primary responsibility for aircraft hijacking.⁴²

The US national level crisis management terrorism response system recognizes the Department of Justice (FBI) as lead agency pursuing criminal matters related to a terrorist incident. At the same time, this same response system recognizes that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will be the lead federal agency during consequence management to alleviate damage, loss, hardship or suffering caused by emergencies.^{43,44} Buried within this federal terrorist response system is the critical role of the National Security Council (NSC).

The NSC exists as the principal forum for national security issues requiring presidential consideration, and was organized under the mantle of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the NSC to deal with domestic and international terrorism. Presidential Executive Order 12656, signed by President Reagan on November 18, 1988, assigned primary responsibility for national security preparedness policy and terrorist response to the NSC. Particularly noteworthy is that this Executive Order

appoints the NSC as the executive branch liaison to Congress and the federal judiciary on national security emergency preparedness matters.⁴⁵

Compounding the difficulty in the search for who is in charge at a domestic terrorist attack using WMD, FEMA's Federal Response Plan (FRP) assigns lead federal agencies based on set emergency support functions. Various federal agencies are appointed lead under this plan with responsibility for designated emergency support function- such as American Red Cross (mass care), HHS, Public Health Service (health and medical services), EPA (hazardous materials), and DOE (energy- nuclear).

In the FEMA FRP, the Department of Defense (DOD) is lead federal agency for public works and engineering, and is active in supporting the other emergency support functions in the U.S. response to international terrorism.⁴⁶ Remarkable in this plan is the clear lack of a designated lead to address WMD terrorism. The FRP does not clearly assign the DOD as lead in WMD incidents, despite denizen expertise regarding terrorist weapons of all types, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁷

The role of government must lie in preparation of appropriate equipment and forces for catastrophic events. In all catastrophic disasters, large numbers of people are likely affected, overwhelming local health facilities, communication networks and public safety authorities. The DOD can take the lead in establishing training and equipment development for federal forces responding to WMD terrorist attacks.⁴⁸ The U.S. government's ability to respond quickly and effectively to a domestic WMD attack by terrorists frames the deterrence value of a nation's readiness.⁴⁹ A potential means of crisis

support and consequence management from a terrorist WMD attack within the United States should be the existence of a Department of Defense WMD Joint Response Force.

Conclusion

The aim of a terrorist group is to create a climate of fear and social collapse, essentially demoralizing the population and creating a groundswell of turmoil against the government. The message that WMD terrorism sends is one of citizen vulnerability, fear, anxiety and government impotence.⁵⁰

The ultimate test of any government is how it responds in times of crisis. Despite the number of nations that sign multilateral conventions against chemical or biological weapons, the number of countries which now possess or are actively pursuing WMD capabilities are still increasing.⁵¹ the government needs to be able to back up stated policies in counterterrorism and WMD counterproliferation within the United States.⁵²

Asymmetrical threats will continue to challenge US national security by attacking weakness and not strengths. No potential adversary in the foreseeable future can directly confront America's conventional military forces on the battlefield. Thus, the US must maintain not only sufficient conventional combat forces, but must also use the time to organize and train military capabilities that can prevent and deter the use of WMD by terrorist within the United States.

Within the federal crisis response system, the use of federal armed forces would be considered only after local, state and federal law enforcement forces responded and could not handle the situation. The president would decide on employment of federal armed forces, based upon the advice of the attorney general, and only as a last resort in extreme

cases of terrorist attack. As a direct result of terrorist use of WMD in Japan, and terrorist attacks against the Oklahoma City Federal building and New York World Trade Center in the United States, the President, via Presidential Decision Directive 39, formally expressed desire to obtain the capability to combat terrorist acts.

The Army has a central role in the DOD WMD counterproliferation initiative. The Secretary of the Army is the appointed executive agent for use of military forces in civil emergencies, as detailed by the concept of operations contained in the Army Civil Disturbance Plan, Garden Plot.⁵³ Additionally, the Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for DOD to coordinate and integrate research, development, test, evaluation, acquisition, and military construction in all nuclear, biological and chemical defense matters.⁵⁴

Liaison and training with various federal, state and local agencies is critical to develop a dialogue to gain intelligence and situational information prior to a crisis.⁵⁵ Military response units must clearly understand the scope of authority of responders, limits of responsibility, and passage of operational control based on jurisdiction.

Public Law 103-160 requires that all Military Services conduct Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) defense professional training at the same school location. Subsequently, all Services of DOD have co-located their training programs at the US Army Chemical School. This is the same school that runs the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF), the only facility in the free world that permits training with live chemical agents. This unique facility has been used thus far to train over 36,000 US

Armed Forces, as well as military from Germany, United Kingdom, and selected US law enforcement personnel.⁵⁶

Despite the published threat to national security, the DOD WMD counterproliferation initiative is still missing the existence of a standing Joint military WMD response force, organized and equipped to train and exercise with civilian counterparts of federal, state and local agencies.

Recommendations

“Weapons of mass destruction- nuclear, biological and chemical- along with their associated delivery systems, pose a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly nations...”

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.

The White House, February 1995

As the DOD executive agent for NBC matters and domestic disasters, the Army should be assigned the DOD lead for military response forces and provided the requisite resources to support the US domestic response to WMD terrorist attack. By tasking the Army with this vital mission and allocating the appropriate resources, a Joint WMD response force could be activated, leveraging existing expertise and training infrastructure. This action would provide the federal government with the quickest returns on investment for readiness against WMD terrorism within the United States.

Activate Joint DOD WMD Response Force Headquarters

Within a democracy the federal governmental methods of countering terrorism are very limited, as the techniques used must not unnecessarily infringe on civil rights,

ensorship, or use of secret police. However, handling of a terrorist incident must be timely, well coordinated to focus assets of local, state and federal government at the right place and time for maximum effects. The time, expertise and political will now exists to activate a Joint DOD WMD Response Force, providing a needed focal point for DOD organization, training and equipping within the interagency team.

The FY97 Defense Authorization Act directed the SECDEF to develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team as part of a national strategy to support the civil response to WMD in terms of manning, equipping and training. Providing clear, streamlined lines of authority and communications are critical during any operation, but paramount in response to a terrorist WMD attack. Interagency working groups and response forces must be thoroughly trained and rehearsed at tactical, operational and government interagency levels.⁵⁷ Military units function best under tactical command of the military commander, while overall control of the federal response would be retained by the Department of Justice (FBI).⁵⁸

Special operations forces (SOF) are trained and resourced for interagency, joint and combined operations in counterterrorism and WMD counterproliferation.⁵⁹ US Special Operations Command is currently formulating a future military strategy for WMD and terrorism that includes crisis resolution, providing the ability to respond quickly and successfully to neutralize a lethal, potentially WMD threat.⁶⁰

Leverage Existing DOD Executive Agency and Infrastructure

DOD response forces are directed through the Secretary of Defense and assisted by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of the Army for crisis and

consequence management. All military taskings and actions are coordinated through the Director of Military Support (DOMS). As outlined in the national interagency terrorism response system, DOD forces should be employed under operational control of a Response Task Force (RTF), or the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Either of these task forces, when deployed, are normally assigned to an appropriate Unified Combatant Commander (CINC).⁶¹

The most efficient command and control of DOD forces identified as response forces to domestic WMD terrorist incidents should be task organized under an active duty Joint WMD response force headquarters, potentially assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command, US Special Operations Command. This response force headquarters should be modeled after an Army Chemical brigade headquarters, providing the required staff, technical expertise and equipment.

Requiring less than 80 personnel, the proposed Joint WMD response force headquarters would contain the required technical specialties on the staff to provide intelligence, operations planning and control, logistics, and communications functions. Additionally, assigned special staff would provide expertise in legal, public affairs, comptroller and contracting. More importantly, a commander would finally be assigned this critical mission, and be responsible for the necessary training and readiness. As the DOD focal point for interagency WMD terrorism response, this force would provide the much needed operational continuity from coordinating, planning, exercising, training, actual response and recovery.⁶²

Leverage Existing Service Units

Assets assigned to this Joint WMD response brigade headquarters should include the Army Technical Escort Unit, USMC CBIRF, technical WMD support specialty elements of the USAF and USN, and a tailored Army Chemical Battalion. These units are currently separate elements of the different Military Services designated to respond to nuclear, biological or chemical agents or weapons, in peace and during war. While providing specific response capabilities, this task organization provides clear mission requirements and responsibility for all DOD response forces.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps activated the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) in June 1996 as a capability to support deployed USMC forces for WMD consequence management. This unit is comprised of approximately 375 Marines and Sailors, and provides capabilities similar to an Army Chemical battalion in terms of chemical and biological agent detection, identification and limited decontamination. The CBIRF has additional medical support, casualty treatment, and laboratory diagnostics capabilities integrated into the unit.

The Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU) is composed of 152 soldiers and civilian personnel, responsible for technical escort of chemical and biological agents and munitions, rendering safe and/ or disposal of CB weapons.

A significant capability for the Joint DOD WMD response lies in the 44 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) defense companies in the Total Army, with 15 of these in the Active component, 9 in the National Guard and 20 in the Reserves. Additionally, there are three Active Army Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) tactical

Chemical battalions, providing support to Army maneuver divisions and Corps. While originally organized to support the Army's fight against the Cold War threat of Soviet WMD on the battlefield, these units are trained and assigned throughout the Army, ready to provide force protection for the Army within the continental US and with forward deployed forces around the world.

With trained battle staff personnel at the battalion level, these NBC defense units are equipped and trained to provide WMD detection and identification, protection and decontamination of people and equipment. The Navy and Air Force have specialists trained in NBC defense in Ships' survivability and Civil Engineering, respectively.

Leverage Existing Common Tactics, Equipment and Training

The FBI, as lead federal agency in domestic terrorist incidents, should procure WMD protective equipment, detection and identification capabilities and immunizations through the DOD. Other federal, state and local agencies tasked to respond to WMD incidents could also procure common equipment and parts through DOD and receive training at the US Army Chemical School. Training and equipping all the response forces with common tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment is a vital step in enhancing interoperability and support between government agencies.

Training within DOD for defense against nuclear, biological or chemical weapons is currently conducted for the Joint Services at the US Army Chemical School, which is conveniently collocated with the US Army Military Police School. The U.S. Army Chemical school can provide training to federal, state and local responders to WMD terrorist attack on established tactics, techniques and procedures in NBC defense.

Endnotes

-
- ¹ Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1986), 60.
- ² President William J. Clinton, A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: USGPO, February 1996), 12-13.
- ³ Ibid., 26.
- ⁴ Cline, 32.
- ⁵ General Ahmed Galal Ezeldin, Ph.D., Global Terrorism: An Overview (Chicago, IL: The University of Illinois at Chicago, Monograph No. 10, 1991), 63.
- ⁶ Ibid., 29.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Ibid., 28.
- ⁹ Yonah Alexander and James S. Denton, eds., Governmental Responses to Terrorism (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1986), 74.
- ¹⁰ Ezeldin, 38.
- ¹¹ William Regis Farrel, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 50.
- ¹² Ibid., 52.
- ¹³ Ibid., 44.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 55.
- ¹⁵ Maurice Eisenstein, Countering the Proliferation of Chemical weapons (RAND: National Defense Research Institute, for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1993), 1.
- ¹⁶ Shelley A. Stalh and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press in association with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), 78.
- ¹⁷ Eisenstein, viii.
- ¹⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), 1.

Endnotes

- ¹⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), 4-10.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 11-15.
- ²¹ Ibid., 36-40.
- ²² Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 1994), 9.
- ²³ Ezeldin, 12.
- ²⁴ U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 10321, April 1996), 23.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Hoffman, 18.
- ²⁷ U.S. Department of State, 73-74.
- ²⁸ Hoffman, 9.
- ²⁹ Hoffman, 7.
- ³⁰ U.S. Department of State, 5.
- ³¹ Ezeldin, 38.
- ³² Farrel, 35.
- ³³ U.S. Department of State, v.
- ³⁴ U.S. Department of State, iv.
- ³⁵ Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 65.
- ³⁶ President William J. Clinton, White House Press Release, Executive Order 12938 (Washington, DC: May 18, 1995).
- ³⁷ Clinton, A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

Endnotes

- ³⁸ Jeff Erlich and Theresa Hitchens, "Counterproliferation Efforts Await Requirement Review," Defense News (Nov 6-7, 1995): 20.
- ³⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, 48.
- ⁴⁰ Alexander, 124.
- ⁴¹ Farrel, 35.
- ⁴² Ibid., 36.
- ⁴³ Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Handbook of DOD Assets and Capabilities for Response to a Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Incident, (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Operations Directorate, July 1996), 2.
- ⁴⁴ Alexander, 8.
- ⁴⁵ William L. Waugh, Jr., Terrorism and Emergency Management: Policy and Administration (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1990), 107.
- ⁴⁶ Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3.
- ⁴⁷ Celmer, 64.
- ⁴⁸ Eisenstein, 20.
- ⁴⁹ Celmer, 70.
- ⁵⁰ Ezeldin, 14.
- ⁵¹ Dr. Gordon C. Olehler, The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat, Statement for the Record, to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs (Washington, DC: Director of Central Intelligence, 1 Nov 1995), 1, 10, 12.
- ⁵² Ezeldin, 43.
- ⁵³ Farrel, 56.
- ⁵⁴ Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4.
- ⁵⁵ Frank Bolz, Jr., Kenneth J. Dudonis, and David P. Schulz, The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures and Techniques (New York: Elsevier, 1990), 192.

Endnotes

- ⁵⁶ Status Report to the President, Consequence Management for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Terrorism, (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1995), 2.
- ⁵⁷ Ezeldin, 71.
- ⁵⁸ Farrel, 108.
- ⁵⁹ U.S. Special Operations Command, SOF Vision 2020, (Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 1996), 8.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.
- ⁶¹ Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7.
- ⁶² Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff, appendix G, H.

Bibliography

- Alexander, Yonah, and James S. Denton, eds. Governmental Responses to Terrorism. Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1986.
- Bolz, Frank, Jr., Kenneth J. Dudonis, and David P. Schulz. The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures and Techniques. New York: Elsevier, 1990.
- Celmer, Marc A. Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987.
- Cline, Ray S., and Yonah Alexander. Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare. Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1986.
- Clinton, William J., The President of the United States. A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington, DC: USGPO, February 1996.
- Clinton, William J., The President of the United States. Executive Order 12938. Washington, DC: White House Press Release, May 18, 1995.
- Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Handbook of DOD Assets and Capabilities for Response to a Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Incident. Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Operations Directorate, July 1996.
- Eisenstein, Maurice. Countering the Proliferation of Chemical weapons. RAND: National Defense Research Institute, for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1993.
- Erlich, Jeff and Theresa Hitchens. "Counterproliferation Efforts Await Requirement Review". Defense News (November 6-7, 1995).
- Ezeldin, Ahmed Galal, General, Ph.D. Global Terrorism: An Overview. Chicago, IL: The University of Illinois at Chicago, Monograph No.10, 1991.
- Farrel, William Regis. The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency. Consequence Management for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Terrorism. Status Report to the President, Washington, DC: FEMA, 1995.
- Hoffman, Bruce. Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 1994.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Proliferation: Threat and Response. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996.

Oehler, Gordon C., Dr. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat. Statement for the Record, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government Affairs. Washington, DC: Director of Central Intelligence, November 1, 1995.

Stalh, Shelley A., Geoffrey, Kemp, eds. Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia. New York: St. Martin's Press in association with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992.

U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995. Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 10321, April 1996.

U.S. Special Operations Command. SOF Vision 2020. Department of Defense, 1996.

Wagh, William L., Jr. Terrorism and Emergency Management: Policy and Administration. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1990.