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This thesis examines military presence as an effective means of influencing conflict management/resolution in contemporary midlevel conflicts. Advocated in the National Security Strategy, presence, a concept with a long naval history, has taken on a new context. The National Military Strategy states that "overseas presence forces, . . . promote stability and prevent conflict." Although embraced in strategy, presence as a joint concept is difficult to describe in doctrine. Perception driven, its cause and effect relationships are often intangible.

The thesis draws on the author's experience with and critique of presence applications in Haiti (OPERATION SUPPORT/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY). A historical overview culminating in an assessment of current doctrine traces the development of presence as a strategic concept. U.S.-Libyan relations provide the case study for analysis of presence and its policy ramifications.

Successful presence provides suasion. Simple historical perspective infers presence is a viable form of influence; however, effective application requires doctrine beyond the axiom: "Diplomacy that cannot be backed by force is limited." This thesis concludes that to achieve suasion joint presence has two fundamental requirements: an enabling doctrine of phased presence operations and integration into a long-term synergistic security strategy balancing and coordinating all instruments of national power.

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SUASION THROUGH MILITARY PRESENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF PRESENCE
IN U.S.-LIBYAN RELATIONS, 1977-1995

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

PETER JOSEF ALFRED RIEHM, LT, USN
B.M., University of Houston, Houston, Texas, 1985

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

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
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
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ABSTRACT

SUASION THROUGH MILITARY PRESENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF PRESENCE
IN U.S.-LIBYAN RELATIONS, 1977-1995 by LT Peter J. A. Riehm, USN,
200 pages.

This thesis examines military presence as an effective means of influencing conflict management/resolution in contemporary midlevel conflicts. Advocated in the National Security Strategy, presence, a concept with a long naval history, has taken on a new context. The National Military Strategy states that "overseas presence forces, . . . promote stability and prevent conflict." Although embraced in strategy, presence as a joint concept is difficult to describe in doctrine. Perception driven, its cause and effect relationships are often intangible.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: PRESENCE IN HAITI

In 1991, a coup unseated Haiti's first democratically elected President Jean Bertrand-Aristide. The United States (US) and the Organization of American States (OAS) promptly imposed trade sanctions on Haiti. By January 1992, mass refugee flight to the US began. Faced with the potential for human tragedy at sea and multitudes of illegal immigrants, the Bush administration responded in February 1992 with a repatriation policy. Although highly controversial, this policy kept the illegal immigration issue in check while the OAS pursued protocols on the restoration of democracy.

After challenging the Bush policy toward Haiti as "inhumane and morally wrong" during the 1992 Presidential campaign, President Clinton extended the Bush administration policy of repatriation upon his inauguration.¹ Clinton's campaign rhetoric triggered a boat building binge in Haiti.² With the specter of renewed refugee problems, the US implemented OPERATION ABLE MANNER, a broader US Coast Guard and US Navy operation providing naval presence to rescue or retrieve refugees and repatriate them. The OAS and United Nations (UN) brokered the Governor's Island Accords in July 1993, which provided for the return of Aristide, the early retirement of the military junta members, and the lifting of the trade sanctions. The agreement also contained provisions

for American and Canadian military advisors to reform the Haitian military and retrain the Haitian police force.

In October 1993, the US dispatched the *USS Harlan County (LST-1196)* to deliver some 200 military advisors to Haiti. Upon arrival in Port-au-Prince harbor, several small boats blocked the ship's berth and an armed mob on the pier chanting anti-American slogans prevented the ship from mooring. The leader of the de facto government Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras refused to retire and refused to allow Aristide's return thereby undermining the Governor's Island Accords. With no agreement and humiliated, the Clinton administration realized further measures were necessary. Diplomacy was stalled and economic sanctions seemed virtually ineffective. At that juncture, applying the military instrument of national power was the most viable means for increasing pressure on the recalcitrant military junta running Haiti. Securing UN approval, the Clinton administration launched OPERATION SUPPORT DEMOCRACY. This was a maritime interdiction operation (MIO) to enforce the embargo. With this development, the US was employing military presence in support of trade sanctions enforcement and refugee management.

Due to significant domestic pressure from special interest groups, the Clinton administration ended the repatriation policy in May 1994 and offered the opportunity for political asylum screening. The administration had seriously underestimated the Haitian response. Human catastrophe and crisis in illegal immigration ensued. Daily, thousands of Haitians were attempting to flee to America, and hundreds were drowning. Military presence was increasing rapidly. The Coast Guard

and Navy redoubled efforts to deal with the surge in refugees and the US Army sent equipment and military advisors to the Dominican Republic in an effort to stem the overland violations of tightening UN sanctions. Military presence was enforcing the embargo, and it was becoming clear that the mission for refugee management was actually thinly veiled illegal immigration control.

By the summer of 1994, the political situation was untenable. The population of Haitian refugees (and later Cuban refugees) in the US sanctuary at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base was swelling exponentially. Domestic pressure to resolve the Haiti crisis was mounting amid virulent criticisms of mismanagement. A military solution seemed inevitable. Here was an opportunity for a post-Cold War application of military presence to manage and resolve a minor conflict. However, the campaign thus far was mired by new complications in the nether world of operations other than war (OOTW). Military presence was attempting to manage the crisis by enabling economic measures with MIO and simultaneously conduct the unorthodox military mission of illegal immigration control. Then, in July 1994, the National Command Authority (NCA) sent the *USS Wasp (LHD-1)* Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) with 2,000 Marines embarked to Haiti in an effort to intimidate the military junta into stepping down.

The United States sought a specific outcome from the de facto government of Haiti: The coup leaders must step down and restore the legitimately elected government. During the campaign, the US brought several instruments of national power to bear. The US enforced economic sanctions with a multinational force under the auspices of the UN.

Diplomatic initiatives were attempted without resolution. Military application included MIO, refugee management (or illegal immigration control), and presence operations. US Navy presence operations in the Haitian littoral evoked tangible responses from the coup regime, but these operations never seemed to be coordinated with or pursued by the State Department. Finally, the US decided to employ a military operation to coerce the desired outcome. While that operation was imminent, one last ditch diplomatic effort was launched. In the looming shadow of military invasion, the threat of force seems to have lent the diplomatic effort the credibility to be successful. President Clinton summarized the apparent success:

The combination over time of mediation among the Haitian parties and steadily intensified sanctions proved, in the end, ineffective in budging the Haitian military leaders from their stubborn and illegal hold on power. Only the imminent threat of force combined with determined diplomacy was in the end successful in making it possible to achieve our objectives and further our national interests regarding Haiti.³

The US government achieved its desired outcome through the complementary application of the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of national power. The military instrument began as a presence operation on a grand scale. The preparations for invasion (use of force) were in effect presence operations that enabled execution of an invasion. These preparations proved an adequate threat of force to achieve an unopposed entry and political solution thereby precluding execution of a forced entry operation. But, was this application efficient? Was this approach the most effective means to achieve this end? Could the same outcome have been achieved through a more economy of force approach to presence? Obviously, a diplomatic settlement was

feasible with appropriate credibility, but could a different even smaller force have adequately communicated that credibility? This thesis contends that the military forces conducting presence operations prior to the decision to invade could have indeed communicated sufficient credibility to threaten the aggressors into seeking a political solution.

There was a multinational task group numbering five to seven warships at any given time, of which three to five were always US, conducting Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs) in support of UN sanctions with a US Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) in the vicinity of Haiti. While the efficacy of a large-scale forced entry with said forces may be disputable, its capacity to communicate military credibility in support of diplomacy is viable. Based on Haitian reactions to various presence operations of only one or two warships and helicopters, the ARG, escorted by several destroyers and frigates with helicopters flying in Port-au-Prince harbor, would have conveyed a clear and credible message. The ARG also had the capability to execute a permissive entry and to maintain order in the city for several days until follow-on forces could arrive to occupy the rest of the country. So, if the National Command Authority (NCA) was ready to enter into limited hostilities, what would have been lost by attempting another diplomatic initiative in concert with presence operations by those military forces already in theater? If it failed, those ships could have backed off and waited for those adaptive force packages to arrive for a forced entry. Had it succeeded, the crisis would have not only

ended sooner, but also spared the expense of mobilizing significant invasion forces.⁴

This professional experience off the coast of Haiti is the genesis of this thesis. Presence operations seemed to have been either misapplied, underutilized, or just plain misunderstood. The *USS Harlan County* incident in October 1993 is a good example of misapplied presence with an inadequate attempt at entry and unceremonious withdrawal of forces. Where was the disconnect? Was it lack of doctrine or lack of appreciation for the proper employment of presence? In pondering these questions, it became clear to the author that evaluating or measuring the effectiveness of presence operations has been subjective and largely intangible. Apparent ambiguity and difficulty in measuring variables make presence a complex concept to grasp, much less apply. For this thesis, presence is defined as any use of military power intended to influence a sovereign entity, regardless of perception, including mere capability to measured applications of force short of war. This thesis will attempt to discern some pattern or form to measure efficacy of presence operations.

Presence is a military operation, but in the macroconcept of using the military instrument to exercise national power, how does it fit in? To discuss how the military instrument is going to exercise presence, a working definition for power is required. This thesis will employ a "control-oriented" definition used by most analysts. Power is "the ability to control others and/or to manipulate one's environment as well as the outcomes associated with the events occurring within that environment."⁵ Strategy for the use of the military instrument to wield

power can be described in two broad categories: the application of force and the threat of force.⁶ The threat of force seeks influence or more precisely suasion. Suasion⁷ is the underlying principle for presence operations.

There are many models for the concept of influence; this thesis will rely on two. John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Associate Professor of Political Science at Miami University, explains that influence falls into three basic categories: compel, defend, and deter. He further states that the act of compelling (or war) between industrialized democracies is highly unlikely. As evidence he cites economic interdependence and the absence of conflict between First World states since World War II. According to Rothgeb, industrialized democracies will be primarily engaged in defending and deterring with only occasional acts of war to compel Third World nations.⁸

Similar to Rothgeb's model, Adam B. Siegel of the Center for Naval Analyses defines influence in terms of three concepts: Deter, Compel, and Reassure. Siegel's model focuses on how specific applications of military power actually influence. Offering numerous historical examples, he acknowledges the difficulty of proving influence occurred; something did or did not happen due to presence operations. He sums up this dilemma as perception. Perception has three basic factors: Capability, Credibility, and Communication. Perception is an essential element of influence in presence operations; however, the target's perception is immeasurable. It is not "objective reality," but rather an adversary's or friend's perception that determines influence. What does an opponent or friend think your capabilities are? What is

his perception of your credibility? Does he think you have the will to use the capabilities? And finally, what does he understand your intent to be, as opposed to what you thought you communicated?⁹

Understanding how an application like presence is intended to influence is a significant step in relating objectives of military operations to target interests. Shortfalls lie in the absence of doctrine to tie strategic objectives to the operational vehicle and any reliable means to measure effectiveness. Using military power to influence can be described in terms of "threat of force," but this thesis will focus on the concept of suasion. Presence is more appropriately described in terms of threat of force through force application to varying degrees. Within these degrees of threat and force application lies the concept of suasion: Compellence, Deterrence, and Reassurance.

This thesis will investigate the entire spectrum of presence from the sense of deterrence, by mere existence of capabilities, through the various applications of force in ever-increasing degrees. The basis for this thesis is doctrinal categorization of presence and an analysis of specific historical applications of presence. From this basis, the author will attempt to determine the scope of presence and to identify viable patterns of presence to which an influence can be attributable.

Endnotes

¹Tom Masland, "How did we get here?" Newsweek 124 (26 September 1994): 27.

²"Clinton's Haitian Headache," U.S. News and World Report 114 (25 January 1993): 16.

³William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti" October 13, 1994, Administration of William J. Clinton (Washington DC: The Whitehouse, 1995), 2021.

⁴The author was the Surface Operations Officer in DESTROYER SQUADRON TWO FOUR in OPERATIONS SUPPORT/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The squadron was the Commander, Task Group 185.1 that supported the littoral flanks of the invasion force and continued maritime interdiction throughout the operation.

⁵John M. Rothgeb Jr., DEFINING POWER: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 17.

⁶US Department of Defense, JCS Pub I: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1 June 1987), 232.

⁷Suasion is the act of persuading. In the context of presence, it means to deter, compel, or reassure.

⁸Rothgeb, Jr., 138-139, 153.

⁹Adam B. Siegel, To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crisis: the Role of US Naval Forces (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1995), 1 - 5.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND: A HISTORY OF PRESENCE

For as long as people have assimilated into groups, those groups have sought power. To maintain their independence and group identity, a group of people must achieve some degree of influence over their environment. Three political weapons are generally available: physical force, economic power, and psychological power or propaganda. In many situations, propaganda is based on the threat of physical or economic coercion. In primitive societies, "supporters were enlisted by the prestige of available force."¹ This concept of influence establishes the paradigm for presence. If you cannot (or will not) offer something desirable to attain your interests, offer something definitely unwanted. In other words, a credible threat of force will encourage support and cooperation from others. Emperor Wu-Ti of third-century China further illustrates this point: "If the sharp sword be not in your hand, how can you hope your friends will remain many?"² Emperor Wu-Ti eloquently captures both edges of the sword. One edge will deter would-be enemies from turning against you, and the other reassures your allies that your commitment is valuable.

The concept of sovereignty made a great leap with the emergence of a functioning balance-of-power system following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.³ As the evolution into the system of modern nation-states began, sustaining sovereignty obviously became essential not only

to each nation-state's interests but to its very survival. It became "axiomatic" that a state would depend at some time on force or the threat of it.⁴ With anarchy inherent in the international system of states, countries wanted to use force as an instrument in pursuit or protection of their interests. However, in the wake of the brutality of the Thirty Years War, using the sword to influence every situation was becoming less acceptable. Hence, the balance-of-power system was convenient; any one state could be deterred from aggression because it could not defeat another state and its allies. Adroit manipulation of this system could alleviate the requirements for using force by employing the threat of force. Implicit in this concept was that a credible threat of (combined allied armies) force could be a viable option for achieving suasion.

While statesmen were gaining appreciation for the implicit threat-of-force concept in a balance-of-power system, a military application of suasion was developing out of the concept of naval defense. This early stage of presence was during the period of the state system and naval power. When military applications are analyzed in terms of the three basic factors previously mentioned, threat of force had limited manifestations by the seventeenth century. Capability was expensive to maintain, and credibility was difficult to communicate. If you could not close (presence) with your enemy, you lacked sufficient capability. If you lacked sufficient capability, your threat was not credible. If your threat was not credible, communicating your desires was difficult. If communicating your desires was difficult, your ability to influence was impaired. If your ability to influence was

impaired, your sovereignty could be threatened. Therefore, if you can not close (presence) with your enemy, your sovereignty could be threatened. Laborious logic, but the lesson is both simple and significant: You must always remain ready and able to defend, lest your sovereignty continually be challenged.

The British Isles were quite naturally best defended from the sea, so until the seventeenth century the Royal Navy was essentially defensive. Even when employed in offensive operations, their primary role was to enable the Army to fight.⁵ During the wars with Spain around the end of the sixteenth century, England had acquired a relatively respectable Navy. In 1604, James I concluded peace with Spain. Without an enemy at sea, he then let the Royal Navy wither away until it was virtually nonexistent. In the conspicuous absence of sea power, piracy returned to the English Channel. Excessive loss of merchant shipping had deteriorated the situation such that in 1616 a special commission was appointed to investigate the matter. They recommended providing enough Navy to counter any force on the sea. Their two major points were: The Navy should continue to rely on hiring armed merchants to augment defense needs, and that this vital matter of national security could not depend on uncertain foreign alliances.⁶

The commission clearly understood naval force was required to eradicate piracy in the English Channel. Whether or not they realized a continuous naval presence would be required to keep them away is debatable. Despite their recommendations, the ensuing naval buildup was meager to the tasks. Piracy continued to be a nagging problem, and the Royal Navy could not even begin to compete on the high seas. "All

pretense of sovereignty was finally exploded in 1639, when the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Tromp drove the Spanish fleet into Dover Roads and destroyed it in English territorial waters."⁷

Colonies could neither be acquired, nor adequately and economically protected by garrisoning outposts. With land forces spread thin throughout the colonies, any concentration of force against an unexpected enemy was virtually impossible. A seventeenth century governor of Barbados declared that the islands could only be safe if the Royal Navy had command of the sea; he stated, "All turns upon mastery of the sea."⁸

The lessons for defense through naval presence were accruing, but another lacking factor was maritime commerce. The Commonwealth of England realized the necessity to increase trade and with that purpose embarked on a substantial naval buildup. "That purpose was itself a means to an end and that end was the nation's fighting strength at sea."⁹ The Navigation Act of 1651 decreed that all imports to England must enter in English bottoms or in ships of the country of origin. With a near monopoly of the carrying trade, Holland took issue with this challenge. Subsequently, three Anglo-Dutch naval wars were fought between 1652 and 1674. Emerging victorious, England inherited the vast majority of the carrying trade from Holland.¹⁰

By the end of the seventeenth century, the value of sea power to England was evident. It was essential to the defense of the home isles, the protection of colonies, and the guarantee of trade. In the age of sail, the Royal Navy subsequently became proficient in the application of sea power through naval presence. England maintained a great Navy to

ensure her sovereignty, but lacked the natural resources to sustain it. The Baltic states had these natural resources, but they were constantly fighting amongst themselves and disrupting the supply of naval materials to England. The solution was: The Royal Navy maintained a strong squadron in the Baltic Sea that prevented them from invading each other and thereby kept those resources flowing to England.¹¹ Naval presence provided stability, protected trade, and ultimately enhanced England's sovereignty.

Until American independence, the Royal Navy also protected American commerce.¹² Thus began the American experience with sea power. The fledgling nation was immediately faced with the necessity to protect her maritime commerce. A military vehicle was delineated in the United States Constitution where congress is authorized: "To provide and maintain a Navy."¹³ This is tangible evidence that the American founding fathers understood the differences in applying military power and naval power. President George Washington not only appreciated sea power, but also valued its application through presence. In his annual message to congress in 1796, he expressed concern that American commerce around the world would not be respected without "a naval force, organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to war."¹⁴

So, why a Navy and not an Army? While there are many reasons why the Constitution does not provide and maintain an Army, it was clear that some capability to protect American trade and to communicate American interests abroad was required. For this perpetual requirement, sea power held the answer. The concept was (and still is) that the Navy

would sail the high seas (international waters) to protect American property and shipping, visit foreign states to communicate US interests, and tangibly demonstrate US commitments. This military application did have occasion to fight for American interests, but the essential element was being there (read presence) to deter would-be aggressors and/or to reassure allies. This was the age of sail. Presence consisted of fleets and squadrons deployed to a forward station to roam their theater in support of American interests.

Although there were some notable early advocates of sea power, it was certainly not embraced by all. Federalists supported a strong aggressive Navy to protect maritime commerce, which also happened to be a regional priority in New England. Republicans, and the rest of the country, were vigorously opposed to federal taxes to pay for an institution that they perceived to be beneficial to only one region.¹⁵ In the absence of a credible capability to defend American shipping, France felt free to interdict British goods even if they were in American ships. Consequently, the United States had to rapidly build up naval power to engage France over the sovereignty of American maritime commerce.¹⁶ The Quasi-War with France was eventually successful, but the question begs: Had the congress heeded George Washington's petition and maintained a credible naval force, could hostilities with France have been averted?

History indicates that the lessons of sea power were not easily nor readily accepted. After peace with France, the navy was significantly reduced. Enough naval forces were kept for early American administrations to deliver tribute to the Barbary pirates. Eventually,

the sums of tribute were deemed inadequate by the Pasha of Tripoli and he declared war on the United States.¹⁷ Another smaller naval buildup and four years of war followed. The Pasha was finally willing to settle for peace when faced with what he perceived to be superior force. An ad hoc army under self-proclaimed General William Eaton, "United States Naval Agent for the Several Barbary Regencies," had marched from Alexandria, Egypt. They seized the eastern most Tripolitan city Derne with the support of three US warships. Withstanding several Tripolitan assaults to retake Derne, the conflict ended with the arrival of the *USS Constitution*. Fearing her broadsides, the Tripolitans left, and her captain delivered the news of a newly concluded peace to a disappointed Eaton. The combined threat of a land force in the East and a formidable naval force from the sea convinced the Pasha it was time to cash in his remaining American hostages before defeat was unavoidable.¹⁸

In spite of the experiences of the Tripolitan war, the Jefferson administration concluded that a series of coastal fortifications and small gunboats scattered along the American coast were the best defense against invaders. The concept of coastal fortifications was arguably sound, but widely distributed small gunboats would prove ineffective. The concept was akin to garrisoning outposts along the frontier. There were not enough to cover adequately the entire area. They were dispersed too widely to concentrate force quickly, and individually too weak to deter a strong unexpected enemy.¹⁹ By the War of 1812, the lessons were being relearned. The small and essentially coastal Navy was powerless to protect American shipping from devastating depredations by all belligerents. Although no large-scale invasion of the United

States was successful, the burning of Washington was nevertheless embarrassing to American national pride.²⁰

Finally after the War of 1812, some lessons of sea power were being heeded. Although the US could not afford to challenge the Royal Navy, the inherent value of naval presence was becoming apparent. There was no dramatic post-war reduction of the Navy for basically two reasons. First, the public had taken national pride in several of the more conspicuous naval achievements of the war. Secondly and more importantly, foreign trade was growing rapidly with an expanding requirement for protection abroad. Consequently, forward operations increased; historical evidence suggests highly successful presence operations achieved suasion with the Barbary pirates. In 1815, Commodore Stephen Decatur sailed a strong squadron of ships into the Mediterranean and exacted peace from the Dey of Algiers on American terms without open hostilities. He then took his formidable force to Tunis and Tripoli. Backed primarily by presence of arms, he demanded and obtained indemnity for American prizes that had been turned over to the British during the war. From this success until the Civil War, the US Navy regularly maintained a substantial presence in the Mediterranean and piracy by the Barbary states abated drastically.²¹

By the end of the nineteenth century, presence operations were the essence of forward-deployed units. Developments in steam and steel were making naval presence more viable and formidable. Steam ships were more maneuverable and no longer hostage to the wind. Steam and steel allowed larger ships with ever greater gunnery. Ships and squadrons continually circulated from port to port throughout their jurisdiction,

"showing the flag" to assure Americans living abroad that their country was concerned about their persons and property, in addition to reminding foreigners of US power.²² It also became routine to put US Marines ashore to protect American property, embassies, and consulates. The US Navy even engaged in combined operations with other navies to achieve suasion. For example, the US Asiatic Squadron conducted a show of force in concert with British and French ships to deter Chinese rioters from attacking western property in Canton.²³

By the 1880s, the industrial revolution was well under way in the United States, and again, American maritime commerce was thriving. Influential business leaders were advocating a revival of the merchant marine and a Navy to support it. The newly elected republican government agreed and supported a naval buildup.²⁴ It was in this period of naval ascendancy that Alfred Thayer Mahan emerged as the leading naval strategist in the world. He declared that vigorous national shipping and a strong Navy were mutually dependent.²⁵ This was a significant development in strategic concepts. In essence, he was proposing that a form of economic power and military power were inextricably connected not by monetary support but by reason for existence.

One of his underlying premises was that the Navy must be strong enough to defend the coast, prevent blockades, and ensure "the trade and commerce of the country should remain, as far as possible, unaffected by an external war." His recommendation was to maintain "a force afloat capable of taking the offensive as the surest path to certain defense."²⁶ In other words, maintain a fleet capable of defeating any

other fleet or more precisely command of the sea. In the era of imperialism, these precepts were well received; however, large naval forces were still relatively expensive. This objection was not lost on Mahan. In his treatment of time as a factor in war, he addresses this issue:

If time be, as is everywhere admitted, a supreme factor in war, it behooves countries whose genius is essentially not military, whose people, like all free people, object to pay for large military establishments, to see to it that they are at least strong enough to gain the time necessary to turn the spirit and capacity of their subjects into the new activities which war calls for. If the existing force by land or sea is strong enough so to hold out, even though at a disadvantage, the country may rely upon its natural resources and strength coming into play for whatever they are worth, - its numbers, its wealth, its capacities of every kind. If, on the other hand, what force it has can be overthrown and crushed quickly, the most magnificent possibilities of natural power will not save it from humiliating conditions, nor, if its foes be wise, from guarantees which will postpone revenge to a distant future. The story is constantly repeated in the smaller fields of war: "If so-and-so can hold out a little longer, this can be saved or that can be done;" as in sickness it is often said: "If the patient can only hold out so long, the strength of his constitution may pull him through."²⁷

On the surface, this appears to merely be a sound lesson on naval preparedness for defense. True enough--if you do not have enough capability to stay in the battle until all your power can be brought to bear, certain objectives and possibly the whole war may very well be lost. However, this concept readily extrapolates and expands for application in peace. Objectives like shipping and American property abroad require protection in peace and war. More specifically, they will require defense during that nebulous and intractable transition from peace to war. This essentially perpetual requirement puts US armed forces in continuous defense of national interests. In the Mahanian strategy, this requires adequate capability to defend national interests long enough to enable the "Fight and Win"²⁸ forces to arrive.

Presence then develops from this principle with two corollaries: forward and suasion. National interests have transcended specific objectives into national security requirements. These requirements globally expanded the American security perimeter.²⁹ With interests and requirements all over the world, they must be defended forward. In the same way inadequate capability can lose significant interests before reinforcements arrive, so too can the absence of capability sustain irretrievable losses.

By the era of imperialism, Navies were maintaining forward presence, but the classic naval roles were blockade and intervention. Mahan and Julian Corbett were wrestling with the concept of "command of the sea." Mahan envisioned fleets battling for supremacy, but Corbett said that a "fleet in being" (a capability perceived to be credible) could keep potential adversaries preoccupied with the notion of potential harm from that "fleet in being."³⁰ The British would assert that Pax Britannic was created by adroit application of presence. Putting these strategies in the context of presence, the most efficient way to defend with presence is by achieving suasion. Examining this strategy in terms of influence, such as the Siegel model; the goals of presence operations should be to deter, compel, and/or reassure. These influences are manifestations of suasion that can provide defense.

The goal of presence is to defend American interests. However, defending something through suasion becomes somewhat abstract. The conventional concept of defense is to guard something and forcibly ward off attackers. Suasion is the act of persuading; or more precisely for this thesis, suasion produces influences that deter, compel, and

reassure. So, if suasion only produces influences, how does it defend? If an interest/objective has been successfully defended, it remains unmolested, unimpeded, and/or enhanced. If an adversarial act is deterred, it remains unmolested. If an enemy is compelled to withdraw from a position incompatible with our interests, it is unimpeded. If an ally is reassured that his support of us is the strongest position, it is enhanced. Therefore, if suasion is achieved, we have successfully defended our interests.

The twentieth century saw continuous rise and fall cycles in naval power, but the efficacy of sea power survived it all. Increasing commerce, external threats, and empire duties (protecting colonies) would contribute to the ascent and development of sea power. The American economy and commerce were still growing with the same needs for naval protection expanding. Mahan, however, saw a twist for American naval power in the Panama Canal. He believed that the Panama canal would make the Caribbean "a great highway of trade" and with it attract the "interests of all the great commercial powers." This situation would compel the United States to increase naval presence to strengthen its influence in the region in order to "guarantee freedom of communications."³¹

After the Spanish-American War, the newly acquired territories, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, significantly increased duties for the US Navy. These far flung possessions required protection, and those forces would have to compete with the emerging naval powers of Germany and Japan. Both of these countries were engaged in naval buildups and aggressive deployments around the world. By 1903, the

Imperial German Navy formally adopted the Buechsel plan. This plan "proposed acquisition of a stronghold in the West Indies, a free hand for Germany in South America, and American renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine."³² Quite simply, the navy would require credible capability and the capacity to communicate proficiently their intentions.

At the same time on the other side of the globe, the United States was also committed to Secretary of State John Hay's 1899 commercial Open Door policy and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The US did not have the capability to influence credibly its interests in the Far East. The US maintained presence in China with a riverine Navy. They would either have to increase naval presence there or align themselves with another power to attain cumulative influence.³³ Of these choices, enhanced naval presence would certainly be more reliable than entangling alliances.

Presiding over this era, President Theodore Roosevelt advocated a global view and an American obligation to influence its interests. His corollary to the Monroe doctrine amounted to US authorization to "exercise international police power."³⁴ To make his influence credible, he saw robust sea power as the answer. "Speak softly and carry a big stick" was his summation of his foreign policy. The stick was generally understood to be the Navy.³⁵ Not only did his administration build up the Navy, it sought to use it to communicate its desires and intentions. The Great White Fleet³⁶ was an excellent example. Its missions were to communicate goodwill to Japan and plainly demonstrate superior capability to friend and foe.³⁷ The goal of this

battleship presence was to prove US capability was credible and thereby deter enemies and reassure allies.

The application of naval presence to influence American interests continued to thrive through World War I (WWI) and the inter-war period. President Roosevelt built up the navy and laid the foundational policies, but President Woodrow Wilson added his global idealism. Of course, the imperial interests remained, but President Wilson's humanitarian goals became central to his policy--"Americanize the backward states." Heavily involved throughout the Caribbean and Central America, the Wilson administration's efforts in Haiti are illustrative of the general approach. Near continuous naval presence and repeated expeditionary landings of small detachments to protect American interests finally culminated with intervention in 1915 and occupation (long term presence by US marines) until 1934. The three driving interests were: (1) establish American control over Haitian finances and politics to facilitate democratization; (2) prohibit foreign powers from gaining predominance in Haiti; and (3) obtain Mole Saint Nicholas, a natural harbor on the sea lanes to the Panama Canal, for a naval coaling station.³⁴

President Wilson wanted "a navy second to none." His assertion that the American Navy had to defend the largest expanse of area in the world led the congress to agree and pass the Naval Act of 1916. This master plan would create the world's largest Navy and set the stage for the Post-WWI era of naval limitations treaties. The General Board³⁹ declared naval limitations would preclude the US Navy from ensuring world peace and American national interests. After the Washington Naval

Conference in 1921, the Navy accepted the limitations but managed to preserve some credibility and capability through aggressive modernization programs and the development of carrier air power.⁴⁰ Despite these efforts to guarantee peace and stability through limitations as opposed to unfettered naval power for presence, the world scene again swerved into the path to world war. By the 1930s, isolationism and domestic economic woes left a Navy with significantly diminished capability to influence events in favor of national interests.⁴¹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt renewed naval building programs as part of his "New Deal" policy for economic revival of the depressed steel and shipbuilding industries.⁴²

The end of World War II (WWII) brought another drastic draw down and with it a firestorm on the future efficacy of sea power. Many believed amphibious operations were obsolete, and the proponents of air power testified that the Air Force strategic bombers could do everything the Navy could do. The Air Force earnestly believed the deterrent influence of the atomic bomb was supreme. Their premise was that the war-fighting and deterrent capacity of nuclear weapons was sufficient to assume the Navy's traditional role as first line of national defense. The strategic problem with this theory was its extremely limited options. If diplomacy fails in an international dispute, the next step would be atomic devastation. Without sea power or presence to develop and pursue that spectrum of responses between diplomacy and war, the Air Force's planned responses were too radical.⁴³ This strategy also suffers from the perception dilemma. The capability was unquestionably real, but its connection to US purposes could not always be communicated

nor was its use always credible. A global superpower's ultimate weapon was difficult to wield in minor regional conflicts. Threatening or implying nuclear attack with regard to most diplomatic disputes simply was not viable. The perception of many smaller nations was that their particular difference with the United States would not exceed the risk of international condemnation for employing nuclear weapons. Therefore, the threat of nuclear force by major powers was and still is often not credible to minor regional players.

As the US armed forces reorganization debate raged on, the post-war threat was emerging--the Soviet Union. After continued Soviet aggression, the Truman administration formally adopted the "Policy of Containment" in 1947. It basically said that the United States would oppose aggressive measures to impose totalitarian regimes on developing nations and support those nations resisting oppression.⁴⁴ A "Policy of Containment" implied not only halting Communist expansion but also keeping it within its current boundaries. Someone would have to patrol those boundaries. Naval forces were already patrolling every corner of the world to provide a stabilizing influence by their presence. Then Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal had directed the US Navy to "steam 'in any waters in any part of the globe' so as not to cause 'excitement or speculation' when crisis deployments were required."⁴⁵

In 1946, Great Britain had already informed the United States that they could no longer sustain their whole Mediterranean forces. "If the Soviets were to be contained, Britain would need help from the United States in Europe."⁴⁶ This development and the continuous requirement to seek influence in many assorted regional conflicts and

international situations prompted the Navy Department to announce that naval deployments to the Mediterranean would occur routinely from now on. Secretary Forrestal said the intention of that policy was to "support American forces in Europe" and to "carry out American policy and diplomacy."⁴⁷

By this time, the *USS Missouri (BB-63)* had already been sent to support Turkey in their stand against the Soviets and their demand for joint control of the Bosphorus and Dardenelles Straits (the maritime chokepoint connecting the Mediterranean and Black Seas). The aircraft carrier, *USS Franklin D. Roosevelt*, visited Greece to show support of that government as it faced communist-led insurgency.⁴⁸ These examples demonstrate how, when the United States desired influence, naval presence was a primary tool. The United States emerged from WWII with the unquestioned military capability of a superpower, not to mention the most devastating strategic weapon, the atom bomb. However, capability cannot stand alone. Purpose must be communicated and methods must be credible. The movement of warships into an area of conflict was a perceptible action. The action in itself communicated commitment and lent credibility to US diplomacy. Credibility was also inherent in the method. The Yugoslavian and Greek communists could believe a naval force might conduct operations against them even if only limited in nature. They would find it much more difficult to perceive the threat of nuclear response to their relatively minor aggression.

Despite steady naval requirements, the post-WWII drawdown continued unabated to the smallest Navy since before WWII. The Korean War initiated it and full-fledged Cold War sustained a significantly

larger Navy to this day. While the bipolar "waltz" between the US and USSR held center stage for some forty years, there were ample interests requiring American influence. One of the more illustrative incidents where presence was successfully used was the 1958 defense of Taiwan. Communist China began bombarding the Nationalist Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The US Seventh Fleet, some 150 warships including six aircraft carriers, moved to the vicinity of Taiwan. US Air Force and Marine Corps fighters operated from Taiwan airfields to guard the island.⁴⁹ Operationally, this military presence allowed the Nationalist Chinese Armed Forces to concentrate their forces on Quemoy. However, the strategic benefit was perhaps more significant. US presence produced two distinct influences: (1) The Nationalist Chinese were reassured in their efforts by our tangible commitment, and (2) The Communist Chinese were deterred from escalating the conflict to an attack on the main island of Taiwan, Formosa. This was also joint presence operations. Moving fighters to Taiwan enhanced US credibility and communicated commitment as much as the actual missions they flew.

The strategic reality of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)⁵⁰ overshadowed most relations and interactions between the US and USSR since the 1960s. Presence operations did, however, play key roles in several significant events. In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union built military bases in Cuba and had already deployed missile systems and armament capable of striking the continental United States with nuclear weapons. President John F. Kennedy demanded their immediate removal and ordered the US Navy to "quarantine" Cuba. The US Navy used about 180 ships for this mission while only five Soviet

submarines were in the vicinity. The Americans were also able to continuously track those subs and even forced a few to the surface. Without open hostilities or nuclear threats, naval presence provided the leverage to compel the Soviets to remove those weapons after only five days of quarantine.⁵¹

The Vietnam War diverted the Defense Department's attention and funds. With focus on Vietnam, naval presence in the rest of world was significantly reduced. Forward-deployed naval presence (counted as ship-days out of area) fell by over one-third from 1965 to 1972. A more critical development was that the Soviet Union's forward naval presence increased by almost sevenfold for the same period. Except for the Pacific, the Soviets actually had more ship-days in every other part of the world. In its effort to assuage the national feelings about Vietnam, the Johnson administration was trying to hide the true high costs of the war. They did this by trying to pay as many war expenses out of the regular defense budget as possible. One of their tactics was to gut new construction projects for the armed forces; this ploy devastated the Navy's shipbuilding program. By 1978, the Soviet Navy was more than twice the size of the US Navy in major ships.⁵²

American naval power was already in decline, but during the Carter administration, American military power and prestige reached its Cold War nadir. President Carter's Secretary of Defense Harold Brown promulgated a defense policy in which the Navy's only wartime mission was to protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and maintain the underwater leg of the nuclear triad. To further compound the situation, these were the only missions for Navy force structure projections and

funding. The Navy's quintessential peacetime mission--presence--and forward-deployed requirements were disregarded. Among naval experts and congressional leaders, the most sanguine assessment was that the Navy could probably defend the SLOCs in war, but the Navy's current level (which, by 1978, was already drastically reduced) of peacetime forward deployments could not be maintained.⁵³

Ironically, the administration, which initially neglected peacetime presence, would be faced with difficult scenarios where naval presence seemed to be the only option. After the Shah of Iran was deposed, civil unrest threatened American lives and property. By early 1979, a naval task force of seven ships evacuated 440 people from Iranian ports. Hostility towards Americans continued to escalate; by March, American citizens were lining up to leave at Teheran airport. Coincident to developments in Iran, South Yemen attacked North Yemen. In its attempt to influence the theater situation, the Carter administration applied military presence with mixed results. The administration sent the *USS Constellation* carrier battle group to the Arabian Sea and USAF airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia. However, the stated purpose was only to support North Yemen in its struggle against South Yemen with no mention of the crisis in Iran. On one hand, Carter's response was integral to resolving the conflict between the two Yemen's and crucial to regaining Saudi trust and confidence. On the other hand, there was an apparent aversion to the appearance of "gunboat diplomacy" regarding Iran. The administration sent capability that might have been credible had they

not failed to communicate their true interests, which were to protect American lives.⁵⁴

Incredibly, the application of presence lesson of "too little, too late" was not heeded. On 4 November 1979, radical Iranian students took the Americans at the US embassy in Teheran hostage. The *USS Midway* carrier battle group was ordered to the Arabian Sea on 14 November to conduct "naval maneuvers." This time the Department of Defense (DOD) was very careful to stipulate that this deployment was not related to events in Iran. Once again, naval presence was being applied after the fact; and because the true purpose was not communicated, this effort had virtually no credibility. The administration's indecision and poor communications resulted in significantly reduced influence abroad. Despite the continuous presence of two carrier battle groups in the Arabian Sea for the remainder of his term, the Carter administration held no sway with the Soviets when they invaded Afghanistan and could not resolve the Iranian hostage crisis until after President Carter lost his 1980 bid for reelection.⁵⁵

These experiences were not lost on the Carter administration. DOD and the National Security Council (NSC) were contemplating the need for a military Rapid Response Force to protect American interests abroad as early as 1977. With the fall of the Shah of Iran in February 1979, the NSC established the need for a Rapid Response Force to replace the Shah's Iran in the Arabian Gulf balance of power. DOD nominally established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) on 1 October 1979, under Readiness Command at Macdill Air Force Base. The new command's mission was predeployment planning and training for non-NATO

contingencies. This command was the precursor to present day Central Command (CENTCOM). Then in December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Carter responded with a warning in his next State of the Union address (that became known as the Carter Doctrine) that the US would use force to protect American interests in the Arabian Gulf region. Naturally, all eyes turned to the RDJTF, which by this time was "still more conceptual than real." Despite an early lack of analysis to determine viability of military operations in support of US policy, the RDJTF eventually became the "centerpiece for American regional policy planning."⁵⁶ By the end of its tenure, the Carter administration embraced the military instrument and its utility to diplomacy through presence. It was too late for President Carter, but he did give the Reagan administration a head start on the 1980s military buildup.

President Reagan and his Secretary of the Navy John Lehman reversed the decline of American sea power and set out to restore American influence abroad. The Reagan administration understood the use of presence and its effective application. Immediately embarking on a military buildup, forward naval presence was increased with much sterner policies. The US Navy was directed to resume exercising in the northern Gulf of Sidra (the waters off Libya claimed by same as territorial waters) with the purpose of reasserting the right to freedom of navigation in international waters. During an exercise in August 1981, the *USS Nimitz* battle group was approached by Libyan fighters. The Libyans fired on the F-14 combat air patrol sent to intercept them and were subsequently shot down. The Reagan administration took this opportunity to define their approach to international relations.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig bluntly stated this was "unacceptable behavior" and the United States would "no longer overlook these illegal activities" no matter who the perpetrator was.⁵⁷ Regardless of the correctness of these policies, one dimension is indisputable; their purpose and interests were clearly communicated. Renewing capability and revamping clear communications would restore credibility. This recipe would ultimately revive American influence and prestige.

The end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union ended a four decade bipolar balance-of-power system that on one hand flared into minor conflicts along the fringes and on the other suppressed potential regional hostilities. During this period, most nations would routinely align themselves with a superpower or attempt a precarious neutrality. If US or Soviet interests were at stake, the superpowers usually heavily influenced if not determined outcomes. While this factor often influenced when and where presence might be applied, it did not really affect the methods. With regard to influence between states, the real impact is the absence of a balance-of-power security system. The only tenable prediction is a much more unpredictable era. As the new international security system evolves, the number and rate of conflicts will probably increase. Many of these might have been previously suppressed. In an age of uncertainty, forms of limited naval warfare, like "gunboat diplomacy" or military presence, will probably have more occasion for application.⁵⁸ It will be implemented in almost every scenario at least as an enabling operation. Even if presence is not a solution, it will be the vehicle to enable follow on forces to "fight and win."

Endnotes

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³⁶President Theodore Roosevelt sent sixteen white battleships on a "show the flag" circumnavigation of the globe 1907-1909.

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CHAPTER 3

SITUATION: CURRENT STRATEGIES AND METHODOLOGY

President Bill Clinton's 1995 "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" is a proactive policy well grounded in the concepts of presence. It states "First and foremost, we must exercise global leadership;" and continues ". . . the US is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade." From this primary premise, springs the strategy of engagement. The National Security Strategy's (NSS) main effort is "selective engagement," which advocates "focusing on challenges that are most relevant to our own interests." Inherent to "global leadership" and forging stability and openness is influence. Pursuing influence through "selective engagement" implies that the US is there in some form, hence the concept of presence. Indeed, "Overseas Presence" is listed as a fundamental policy for determining force structure. It calls for a "robust overseas presence" mentioning several forms: "permanently stationed forces and pre-positioned equipment, deployments and combined exercises, port calls and other visits, as well as military-to-military contacts." This particular section concludes that by "demonstrating our commitment," the US will enhance deterrence and reassure allies.¹

These parts of the NSS are right in line with the concepts of presence, but there are two criticisms. One criticism is the placement and stature of "overseas presence" within the strategy, and the other is

the contrary reductions in presence. "Overseas Presence" is treated as a subsection of "Enhancing Our Security." However, examination of every subsequent goal and policy infers presence as an integral contribution. Therefore, presence should be treated as a common thread of the entire strategy as opposed to one part within. This contention is easily supported by analysis of any actual implementation. Any national security endeavor begins with some form of presence; presence conveniently demonstrates interest or commitment and enhances communication of purpose. Regardless of results, presence either achieves suasion or enables some degree of escalation by augmentation forces or even follow-on forces for open hostilities. And, after national objectives have been attained, presence remains as a stabilizing factor and guard to guarantee American interests.

The other criticism is the ambiguity with regard to "enlargement." The NSS expounds at length on engagement but does not specifically define or discuss enlargement. Enlargement is only implied in admonitions for proliferation of democracy, capitalism, and mutual security arrangements. These enlargements would enhance US security with more entities friendly to US interests, but these enlargements would be pursued through engagement--US global leadership. Greater global leadership to obtain these enlargements requires more influence. The National Military Strategy's (NMS) primary vehicle for gaining more influence is "overseas presence." The paradox is the current defense drawdown and declining overseas presence. The NSS seems to rely almost entirely on diplomatic and economic measures for enlargement. The NSS fails to address how the US will use the military instrument to enlarge

its international sphere of influence while American presence is simultaneously receding from abroad. Furthermore, whether or not planned future force structures support enhanced presence is a topic of constant debate.

To support the NSS, the 1995 National Military Strategy (NMS) proclaims two complementary objectives: "Promoting Stability and Thwarting Aggression." It delineates two strategic concepts to pursue these objectives: "Overseas Presence" (prevention) and "Power Projection" (correction). The NMS correctly recognizes presence as an underlying principle in achieving all its objectives. It also addresses the challenges of producing a balanced force structure that can achieve both objectives in an austere budget environment. However, it does not make any prescriptions for that balance. This balance is very important in the context of Mahan's strategy to maintain enough capability to prevent struggle from occurring or keep the battle going until all resources can be brought to bear. While presence may often achieve suasion and resolution, when it does not or cannot, it must be sufficient to maintain a grip on our interests until adequate power projection can compel a desirous settlement. Inadequate capability in either realm is unacceptable and could jeopardize national interests. So, in efforts to determine this balanced force structure, some idea as to what extent presence might be effective would be critical. It is in this vein that this thesis searches for some estimation of the efficacy of presence.

Presence is clearly a viable and acceptable concept. The strategy of presence has certainly been embraced by the National Command

Authority (NCA), Department of Defense (DOD), and all the armed services. Each of the services pays tribute to the merits of presence and even describes different forms of presence, but doctrine to apply it successfully is lacking. A dearth in doctrine can probably be attributed to two factors: (1) implementing presence is intertwined with diplomacy (a realm beyond military control), and (2) measuring progress and even success is extremely subjective and abstract in nature. Here again, this thesis will analyze a case study and attempt to determine what positive results may be attributable to presence. If a form of measurement can be established, it would be a valuable instrument to further developing doctrine for applying presence.

The United States Army's FY96 Posture Statement declares "America's Army is the nation's force of decision."² This declaration and the determined drive to create FORCE XXI are indicative of the Army's dominant focus on the "Fight and Win" component of the NMS. It is a relatively safe assumption that, should the United States again fight a war (DESERT STORM size or larger), the Army will be committed to go to ground to win it. Even though the discussions on presence are minimal, the Army does contribute significantly to presence operations. There are some 125,000 Army soldiers forward based around the world with concentrations in Europe, Japan, Korea, and Panama. While peace time missions are proliferating into all manner of assorted missions, the original premises were occupation and forward defense. From these requirements evolved the concepts of "promote stability" and "deter aggression." All of these strategies rely on military presence to influence other nations. In the 1990s, missions may be called nation

assistance, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, shared training, or even military operations other than war (MOOTW).

Regardless of semantics, they are all essentially some form of presence operation. The Army establishes and pursues relations with foreign armies to reassure allies and maintains combat power forward to deter potential adversaries.

Another pragmatic use of forward-based forces has come into vogue. Forces around the world are ideally positioned to respond to remote regional crises. As the post-Cold War drawdown reduces America's "overseas presence," those forces remaining forward are being called upon more often and becoming more valuable. Even though the crisis may not be in the immediate vicinity of forward US bases, they are often close enough to better enable a more timely response than CONUS based assets. The nomenclature may be dynamic, but the underlying concepts of presence, capacity to influence and ability to enable follow-on forces, remain the guiding principles for the overriding purposes of "overseas presence:" "Promote stability and deter aggression."

The United States Air Force (USAF) white paper, "Global Presence"² (1995), superseded the previous USAF white paper, "Global Reach-Global Power." This paper wholeheartedly embraces the concept of presence, but the Air Force declares utilization of information technologies will add a fourth dimension, "Virtual battlespace." "Global presence" is explained as a strategy that contains all the traditional forms of presence to include the unique attributes of all military forces. Their innovation is the addition of information technology and space systems. Paying much homage to a team effort, this

paper acknowledges that in most cases information combined with physically present forces are required. It then adds the tenuous claim that sometimes information alone can be presence. Although not explicitly, this strategy does recognize the three basic factors of influence: capability, communication, and credibility. However, the "virtual" dimension of "Global presence" is not adequately explained within these factors.

The USAF view is that when the Cold War ended, forward defense was no longer required. Its follow-ons, forward presence and overseas presence, were intended to simply reassure allies. The Air Force contention is that physically present forces are no longer affordable in every case. In a very clever approach, the first benefit of information technology is better intelligence (oddly, this word seems to be carefully avoided) to facilitate better decision-making regarding presence and the second is the actual omni-present aspect of space systems. This approach relies heavily on technological advances. It states that technology gains in "Situational Awareness" (information technology), "Strategic Agility" (air lift), and "Lethality" (improving precision munitions) combine into "synergistic benefits" that "allow America to consider a wide range of military responses to worldwide circumstances."⁴

The Air Force message is presence will be joint, but it subtly attempts to cast "physical and virtual means" as equal components of "Global presence." The descriptions of joint efforts and the benefits of technology are sound. However, the implications that "virtual means" have genuine capacity to influence require some large leaps of faith.

The assertion that "Global presence" enables commanders "to obtain the balance of forces and capabilities needed to exert presence"⁵ is basically acceptable. However, the premise that the virtual presence of space and information systems have the capacity to influence seems overextended.

The Air Force analogy is that presence formerly was a policeman guarding the bank, but now virtual presence allows an alarm system to protect the bank. The supposed parallel is that space systems are continuously monitoring world hot spots. As soon as a would-be aggressor takes an action counter to American national interests, the authorities (the US) would be notified. However, the analogy unravels in lack of credibility thereafter. In the first scenario, it is axiomatic that the police will respond to an alarm at a bank. In the many assorted international scenarios, no such claim can be supported. Even if the would-be aggressor understood our desires and acknowledged our capability to monitor, why would he believe that the US would respond? Without commitment of physically present forces, credibility could only be established based on a documented history of forceful responses in similar situations. Historical premise is also strained because if a calculating foe estimated the price too high for America, he would certainly gamble on our lack of resolve. In 1994, Saddam Hussein knowingly moved his forces south under US satellite eyes. In spite of his earlier experience, he was again testing the waters. As soon as forces physically moved into theater, he realized US resolve and backed off.

Overall, "Global presence" is viable, but the capacity of "virtual means" to influence is minimal at best. A claim that "virtual means" enables presence is more supportable. An even better description may be "enhance." As a commander evaluates his area of interest, he has traditionally turned to the intelligence community for information and analysis. Space and information systems are a much improved capability to provide information; therefore, "virtual means" enhances presence with better intelligence.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the Department of the Navy published its white paper, ". . .From The Sea," in 1992. This paper shifted the maritime focus from the Cold War blue-water strategy to power projection and the capacity to "influence events in the littoral regions of the world."⁶ Although a Navy-Marine Corps joint effort, the raison d'être of the Marine Corps is and has been power projection in the littorals. This shift was largely for the benefit of the Navy; the Marines were already there. In 1995, the Navy-Marine Corps team updated its strategic vision with "Forward . . .From The Sea."⁷ This white paper reconfirmed the strategic concepts of ". . .From The Sea" and emphasized the necessity of maintaining forward-deployed naval forces. After acknowledging warfighting as fundamental, the following excerpt set the priority:

Our most recent experiences, however, underscore the premise that the most important role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be *engaged* in forward areas, with the objectives of *preventing* conflicts and *controlling* crises. Naval forces thus are the foundation of peacetime presence operations and overseas response to crisis. They contribute heavily during the transitions from crisis to conflict to ensuring compliance with terms of peace.

The common thread in warfighting, preventing conflicts, and controlling crises is "forward deployed." Presence is the primary means for applying naval power. Using presence to engage, prevent, and control, the Navy-Marine Corps team clearly expects to achieve suasion.

The Navy-Marine Corps team concept of "Peacetime Forward Presence Operations" considers presence integral to foreign policy. Presence is described as being engaged in "preventative diplomacy" and "supporting [US] policies overseas." This approach seeks to reassure allies by enhancing interoperability through combined exercises and promoting stability by US naval presence. Deterrence is also a primary goal of naval presence. Beyond strategic deterrence with nuclear capability, this white paper advocates "conventional deterrence." This concept is based on using "Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) capable ships to extend credible defenses to friendly and allied countries." Presence of credible defenses is postulated to inhibit the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Allies would be reassured by our presence and thereby be less inclined to develop their own offensive capability. Not stated, but implied, this capability might also deter potential adversaries from pursuing expensive offensive capability that this defense would successfully counter."

"Enabling" is a concept first advanced in ". . .From The Sea." Essentially, this concept establishes presence as a foundational operation to span from pre-conflict to conflict and remaining through post-conflict. Presence assets enable follow-on forces to enter the theater and build sufficient combat power to escalate a conflict as necessary. ADM Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

promotes a synergistic approach where all services adopt a credo of enabling other services in addition to accomplishing their own missions.⁹ Even from a joint perspective of national military power and force application, in every phase presence is the anchor.

Beyond all the attention currently being paid to presence by all the services, the study of this concept is essential to the perpetual debate on what military operations will look like in the future. Several issues would benefit by the development of a modern doctrine for presence. In 1996, the United States has no undeniable enemy in any industrialized nation. Russia, China, and India in some scenarios could one day pose a threat to US vital interests. Of all the industrialized democracies, any scenario predicting serious challenges inimical to American interests are tenuous at best. Since WWII, there have been no incidents of international war between developed western countries.¹⁰ Rothgeb contends the option of force to coerce another nation-state is already considered a rare last resort and its unacceptability will most likely increase if democracy continues to develop and spread. The foremost reason why war between democracies is unlikely is economic interdependence.¹¹ This is not to proclaim the extinction of large wars. The purpose is to establish some parameters on the international landscape for the foreseeable future. It is largely agreed that any imminent threats to US interests are in the plethora of potential regional conflicts. It is a safe assumption that the horizon holds low-intensity conflicts with occasional major regional conflicts for the United States. Therefore, influence through enhanced presence operations would be beneficial and perhaps necessary. Using the concept

of "enabling" in this environment, can presence shape future military operations?

Whether presence maintains it's traditional role and level or increases in stature among military options to pursue/protect national interests, it will nevertheless be a significant factor when planning force structure requirements for the next century. Looming fiscal constraints will also impact the force structure and will probably affect force employment based on economy. Modern doctrine to increase the efficiency of presence and any means of gauging the effectiveness of military presence operations, which could become a predominant role, becomes all the more important to the ongoing debate.

This thesis will focus on research and analysis of presence operations and any identifiable action/reaction/inaction by targeted nation-states. Juxtaposing these two factors, this project will determine if discernible patterns of presence and probable results can be developed. The primary question: Is Presence an effective means of influence for conflict management/resolution in mid-level regional conflicts in the post-cold war era? The central case study for this project will be the relationship between Libya and the United States concentrating on the period from 1977 to the present. This case is deemed adequate for this research by the significant amount of presence operations and its potential parallel to the post-Cold War era. While both the US and the USSR had interests in Libya, analysis will be based on the assumption that those interests were not vital to either nation's territorial integrity and could not seriously impact their national security.

American policies will be extracted from government documents. Its implementation and ramifications will be traced through actual government accounts, scholarly reviews, professional journals, and assorted news sources. Libyan policies and activities will be compiled from several books on Libya, monographs, various journals, and assorted news accounts. This information will be analyzed to determine any cause-and-effect relationships and thereby assess American presence strategy and operations.

Several limitations are inherent to this thesis: (1) Libyan policy and perspective will be almost wholly derived from secondary sources. (2) Assessing US actions will be largely subjective. Concrete links between American actions and Libyan inaction/reaction will be often unavailable. Assessing US actions will require considerable degrees of inference and deduction. (3) "A negative is difficult to prove." In other words, proving deterrence through inaction by the Libyans in response to American activities is abstruse for two reasons. If the Libyans did not ever take an action, then their intent to do so is an assumption. And, when attempting to ascribe a certain behavior to a specific action, ruling out all other factors is abstract.

The following delimitations are imposed on this thesis. The central case study is US/Libyan relations concentrating on presence. Analysis will attempt to avoid Cold War bipolar considerations in an effort to focus on the efficacy of presence between actor and target. Analysis will cover the period from 1977 (the Libyan break with US patronage) to 1995.

In the analysis of presence in US/Libyan relations, four general outcomes are possible: (1) Inimical Libyan activity was inversely proportional to US presence operations; (2) Inimical Libyan activity was provoked by US presence operations; (3) Influence of US presence operations was negligible; inimical Libyan activity was more significantly affected by other factors; and (4) No supportable relationships exist. If a relationship exists, this thesis will endeavor to produce a framework for modern doctrine and general guidance on means to gauge effectiveness.

The answer to the thesis' primary research question will be a crucial contribution to the future of presence operations. Is presence an effective means of influence for conflict management/resolution in mid-level regional conflicts in the post Cold War era? If the answer is no, all US strategies from the NSS and NMS to each service's doctrine face fundamental changes away from presence concepts. If the answer is yes, presence will need a modern doctrine for the twenty-first century and presence requirements given a greater weight in future force structure requirements. A modern doctrine and judicious implementation of presence operations could significantly advance American interests and remarkably shape future military operations.

Endnotes

¹The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White House, February 1995), 7, 9-10.

²US Army, United States Army Posture Statement FY96 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1995).

³Sheila E. Widnall and Ronald R. Fogelman, "Global Presence," Joint Force Quarterly 7 (Spring 1995): 94-99.

⁴Ibid., 98-99.

⁵Ibid., 99.

⁶US Navy, . . . From The Sea (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1992).

⁷US Navy, Forward ...From The Sea (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1995).

⁸David S. Yost, "The Future of US Overseas Presence," Joint Force Quarterly 8 (Summer 1995): 72-72. Mr. Yost is in agreement with the Navy strategy and offers an excellent explanation and analysis of its utility and implementation.

⁹William A. Owens, "Living Jointness," Joint Force Quarterly 3 (Winter 1993-1994): 10.

¹⁰John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 74.

¹¹Ibid., 153-160.

CHAPTER 4

LIBYA

Introduction

This chapter will examine the use of presence within the parameters of the conflict between Libya and the United States. To understand that influence, this thesis will briefly address the background of Libya, the emergence of Muammar Qaddafi as its ruler, his philosophy and regime, and the evolution of modern Libya. The format is the origins, influences, and developments of Libyan foreign policy objectives and methods. The origins of US-Libyan conflict are rooted in Libya's tragic history in the twentieth century.

Libya is a relatively large North African country mostly consumed by the Sahara Desert. On the northern coast of Africa, it has approximately 1,200 miles of coastline buttressing the central Mediterranean Sea. It is about 300 miles south of Malta, Italy, and Greece. At approximately 680,000 square miles, Libya is roughly the size of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. It is bordered to the west by Tunisia and Algeria, to the south by Niger and Chad, to the southeast by Sudan, and to the east by Egypt.

Libya has three historical provinces that essentially reflect its three distinct geographic regions. The narrow coastal plain or green strip along the azure Mediterranean (approximately 120 kilometers wide) provides the only tillable land. The province of Tripolitania

contains the northwest coast and plain, and on the other side of the Gulf of Sidra, the province of Cyrenaica includes the northeast coast and plain to the Green Mountains or Jabal al Akhdar. The Green Mountains have the only forested area in Libya, about 1 percent of the total land mass. The southern province of Fezzan encompasses most of the vast desert that comprises more than 90 percent of Libya. Desert climate dominates Libya; even the semiarid coastal plains receive minimal rain. There are no perennial rivers only wadis, gullies or water courses that drain off the infrequent rainfall.¹

Evidence of human life in Libya dates back to around 8,000 B.C.. The Berbers, "usually regarded as the original Libyans," invaded about 3,000 B.C. from southwest Asia.² An Arab-Berber ethnicity evolved. Libya's current population of approximately five million has a 90 percent Arab-speaking majority of this mixed ancestry. The official religion is the Sunni branch of Islam. About 90 percent of the population lies in the coastal areas. The two largest cities are Tripoli in the West and Benghazi in the East. Nomads constitute about 20 percent of the population.³

History of Libya

Libya's history has been marked by a long succession of merchant and colonist invaders. From ancient to medieval times, the most notable habitués were the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, Persians, and Romans. Libyan coastal settlements, particularly Tripoli, provided a "convenient crossroads" between Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. By 1,200 B.C., trade routes were well established trafficking slaves and various goods from central Africa. The Arab conquest of Libya in the seventh century

wrought the formative influence still pervasive in modern Libya. The Ottoman Turks consolidated control of Libya in the sixteenth century. Under Arab influence and Turkish dominion, Libya did enjoy several intervals of relative autonomy. Foreign governance concentrated on the coastal plain; the nomadic tribes of the Sahara were arguably never subjugated.⁴

The next and final foreign domination was Italian. Italy, lagging in the colonial race and desperate for "breathing space," in the late nineteenth century embarked on a policy of "peaceful penetration" of Libya that expanded to "economic penetration" shortly after the turn of the century.⁵ In the aftermath of the young Turks revolt in the Ottoman Empire, Italy in 1911 invaded and gained a foothold in Libya. The Ottoman Turks, the nominal sovereigns, ceded their rights to Libya and withdrew in 1912. The Libyans contested Italian sovereignty all through World War I. A peace agreement in 1917 granted self-government to the Libyans, but retained some Italian control of Tripolitania. The Misratah-based Tripolitanian Republic was declared in 1918. With the advent of Benito Mussolini's regime in Italy, the call to make Libya Italy's "fourth shore" was renewed. A military reconquest began in 1922 and was finally completed in 1932. Italy officially annexed Libya in 1939. Libya did achieve significant economic progress, agriculture development, and infrastructure improvement during this period.⁶

The Axis and Allied powers repeatedly ravaged Libya in World War II in the struggle for control of North Africa. Libyans saw the war as another opportunity to secure their independence. Already in 1939, Libyan leaders in Egypt organized Libyan forces and contacted the

British in Egypt for military coordination. Despite British refusal to guarantee independence, the Libyans supported the Allies and fought to wrest Libya from Italian domination. By 1943, all Axis forces had been dislodged from Libya. Until well after the war, Libya's three provinces were administered by military governments, the Free French in Fezzan and the British in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The strategic value of Libya in the Cold War was foreshadowed by a determined Soviet effort to secure a trusteeship over Tripolitania at the Potsdam conference in 1945. Finally in 1949, a UN General Assembly resolution decided that Libya should become an independent sovereign state no later than January 1, 1952.⁷

The long process to devise and implement an independent Libya was carefully coordinated by UN commissioner, Dr. Adrian Pelt. In an attempt to ameliorate their post-colonial anxieties over the destiny of former colonies, the European powers exerted considerable influence on this process with varying concepts for Libya's future. Proposals ranged from a return to colonial status or foreign trusteeship to totally unfettered independence. Dr. Pelt had to balance these interests and navigate the process to independence by 1952. Finally, agreement was reached on a form of government, a "federal state with parity representation" and a constitutional monarchy. All sides agreed to recognize the Emir of Cyrenaica, Sayyid Muhammed al-Idris, as monarch. Idris had essentially been leading Libya's struggle for independence since 1917 when he negotiated an agreement with the Italians for self-government in the short-lived Tripolitanian Republic. Libya declared

independence on December 24, 1951, one week ahead of the UN deadline. King Idris assumed the throne of the United Kingdom of Libya.⁸

The neoteric Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world. During the independence process, King Idris had made covert agreements with the British for their support of the independence plan and later economic aid in exchange for military basing rights. The United States also realized the strategic significance of Libya and their need for economic aid. By 1954, the US had secured an agreement to lease Wheelus air base.⁹ In Cold War parlance, Libya could provide necessary basing for strategic bombers; but on the other hand, the West certainly could not allow the Soviets a North African foothold that could penetrate NATO's southern flank. Another factor affecting Western interests was oil. These early developments assured Western influence at least temporarily.

The Italians suspected the existence of oil in the 1930s and started some cursory exploration. By the 1950s, western companies were vying for exploration concessions. In 1959, the Esso Corporation (later Exxon) announced that a highly successful oil well had been drilled 200 miles south of Benghazi. This discovery kicked off the "Great Libyan Oil Boom." The flow of capital into Libya was tremendous with equally profound effects on the populace. Unfortunately, distribution of oil revenues was narrow. A small wealthy Westernized Libyan elite emerged. This gush of affluence made the mass of the population ever more aware of their abject poverty. Sudden oil wealth helped to polarize Libyan society.¹⁰

Libya was fertile ground for anti-Western/pro-Arab dissension. This discontent culminated in a bloodless coup by the "Free Unionist Officers" on 1 September 1969. In a matter of hours, the "Free Officers" occupied all the key government installations with minimal resistance. The news of the coup was generally greeted with enthusiasm by average Libyans. The lack of opposition and ebullient reaction can probably be attributed to widespread dissatisfaction with corruption in the government of King Idris.¹¹ These events unfolded while King Idris was in Turkey. King Idris asked the British to intervene, but they refused. Both the United Kingdom and United States felt some sort of change was inevitable and further believed or more precisely hoped that the "Free Union Officers" would be anti-Soviet. The Revolution Command Council (RCC) had asserted control over the newly proclaimed Republic of Libya, but their leader seemed to remain anonymous.¹²

Western authorities were well aware of dissident activity in Libya, but this was not a revolutionary group anyone had predicted nor expected. Even the Egyptians were at a loss to explain the coup. Egyptian authorities were anxious to determine if this new regime would be amicable or inimical to their interests.¹³ Any sort of crisis response by foreign powers was not only undetermined but also appeared unwarranted. In their 1 September proclamation, the new regime guaranteed the security of foreign personnel and property and assured all diplomats that existing agreements and treaties would be honored.¹⁴ Both the Arab and western worlds were shocked at the youth, low rank, and relative obscurity of this revolution's leader, a 27-year-old signal officer.

Qaddafi's Revolution

Muammar Qaddafi¹⁵ emerged as the leader of the "Free Union Officers" and head of the RCC. While lacking notoriety, this revolutionary movement had political tenure. They had been planning their revolution for over a decade. Frustrated by Libya's failure to support the anticolonial struggle in Algeria and prevent the British from using Libyan bases against Egypt in 1956, Qaddafi organized some fellow students to form a secret group in Sebha in the late 1950s. From this modest beginning as a teenager, Qaddafi and his secret group blossomed into the "full-fledged underground movement" that would seize power in 1969.¹⁶ Apart from the obvious key role Qaddafi played in the coup, it is imperative to understand Qaddafi, the man and his philosophy. He became and still is the monolithic embodiment of modern Libyan foreign and domestic policy as Robert Waller has pointed out:

Quite clearly, Libyan policy is not driven solely by threat perception: Ideology and Col. Qaddafi's quixotic leadership also play significant roles.¹⁷

The youngest of four children, Mu'ammarr Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Qaddafi was the only son of poor Bedouin nomads. He was born in a tent in the Sirte desert in 1942.¹⁸ From the small Qaddadfa tribe, he was of Berber stock albeit Arabized. He spent much of his early childhood alone in the desert tending the family's herds. His first formal education was firmly grounded in the Koran at a Muslim elementary school. The school was eighteen miles away, so young Qaddafi would sleep in the Mosque during the week and return to his family's encampment on weekends.¹⁹ Politically oriented at an early age, Qaddafi developed a fierce passion for secular Arab nationalism. Gamal Abdul

Nasser became his lifetime hero when he overthrew Egypt's King Farouk in 1952. When the Algerian Revolution erupted in 1954, Qaddafi, still a boy, was moved to give speeches in schools and Mosques in support of the Algerian struggle for liberation. He even collected money from neighbors to send to the Algerian rebels.²⁰

Qaddafi developed a particularly grandiose self-perception. He earnestly believes that he is "charged with a prophetic and revolutionary role in world affairs." He also holds that Libya's oil wealth was granted by Allah to proselytize for Islam. These views combined with his espoused secular Arab nationalism to form an overarching anti-Western vision.²¹ Although he scorns the West, he will indulge his hyper-inflated ego by comparing himself to western icons. When justifying his policies, Qaddafi will claim to be patently against terrorism, but he does support just causes of liberation. He will explain: "If you say I am a terrorist that means George Washington was a terrorist."²² Qaddafi was personally gratified by President Ronald Reagan's attention. He felt that as Reagan's major opponent; he was obviously a key actor on the world stage.²³

Megalomania

Qaddafi is an "extraordinarily vain" man. A flamboyant dresser, it is not uncommon to see him in an elegant Italian suit or donning a cape and perhaps esoteric Bedouin headgear. He sometimes changes garb up to three times a day. He is particularly fond of his lustrous white naval uniform despite his nonexistent nautical affiliation. Although, he did ride a patrol boat out to his self-proclaimed "line of death" one time in an act of defiance to US Sixth Fleet maneuvers in the Gulf of

Sidra. Much like other modern dictators, Qaddafi makes sure his picture is everywhere in Libya. He appears on billboards and walls; his portrait peers into every shop, office, and school. Nothing in Libyan culture escapes his influence; he even renamed the months.²⁴ To describe Qaddafi as a megalomaniac is sound speculation, he is constantly seeking center stage. During the Reagan/Gorbachev summit in November 1985, Qaddafi fully intended to go to Switzerland and lead a "peace march" through Geneva. He had to be curtly rebuffed by the Swiss.²⁵

Radical to the West and at least eccentric to Arabs, Qaddafi's mental health is questionable. A 1982 CIA report said that "he is judged to suffer from a severe personality disorder. . . under severe stress he is subject to episodes of bizarre behavior when his judgment may be faulty." Other CIA material suggests drug abuse (sleeping pills and pills to wake up) and bouts of severe depression. The Israelis believe he suffers from epileptic fits. The Egyptians were also concerned with his mental stability.²⁶ In 1973, Israeli fighters shot down an innocently errant Libyan airliner. Determined to exact revenge, Qaddafi summoned the commander of an Egyptian submarine stationed in Libya under the old joint defense arrangements with Nasser. The cruise liner, *Queen Elizabeth II* (QE2), was steaming from England to Israel to deliver Jews for the Israeli independence celebration. Qaddafi ordered the young commander to sink the QE2. After getting underway, the Egyptian commander notified his chain of command in Egypt of his mission. He was immediately recalled to Alexandria without incident. Denied vengeance, Qaddafi became despondent. His depression was so

severe those closest to him described him as a different person. Withdrawing to the desert, he was extremely irritable. His symptoms could be termed manic depressive.²⁷

Whatever his state of mind, Qaddafi is an enigmatic figure to his friends and enemies. The predominant impression of western journalists that interview him is "not insanity, but profound naiveté." Western diplomats might agree that his ideas are very simple, but nevertheless alarming in a head of state. Muslims are often perplexed and some clerics highly annoyed with some of his presumptuous contradictions to Islam. Mohammed Heikal, a close confidant to Nasser, said "Nasser would have deeply disapproved of the direction his young protégé had taken." Heikal remembers admonishing Qaddafi himself shortly after the coup. He told him that "he had learned alot, but absorbed too little."²⁸

The fundamental beliefs and motivations have not changed for Qaddafi. As this thesis examines Libyan policies and their evolution, it will be clear that his vision is consistent. He is still eccentric in policy and bizarre in behavior. However, he has become much more isolated and cautious regarding his personal security. When he began his tenure at Libya's helm, he was very accessible to all. His daily routine and life were not unlike any average citizen. It was not uncommon to meet him on the street. Several assassination attempts spawned elaborate security measures. Frustration with the progress of his revolution may have also dimmed his view. "Populist at heart, he is now more remote from the people than most western leaders."²⁴

Qaddafi's egocentric approach pervades all his policies, but his espoused philosophy is highly instructive. An odd mix of socialism, progressive populism, and Islam, his esoteric theories are the source of his peculiar policies. In the years planning the revolution and the early years of his regime, Qaddafi's philosophy was forming. He had to reconcile three major influences to blend his ideas into a single, not necessarily cogent, doctrine. These influences were Islam, Sirtic Bedouin common sense, and Nasserism, his personal brand of Arab nationalism.³⁰

Qaddafi's Ideology

Qaddafi's ideology crystallized in the aftermath of 1973 Israeli downing of a Libyan airliner. A memorial service for the victims in Benghazi turned into a riot against not only Israel but against Libyan and Egyptian inaction as well. The incident, his foiled attempt on the QE2, and the subsequent unrest contributed to his extreme frustration. Severely depressed, he resigned from the revolution and withdrew to the solace of the desert. Renewed in the Sahara, he returned after two months with revived passion and vigor for the revolution. He reversed his resignation and laid out a five point program for the revolution in a fiery speech in Zwara.³¹ The five points of the "Zwara Declaration" were: (1) suspension of existing laws in favor of the precepts of "sharia" (Islamic law); (2) "elimination of political illnesses" or "weeding out of all feeble minds" (this was directed at intellectuals and political parties); (3) "arming of the population to secure the 'defense of the revolution'" (this was the premise for organizing special security forces and popular paramilitary groups to counter the

armed forces and keep each other in check); (4) an "administrative revolution" to devolve power to the people (this measure established citizen committees to run all businesses and government entities except defense); and (5) "elimination of 'all imported poisonous ideas'" (this was the premise for purges of universities and anybody else who's allegiance to the revolution was questionable).³²

Libya's policies had been "confrontational from the beginning;" Qaddafi was early opposed to both capitalism and communism.³³ His repackaged philosophy merely codified what he came to call "The Third Universal Theory," the Libyan alternative to capitalism and communism. He wrote his theory into a treatise and kept refining it until he published it in his Green Book in 1975.³⁴ In the introduction to his "Unauthorized Edition" in 1988, Henry M. Christman provided the following description:

The Green Book is a manifesto of political, economic, and social concepts formulated by Colonel Qaddafi into a socialistic system of direct participatory democracy which he calls "The Third Universal Theory." Although it disavows violence, it is a theory he describes as an "instigator of revolution."³⁵

The Green Book is organized into three parts, each presented as solutions to ideological dilemmas. Part one deals with democracy and governance. Part two postulates economic reform and policy. Part three is an eclectic compendium of peculiar social mores to support "The Third Universal Theory." His propositions are populist and passionate but particularly lacking in practicality. Most of his points are simple, but his arguments are not particularly coherent nor sound. In his righteousness, he is often at odds with traditional Islamic teachings; not to mention, he tends to contradict himself as well.

The thrust of his ideology in Part one is the concept of "participatory democracy." He contends that "representation is fraud;" therefore, any form of government that employs representatives of the people is oppressive.³⁶ Qaddafi sees the will of the people subverted by not having a direct say in issues of governance. After denigrating various other political systems, he proclaims the Libyan system of popular congresses to be the only pure form of democracy. The General People's Congress is derived from public committees selected at the local level. He casually discounts his apparent contradiction by simply saying his system is different because everyone is involved.³⁷ His most curious dichotomy surfaces at the very end of Part one. After his pedantic diatribe about "participatory democracy" to guarantee each person a voice, he nonchalantly dismisses his theory in practice.

Theoretically, this is the genuine democracy. But realistically, the strong always rule, i.e., the stronger part in society is the one that rules.³⁸

No less obtuse, his prescriptions for economic policy are a mongrel of anarchism and socialism. His central theme is "in need freedom is latent." His premise is that oppression exists if a man has a need, but someone else controls the commodity for that need. His concept is essentially a zero-sum game. From this logic, he decides that everyone is entitled to three basic needs in order to be free, so he guarantees each citizen the right to a house, a vehicle, and an income even though "there are no wage-workers in the socialist society, only partners."³⁹ Qaddafi views workers in the rest of the world as slaves to their wages. His strain of "natural socialism" alleviates this burden by abolishing wages and making everyone a partner at their

place of employment. Hence, all businesses and institutions are run by people's committees.⁴⁰

Part three is a futile attempt to reconcile the social implications of "The Third Universal Theory" with traditional customs and Islam. By taking his interpretations for society beyond the Koran, "The Third Universal Theory" has "tarnished his Islamic credentials."⁴¹ His perspective is ethnocentric. He states that the most important human group is the family and families are part of tribes or "bigger families." The tribes all combine into the nation; all of which are linked by the family unit.⁴² A tidy package but he infers the dominance of group welfare over the individual freedoms he alluded to in Parts one and two. He goes on to discuss women, minorities, blacks, education, the arts, and sports. While novel, none of these opinions further illustrate the origins of Libyan policy other than to provide more examples of convoluted logic.

Initially, Qaddafi's "The Third Universal Theory" and The Green Book were well received in Libya and by Arabs at large. His "alternative theory" seemed to present a uniquely Arab solution that played well to the masses. In the mid-1970s, Qaddafi and his philosophy were an "inspiration to the Arab world;" however, his views were particularly antagonistic to Arab royalty in the more conservative Arab countries.⁴³ He had attacked both capitalism and communism, so both the West and the Soviets were wary of his motives and objectives. The West considered his ideas radical with great potential for oppression and propensity for violence. The Soviets while not enamored with his

ideology would see a mutually beneficial relationship in strategic and economic areas.

Qaddafi's Libya and the World

Libya's masses were certainly receptive to Qaddafi's overtures, but his unbridled enthusiasm was simply not contagious to the people, at least not to the degree he envisioned. In practice, the populace could be described as apathetic to "participatory democracy." Several factors have created a cyclic effect that perpetually foments increasing turmoil. In his zeal, Qaddafi established "Revolution Committees" to compel the public to be more enthusiastic about his philosophy and the revolution. The "Revolution Committees" became a paramilitary force of four to five thousand "young enthusiasts and thugs." The press dubbed them "Hit Squads." Not only do they purge the people of non-believers, they evolved into a means of keeping the armed forces in check.⁴⁴ With an overbearing internal security force among other domestic vagaries, there is "mounting internal unhappiness with Qaddafi." Of course, Qaddafi just becomes more frustrated with the failure to achieve the ideals in his The Green Book.⁴⁵ Hence, the entire cast is locked in a never-ending cycle of dissatisfaction and discontent marked by intense brutality that unfortunately colors the Libyan view of the outside world as well.

Far from the egalitarian system sought by Qaddafi, he has created a regime sustained by propaganda, nepotism, fear, and division. Libya has instituted an incredibly pervasive internal propaganda program. The populace is inundated with Qaddafi, his teachings, and the revolution; this propaganda dominates every form of media. His

propaganda wonks have gone so far as to have his teachings put to disco music for the young revolutionaries. Another typical tool is to organize "spontaneous" demonstrations to hear Qaddafi speak; he may or may not attend. They have also been known to pay foreign guest workers to attend as a show of solidarity and perhaps enhance crowd numbers.⁴⁶

Qaddafi's Regime

In Libya's atmosphere of harsh intolerance, the regime continues to rot. Nepotism has thoroughly taken root. To survive and possibly thrive in Libyan politics, the elite recognize three important factors: seniority, kinship (great potential here), and affiliation with a military institution.⁴⁷ Loyalties are easily guaranteed; there is scarcely a place in Libya that is not bugged. There are men in police uniforms, but the police have been officially abolished. Part of the revolution, the theory is that the people police themselves. In case the people or the pseudo-police are not up to it, there is a plethora of security services to guarantee state safety. Needless to say, everyone in Libya is scared.⁴⁸

Division is integral to Qaddafi's regime. Turmoil may intensify, but his compartmented government shields his reign. Islamic fundamentalists have been dissenting and causing dissonance. Qaddafi exercised flexibility; he formed the new "Popular Guard" to monitor worshippers. By 1989, "minor skirmishes between Islamists and security forces were erupting." This one example illustrates Qaddafi's method for preserving power. Qaddafi ensures his survival by pitting the police, the military, and the security forces against each other. By

this strategy, no single group can emerge dominant or strong enough to threaten Qaddafi.⁴⁹

Oil wealth is the key to modern Libya. In the 1960s, the lavish lifestyles of the wealthy oil sheiks polarized the indigent masses with resentment. After Qaddafi's coup, the 1970s saw dramatic improvement in the standard of living for all Libyans because oil revenues were widely distributed. Annual oil revenues steadily climbed until they peaked in 1980 at about \$21 billion. By the early 1980s, all Libyans had a relatively high standard of living.⁵⁰ However, a world oil glut starting in 1981 would reverse this trend. The 1980s were again marked by resentment as slumping oil prices hurt Libyans' standard of living and fostered domestic discontent.⁵¹ This trend continues today.

Copious petroleum proceeds had allowed Qaddafi extravagance in his budgets to pursue his eccentric policies. By 1985, oil revenues were still about half of their 1980 peak level and sinking further. The standard of living was already declining when in 1985 Libya instituted "very severe austerity measures" for public spending to compensate for the drop in real oil income. The impact on Libyans and their standard of living was appreciable. In the mid-1980s, Tripoli had become a very dismal place. Shopping areas were mostly deserted and those shops that were open had little to sell.⁵² Withering oil income was not the only factor for this economic adversity. Beyond the petroleum sector, there was no depth in the Libyan economy. Nonpetroleum economic development under Qaddafi was poor; Libya was significantly lacking in industrial infrastructure, skilled technicians, and professional managers⁵³

Qaddafi was now reaping the deleterious effects of his revolution's radical economic policies. He had abolished retail trade and bank accounts. These measures combined with management by people's committees "discouraged private investment and spawned a black market." There was an absolute decline in agriculture productivity that only exacerbated Libya's "massive dependence on imported food." Qaddafi's crusade against the private sector eventually moved 75 percent of Libya's labor force into the public sector. Qaddafi had created an "oil welfare" state with an economy hopelessly dependent on oil and a populace whose ambition had languished in Libya's largess.⁵⁴

Prospects for Libya's economy are virtually an exclusive function of oil revenue. Spending is primarily consumption driven. Outside the petroleum industry, Libya does not have the technological or human resources to transform capital into a productive base. The "oil welfare" state has created a national lack of initiative. Qaddafi has "contributed to the incapacitation rather than liberation of his people."⁵⁵

Qaddafi's regime has given modern Libya a continuum of economic dissatisfaction, Islamic discontent, and political dissension. While the standard of living is still much higher than before the revolution, the majority of Libyans have been born since then and have little appreciation for that history in their current decline. Qaddafi considers Islamic fundamentalism his greatest internal threat. His response is mixed. He has attempted appeasement with extensions of "sharia" (Islamic law) jurisdiction as recently as February 1994 and he has also applied oppression going so far as to dispose of dissident

clerics. Political dissension is manifest in continuous public disturbances, which are increasingly tribal in nature. There are confirmed reports of domestic unrest and public violence in Benghazi as recently as June and September 1995. The prognosis for Libya is a perpetuation of this continuum. Coup attempts are fairly certain, but success has been so far unlikely. An Islamic assassin cannot be ruled out, but the most probable coup would be from the inner circle. Nevertheless, Qaddafi is still firmly in control of Libya. His domestic problems may factor into changing his foreign policy, but they are unlikely to cause any change.⁵⁶

Qaddafi's Foreign Policy

In line with his own self-perception, "Qaddafi has a strangely inflated view of Libya's role in the world."⁵⁷ He envisions himself a world leader and Libya a world power. His foreign policy goals are consistent with that view. Qaddafi sees three spheres of influence (or power) for him to dominate: the Middle East or Arab world, Africa, and Islam. Therefore, his primary foreign policy goal is to achieve hegemony in all three. Coequal or the other side of the same goal, Qaddafi desperately desires to "weaken the west" or more specifically remove all western influences from his perceived spheres of influence. A subset of or even perhaps the linchpin to his goal to "weaken the West," the destruction of Israel is significant enough to merit specific mention. Qaddafi employs three "principle means" in pursuit of his goals: foreign intervention, terrorism, and outside assistance.⁵⁸ After due consideration of the influences on Libyan foreign policy, this thesis will resume an examination of these "principle means."

Despite his extreme ideas and apparent irrational behavior, analysis of Qaddafi's foreign policy during his reign will demonstrate remarkable continuity. Upon seizing power in 1969, his early goals were already consistent with his grand strategy to weaken the West and achieve hegemony. His first priority was to consolidate his power through national unity. Of course, this was best done by eliminating political parties thereby weakening any institutional challenges. With his countrymen in line, his next goal was to evacuate foreign military presence from Libyan soil. To shore up his position, Qaddafi declared immovable neutrality between the superpowers. This stance was designed to assuage any Western hesitancy in relinquishing holdings where the Soviets might be interested. It also enhanced the distinction of Qaddafi's Arab nationalism as unique and separate if not above the hackneyed bipolar east-west conflict. In the foot steps of Nasser, Qaddafi's overarching goal was to seek dominance in the Arab world with an impassioned message of Arab unity.⁵⁹ In an odd theme persistent in his policy, he greeted the first Egyptian officials after the coup with proposition for union with Egypt and submission to his childhood hero, Nasser.⁶⁰ He was to be sorely disappointed by the responses of other Arab leaders.

Chapter 5 will analyze Libya's foreign policy development, evolution, and success or failure as juxtaposed to US policy and specifically military presence. This section of the thesis will consider the threats to Libya, influences on and general summary of Libya's foreign policy in greater detail. However, this is still an overview to construct a framework for analysis. Libya's external

threats will be identified and defined. Influences on foreign policy will be examined and weighted. Finally, a summary will describe the relatively consistent nature of Libya's foreign policy goals but unpredictable methods and a working restatement of objectives and strategy for analysis in the next chapter.

Qaddafi's Libya and The United States

In light of Qaddafi's two primary foreign policy goals, hegemony and eradication of western influence, the United States poses the only viable external threat in the form of dominant regional influence. Qaddafi considers Israel "the last vestige of US imperialism in the Middle East;"⁶¹ and as such, Israel is merely an extension of the US threat. Although he has recently stated that Israel's nuclear arsenal is his number one threat, his view of Israel as a manifestation of the US persists.⁶² Islamic fundamentalists and conservative Arab monarchies in the region may have inimical intentions toward Qaddafi, but they would only use external pressure in the form of funds or moral support for Libyan dissidents to foster internal threats. While most of Libya's neighbors are uneasy about his policies and unpredictability, none are in a position to attack him. In short, the United States is the only external power that is not only poised to take action but also has the means and record to be credible.

In the early years of his regime, the United States generally considered Qaddafi "a certified Libyan patriot and definitely an anti-Communist, with fairly benign approval." Due to the activities of some renegade former CIA agents in Libya in the 1970s, there was a perception that Qaddafi enjoyed CIA protection. Some Arabs even thought Qaddafi

was an American agent.⁶³ These amiable beginnings were tenuous at best and doomed from the start. Libyan and American interests were on a collision course. Libya's primary goal to "weaken the west" and, at very least, remove western influence dictated a contrary stance. Qaddafi wanted to oust pro-US (western) governments in the region and the United States obviously wanted to protect them.⁶⁴

The specific factors in the deterioration in Libyan and American relations are instructive with regard to current relations and to some degree shaped that relationship. US support of Israel is intolerable to Libya; but before tainting relations, Qaddafi was extremely clever in suppressing his opinion until he achieved an early objective. Early on, the US was very interested in maintaining good relations. Qaddafi expressed an overriding desire to remain neutral without foreign military presence in Libya. In an earnest effort to placate him, the US agreed to vacate Wheelus Air Base. After US forces withdrew, a Libyan official informed the US ambassador that Libya could never have good relations with any nation that supported Israel. Qaddafi viewed US refusals to sell arms to Arabs and their lobbying of NATO allies to follow suit as a deliberate attempt to keep Arabs weak and somehow subjugate them. In addition, the US firmly objected to Qaddafi exporting revolution.⁶⁵

From his perspective, Qaddafi could only surmise that the West had applied a double standard. He concluded that the US was trying to dominate the world. He saw US support for Israel and its occupation of Arab lands and US third world policies in general as "international terrorism." In his opinion, if the US could condone Israeli violence

and simultaneously oppose Arab rights in the region, the United States was the antithesis to his cause. Therefore, the US became the "greatest ultimate obstacle to Qaddafi."⁶⁶ In this way, he came to oppose all US presence in the Middle East. He perceived US presence as a "threat" and a campaign to "destabilize and overthrow" his regime.⁶⁷

Past colonial experiences and contemporary reality weigh heavily in Libyan foreign policy. Libya's history has fostered a dim almost xenophobic view of any foreign influence. The current situation demonstrates that foreign interests in the region remain significant and to Libya any foreign influence is oppressive. Probably the only human being to have had any significant influence on Qaddafi was President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, his childhood hero. Qaddafi essentially adopted Nasser's ideology as his own: Pan-Arabism, Anti-Zionism, and Anti-Colonialism. Anti-Zionism and Anti-Colonialism are the guidance for his foreign policy to "weaken the West." Pan-Arabism is the bedrock on which Qaddafi builds his quest for hegemony. He is obsessed with Arab unity; it seems he is perpetually committed to some pending agreement of union with another Arab nation. At one time or another, Qaddafi has had agreements to merge with Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Syria, and Morocco. Pan-Arabism was also part of his reasoning to proclaim non-alignment or more subtly as an alternative choice of defiance.⁶⁸

While eternally devoted to his concept of Pan-Arabism, it has been a constant source of disappointment to Qaddafi. Few of his schemes for Arab merger have come to fruition and none has lasted. The first significant snub came in 1973 when Egypt and Syria excluded Qaddafi from the planning and execution of the attack on Israel. Then when Egypt

accepted the cease-fire, a hopeless decline in relations started.⁶⁹ To Qaddafi in 1977, the Camp David Accords were the nadir for Pan-Arabism when Nasser's homeland succumbed to their mortal enemy and made peace. Little did he know that this trend would slowly but steadily continue. The Middle East peace process and gradual acceptance of Israel are particularly disturbing to Qaddafi because it undermines his legitimacy in the Arab world.⁷⁰ Not only does an Arab-Israeli settlement signal disagreement with his position, his mortal enemy and threat to Pan-Arabism are no longer seen as a threat by the rest of the Arab states, Syria and Iraq excepted. Therefore, his purpose in the Arab world has dissipated.

Qaddafi's failures to rally the Arab world disappoint him and exacerbate his stubborn extremism. Conservative Arab states particularly monarchies resent his inciting unrest in their countries for Arab nationalism or his "natural socialism."⁷¹ Those countries bordering Libya find little reassurance in his belligerent rhetoric. Increasingly in the Arab world and beyond, Qaddafi is finding himself more isolated. Other countries may be sympathetic to Libya, but many feel Qaddafi has caused his own problems.⁷² For Libya, regional relations are usually strained. In general, not even the third world trusts him.⁷³

Relations between Libya and the USSR were grounded in convenience. The USSR did not particularly influence Libyan policy, nor did Libya present any special considerations to Soviet policy. Any interactions provided perceived benefits to each; ideological ties were tenuous. Early in Qaddafi's regime, Libya was not inclined to the USSR.

He was highly critical of the Soviet failure to export good arms and their acquiescence to the migration of Soviet Jews to Israel. As late as 1973, Qaddafi called the USSR "the arch enemy of the Arab world." Despite this enmity, the USSR saw a lucrative customer in Libya, a radical, oil-rich state that could buy arms with hard currency.⁷⁴ Libya was finding the US more and more disenchanted with its policies; this deterioration helped push Libya toward the USSR for patronage. Eventually, they found each other palatable. The USSR could overlook their "contempt for Libya's political maverick" for the prospect of cash. Strategically, Libya was a good geographic foothold in North Africa that could also affect southern Europe. The USSR could benefit indirectly from Libya's destabilizing antics around the globe. Libya also realized substantial benefits. They got arms, technology, and the attention of a superpower. While Qaddafi publicly denied granting the Soviet Union basing rights, it was not a difficult presumption, that he would given different circumstances.⁷⁵

The Libyan/Soviet venture was fruitful. It is estimated that the total arms transfer over the years was approximately \$20 billion. By 1985, there was a small rift. The USSR was unhappy about Libya supplying arms (some of it Soviet) to Iran and Qaddafi's opposition to a Middle East negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, the relations would continue because Qaddafi perceived a deterrent effect to the West. Libya's arms debt was reportedly around \$7 billion by 1985, but counter to Soviet needs, Qaddafi wanted to pay in oil.⁷⁶ Another source put the Libyan arms debt at \$4-5 billion before emergency shipment of SAM-5 missiles in March 1986.⁷⁷ As late as 1995, Russia was still pressuring

the Libyans to pay their arms debt of \$4 billion.⁷⁸ They think they are using each other, but should the mutual abuse cease, so will their relationship.⁷⁹ Since the relationship was originally founded in military and monetary gratification and those factors are diminishing rapidly, their association is likely to fade away with its strategic value or lack thereof.

Qaddafi covets a world and regional role for Libya. This is the heart of his vision.⁸⁰ His two primary foreign policy goals, regional hegemony and weakening the West, are designed to facilitate his dream. This thesis will first discuss political and then military tactics applied by Libyan policy. His political or loosely diplomatic efforts include becoming an Arab and African leader, expanding Libya's national frontier, and confounding the imperialists.⁸¹ The tools he employs are diplomatic relations, financial assistance, and political unity. Qaddafi uses his alluring message of Arab nationalism or solidarity among non-aligned states to establish political unity. He also sees his diplomatic relations as means of defining his leadership. As the enemy of the United States, the nemesis of the West, and crusader for political unity among Arabs and all non-aligned states, he feels that only he can be the true leader of the Arab and African worlds. Qaddafi is always poised to expand Libya's national frontier or make Libya disappear inside a larger state by a union with any other Arab states. Of course, he is not averse to military coercion as evidenced by his role in the Civil War in Chad. Qaddafi enjoys flaunting his diplomatic relations with rogue states inimical to the West in his effort to confound imperialists. He generously doles out his financial assistance

to any group, insurgent movement, or terrorists, which might possibly undermine Western interests. As part of his strategy to confound imperialists, he expanded efforts in Latin America to thwart US policy in our own backyard.⁸²

Qaddafi's government is organized into numerous secretariats. His foreign policy establishment is convoluted and diluted by these various secretariats. However, he personally retains stringent control of any policy decisions. This case study commences with Libyan and US relations in 1977. In that year, Qaddafi proclaimed the "Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority" and officially renamed Libya as the "Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya."⁸³ Jamahiriyya means 'era of the masses.' While Soviet influence seems to resonate in these terms, the only discernible consequence was more latitude to implement his own radical political and economic policies. These changes only further complicated an already incoherent foreign policy apparatus. The tangible effect on foreign policy was negligible, but it further reinforced Qaddafi as the singular embodiment of Libyan foreign policy.

An examination of successes and failures in Libya's foreign policy portrays a dismal record. In his quest for hegemony in all his realms, Qaddafi has failed: Islamic clerics dispute him, African nations distrust his intentions, and the Arab masses reject his message. As far as weakening the West, Israel has not been supplanted by Palestine and the imperialists go unpunished. Even at home, Libyans have responded only half-heartedly to his revolution despite improvements in living standards.

Resistance to his ideas and failures in foreign policy frustrated Qaddafi and drove him to a "reactive foreign policy."⁸⁴ This trend emphasizes the three principle means for pursuing his goals: foreign intervention, terrorism, and outside assistance (or subversion). His tactics are generally unsavory. He will fund and train insurgents and dissidents and provide safehaven for terrorists. He gladly supplies weapons to any subversives and calls them revolutionaries. His penchant for destabilization knows no bounds; he will even deploy assassins. Of course, under favorable circumstances, he may resort to military intervention.⁸⁵ Oil revenues may fluctuate, but as always, it is only from that wealth that Qaddafi can afford to indulge his reactive foreign policy.⁸⁶

The US opinion is that Qaddafi uses "diplomacy of subversion."⁸⁷ Actually, Libya's best deterrent is Qaddafi's unpredictability.⁸⁸ Reactive foreign policy does not enhance his vision; Qaddafi's methods harm his causes. His radical policies, particularly Libya's terrorism and support of terrorism, portray Arabs as terrorists and fanatics.⁸⁹ Such strategies only encourage moderate nations to shun him and polarize those already inclined against him. His policies relegate Qaddafi to the fringe of international politics.

Two recent quotes from Jane's Intelligence Review succinctly summarize Libya's current situation:

Qaddafi's personal status will take precedence over his country's needs to the bitter end.⁹⁰

The desperate and vindictive nature of this Libyan policy indicates that after 26 tumultuous years in power, the regime is wilting under the cumulative weight of foreign policy failure, economic strain, and domestic discontent.⁹¹

In this context, successive US administrations have had to deal with Libyan anti-US policies and actions. The next chapter will examine US policy towards Libya and the evolutionary role of presence in that policy.

Endnotes

¹Global Encyclopedia (Alexandria, VA: Global Industries, Inc., 1987), 319-320.

²Lillian Craig Harris, Libya: Qaddafi's Revolution and the Modern State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 1.

³Global Encyclopedia, 320-321.

⁴Geoff Simons, Libya: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 73-91.

⁵Ibid., 92-93.

⁶Harris, 5-8.

⁷John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982) 36-39.

⁸Simons, 129-136.

⁹Ibid., 132, 139.

¹⁰Cooley, 43-47.

¹¹Harris, 13-14.

¹²Cooley, 7-8, 13-14.

¹³Ibid., 11-14.

¹⁴Harris, 15.

¹⁵David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution (Boston MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1987). In Arabic, Qaddafi is pronounced in a short, incomprehensible explosion of guttural sounds that do not transliterate easily into the Latin alphabet. There are reportedly over 600 ways of spelling it;" (21). This thesis will use the spelling: Qaddafi. His name is derived from the name of his Bedouin tribe, "Qaddadfa which means those who spit out or vomit;" (33).

¹⁶Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice (Brattleboro, VT: Amara Books, 1986), 6.

¹⁷Robert Waller, "Libyan Threat Perception," Jane's Intelligence Review Vol. 7, No. 9 (Sep '95): 407.

¹⁸Blundy and Lycett, 35. The exact date is unknown. Qaddafi maintains that his birthday was in the spring of 1942. However, these authors believe he may actually have been born in 1940. First, due to poverty, he started school two years late for which it is believed he deducted two years from his age. Second, he claims to vividly remember listening to the rumble of W.W.II tank battles in the desert. The Axis was driven from North Africa by May 1943. The Authors contend that if his claim is true, it is much more likely that a toddler would remember these events than an infant.

¹⁹Harris, 45.

²⁰El-Khawas, 3-4.

²¹P. Edward Haley, Qaddafi and the United States since 1969 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 10.

²²Blundy and Lycett, 19.

²³Harris, 99.

²⁴Blundy and Lycett, 20-30.

²⁵Harris, 95.

²⁶Blundy and Lycett, 21.

²⁷Cooley, 106-108.

²⁸Blundy and Lycett, 18,24.

²⁹Ibid., 20.

³⁰Ibid., 87.

³¹Ibid., 84-84.

³²Harris, 17-18; Blundy and Lycett, 85-86. Renditions of the Zwara Declaration varied in description with some nuances in substance. These two sources were compared and used to compile an interpretation pertinent to this thesis.

³³Harris, 86.

³⁴Blundy and Lycett, 86-96.

³⁵Muammar M. al-Qaddafi, The Green Book, ed. Henry M. Christman (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988), 7.

³⁶Ibid., 40-42.

³⁷Blundy and Lycett, 96-97.

³⁸al-Qaddafi, 62.

³⁹Ibid., 72.

⁴⁰Blundy and Lycett, 97-98.

⁴¹Waller, 407.

⁴²al-Qaddafi, 85-96.

⁴³Harris, 86-87.

⁴⁴Lisa Anderson, "Libya's Qaddafi: still in command?" Current History 86:65-8+ (Fall 1987): 62.

⁴⁵Harris, 125-126.

⁴⁶Blundy and Lycett, 16-20.

⁴⁷Anderson, 66.

⁴⁸Blundy and Lycett, 28-29.

⁴⁹Waller, 407-408.

⁵⁰Blundy and Lycett, 19.

⁵¹Anderson, 65.

⁵²Blundy and Lycett, 31, 28.

⁵³Harris, 107.

⁵⁴Anderson, 66; Harris, 128-129.

⁵⁵Harris, 107, 84.

⁵⁶James Wyllie, "Libya - Regime Stress," Jane's Intelligence Review Vol. 7 No. 12 (Dec '95): 555; Waller, 407; Cooley, 273-281; Anderson, 65,87. This paragraph was a synthesis and compilation of prognoses by these authors. While the sources range from 1982 to 1995, their admixture is relevant and coherent because Qaddafi's regime has attained a stagnating status quo since the early 1980s with long term deleterious effects on Libya.

⁵⁷Blundy and Lycett, 26.

⁵⁸Haley, 11.

⁵⁹Harris, 15.

⁶⁰Cooley, 11-12.

⁶¹Ibid., 101.

⁶²Waller, 410, 408.

⁶³Cooley, 80-83. There appears to be quite a tale of intrigue regarding two former CIA agents, Frank Terpil and Edwin Wilson. While their activities may have had ramifications in terrorism issues, their impact upon policy is negligible and beyond the scope of this thesis.

⁶⁴El-Khawas, 126.

⁶⁵Ibid., 121-122.

⁶⁶Harris, 99.

⁶⁷El-Khawas, 125.

⁶⁸Ibid., 119-120, 126-127.

⁶⁹Harris, 87-88.

⁷⁰Wyllie, 554.

⁷¹Harris, 93.

⁷²Anderson, 87.

⁷³Harris, 103.

⁷⁴El-Khawas, 122, 151.

⁷⁵Harris, 97.

⁷⁶Ibid., 98-99.

⁷⁷Anderson, 66.

⁷⁸Wyllie, 554.

⁷⁹Cooley, 283.

⁸⁰El-Khawas.

⁸¹Harris, 84.

⁸²Ibid., 89.

⁸³Ibid., 85-86, 19.

⁸⁴Ibid., 125, 84-85.

⁸⁵Ibid., 84-85.

⁸⁶El-Khawas, 142.

⁸⁷Ibid., 150.

⁸⁸Waller, 409.

⁸⁹Harris, 126-127.

⁹⁰Waller, 410.

⁹¹Wyllie, 554. This excerpt is from an article criticizing Qaddafi's 1995 attempts to eject Palestinians from Libya even though Israel nor any other nation is willing to accept them. Qaddafi is trying to illustrate his point that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not truly autonomous.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS: PRESENCE IN US-LIBYAN RELATIONS

Overview of US Policy

Libya had significant strategic value to the United States following World War II. An early indication of Libya's importance came at the Potsdam Conference, when Stalin proposed a Soviet "trusteeship" for Libya. Recognizing the potential vulnerability of Southern Europe to Soviet bases in the Mediterranean, the United States (US) and Great Britain opposed the Soviet maneuver.¹ When the Cold War began, the US and Britain sought to exploit the geographic advantages of Libya for Mediterranean and Middle East security. In the 1950s, both the US and Great Britain secured air bases in Libya to support strategic bombing capabilities against the Soviet Union.² The increasing presence of US oil companies involved in oil exploration added another dimension to Western interests. A tenuous status quo was attained under the pro-Western King Idris, but the bloodless coup in 1969 brought an unknown variable--in the form of Qaddafi--to power. The West would need to reassess Libya's strategic importance and to determine an appropriate policy toward the new regime.

Qaddafi's Libya presented a unique dilemma: Was it an Arab state, an African state, or both? Was the overthrow of the monarchy a revolution or a coup? P. Edward Haley describes three general phases of US policy:

| | | |
|--------------|---|------------------------|
| Conciliation | - | Friendship |
| Restraint | - | Indifference |
| Opposition | - | Hostility ⁴ |

The initial US assessment was that Qaddafi was a "Libyan patriot" and an anti-Communist. Conciliation with the new regime seemed appropriate. Qaddafi enjoyed American support in his early years. When the treaty for Wheelus Air Base came due for review in 1970, Qaddafi professed a fervent desire for Libya to be nonaligned in the bipolar world and so requested the removal of the US military presence from Libyan soil. Advances in aviation technology obviated the need for Libyan bases to conduct strategic bombing, so the Nixon administration determined that relinquishing the base was a proper gesture. The intent was to appease Qaddafi and keep Libya in the American sphere of influence thereby retaining American access to Libyan oil and denying the Soviets access to this strategically important position. After the US left Wheelus, this hope was soon dashed when Libya informed the US that it could never have good relations with any nation amiable to Israel. The Nixon administration began to doubt Qaddafi's credentials as an anti-Communist.⁵ Diplomatic relations became strained, and in 1972 the American Ambassador was recalled, ending the phase of conciliation to establish friendly relations with Qaddafi's Libya.

Started in the Nixon administration, the Ford and Carter administrations continued a policy of restraint. Qaddafi sought a regional and world role for Libya; he sought disassociation with the West as a prerequisite.⁶ However, a direct challenge to the US was not immediately apparent, so restraint toward Libya seemed preferable in the strategic environment of the 1970s. The recent Sino-Soviet break implied a decline in the global threat of Communism. Moreover, seeking

domestic support for confrontation abroad in the era of "post-Vietnam isolationism" was unpalatable to many politicians. Paradoxically, Soviet influence in the region appeared to be growing. Unfortunately, widespread Arab dissatisfaction with American support for Israel prompted very tolerant US policies toward Arab states lest they be pushed into the Soviet realm. Furthermore, Europe was challenging US leadership; many felt they could do better in diplomacy and oil well drilling.⁷ Absent unity abroad, support at home, and solid relations with Arab states, a policy of indifference to Qaddafi's eccentricities was arguably prudent.

The election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States marked a dramatic shift in US policy toward Libya. Signals of opposition to Libya began emerging in the Carter years, but it was Reagan who announced and implemented a decisive policy of opposition. Some pundits believed Reagan only chose Libya to demonstrate his tough anti-Communist stance.⁸ There is no doubt that Reagan resurrected the status of the Soviet Union as a US archenemy as evidenced in his first press conference when he described the Soviet empire as willing "to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" to further its interests.⁹ However, a broader view of US-Libyan relations exposes a relationship that has been "confrontational from the beginning." Qaddafi has always opposed both Communism and capitalism with ever-increasing vigor.¹⁰ In his obsession with Arab unity, he regards Israel as "the last vestige of Western Imperialism" in the Middle East.¹¹ Therefore, US support for Israel could only result in the US and Libya being diametrically opposed. The 1973 Yom Kippur War was very difficult for Qaddafi to

accept. Distrusted by Sadat, Egypt shunned Libya in the effort. Initially disappointed, Qaddafi was livid when Sadat agreed to disengagement talks. Libyan and Egyptian relations never mended.¹²

This divergence was sharpened by President Carter's Middle East peace initiatives and the resulting Camp David Accords, between Israel and Sadat's Egypt. Qaddafi had become more than inimical to US interests; he was aggressively attempting to subvert them. By the time President Reagan came on the scene, US indifference to Libya over the last decade had presided over a steady process of Qaddafi pushing ever more extreme policies. Qaddafi was clearly a menace to US interests enjoying some success in damaging them. The Reagan administration adopted a policy to destabilize Qaddafi; this was intended to minimize his influence if not to actually facilitate his removal. Three general goals made up this policy: isolate, embarrass, and weaken Libya. Some charged Reagan's posturing as overreaction and no more than part of his ploy to justify big defense budgets.¹³ Regardless, a shift in policy was inevitable; accommodation (conciliation) had not worked and restraint had only exacerbated the situation.¹⁴

The subsequent sections of this chapter are divided into four chronological periods for analysis. The first period 1977 to 1980 will investigate the last years of a "restraint" policy towards Libya in the Carter administration. The next period 1981 to 1984 emphasizes the shift in policy from "restraint" to "opposition" within the first Reagan administration. The period 1985 to 1986 details the phase of "opposition" that escalated into open hostility, highlighted by the 1986 air raid on Libya. Finally, the period 1987 to 1995 analyzes the

continued policy of "opposition" that essentially evolved into micro-containment. Each section describes US-Libyan relations in general, recounts initial policies and goals for each, examines events, analyzes the use or nonuse of military presence, and assesses the efficacy of military presence in supporting policy and enhancing national interests. Military presence is discussed in the context of appropriate measures for the military instrument of power. Assessments focus on if and how military presence may have achieved suasion, particularly in the forms of compellence, deterrence, and reassurance.

Restraint, 1977 to 1980

The analysis of the case study for this thesis begins in 1977 for several reasons. US-Libyan relations had been steadily deteriorating since the recall of the US ambassador to Libya in 1972 and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Middle East peace initiatives of the newly elected Carter administration brought the mutually exclusive interests of both into sharp relief. Both the US and Libya reached subtle turning points in their respective policies. This period marked the first consideration and employment of the military instrument of power in support of US policy toward Libya. The analysis in this section will highlight the use and nonuse of military presence and ultimately demonstrate an ineffective application of presence.

In a broad sense, the decline in US-Libyan relations was apparent and easily recognized. Close US-Israeli relations were abjectly intolerable to Qaddafi. US refusals to sell arms to Libya and similar efforts to get NATO to refuse sales had served to drive Libya towards the Soviet camp. US objections to Libya exporting terrorism and

insurgency also intensified tensions.¹⁵ Qaddafi steadfastly denied these accusations. He publicly stated his opposition to terrorism even going so far as to call for its elimination by international law. However, he cleverly reserved the right to promote freedom and support those revolutionaries seeking deliverance from imperialist tyranny.¹⁶ His pleas of innocence did not resonate within the US State Department. By 1977, the State Department considered it a "matter of public record" that Libya had supported at least eight acts of terrorism since 1972. This list included deeds from the tragic massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich to the kidnapping of certain Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil ministers in December 1975. The State Department also listed four countries known to have "aided and abetted" terrorists: Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and Somalia. Based on the available information, Senator Jacob K. Javits declared, "Libya is by far the worst offender."¹⁷

Despite Qaddafi's eccentricities and critics' claims of irrationality, his choice of foreign policy tools was logical for his goals and limited capabilities. He had adopted terror, subversion, and intervention. In his quest for Libyan hegemony, he considered weakening the West and eradicating all imperial influences his top priority. While his self-perception might be described as illusions of grandeur, he realized that Libya could not compete head-to-head with Western powers. Supporting terror and subversive groups was an astute exploitation of his available means. Through these methods, Qaddafi could attack the West in their "backyards." He always imported huge amounts of arms (mostly Soviet and French). His armed forces were

ill-trained and therefore relatively ineffective. Covert activities gave him an intelligence capability and influence that he would otherwise not have achieved.¹⁸ Essentially, Qaddafi used his copious oil revenues to buy unorthodox forms of power projection.¹⁹

The turning point for Libya in 1977 had two aspects, domestic and international. While Qaddafi reigned supreme, there had been varying degrees of uneventful dissension since 1969. However, the first significant coup attempt in 1975 came from within his inner circle, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). This challenge and other dissonance convinced Qaddafi he must continually divide and disperse power among his subordinates to preclude the ascendancy of any rivals. His Green Book ideology provided his solution. The domestic turning point was the 2 March 1977, Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority. This document amended the 1969 constitution to abolish the RCC and replace it with a "system of direct popular participation in the selection of representatives to the people's committees and the General People's Congress." Qaddafi appointed himself "General Secretary of the General People's Congress." He resigned his official government post in 1979, but retained the title "Leader of the Revolution." Regardless of whatever he calls himself, Qaddafi was and still is the de facto leader of Libya.²⁰

The international turning point for Libyan foreign policy can be directly linked to President Carter's Middle East Peace Initiative in January 1977. Acquiescence by some Arab states to the existence of Israel had irritated Qaddafi, but the potential for a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict brokered by the United States

was almost too much for him to bear. This development was plainly counter to his foreign policy goals to remove Western influence and destroy Israel. Qaddafi displayed "virulent opposition;" Libyan foreign policy was now on a certain collision course with US interests.²¹

Qaddafi was fixated on the liberation of Palestine; he claimed that the Jews will "swallow" Arab states to form a "Zionist Empire."²² His open opposition brought him greater notoriety (which he enjoyed) but also greater international scrutiny. Bent on the destruction of Israel, he could not tolerate Arab states willing to accept Israel. He called for the overthrow of conservative Arab regimes (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, and the Arabian Gulf States) for their perceived ambivalence toward Israel. He was accused of supporting assassination attempts in every one of his neighbors except Algeria, so his calls for Arab solidarity against the US and Egypt met significant skepticism from most Arab nations. Many Arab states were leery of his fanaticism and association with the Soviet Union.²³ Unable to rally Arab unity, Qaddafi became frustrated; he subsequently focused his covert and overt actions on Egypt.

The United States was Qaddafi's nemesis in the larger scheme; but in 1977, Egypt was the focal point. Qaddafi saw Sadat as a betrayer of Arab nationalism and solidarity. The year started out badly with Egyptian authorities connecting Libya to fomenting food riots in Cairo in January, a bombing in Alexandria in February, and a supposed plot to sabotage an Afro-Asian conference scheduled for Cairo in March. On 10 April, demonstrators from both countries attacked each other's

diplomatic missions.²⁴ In July, an "unexpected fierce border war" broke out between Egypt and Libya; it was a six day air and ground battle. These hostilities were driven by their mutually exclusive policies toward Israel. Precise culpability for initiation was "obscured by mutual charges of aggression." In a radio broadcast, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said: "Our armed forces gave Qaddafi a lesson he could never forget. We are ready to repeat this lesson unless this maniac stops playing with fire."²⁵

In the aftermath of this frontier skirmish, Qaddafi accused Egypt of aggression at the border and directing Egyptian guest workers to bomb Libya. More importantly, he ultimately blamed the US charging that the US was using Egypt. He stated: "The US plays a prominent part in aggravating our relations with Egypt." One of his biggest complaints was that the Soviet Navy had not been to Libya, but there was a significant US military presence in the region. He specifically cited US radar sites in Sinai and emphasized naval presence. He believed that the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) off the western coast of Egypt signified US support for Egypt in their conflict with Libya.²⁶ Clearly, Qaddafi held a perception of US military presence, but how did that presence support US policy and was it intentional?

By 1977, the US had no specific strategy for dealing with Libya. The Carter administration was focused on pushing the peace process between Egypt and Israel. Libya was merely a nuisance that was becoming more difficult to ignore. Libyan policies were inimical to US interests, but the United States and Libya quietly enjoyed a healthy growing trade relationship particularly in oil. The only tangible

foreign policy toward Libya was denial of arms sales and the obligatory rhetoric denouncing Qaddafi's support for terrorism. From the Libyan perspective, it is not unreasonable to surmise a general policy of indifference by the US. While protesting Libyan activities, US firms were simultaneously funding those activities through oil revenues. The lack of a comprehensive US policy toward Libya was not negligence. The Carter administration was only continuing a policy of "restraint" inherited from the Nixon and Ford administrations. Prior to Qaddafi attempting directly to subvert US peace initiatives, Libya simply did not pose a substantial threat to important US interests.

Libya's high profile in the heightening terrorist threat and overt attempts to create obstacles for US policy in the Middle East were stimulating the United States to reconsider its policy. The same reason that had sustained a policy of "restraint" was quickly recognized as an impediment to a more proactive policy. The United States had little leverage over Libya short of drastic measures. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. gave the following testimony to a House subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East:

Given our very different positions on the Middle East and the difficulty of engaging the Libyans in meaningful communication on the diplomatic level the United States can assert no significant influence upon Libyan policy. By refusing to approve export licenses for the sale of military-related items to Libya and informing the Libyan Government of our reasons for doing so we have tried to modify Libya's attitude and trouble-making potential. Because of its oil wealth Libya is effectively insulated from outside pressure to force policy changes.²⁷

This statement summarized the conventional wisdom of the day regarding policy options toward Libya. However, this assessment has a singular

focus on diplomacy and virtually ignores the other instruments of power. The US appears to be obstinate in approaching any sacrifice of trade advantages with Libya in order to exercise economic pressure. There also seems to be an aversion to the application of direct military pressure. Utilization of these instruments of power is much more complex than a mere shift in policy, but they do not appear to have been adequately considered.

Military presence was having an effect on the situation even though Libya may not have been the intended target. The radar sites in the Sinai were there to support the 1973 Arab-Israeli War cease fire, but to Qaddafi they were a reminder of colonial intervention. The point is not to remove the radars, but rather realize that any military presence in a region must be factored into each nation's perceived security equation. The CVBG off the Egyptian coast was a classic example of the subtlety of naval presence. There were no pronouncements to deter Qaddafi from attacking, but the silent presence of a CVBG communicated US support for Egypt without fanfare and entangling obligation. Suasion was achieved with regard to Egypt; the CVBG was concrete reassurance of US commitment to Egypt.

Shortly after taking office, President Carter directed a reassessment of national strategy and an investigation of any alternatives. Of course, these instructions met the typical bureaucratic recalcitrance, the State Department feared encroachment on diplomacy and the Department of Defense dreaded meddling in its internal force structure development. The results of the reassessment rendered five recommendations for policy: (1) a greater emphasis on nonmilitary

aspects of foreign policy, (2) renewed stress on conventional arms in an age of nuclear parity, (3) emphasis should be on NATO and Europe, (4) emphasis placed on mobility including the Third World, and (5) recognize the importance of the Middle East and Persian Gulf, but mostly as they relate to NATO interests. In August 1977, Carter issued a Presidential Directive (PD-18) that directed ground forces with naval and air support to be prepared for employment in the Persian Gulf.²⁸ PD-18 did not significantly shift policy, but it did signal wider consideration of the military instrument of national power in support of policy. It also foreshadowed more proactive use of the military later in the Carter administration.

US and Libyan foreign policy obviously ran counter to one another. However, remnants of earlier more lenient policies and Qaddafi's obfuscations clouded interests and both sides avoided direct confrontation. Qaddafi complained that Washington had put him on the black list without reason. Even after his border clash with Egypt, he expressed a desire to improve US-Libyan relations--start a "real dialogue" to understand problems and study solutions.²⁹ While Libya appeared willing, the United States refused to restore full diplomatic ties. Qaddafi offered to exchange Ambassadors for the first time since 1972. President Carter "politely rebuffed the offer." The administration cited Libya's support of terrorists and hard-line anti-Israeli groups as the primary reason for its decline. Qaddafi's growing stockpile of Soviet arms probably also figured into the decision. Another reality that complicated the issue was the relatively robust economic relationship between the US and Libya. They had a \$2.5 billion

two-way trade and rising. The US exported everything to Libya and imported significant amounts of Libyan oil. Six US oil companies accounted for almost 68 percent of Libyan oil production. The most probable reason for Libyan overtures was their desire to coax the administration into releasing civilian and military aircraft to them. The Libyans paid for eight C-130 military transport aircraft some three years earlier, but Washington had since refused delivery for national security reasons.³⁰

Two developments late in 1977 marked the turning point in US policy toward Libya: an exposed assassination plot and Qaddafi's reaction to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. American authorities discovered an assassination plot on the US Ambassador in Cairo Herman F. Eilts. President Carter queried Qaddafi on the plot in a personal letter. Qaddafi denied it and nothing ever happened. However, Carter then decided that Qaddafi could not be trusted and probably realized that he was evil.³¹ Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and the Knesset drew heavy fire from hard-line Arab states. Qaddafi called for Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League. Libya quickly organized and hosted an anti-Sadat conference in Tripoli. The hard-line Arab states in attendance were party to the Tripoli Declaration which was a pact declaring opposition to Israel, Egypt, and the peace process, freezing diplomatic relations with Egypt, and reaffirming Arab unity.³² Qaddafi emerged as the leader of the "Rejectionist" movement in the Arab league. This placed Libya in the forefront of opposition to US policies and interests.³³ The Carter administration realized Libya was an obstacle to regional stability and

the peace process. If the US could not weaken Libya, it could strengthen her neighbors.

President Carter's State of the Union address in 1978 made the Middle East peace process--"a precious opportunity for a historic settlement"--the top priority in foreign policy with an emphasis on human rights.³⁴ Assuming the role of a world peacemaker quite naturally required distinct impartiality by the United States. Diplomacy would remain the main battery of foreign policy. The congress had only flirted with economic measures although aircraft sales were still prohibited by the administration. The military instrument would have too easily compromised impartiality. In its effort to maintain a perception as a fair arbiter, the Carter administration eschewed military applications by US forces as evidenced by Zaire and Chad in 1978. However, they recognized the regional instability precipitated by Libya and realized that a military factor was an indisputable part of the security equation.

Unable directly to weaken Libya, the Carter administration chose to balance the military factor by exporting arms to Libya's foes. They made the first ever military sale to Egypt by the US closely followed by sales to Sudan, Somalia, and Morocco.³⁵ The US was providing a military capability to regional friends that was intended to make their self-defense credible and communicate US support. This was an indirect military presence that would hopefully deter Qaddafi. Although the US military presence was not integrated into the policy, this indirect military presence of US arms in the hands of US friends did support US policy for regional stability.

The two main themes coloring Libyan foreign policy in 1978 were increasing intervention in Chad and escalating opposition to Egypt. Qaddafi had been supporting insurgency in Chad, a former French Colony, for several years when in early 1978 the rebels had some relative success and several peace agreements were attempted. The main issues for Libya were influence over Chad and securing the mineral rich Aouzou strip, a disputed area along the border. Although the brief battle with Egypt had exposed Libya's relative military impotence, Libya did intervene with troops in Chad. Prompted by the deteriorating situation, France also intervened with troops and aid. This civil war would rage for another decade, but the significance for the West and Libya's neighbors was the alarming display of bare ambition and brutal aggression by Qaddafi. Libya's adventurism also "revealed a sharp tilt to the USSR."³⁶

Qaddafi's huge Soviet arsenal (he called it his "arsenal of Islam") and his incessant plotting against Sadat and the peace process made Libya an unrelenting threat to Egypt and a constant concern to all regional actors. His opposition was growing more vocal and vitriolic. He proclaimed himself the "champion of Moslems everywhere" and a "bitter foe of Western imperialism." Beyond his virulent rhetoric, he was also accused of funding coup attempts in Egypt and Sudan. His disdain for Arab monarchies was replaced with overt calls to oust all conservative Arab regimes to make way for Pan-Arab unity. Qaddafi was busy making Libya a considerable detriment to regional stability and security. His support for terrorism abroad also pushed him to the front of global terrorist threats. Qaddafi used his oil wealth to fund terror from

Ireland to the Philippines and arm the Palestinians.³⁷ Libya had already trained thousands of guerrillas to destabilize his neighbors and now his activities were reaching around the world. Even more disturbing, Qaddafi supported any terrorists "without regard for prudence or proportion." He appeared oblivious to whether or not their interests coincided or were mutually supportive.³⁸

The Camp David agreement in September 1978 was tangible evidence that Qaddafi was not succeeding in his campaign to thwart peace with Israel. Infuriated, he redoubled his efforts against Egypt. The Arab hard-liners: Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), met in Damascus soon after Camp David and severely criticized Sadat for making a "separate peace with Israel and betraying the Arab cause."³⁹ Qaddafi quickly determined that to weaken the West, he must lead the "Rejectionist" faction of the Arab League to isolate and punish Sadat's Egypt and ultimately defeat the Camp David agreement. The "Rejectionist" states denounced Camp David and declared the agreement null and void. They established joint military and political commands and broke all ties with Egypt. Qaddafi and Yassar Arafat convinced Jordan to oppose the agreement. He proclaimed himself to be the "vanguard of the Arabs." He cited the Camp David agreement as evidence that the Arab position was closer to him than Sadat.⁴⁰ Qaddafi's stature in the Arab League was temporarily enhanced. This development only made Qaddafi that much more dangerous to the West.

Opposition to US peace initiatives in the Middle East intensified, but it was developments in the Persian Gulf that prompted the Carter administration to seriously reevaluate the military

instrument in foreign policy. In November 1978, Saudi Arabian officials disclosed that they no longer trusted the United States to support their security. They provided three reasons: (1) they perceived a double standard for Israel and the Palestinians, (2) they were disappointed in the US failure to support the Shah of Iran, and (3) the US appeared to be soft on the growing Soviet threat to the Gulf. President Carter requested military options to ameliorate this situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) responded with a four point plan: (1) acquire regional bases, (2) increase naval presence in the Indian Ocean, (3) increase military assistance to regional nations, and (4) upgrade the American military's intervention capability.⁴¹ The JCS response plainly recognized the role of military presence in reassuring allies of American commitments. Furthermore, a credible intervention capability could deter aggression. This plan would support US policy by achieving suasion with friend and foe through a robust US military presence. The keys to enabling American influence were access and presence.

The US military of the late 1970s lacked the capability to access remote theaters with a credible presence. The presence the US did exercise was often not credible because it could not enable a significant intervention capability. American influence abroad was waning. Diplomacy was effective with willing participants, but it was often impeded by recalcitrant players. Economic measures were usually superficial. The US was not ready to sacrifice commercial oil interests for sincere and serious sanctions. The US military had to be woven into foreign policy in order to insure a respectable capacity to influence international situations. PD-18 in 1977 recognized this need and

directed the US military to be ready for contingency operations in the Persian Gulf. Already in September 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in a speech to the National Industrial Security Association advocated the creation of a light mobile force tailored for non-NATO contingencies.⁴² In the summer of 1978, a JCS study "implicitly" recognized the need for a mobile, quick-response force for contingency operations especially with a renewed potential for bipolar overtones.⁴³

Many in DOD considered the US military instrument moribund. The Saudi loss of confidence highlighted the inadequacy of US military strategy in the region. While considerable thought had been given to the dilemma, the impetus for change finally came from the challenges to the status quo in the Persian Gulf. The two primary US allies in the Persian Gulf were Saudi Arabia and Iran. The "Shah of Iran" was willing to cooperate with the US for significant military aid. The Nixon administration had felt quite content to build up Iran with US arms and thereby use Iran as a "proxy" military presence in the Persian Gulf. Regional stability and American influence were maintained through the "twin pillars:" Saudi Arabia and Iran. By February 1979, Saudi Arabia was disillusioned with US policy toward Jerusalem, and Iran had fallen to Islamic fundamentalists who considered the US to be the "Great Satan." The military was the only viable instrument to regain influence in the Gulf. The National Security Council met 28 February 1979 and proposed a new strategic policy. Zbigniew Brezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, described the Persian Gulf as an "arc of instability." The State and Defense Departments were ordered to collaborate in creating a rapid deployment force for this region. In the context of

regional security, this new rapid deployment force would in theory replace Iran as a stabilizing military presence in the regional balance of power.⁴⁴

The new strategy for military presence was arguably sound and patently precipitated by necessity. However, there were two significant immediate shortfalls to implementing the JCS recommendations. The US military lacked the readiness and capability for such missions and the US had no bases in the region. The problem of wielding the military instrument was particularly perplexing. First, establishing a viable military presence backed by credible power projection would require significant cooperation and innovation between the characteristically parochial armed services. Second, to upgrade military intervention capability would require large infusions of cash to develop an appropriate force structure particularly in the grossly deficient capability of strategic mobility. Third, although the US did not at that time possess this rapid response force capability, the US was already underwriting its policy by implying such a capability. Both the Secretaries of Defense and Energy had publicly stated that the US would defend its vital interests in the Persian Gulf as early as February 1979.⁴⁵

US policy was generally out of favor in the Arab world mostly due to its support for Israel. Washington's perception of a rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism made the regional basing of US forces a very sensitive subject. Secretary Brown went to the Middle East in March 1979 to reassure US friends of the credibility of American commitment to

the region and also broach the topic of regional basing. Only Egypt and Oman would entertain the concept of basing for a US military presence.

Fortunately for the US, South Yemen provided a convenient target of opportunity for the new strategic emphasis on presence. In March 1979, South Yemen attacked North Yemen. The US response was swift and tangible. The State Department promptly and publicly proclaimed the region to be of vital importance to the US. The USS CONSTITUTION Battle Group was immediately dispatched to the Arabian Sea and four AWACS aircraft were quickly deployed to Saudi Arabia. These measures were designed to demonstrate a strong American response. They worked. The US clearly communicated its interests, backed it with a viable capability and thereby derived greater credibility. US military presence achieved suasion on two fronts. Saudi Arabia was reassured of the American commitment and relations improved. The Saudi's were also more amenable to American propositions on regional basing. More difficult to assess, a degree of compellence might have been achieved. The Arab League was only willing to negotiate peace after South Yemen had pushed back the North Yemenese and US military presence was established in the area.⁴⁷ This presence compelled the Arab League to enter the process and reassured them with American involvement. North Yemen was compelled to avoid a war of attrition and accept negotiation by the overwhelming presence of Saudi and American forces in their immediate vicinity. The relative weight of these factors in the outcome is unknown, but military presence was certainly a key factor. Regardless of degree, in this case military presence is attributed an

influence, it was consistent with US policy and a viable application of the military instrument of power.

US-Libyan relations were temporarily and superficially improved during this same period. The US was preoccupied with the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations and the Persian Gulf. Again in late 1978 and into 1979, Libya was attempting to improve relations with the US. Once again however, the undergirding reason was aircraft sales. Qaddafi wanted the US to license the sale of Boeing 747 and 727 civilian aircraft to Libya and maybe even finally release eight ordered C-130 military transport aircraft.⁴⁷ The US welcomed this more congenial approach. President Carter's preferred foreign policy guidance was still "to deal constructively with pressing world problems."⁴⁸

Qaddafi enjoyed some success with his US initiatives. In January 1979, the US granted an export license for Boeing 727 civilian aircraft to Libya.⁴⁹ In an 11 January 1979 news conference Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was asked if the US had changed their view of Libya as a supporter of terrorism. He replied:

Libya has now signed the three conventions with respect to hijacking in the air - which is different from the past. We are continuing to watch and observe the situation there.⁵⁰

This sale was a marked change for US policy toward Libya. However, this constructive engagement did not have any reciprocal effects on Libyan policy. Libya was still acting counter to US interests. As he was negotiating and securing an American aircraft deal, he supported the revolution that toppled the Shah in Iran.⁵¹ In February 1979, Qaddafi intervened in Uganda with 2,500 Libyan troops to crush a rebellion launched from Tanzania.⁵² The 26 March 1979 signing of the Camp David

agreement predictably strengthened and sharpened Libyan opposition.⁵³ By March, the US was already having second thoughts about Libyan sincerity. In Senate hearings on the "Omnibus Terrorism Act of 1979," there was significant concern and consideration for Libya possibly using US civilian aircraft for military purposes.⁵⁴

US-Libyan relations were tenuous throughout 1979. In an odd twist of fate, the Iranian hostage crisis brought this period of pseudo-amity to a close. Despite the potential impropriety of Billy Carter's, the President's brother, ill-advised relationship with Libya, President Carter sought to use his brother to arrange a meeting with Libyan officials to request their assistance with Iran. The US asked Libya to act as an intermediary and join in universal condemnation of the Iranian incident. Qaddafi accepted the role and did, indeed, condemn the Iranian actions. He also expressed a desire for better relations with the US. Although he sent a delegation to Tehran on behalf of the US, he appeared unable to control his polity at home. In December 1979, a Libyan mob sacked and burned the US embassy in Tripoli, supposedly because the US had frozen Iranian assets.⁵⁵

It is difficult to understand why President Carter would appeal to Qaddafi for help in the Iranian hostage crisis. Two years previous, Qaddafi's opposition to Carter's Middle East peace initiatives and support for terrorism had convinced Carter that Qaddafi was not to be trusted. After the embassy burning, it appears Carter finally accepted Qaddafi's innate belligerence to the West. However, he still seemed to be at a loss about how to direct a comprehensive US policy toward Libya. Regarding his administration's prohibition of large tractor sales to

Libya, he upheld the controls as consistent with US policy objectives to promote regional stability. He cited Libya's interventions in Uganda, Chad, and the Central African Republic during 1979 as evidence of Libya's propensity for military adventurism. Conceding that foreign companies probably would sell Libya the tractors anyway, Carter asserted that at least the US would not contribute to Libyan military activities. He also contended that to discontinue the restrictions would send a negative message to Libya's frightened neighbors. He further stated that these controls would supplement other means designed to influence Libya. He did not elaborate on those other means, but he did say few alternative means were available to the US because Libya does not need American money or military aid.⁵⁶ Despite his obvious frustration with Libya, President Carter carefully weighed his economic and diplomatic instruments of power, but still seemed to exclude the military instrument as a viable instrument to influence Libya.

The Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel had been a major feat for President Carter's diplomacy of constructive engagement. Unfortunately, other security developments overshadowed this significant success and demanded military attention. In a dramatic shift from a year previous and a surprise to many, Carter announced what came to be known as the "Carter Doctrine" in his 1980 State of the Union Address:

An Attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.⁵⁷

The Carter Doctrine was a "product of severe domestic and international pressures."⁵⁸ Many critics simply attributed the Carter Doctrine as a quick reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

December 1979.⁵⁹ Undoubtedly, the Soviet aggression was a large factor. In the larger diplomatic scheme, it would have been imprudent not to reassert US interests and formally yet subtly put the USSR on notice of our significant opposition.

Some charged that the Carter Doctrine was motivated purely by oil. Again, a valid concern and important consideration, but endeavors to preserve unfettered access to resources or commerce are an American institution. This policy was merely stating obvious interests and emphasizing its importance. It was and is no secret that the western world (to include Japan) is heavily dependent on Persian Gulf oil. With regional stability threatened, it would have been negligent not to highlight US vital interests at a time when the US security "proxy" had disappeared.

The Iran Hostage crisis was a major factor leading to the Carter Doctrine. Faced with a terribly difficult situation of the utmost urgency, the Carter administration recognized the futility of economic sanctions and realized that diplomacy was of limited utility in the face of Islamic zealots. The application of the military instrument of power was required. The JCS informed the President that they were "virtually powerless" to rescue the hostages. There were no military options available. How the US military arrived at this hamstrung state is not of issue here, but rather the fact that the military was thrust to the forefront of foreign policy in a non-bipolar contingency is significant. The Carter administration had previously kept the military instrument at arms length. The Carter Doctrine embraced the military option, and the President had even created a special military force that could implement

his new policy: the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).⁶⁰ Considering "containment," preservation of access to a vital natural resource, and the renewed emphasis on the efficacy of the military instrument, the Carter Doctrine was a natural and inevitable response to any substantial threat in that region.

The RDJTF was established 1 October 1979 at Macdill Air Base under Readiness Command. An administrative conglomeration of Army and Marine forces, its mission was predeployment planning and training for non-NATO contingencies. Its inception predates the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Good intelligence and analysis may have foreshadowed aspects of these developments, but it probably did not predict them. The Carter Doctrine might have made the RDJTF more prominent, but the administration had planted those seeds with PD-18 back in August 1977. Furthermore, as these situations deteriorated, it is not difficult to surmise that Carter was losing patience with the State Department's conciliatory approach and instead opted for the military.⁶¹

The RDJTF's notoriety arrived with the Carter Doctrine, but its capabilities were still very marginal. The Carter Doctrine warned of the use of force, but the RDJTF was still more conceptual than real. In open hostilities, the RDJTF was inadequate to beat the USSR in the Gulf, but it might delay any action long enough for the US to threaten nuclear escalation. In other words, the RDJTF was "tripwire" to the real deterrent - nuclear escalation. Without debating its merits, this was a viable strategy. However, if the primary purpose was to enable the larger deterrent to the USSR, why was the structure emphasis on

mobile and light forces?⁶² If the Red Army was truly the primary target, would not a combined structure emphasizing heavy forces be more appropriate? Again, force structure could be contested, but the salient point is that deterring Soviet aggression was not the only consideration in establishing the RDJTF and perhaps not even the primary factor.

Criticized as a "paper tiger," the most glaring deficiency of the RDJTF was the absence of strategic mobility. In the post-Vietnam draw-down and ensuing disillusion with the military option in general, the Congress had been reluctant to fund expanded strategic lift since 1973. By 1979, the administration and the military had recognized that gaining access to distant theaters presented significant difficulties. The Iranian Hostage Crisis was a painful reminder of this weakness and also a catalyst for the organization of viable forces. In November 1979, Carter added a request for 14 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) to the Five Year Defense Plan. The USAF was busy conducting a survey of all the air fields in the world to determine capability. The need was urgent, so in February 1980, the administration produced an "interim response" with the Near Term Preposition Ships (NTPS) to fill the gap. The NTPS were existing Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) ships adapted for this mission. The administration also investigated chartering and buying more such ships.⁶³ Initial capabilities were certainly limited, but strategic mobility and access to a region had been identified as the critical path to applying the military instrument. The pattern was developing for military presence. This policy required military presence that could enable an appropriate military option: suasion or decisive action.

1980 proved to be a banner year for Qaddafi and Libya. Oil revenues were skyrocketing to what would be its peak at over \$20 billion. Qaddafi's checkbook held sway with terrorists and insurgents all over the world. The success of his military interventions may have been questionable, but nevertheless he was gratified by simply wielding his power. All this and an ambiguous US policy toward Libya emboldened Qaddafi. Libyan-sponsored terrorism, especially against Libyan expatriates, surged. Such an assessment seems obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but the simple reality once again was that Libya could not get to center stage in American foreign policy. Iran and the hostages were firmly planted center stage. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan appeared too important to allow Libya much prominence in US policy particularly in an election year.

Qaddafi was feeling pressure from Libyan dissidents. He could handle those at home but those abroad were more difficult to silence. In 1980, Qaddafi embarked on a campaign to intimidate Libyan exiles. He ordered all Libyan exiles back to Libya or suffer the consequences. Libyan sponsored terrorism rose sharply. Incidents of Libyan terrorism for 1977, 1978, and 1979 were one, four, and three respectively. In 1980, that number shot up to 19 and the majority of those were against Libyan expatriates.⁶⁴ Most of the murders were in Europe, but Libya was connected to the shooting of a Libyan student in Colorado. This brazen violence could not be ignored. In May 1980, President Carter expelled four Libyan diplomats for connections to the intimidation campaign and recalled the last two American diplomats from Libya.⁶⁵

Through June 1980, the US policy toward Libya had been primarily diplomatic. Cursory economic measures had been attempted (most notably the restriction on large tractor sales), but little serious consideration had been given to real sanctions namely oil although an oil boycott was by this time at least being mentioned in Washington. With diplomatic relations almost non-existent and Libyan terror growing, the military instrument became by default a viable alternative to attempt to influence Libya. The Carter administration definitely did not desire a military confrontation with Libya, so the subtleties of military presence became the preferred option. Curiously, US military presence was already having an effect on Qaddafi, but it is unclear if the administration and the military fully appreciated this nuance. While Qaddafi probably enjoyed US troubles in the Persian Gulf, that situation also brought an unwelcome development for Qaddafi's foreign policy goals. Starting in 1979, US military presence in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea increased dramatically. Qaddafi objected strongly to the US build up during the Iran hostage crisis.⁶⁶ Greater Western presence in the Middle East was exactly contrary to his goal to "weaken the West."

In August 1980, the Commander of the US Sixth Fleet announced a naval exercise to be held in the Gulf Of Sidra (or Sirte) in September. Critics claimed such maneuvers were highly provocative. The US intent was to "send a clear signal to Qaddafi" without confrontation that the US disapproved of Libyan activities.⁶⁷ Unfortunately, history and unsure execution would deliver an ambiguous if not different message. Libya had claimed the Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters in 1973,

contrary to internationally accepted limits of three or twelve miles. The US and others in the international community did not recognize Libya's claim. The US Navy had been for years using the Northern part of the Gulf for exercises because it was clearly outside normal sea lanes. The Navy was undeterred by Qaddafi's claims and continued occasional exercises in the area.⁶⁸ In fact, from 1976 to 1980 there had been many "near confrontations" between US Navy aircraft and Libyan jets, so freedom of navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra were somewhat routine.⁶⁹

Before the exercise began, President Carter directed the Navy to remain clear of the disputed area. He was worried that any undue provocation might jeopardize efforts in the Iranian hostage crisis. He also wanted to avoid the appearance of inciting a confrontation for political gain in an election year. Qaddafi may have taken this gesture as tacit recognition of his claim.⁷⁰ Even more damaging, Claudia Wright in an article in International Affairs cited private communications between Libyan officials and the Carter administration where the US agreed not to exercise south of 32°30' North latitude which also happened to be the northern boundary of Qaddafi's claim.⁷¹ Despite US restraint, there were two separate tense contacts between Libyan aircraft and US Air Force electronic surveillance RC-135 aircraft escorted by Navy F-14 fighters. The RC-135s were both flying along the edge of Libyan airspace when Libyan jets flew out to intercept them and the F-14s warned the Libyans off. However, there is disputed evidence that the Libyans had actually fired on the RC-135s before turning back. Some accounts even claim that one RC-135 was shot down, but this claim

is unsubstantiated.⁷² In any event, there were no significant ramifications from these encounters.

Disregarding the issue of policy correctness, this application or misapplication of military presence failed to support US policy. The US desired to influence Qaddafi. The goal was to deter (or better stated compel him to stop) his support of terrorism. The show of military force designed to demonstrate resolve and intimidate those inimical to the US was not communicated. US acquiescence, tacit or agreed, to the Libyan claim legitimized Qaddafi. What was the cost to Qaddafi? Nothing. He maintained his territorial integrity in the face of a superpower challenge and continued the activities the US disdained without reprisal. Regardless of outcome, credibility was lost when Libyan aircraft challenged US aircraft and the resulting perception emerges that the Libyans had defended their territory. There was no cost or implied cost to Qaddafi for his policies. Just within this operation, the US fulfilled no policy goals and Libya fulfilled all of theirs. This did not disprove the efficacy of military presence, but it did highlight the difficulty for any military operation to achieve an objective or suasion when strategic policy is fluid.

Libyan sponsored terrorism was rampant in 1980, but Libyan military intervention was equally ominous. Qaddafi had been supporting insurgency in Chad for several years. He also claimed the Aouzou strip in northern Chad and by 1980 Libya was occupying it. Particularly ominous was the speculation that the Aouzou held significant deposits of uranium.⁷³ Amid much fighting, it looked like a cease-fire would be imminent about mid-1980. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was

diligently trying to broker a peace settlement. In September, Qaddafi released the details of a secret treaty signed in June with the "transitional government of Chad." The treaty committed Libya and Chad to mutual defense and for all practical purposes affected a union between the two states. In November, Qaddafi started moving large numbers of troops into Chad although he denied this charge saying he had only dispatched a few military advisors. By December, there was a Libyan combined arms force of several thousand. Chad fell and those who had agreed to merge with Libya became the new government.⁷⁴ This development "aroused international alarm." Qaddafi had been involved in several attempts to overthrow neighboring states, but this was his first success.⁷⁵

Presence was better applied in BRIGHT STAR 81 conducted in November 1980. This was the first regional field exercise for the RDJTF. The RDJTF Head Quarters, a battalion from the 101st Air Assault Division, and a reserve squadron of eight A-7 aircraft joined Egyptian forces for a two week exercise in the desert west of Cairo.⁷⁶ It was a small scale exercise, but it did achieve suasion. US military presence through participation reassured Egypt of US commitment to Egyptian security. The exercise was also meant to influence those who might be belligerent toward Egypt. It is virtually impossible to ascribe deterrence to a non-action, but it is reasonable to assert that any potential aggressor would reweigh his position if he understood that the US had added its weight to the security equation. We cannot say with certainty that Qaddafi was deterred from attacking Egypt again, but his decision to attack would be at least more difficult and perhaps delayed.

Thus, as long as a potential aggressor delays his attack, there is basis to assume deterrence from military presence.

The Carter administration closed out 1980 at its nadir and Libya was at its zenith. In an article in SAIS, G. Henry M. Schuler provided a brilliant assessment of US policy until 1980 and persuasive argument of how it should be changed. Schuler contends that the Qaddafi threat is debated but never to conclusion. There has been no coherent Libyan policy; it has been a "decade of vacillation." The "accommodaters" dominate policy until Qaddafi really misbehaves again, then the "confronters" temporarily move up to recite the obligatory rhetoric. The US policy has been essentially accommodation which has amounted to appeasement. This policy has attained four results: (1) "disheartened friends in the region," (2) "discredited efforts to get European support," (3) "emboldened the USSR," and (4) "prompted Qaddafi to continue probing limits."⁷⁷

Qaddafi could no longer be ignored. He will not change or go away without significant external pressure. Schuler delineated three policy choices: (1) accommodate or confront, (2) passive measures to help his neighbors or active measures to directly reduce his capability, and (3) a range of active measures that could be employed. Accommodation had failed for the last ten years, so Qaddafi had to be confronted. An earnest effort to sufficiently arm Libya's neighbors was worth pursuing but entirely too costly to achieve. Therefore, active measures were the only choice; Qaddafi's ability to support and conduct aggression had to be drastically reduced. The risk in covert or overt military action is too great; it would be too bloody, endanger about

2,000 Americans working in Libya, and might motivate Libyans to band together. Qaddafi must be severed from his source of power--oil revenues.⁷⁸ A sound strategy, such a policy implies a primarily if not purely economic approach, but left unanswered the role of the other national instruments of power. It would seem imprudent to discard any potential contribution to foreign policy. A military option, although not preferable, had to be staged in an appropriate manner to support US policy. This was the challenge of a Libyan policy when President Ronald Reagan assumed office in 1981.

Opposition, 1981 to 1984

With the Reagan Administration came a dramatic shift in policy toward Libya. Shortly after inauguration, President Reagan deliberately changed US policy from "restraint" to "opposition." Pundits tend to dismiss this shift as simply a reflection of the hawkish nature of Reagan as opposed to Carter. While Reagan was more prone to direct solutions, it is fairly obvious Carter was moving in the same direction in his last year in office. It is not axiomatic that he would not have also shifted to "opposition" with perhaps only a different execution of such a policy. Although the Carter Administration had initially taken great pains to pursue constructive engagement with Libya, by 1980 it had moved inexorably toward confrontation with Libya. Reagan only hastened the process with a more overt approach.

By 1981 Qaddafi was largely in disfavor in the US and internationally. His well known support of terrorism had earned him vehement disdain throughout the world. His military adventurism, particularly his recent apparent conquest of Chad, disturbed the

international community especially his nervous African neighbors. Many African nations were urging US action against Libya. Reagan called for a review of US policy toward Libya. The administration was sensitive to the ramifications of an abrupt halt to the significant oil flow between the US and Libya. Until this time, it had been "business as usual" with Libya despite Qaddafi's inimical activities. Libyan oil imports accounted for about 11 percent of all imported US oil (Libya was the US's number 3 oil supplier). Five US companies bought over 50 percent of Libyan oil. They realized that initial options would be limited due to the economic relationship not to mention the 2,000 Americans in Libya. The State Department was split on the policy reassessment. One camp felt it was a regional problem and the US should stay out (continue restraint). The other camp advocated opposition. Libya's oil wealth was enabling Qaddafi's policy of terror and the US could not condone this. His revenues must be reduced and the US should bring all force to bear.⁷⁹ The Reagan administration realized that the US was involved in supporting Qaddafi's terror network through American trade.⁸⁰ They would have to make some difficult changes to effectively implement a genuine policy of "opposition."

The Reagan Administration agreed in principle with the Carter Doctrine. However, they thought it was a mistake to make a declaration to protect American vital interests absent the military capability to actually do it. The Reagan administration immediately proposed large defense increases including upgrading the RDJTF. With American military strength rebuilding, the Reagan-Haig foreign policy essentially "refined, amended, and expanded the Carter Doctrine."⁸¹ Having suffered

many recent foreign policy failures, President Reagan came to power to restore American power, reclaim American prestige, and reassert America's global influence. The Soviet Union was still the primary threat, but much of their resources had been channeled into funding anti-American subversive activities. Reagan's first task became a campaign against Soviet-sponsored terrorism and, of course, Libya headed the list although there were no overt links to the USSR in Libya's terrorism.⁸²

The Reagan Administration was publicly committed to arresting the "growing threat" from the Soviet Union and its surrogates.⁸³ Reagan's interest in Qaddafi grew out of his overarching goal to contain the USSR and its influence. From Reagan's perspective, Libya was doing the Soviet's work to destabilize North Africa. Back to the original concern after World War II, NATO was worried that Libya might allow the Soviets to use their air bases.

Critics believe Reagan's pressure actually forced Qaddafi to move closer to the Soviets. This may be true. Libya and the Soviet Union enjoyed a mutually beneficial arms trade but parted on ideology and policy. However, Qaddafi probably hid behind the USSR as a deterrent to American retaliation. It is quite rational that Qaddafi balance his concerns over one superpower with the support of another. He visited Brezhnev in Moscow in April 1981.⁸⁴ The administration pointed to other evidence of Soviet sponsorship. Twelve SS-12, "Scaleboard," missiles were sold to Libya; they were nuclear capable with a range to southern Europe and much of the Middle East. The Libyans had extended a desert runway to accommodate Soviet "Backfire"

bombers, however, planes and crews never deployed. Libya had secured alliances with other Soviet surrogates namely South Yemen and Ethiopia.⁶⁵ While he may have been trying to shield himself through the USSR, Qaddafi was only proving Reagan's suspicions and securing his place in the forefront of American antiterrorism policy.

Missiles and nuclear proliferation were a grave concern, particularly a nuclear capable terrorist. The developments in Libya were disturbing. OTRAG, a West German rocket company, was conducting rocket and satellite research and development in Libya and Zaire. In March 1981, Moroccan officials reported that "OTRAG agreed to supply medium range missiles (nuclear capable) to Libya." OTRAG in Stuttgart denied this charge. By September 1981, US intelligence revealed that OTRAG and Libya were conducting covert efforts to produce military applications. OTRAG was seeking missile guidance technology. With German help, Libya was trying to build a nuclear reactor that could produce weapons grade uranium. Libya had also bought some uranium from Niger. If this picture was not ominous enough, in June 1981 Qaddafi announced his nuclear energy program. In his typical vitriol, he condemned the "big powers" for terrorizing the world with their nuclear arsenals. He claimed to "scorn" the thought of nuclear weapons, but added that he would not hesitate to use "atomic energy for peaceful purposes."⁶⁶ Qaddafi quickly became the number one potential nuclear renegade in the world. Another reason for the Reagan administration to confront him.

Topping the nuclear proliferation list was not enough, Libya was also the number one terrorist state. Already in 1977 in Senate

hearings, Qaddafi had been dubbed "the worst offender" with regard to support for terrorism. 1980 had gone on record as the most violent terrorist year yet for Libya, so the trend was definitely worsening.⁸⁷ Evidence surfaced linking the shooting of a Libyan student in Fort Collins, Colorado, to a mercenary hired by the Libyan government. In response, the US expelled four Libyan diplomats and closed the Libyan diplomatic mission 6 May 1981. Although serious, this was not a formal break in relations. The acme of notoriety came in the CIA's "Terrorism Report" released 15 June 1981. It concluded that Libya was heavily involved in funding, supplying, and training terrorists and guerrillas. It further described Qaddafi as "the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism."⁸⁸ Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, promulgated an antiterror policy that allowed no negotiations with terrorists.⁸⁹ Reagan's antiterror stance clearly stated a focus on Libya to oust Qaddafi, but Qaddafi believed his "personal prestige" was enhanced by Reagan's opposition.⁹⁰ Casting Qaddafi as a terrorist and adopting a nonnegotiable policy definitely increased the probability for US-Libyan confrontation.

Reviewing this entire situation, the Reagan administration concluded that Qaddafi was a menace that had to be eradicated. A Soviet surrogate, he posed the most dangerous worldwide threat in terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The Reagan administration worried that Soviet missiles could make Libya the "Cuba of the Med" the could threaten NATO's southern flank. Furthermore, in pursuing his policy goal to "weaken the West," Qaddafi consistently lined up on every issue in every region counter to US interests. In 1980 he funded a Soviet project to

have Cuban's build an airfield in Grenada. Qaddafi thwarted Reagan's efforts to gain leverage with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua over \$75 million in aid by preempting the US with his own \$100 million in aid. He also befriended Marxists in El Salvador and Guatemala offering them cheap oil.⁹¹ To the Reagan administration, the evidence was overwhelming. They "launched a campaign to isolate Libya internationally and promote the downfall of the regime."⁹² The US goal was simple--destabilize Libya; the strategy was threefold: isolate, embarrass, and weaken.⁹³

There were seven elements of Reagan's plan to halt Libyan interference: (1) rupture US-Libyan relations, (2) promulgate a propaganda campaign to portray Libya as unstable and Qaddafi as an outlaw, (3) strengthen governments opposed to Libya, (4) impose economic sanctions, (5) coordinate US policy with France, (6) consider covert action against Qaddafi, and (7) threaten military intervention.⁹⁴

The strategy was to threaten, so the application of military pressure was naturally through military presence. The options included sending a CVBG into the Gulf of Sidra, making a huge show of force particularly with strategic air in the next BRIGHT STAR exercise, and supporting Egypt and Sudan in any endeavors against Libya in Chad.⁹⁵ The Reagan policy included various initiatives. The administration would ask that Italy not allow Qaddafi to visit and France to continue her arms and oil equipment embargo of Libya. They would also urge American oil companies to withdraw their personnel and stop importing Libyan oil.⁹⁶

By May 1981 the new US policy toward Libya was widely known. US News and World Report summarized the new aim as "force Qaddafi to quit his global troublemaking" and captured the policy debate in "can it be done without greater danger for the US?"⁹⁷ The initial lead element for the Reagan plan was actually an extension and expansion of Carter's last strategy. The US was strongly opposed to Libya's late 1980 subjugation of Chad, so Carter increased military aid to all those who would oppose Libya: Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan.⁹⁸ On 8 July 1981, Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, testified to Congress that the US would arm African opponents of Libya.⁹⁹ Obviously, Qaddafi's enemies were in favor of this policy, but their reactions highlighted the fact that the isolation phase of Libya had been well underway since early 1980. Almost every North African nation wanted Qaddafi restrained and those specifically threatened, Egypt and Sudan, supported his elimination.¹⁰⁰ The US was encouraging Egyptian intervention in Libya and subtly offering support.¹⁰¹ "The immediate US aim is to demonstrate that its patience with Qaddafi's global mischief making has been exhausted and that it is throwing its weight behind those countries that are attempting to stop Qaddafi." Washington hoped those threatened countries would devise a way to topple Qaddafi or get him to behave. If this course of action failed, the Reagan Administration would have some difficult decisions to make in implementing its tough rhetoric.¹⁰²

By the summer of 1981, the Reagan Administration had an essentially two track policy: military and economic assistance to countries threatened by Qaddafi and make his life "less comfortable."¹⁰³ The general strategy was that a more "robust government in Washington"

directly opposing Qaddafi made it harder for him to oppose the US elsewhere.¹⁰⁴ Qaddafi may have been feeling the pressure. He had been disturbed with the increased US presence during Iranian hostage crisis, but now the Reagan administration was increasing US presence even more. The RDJTF deployment in Egypt, Oman, and Somalia supposedly motivated Qaddafi to seek allies to strengthen his position. In August 1981, Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen formed an alliance to defend against the US threat as evidenced by the presence of the RDJTF.¹⁰⁵ Military presence was definitely having an influence with Qaddafi. Our allies were reassured by our presence, but it could not be said with certainty that Qaddafi had been deterred. One significant aspect of this presence operation was that the US regained the initiative. Qaddafi was now formulating policy in reaction to US presence. The American message had been communicated and Qaddafi recognized the formidable military capability arrayed against him. However, the US still had little or no credibility with Qaddafi. He did not believe the US had the resolve to engage Libya with the military instrument.

By August 1981 tensions were in an indeterminable crescendo. Qaddafi was establishing alliances specifically counter to US interests. And several other new developments were alarming. The terror campaign seemed unabated. In June 1981, a Libyan student in Utah was murdered by a pro-Qaddafi Libyan national.¹⁰⁶ France reversed its policy toward Libya. Newly elected French President Francois Mitterand essentially adopted the Carter administration's policy theme of constructive engagement. In July 1981, France lifted the arms embargo against Libya and agreed to sell four Daphne class submarines with mine laying

capability to Libya. They already had three Foxtrot class submarines with three more on order from the USSR. Perhaps the most ominous indication with Cold War implications was the first landing and refueling of a Soviet Backfire bomber in the Libyan desert.¹⁰⁷ The Reagan administration was already relatively successful in isolating Libya diplomatically and they were pursuing more vigorous economic measures, but the situation demanded action. Military presence was an obvious choice, the subtlety of diplomacy with the forcefulness of military power.

In August 1981 the US Sixth Fleet was preparing for another exercise in the Gulf of Sidra that would result in the first military confrontation between the US and Libya since the Barbary wars. The gross misconception coloring this event is that this operation was Reagan's first "in your face" return to the Gulf of Sidra. This is not true. The Reagan administration almost immediately lifted any restrictions on the US Navy for Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations.¹⁰⁸ As early as February 1981, the Navy had resumed their traditional exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. That month, two CVBG's conducted FON operations in the disputed areas for four days. The Libyans avoided military confrontation. As with most typical FON operations, they were conducted with little fanfare and without incident. Critics charge that the naval exercises in August were deliberately provocative in order to lead to military confrontation.¹⁰⁹ Provocation was probably a welcome side effect, but the intent was to compel Qaddafi to mend his ways through intimidation. FON operations are historically legitimate; they have been a "recurring theme" in US

foreign policy since the Revolutionary War.¹¹⁰ Prudently applied military presence in any situation, be it FON or the pursuit of suasion, must be prepared for any contingency including hostilities. While provocation was probably not a requirement for mission success, the opportunity to forcefully rebuke Libya could only be viewed as enhancing the American intent.

Investigation of the actual event portrays a more mutually adversarial situation. As stated, the US would not consider provocation a negative outcome, but neither would Qaddafi. From his perspective, any chance to stand against the imperialist superpower can only elevate his stature. Qaddafi was well aware of the approaching US Sixth Fleet and was preparing to capitalize on the opportunity. The day before the exercise commenced, Libyan radio blared incessant anti-American propaganda. Warning of the closing US armada, Libyan broadcasts emphasized recent CIA leaks of impending covert operations against Qaddafi deliberately to foment piqued anti-American tensions.¹¹¹ The point is not to condemn Qaddafi's propaganda, but rather illustrate his decision. He had a choice. Prior experience had plainly shown that Libya could quietly ignore the naval exercise, and it would end with little publicity, or he could even make international protests of the American encroachment. However, he chose to increase tensions and counter the US military presence with his military challenge. Both sides were moving toward confrontation and both sides saw potential benefits.

The *USS Nimitz* CVBG commenced the exercise 18 August 1981. On the first day, Combat Air Patrol (CAP) fighters warned away about forty

Libyan aircraft from the Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) exercise area. Six Libyan aircraft actually entered the area and were escorted out by Navy fighters. On 19 August, a Navy E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning/Air Control aircraft detected two Libyan SU-22 (Soviet made "Fitter") fighters closing the CVBG. Same as the day before, two F-14s on CAP were vectored to intercept the approaching Libyans. This time, the Libyan "Fitters" fired on the F-14s. In accordance with self-defense rules of engagement (ROE), the F-14s splashed (shot down) both Libyan aircraft with sidewinder missiles. Qaddafi protested the US violations, but the Libyans did not challenge the CVBG for the remainder of the exercise.¹¹²

The US immediately lodged a complaint for the unprovoked attack and warned any further attacks on US forces would be resisted with force. The Libyans conspicuously promised no reprisals against Americans working in Libya, but the State Department advised them to leave anyway. The details of the incident hold little relevance. The bottom line message for Libya was that "the US was putting Qaddafi on notice;" stop activities inimical to US interests or Qaddafi will find himself in a "no holds barred" contest that he cannot win.¹¹³ This was the most difficult form of suasion to pursue: influence to compel a change in policy or behavior. At this juncture, this is not deterrence. It would be deterrence only if Qaddafi had not yet begun his activities.

The Reagan Administration had realized beforehand that any confrontation with Qaddafi would not be the last. In spite of this realization the exercise was conducted with "President Reagan's personal blessings." There was an acknowledged risk that such an operation could

spawn unrest or violence in Africa or the Middle East, but action had to be taken against Qaddafi. As Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Qaddafi had engaged in "unprecedented obstruction to our own interests and objectives."¹¹⁴ There was no pretense that military presence would gain an immediate decision in this matter, but it was rather part of a campaign to coalesce all the national instruments of power in support of a single coherent policy. Suasion is essentially a military form of diplomacy and should only be joined with a long term plan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig accurately assessed the immediate effects. He said the incident demonstrated US determination, castigated Libya for its support of terrorism, and also served as a warning to Cuba and the USSR.¹¹⁵

While the American leadership was disparaging Qaddafi and hoping for his demise in the immediate aftermath of the NIMITZ incident, critics were charging the new policy with overreaction and futility.¹¹⁶ Many analysts doubted Qaddafi's resolve and believed he would eventually lose support. They advocated that he be "ignored and even accommodated instead of being singled out and confronted."¹¹⁷ In the weeks after the incident, Qaddafi vowed instant retaliation next time and flaunted new considerations of a treaty with the USSR in an effort to push the Cold War hot button.¹¹⁸

The pundits pointed to his continued support of terrorism as proof of his unrepentance. Qaddafi had advocated Sadat's assassination and had funded, armed, and trained the "Al-Jihad" who were linked to the assassination.¹¹⁹ In November 1981, US intelligence sources uncovered

Libyan plots to assassinate the US Ambassador to Italy and other US diplomats in Europe.¹²⁰ These charges were obviously all true, but these assessments were based on only a glimpse of a long-term relationship. They also only considered the two primary actors. Events over the next few years will elucidate an overall declining trend in Qaddafi's influence and failure of his foreign policy. The first tangible effects were on third-party players and eventually Qaddafi also demonstrated changes in his own policies.

The Sadat assassination in October 1981 led to another occasion where military presence was an appropriate application of national power in support of US policy. The Reagan Administration already suspected Qaddafi in the assassination, but Libyan calls to overthrow the new Libyan regime motivated the US to act. The US promptly deployed two USAF AWACS (radar surveillance) aircraft to Egypt. A CVBG was designated to remain in the Arabian Sea and a rotation for a permanent presence of three US destroyers in Bahrain was worked out.¹²¹ This increased US presence in the Middle East tangibly demonstrated US commitment to regional security and thereby reassured US allies that our friendship was worthwhile. The "quick infusion of superior air capability" was a good defense, but it was not a substitute for a long term balance of power defined by US allies being able to defend themselves.¹²²

In the short term, there were no hostilities, but it is impossible to ascertain deterrence with any certainty. There was no evidence to suggest Qaddafi would have attacked Egypt in the wake of Sadat's assassination. Deterrence cannot be assessed for an action for

which propensity is unknown. However, it is reasonable to assume that whatever designs Qaddafi had, he was going to have to include the weight of US military and economic power. Therefore, military presence had at least the minimum impact of becoming part of a foe's decision process. Such measures provided US policy with initiative and a certain degree of insurance.

In the same vein as the October deployments, the planned annual exercise for the RDJTF further strengthened the US position in the Middle East. BRIGHT STAR 82, conducted in November 1981, included more AWACS aircraft, USAF B-52 bombers, and about 4,000 American troops exercising in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman.¹²³ This orchestrated show of force was intended to provide further evidence of US involvement in the region and strengthen the US case to compel modifications by Qaddafi. Exactly what effect this military presence had on Qaddafi was uncertain, but two points were clear. US military presence was establishing a record of reliability and the trend of increasing Western influence was continuing which indicated failure for one of Qaddafi's primary foreign policy goals: eradicate Western influence.

By the end of 1981, Libyan prospects had plunged from the year previous and the US was steadily moving to further isolate Libya. Libya was already suffering from food and basic necessities shortages. Internal opposition to Qaddafi was also growing.¹²⁴ The informational instrument of national power successfully labeled Libya a pariah state which enabled further progress with the other instruments of national power. The economic sanctions soon got some teeth and diplomatic efforts not only further isolated Qaddafi but also embarrassed him.

There would be no more military confrontations until 1986, but military presence would underwrite the collective effort--an appropriate application of the military instrument in support of US foreign policy.

In November 1981, the Reagan administration accused Qaddafi of dispatching "Hit Squads" to the United States to assassinate President Reagan and other top officials.¹²⁵ The administration leaked reports in December that at least fourteen Libyan assassins had entered the US. Despite international skepticism, the seriousness of their accusations was demonstrated by the elaborate and extraordinary security measures taken to protect President Reagan and Vice President Bush.¹²⁶ The administration used the "Libyan Hit Squads" as the premise to order all American citizens out of Libya and ban travel to Libya. With the threat of another crisis, the administration felt it could not guarantee their safety.¹²⁷ The Reagan administration presented the American withdrawal in ethical terms. The withdrawal implied that the US was "more repulsed by Libyan terror than attracted to Libyan oil."¹²⁸

The increased pressure on Libya in the latter half of 1981 also had some effects on some of Libya's Western collaborators. Sweden and Libya had had an arrangement since 1977 to exchange oil for technical training. Sweden bought discounted oil and Libyan missile guidance technicians were trained by Sweden. Sweden canceled all contracts in January 1982. The West German rocket-satellite company, OTRAG, in December 1981 announced an end to all Libyan operations in early 1982.¹²⁹ These European supporters were compelled to abandon their endeavors with Libya. Several reasons could be attributable: (1) the momentum of Libyan isolation, (2) the ethical dilemma of supporting a terrorist

state, (3) safety, (4) they perceived the withdrawal of the Americans as an indication of Libyan instability, and (5) based on the NIMITZ incident and subsequent military presence, they feared the US was clearing the decks for further action. It may have been one, all, or any combination of reasons. Whatever the reason, suasion was achieved with third parties. Their withdrawal was a positive development for US policy and a detriment to Libyan policy. It cannot be said with certainty which instrument of US power should be credited, but it is clear that US military presence was integral to the overall policy.

On the economic front, the US finally decided to assault Libya's center of gravity: its oil wealth. The US had been procrastinating on this option since the mid-1970s. In May 1981, the Reagan Administration encouraged American oil companies to withdraw at the same time the government withdrew its last two diplomats.¹³⁰ In October, the Senate started pushing legislation to ban Libyan oil imports. Exxon voluntarily withdrew from Libya in November.¹³¹ During the Fall of 1981, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan all indicated support for a boycott of Libyan oil.¹³² Secretary of State Alexander Haig in January 1982 said that the US was considering a boycott of Libyan oil and exports to Libya.¹³³ President Reagan officially imposed the embargo on US imports of Libyan oil and prohibited US export of specific items to Libya on 10 March 1982.¹³⁴ The US also extended the restrictions on civilian aircraft sales to preclude military use by Libya.¹³⁵ While the US share of Libyan oil exports had already dropped to 40 percent and was still falling, the real impact on Libya was attributed to a coincidental world oil glut starting in 1981. Qaddafi's oil revenues fell from their

peak of \$20 billion in 1980 to \$7 billion in 1981 and the prospect for rebound was bleak.¹³⁶ This drastic loss of revenue severely undercut his support of terrorism and subversion.

The pressure of the US isolation campaign was pervasive. Qaddafi suffered reverses in his military adventurism. Several factors forced him to withdraw his troops from Chad in November 1981. He had to placate domestic dissatisfaction spawned by the drop in welfare spending. Increasingly isolated, Qaddafi needed to seek conciliation with President Mitterand of France, one of the few Western powers that would deal with him. Emboldened by the burgeoning US role in regional security as evidenced by US military presence, many nations of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were steadily increasing diplomatic pressure on Libya to withdraw from Chad.¹³⁷

US diplomatic efforts exploited the enmity in the OAU toward Libya to achieve a significant success in the second dimension of US foreign policy toward Libya--embarrassment. Qaddafi was in line for the chairmanship of the OAU in 1982. He attempted to host two separate OAU conferences in Tripoli during 1982. Both times, a majority of OAU members stayed away and Qaddafi was unable to attain a quorum to take the chair. He was incensed because he was well aware that his quest for the OAU chair had been thwarted by US diplomatic wrangling. Not only a personal snub, this episode was further proof of the failings of his foreign policy; US influence was increasing. Unfortunately, hurt by his rejection by the OAU, he may have felt freed from their pressure and therefore could resume his activities in Chad.¹³⁸

While 1982 was uneventful, Qaddafi was again reaching out in 1983. In February, President Numeiri of Sudan claimed that Libyan conspiracy to overthrow him was imminent. The US quickly responded by sending USAF AWACS aircraft to Cairo to conduct surveillance on Libyan activities and the *USS NIMITZ* CVBG was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Nothing came of this incident. However, some Egyptian officials questioned the veracity of Numeiri's claims.¹³⁹ Qaddafi resumed military intervention in June by sending troops into Chad to support the rebels. Once again, the US sharply increased US military presence to achieve suasion with both Libya and France. Compelling Libya to cease and desist was difficult, but influencing France to intervene proved an easier task. Due to remnants of French colonialism, France retained significant ties in North Africa. The US strategy was to convince France to intervene on behalf of Chad and thwart the Libyan aggression. US military presence consisted of the *USS EISENHOWER* CVBG in the Gulf Of Sidra, the *USS CARL VINSON* CVBG in the Gulf of Aden (between Africa and southwest Asia), and a cadre of USAF AWACS and F-15 aircraft in Sudan. Qaddafi threatened to sink the *USS EISENHOWER*, but her aircraft flew with impunity.¹⁴⁰

Initially reluctant, France only intervened after intense pressure from the US and other North African nations. The USAF aircraft in Sudan and a US pledge to replace Chadian military equipment lost in fighting the Libyans were designed specifically to gain French intervention. The Chadian civil war would not end soon, but France was only able to make progress in negotiations with Libya after a significant military presence was established.¹⁴¹ US military presence

helped convince France to intervene, but French military presence was integral in compelling Qaddafi to negotiate. To what degree suasion occurred is debatable, but it is reasonable to assume that the absence of military presence would have affected a different outcome.

The entire period from 1981 through 1984 was marked by the Reagan Administration policy of firm opposition to Libya. In contrast to the previous four years, Libyan activities were curtailed after a momentous and turbulent first year. Juxtaposing both US and Libyan foreign policies, it suffices to say Libyan influence declined and US influence increased in the Middle East. There were two significant differences in the Reagan policy from the Carter policy. Reagan's approach was definitely a policy of opposition. Carter's policy was the end of the restraint phase in US policy toward Libya although it could be argued that Carter's last year was actually a milder form of opposition. The gradual changes in the Carter policies would indicate that had arrived at a policy of opposition. However, the salient difference in policy success was not in approach but in execution. The Reagan policies were coordinated approaches appropriately applying all the instruments of national power in synergistic security strategy.

Real economic sanctions were sought and imposed. The effectiveness of these measures during this period may be challenged, but they were consistent with the overarching US policy goals to isolate, embarrass, and weaken Libya. This continuity increased the credibility of the total policy. Military presence was effectively applied in support of US policy. The problems with Qaddafi were not solved, but military presence did reclaim the initiative for US policy

and change the security equation to his disadvantage. More effective and apparent was the suasion achieved with third parties. US allies were reassured by the tangible demonstration of US resolve in military presence. Some friends were enticed to action by the strength of US influence weighted by military presence. Others were compelled to cease actions counter to US interests.

Military presence was also applied regularly. After the confrontation in August 1981, Qaddafi realized that the US military presence meant serious intent. The US Navy exercised regularly in the Gulf of Sidra for the remainder of the period from 1981 to 1984 without incident.¹⁴² Qaddafi may have protested, but he did not challenge the Navy again until 1986. Therefore, military presence was able subtly to emphasize the firmness of US opposition whenever necessary. The Reagan policy was straight forward and underwritten by US military presence.

. . . toward those who would export terrorism and subversion in the Caribbean and elsewhere, especially Cuba and Libya, we will act with firmness.¹⁴³

Hostilities, 1985 to 1986

The policy of opposition with firmness established in 1981 continued virtually unchanged through this period. US actions in 1981 essentially defined US-Libyan relations until 1985. The US position was firmly ensconced by the August 1981 incident in the Gulf of Sidra. Qaddafi retained policies inimical to the US, but his subversive activities were more subdued and less frequent. US military presence had gained leverage in the region and regained the initiative in policy. This application of the military instrument enabled American influence. Suasion could be achieved and if not, the military presence enabled

power projection that could pursue coercion. The period of 1985 to 1987 is selected for analysis to highlight the mutually perceived decline in the tenuous status quo between Libya and the US. This decline precipitated a reassertion of policy objectives that led to the second round of military confrontations in 1986. As in 1981, these confrontations determined the nature of US-Libyan relations from 1986 through 1995.

Qaddafi had never ceased his support for terrorism. However, from 1982 until 1984 there was a perceptible lull in his activities.¹⁴⁴ By late 1984 and through 1985, Qaddafi's support for terrorism and engagement in radical activities seemed to be on the rise again. The US expelled a Libyan diplomat to the United Nations 4 June 1985 on charges that he had conspired to eliminate Libyan dissidents in the US¹⁴⁵. Later that month, a particularly brutal act of terrorism shocked the world and revived a somewhat dormant obsessive fear of terrorism and the vulnerability of Americans abroad. Terrorists hijacked TWA flight #847 from Greece and took it to Beirut. Discovering a US Navy Sailor, SW2(DV) Robert Stethem, onboard, the hijackers beat him senseless, executed him, and unceremoniously dumped his lifeless body on to the hot tarmac. The Reagan administration agreed that Iran and Syria were most likely involved. However, this incident brought Middle Eastern terrorism back to the center of public consciousness and Libya was the most visible example. Libya was suspected and the Libyan of involvement profile in terrorism seemed to rise from this incident forward.¹⁴⁶

To a large extent by Qaddafi's own efforts, the isolation of Libya had been maintained. Qaddafi's overt disgust with the US, Israel,

and some other Arab states certainly seemed connected to his sponsorship of terrorism.¹⁴⁷ He remained a continuous threat to his weaker neighbors particularly Chad, Niger, and Tunisia. He was perpetually inciting unrest in other Arab countries which kept Libyan relations with most of the Arab world strained.¹⁴⁸ Libya was ostracized by many Arab and African nations. Only Iran and Syria remain generally friendly with Libya. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq even supported Libyan opposition groups.¹⁴⁹

The Reagan administration targeted Libya, depicting "Qaddafi as the symbol of terrorism in the Middle East."¹⁵⁰ In the fall of 1985, Reagan approved a plan to destabilize Qaddafi's rule. Some analysts believed that the renewed rise in terrorism and frustration with a failure to change Qaddafi's policies precipitated this move by the White House.¹⁵¹ A leak to the press that the CIA had made plans to topple Qaddafi further exacerbated the situation in November 1985.¹⁵² An Egyptian sting operation caught Qaddafi's agents trying to arrange the assassination of Libyans in Egypt.¹⁵³ In 1984, Qaddafi had renewed his Libyan dissident eradication campaign and Libyan "hit squads" were trickling out of Libya again. By the end of 1985, at least eight more murders in Europe were attributed to Qaddafi's henchmen. Two particularly tragic attacks in December 1985 served as a catalyst to US policy in reviving its campaign against Qaddafi. Terrorists attacked civilians in the Rome and Vienna airports killing twenty people between the two incidents. Quickly, Libya became the prime suspect. Tunisian officials claimed that the Abu Nidal terrorists were traveling on passports confiscated by Libyan officials from Tunisian guest workers in

Libya.¹⁵⁴ Blaming Qaddafi, the Reagan administration was prompted to reevaluate and intensify economic sanctions against Libya.¹⁵⁵

Weakening Qaddafi was the third dimension of the Reagan policy. Libya had been significantly weakened economically since 1980, but the primary factor was the world oil glut that had driven down oil prices and kept them down. The US economic sanctions did inflict short term damage in the Libyan economy, but the effects were limited in the long term because Europe filled the gap left by the American measures. However, Libya's economy was in a general state of deterioration by 1985. The Libyan Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted from \$34 billion in 1981 to \$25 billion in 1985 with the majority of the loss in oil revenues. Libyan foreign exchange reserves fell from \$13 billion in 1980 to \$3 billion in 1985. Some of Qaddafi's eclectic socialism was catching up to him. While his massive welfare spending had greatly improved the Libyan standard of living, it failed to stimulate the economy outside of the oil industry. Living more comfortably on government largesse than ever before, there was little pressure on the populace to work. With 75 percent of the population on government payrolls, this was a pervasive problem. Qaddafi's belt-tightening measures in 1985 were not well received by the public. The Libyan economy was clearly in "trouble" as evidenced by the domestic austerity measures and declining arms purchases.¹⁵⁶

Previous US sanctions had significant loopholes, so many American businesses had managed to retain substantial engagement in Libyan business.¹⁵⁷ The Reagan administration sought to rectify this situation with new sanctions. Obtaining European support proved

difficult. Due to their economic interdependence with Libya, they were unwilling to support tighter US sanctions (they actually had not supported the initial sanctions). Libyan oil exports to Europe had risen from 55 percent in 1981 to 90 percent in 1984. The Europeans also desired to keep Libyan production high so that Libya could continue to pay its debts.¹⁵⁸ In January 1986, the Reagan Administration made a complete break of all economic ties and trade with Libya. Libyan assets in the US were frozen and any remaining Americans in Libya were ordered out. To emphasize the seriousness of the new policy and ensure a peaceful evacuation of Americans, the Reagan Administration sent the *USS SARATOGA* CVBG and *USS CORAL SEA* CVBG to the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁵⁹ The military presence of 28 ships did not enter the Gulf of Sidra, but it did remain just North of Libya where Qaddafi knew they were there and knew Libya was within their reach. The Americans departed without incident. Although this was an uneventful application of military presence, it was instructive in a particular nuance. The administration's intent was not to prove a point in Freedom of Navigation or compel a cessation of terrorist activities, but rather to simply guarantee the safe passage of its citizens by deterring any potential violence. Entering the Gulf might have provoked or unnecessarily spooked Qaddafi, but remaining outside contested waters where US power projection was still a viable factor was an appropriate approach. Nothing happened and there was no way to discern what might have happened. However, it would have been patently imprudent to remove the US's only avenue for immediate recourse to any unforeseen crisis.

In early 1986, the US was again taking a hard line toward Qaddafi. This time, Qaddafi's immediate response was mixed. He made repeated attempts to open talks with the US through Saudi Arabia, Greece, Malta, and the United Nations. The US refused all offers; the Reagan administration believed that Qaddafi would not negotiate in good faith.¹⁶⁰ Why was Qaddafi making overtures to the US? Perhaps, he wanted to avoid a repeat of his unpleasant experience in 1981. For public consumption in Libya and abroad, Qaddafi was presenting a more recalcitrant position. His speeches contained the same predictable vitriolic dogma. Foreign diplomats had a checklist for every Qaddafi speech: Anti-Zionist, Anti-American, Anti-Egyptian, and Arab unity. There were seldom any new topics. In February, Qaddafi put his Women's Military Academy on public display. Smiling and blushing at the foreign reporters while delicately thrusting bayonets into imaginary US Marines, the girls eagerly shared that they had volunteered for suicide squads to repel the US Sixth Fleet.¹⁶¹

By March 1986, the Reagan Administration wanted to emphasize US opposition to Libya. The US sought to further isolate and weaken Libya with military pressure. Enhanced military presence would reassure Qaddafi of American resolve and seriousness and possibly compel US European allies to join in more aggressive measures against Libya. A large naval exercise was scheduled for the Gulf of Sidra. Normally, only two Carriers would be in the Mediterranean during the 1980s. Since January, the *USS SARATOGA* CVBG and *USS CORAL SEA* CVBG were delayed on station and remained in the vicinity of Libya. They were joined by the *USS AMERICA* CVBG arriving from the US. This was a significant presence

and in recent times an unprecedented buildup of military power near Libya. This huge military presence was clearly intended to communicate the capability to enable the escalation of US choosing. The 30 ship task force commenced exercises on 23 March 1986.

The carriers and most of their escorts remained outside of the disputed waters. On 24 March, Navy carrier aircraft started the first of 375 flights over the Gulf of Sidra. A three-ship Navy Surface Action Group (SAG) led by one of the Navy's newest Aegis Cruisers, the *USS TICONDEROGA*, proceeded South across Qaddafi's "Line of Death" to patrol for three days. During that day, Pentagon sources said at least four SA-5 missiles and one short-range missile were fired from batteries near Sirte. That evening when the SA-5 radar site came on again, a Navy A-7 launched two HARM missiles at the site; the radar ceased to operate. About six hours later, the radar was turned again and again attacked by an A-7 with two HARM missiles. The radar site was reportedly hit and damaged. Out in the Gulf of Sidra, Libyan Missile Patrol Boats were maneuvering towards US vessels; these movements were interpreted as exhibiting hostile intent. Based on the missile firings from shore and apparent hostile intent by their movements, the patrol boats were deemed a threat and attacked. Four Libyan boats were attacked with Harpoon missiles and bombs from Navy A-6E aircraft and a fifth was attacked with Harpoon missiles from the *USS YORKTOWN*, an Aegis cruiser steaming North of the Gulf between the patrol boats and the carriers. Two of the Libyan boats were confirmed sunk and damage to the other three was unknown. The next two days passed without incident and on 27 March, the

Pentagon ended the exercise although some ships would remain in the area.¹⁶²

Critics immediately charged intentional provocation. The Washington Post claimed these attacks were "the fruit of the Washington decision in July 1985 to step up the campaign against Libya." The White House denied these charges and asserted that the only objective was to conduct Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations. The Pentagon pointed out that the US Navy had conducted eighteen operations in the vicinity of Libya since 1981; seven of them included exercises south of the "Line of Death." Only the August 1981 and March 1986 exercises resulted in confrontation. To illustrate that Libya was not being singled out, the Pentagon also cited the fact that during the same period FON operations had been conducted versus 35 nations including Canada and the USSR.¹⁶³ The indisputable point was that FON operations were routine, typical, and legitimate.

FON was only one aspect of US policy toward Libya. Analysts who focus on only one aspect of foreign policy when assessing the application of a national instrument of power will invariably induce myopic judgments. A careful accounting of US policy goals and review of the situation reveal a sound application of military presence in support of US policy. The foreign policy objectives with regard to Libya in order of importance were: (1) Compel Qaddafi to cease his support and engagement of terrorism and subversion, (2) Deter Qaddafi from military intervention in neighboring states, and (3) Compel Qaddafi to renounce his claims to the international waters in the Gulf of Sidra. The strategy to attain these objectives had three dimensions: isolate,

embarrass, and weaken. The Reagan Administration had applied the three traditional instruments of national power. Diplomatic efforts were effective in isolating Libya from moderate and conservative Arab states and embarrassing Qaddafi in his bid for the OAU chair. Economic sanctions supported isolation and exponentially magnified by record low oil prices had weakened Qaddafi by significantly reducing his oil revenues. Military presence lent credibility to US efforts.

In this particular incident, the US had vigorously denounced Libyan support for terrorism and expressed a strong desire for Qaddafi to cease and desist his subversive activities. Economic sanctions were strengthened, but their effects would take time and their actual impact was impossible to predict. The administration wanted to emphasize and accurately convey how seriously they were about pursuing US policies now. The application of military presence underscored the importance the administration put on this policy by increasing the risk and potential cost to Libya for actions inimical to US interests. Qaddafi was well aware of US disapproval of his support for terror and US rejection of his claims in the Gulf of Sidra. The US had always disapproved of his activities and had challenged him in the Gulf without incident before. When the US Sixth Fleet returned this time to assert the international right to freedom of navigation, he also knew that current US hostility was very intense and tensions were running high. There had previously been such challenges by the US that Libya had ignored and nothing happened. There was also the last time Qaddafi confronted the US Navy and he lost two aircraft. Qaddafi had definitive

experiences on which to assess the situation. He had a choice and he chose confrontation.

Both the US and Libya made conscious decisions leading to confrontation. Each nation's policy was by that nation's choice. When that policy is inimical to another sovereign, the nation must choose a course of action that increases or decreases the chances of potential conflict. Each nation must assess the potential cost, benefit, and risk. This process is at the core of politics among and between nations. If the cost is too high, the benefit too low, or the risk too great, one nation would wisely realign its policies to fit the threat and available resources. Pursuing policies beyond a nation's capabilities is a gamble.

Analysis of the cost, benefit, and risk equation for both demonstrates the efficacy of military presence in the management of conflict. In March 1986, the perceived cost for confronting the US to Qaddafi was the loss of some military hardware and personnel. Though he was running low on oil revenues, he still had more hardware than his forces could use. He was perpetually suspicious of the Libyan armed forces, so to employ them and lose some was insignificant. He routinely purged them himself. There was inherent risk in employing his military against insurmountable capability; it might precipitate a coup. In March 1986, that was probably the only real risk for Qaddafi. He was already isolated from the international community, so radical activities could not substantially further his isolation. However, the benefit that Qaddafi could derive was significant. Depicting himself as the victim of American aggression could earn him international sympathy.

Standing up to the powerful patron of Israel also buys him significant prestige among Arab nationalists. Qaddafi was conducting policies counter to US interests and he felt he had the resources to continue doing so. US diplomacy and economic sanctions had an effect on Qaddafi's policy equation, but they did not outweigh his perceived benefits. Application of military presence added weight to the American effort, but short of a direct attack to destroy his regime, Qaddafi still assessed the potential benefits to be higher than the costs and the risks were tolerable. In the strategic environment of early 1986, Qaddafi was correct in assuming the American's would not invade. Confronting the US Sixth Fleet was a rational decision.

Similar analysis of the US decision renders the same conclusion. An assessment of the costs, benefits, and risks would dictate a prudent and appropriate application of military presence. Considering Libya's military capability, any confrontation with Libya would have minimal US cost in men and equipment. However, the US could not afford the high diplomatic costs in international condemnation for an invasion of Libya. While the international community generally regarded Qaddafi as a pariah, international support for more aggressive measures was lacking. The situation and the evidence could not support a "fight and win" decision by the US. However, through proper application of military presence the US could increase pressure to a desired and prudent degree. Military presence, particularly naval presence, was noncommittal and flexible. Military presence could be applied and if necessary enable increased pressure through greater military presence or even power

projection. This was precisely the approach the US applied in March 1986.

The US had multiple policy objectives and a need to increase its influence upon Libya. Military presence enabled the US to challenge Libya on one issue and be prepared for any escalation regarding any other issues. The US cost would be some chastisement from the international community, but there were several potential benefits. Application without incident would enhance US credibility and to some degree increase the cost to Qaddafi. Any escalation would only increase the cost to Qaddafi that much more, thereby strengthening the US position. While not highly plausible, there was also the possibility of destabilizing Qaddafi's regime facilitating his removal.¹⁶⁴

This consequence would have conceivably not only achieved suasion but actually attained a major US policy objective: weakening Libya by removing its leader. However, there was an inherent risk that his successor might be worse. This analysis should not be interpreted as a definitive judgment that the US intentionally sought provocation for the specific purpose of fomenting a Libyan rebellion. This situation only illustrates the simple axiom: If all or most of the consequences of military presence are consistent with US policy, appropriate employment of military presence is rational in so far as it does not undermine the policy it is supposed to serve.

Short-term evaluation would render the March confrontation a failure for US policy. On 5 April 1986, a bomb ripped through a Berlin Discotheque injuring 230 people and killing two, one of them an American serviceman. The US insisted that Libya was culpable, but ironically,

such a charge would also prove the US action in March had failed to compel Qaddafi to cease his support of terrorism. While US intelligence held irrefutable evidence of some degree of Libyan involvement, substantial evidence was also surfacing to indicate a strong Syrian connection.¹⁶⁵

In the larger scheme, it did not matter. Terrorism was all too often stateless. Syria may have been more involved than Libya, but Libya was again the most visible example and the US had maintained a viable avenue of approach to Libya through military presence. Certain culpability could take a long time to establish and would probably always be debatable. Swift action against Libya would further increase the Libyan cost already accrued by the March incident. It might also serve as a concrete demonstration to others of the potential cost for supporting terrorism and thereby deter such activity or compel some to cease such activity. Obviously, the Berlin bombing was a convenient pretext for the US to predicate further action. Thus, President Reagan authorized OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON.

Early on the morning of 15 April 1986, the EL DORADO CANYON air strike caught Qaddafi unaware. Near simultaneous raids were conducted on Benghazi and Tripoli. US Navy A-6 bombers hit the military facilities in Benghazi. USAF F-111 fighter-bombers struck three targets in Tripoli: the airport, the port "Sidi Bical," and the "Bab al-Aziziyah" military barracks where Qaddafi lived with his family. The US lost one F-111 in the raid. Official Pentagon reports cited only 36 deaths in Libya. News sources claimed over 100 deaths and many casualties. Qaddafi was uninjured, but his wife, two young sons, and an

adopted fifteen-month-old daughter were hurt. Sources are ambiguous and contradictory. Some claim his adopted daughter was killed and others claim his two sons were killed. The death of the girl is the prevalent claim and seems likely from the evidence.¹⁶⁶ The enmity between the US and Qaddafi had become personal. The cost was now inestimable to Qaddafi.

Military presence in the vicinity of Libya enabled a joint application of power projection. The military presence enabled the military operation with on-site support and flexibility in response. It also enabled the strike in a diplomatic sense. US military presence was a tangible warning to Qaddafi of intense US determination. The incident the previous month had put Qaddafi on notice that military force was a viable option. OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON was intended to remove any doubt Qaddafi may have had that the US would act forcefully and significantly to increase the cost for his continued intransigence. The Reagan Administration realized that this operation would probably not deliver a decision for US policy toward Libya. If Qaddafi had been killed in the raid, this outcome would have been a welcome side effect. However, it was not the purpose of the raid. The raid was no more than another operation in the long-term campaign against Qaddafi.

The high profile US military presence in and around Libya from January through April 1986 supported US policy and enhanced progress toward regional goals. Not designed to obtain decision but rather to exercise influence, suasion was achieved in several respects. First, to a US public frustrated with the intractable nature of terrorism, US actions reassured that the US could and would act to defeat terrorism.

Terror experts were skeptical of the effectiveness of Reagan's military application, but US public support for it was overwhelming.¹⁶⁷

Second, there was significant suasion with third parties. Any other outlaw or potential outlaw states who doubted that the US would act swiftly and firmly with force against sponsored terrorism were reassured of US resolve. American friends and Libyan foes were reassured of US commitment to the Middle East. European allies were skeptical of US policy and particularly reticent about supporting US economic sanctions against Libya. However, US military operations in Libya pressed European powers to adopt measures more in line with US policy. They agreed to expel some Libyan diplomats, restrict Libyan students, and publicly express their displeasure with Qaddafi. Although they never adopted economic sanctions they were now willing to discuss them in an effort to placate the US. The Europeans were pressed to change their policies in an effort to preclude further action by the US¹⁶⁸. Nevertheless, US policy made more progress with further isolation of Qaddafi.

The bottom line confers that the US achieved suasion against Qaddafi. Many Europeans and Arabs thought US military action was a mistake and would only lead to more violence.¹⁶⁹ Qaddafi had to ponder the same issue. Whether or not there would be more violence was largely his choice. He could continue to support terrorism, but he did have significant data points to reassure him that the US could and would respond with force. However, subsequent events proved Qaddafi was not compelled to change his policies. Qaddafi defiantly vowed to continue to "export revolution."¹⁷⁰ A short month later, even the Reagan

Administration "conceded no decline in Libyan terror." Some analysts said the absence of a military rebellion after the US raid appeared to have strengthened Qaddafi's hold on military power.¹⁷¹ Qaddafi did have one other hard fact to consider. For all the expense, his military failed miserably in defending his shores. The Soviet equipment did not work as advertised and his forces were in no way ready for any conventional attack. Qaddafi and his military were "clearly shaken" by the raid.¹⁷²

Despite international skepticism, President Reagan promised more attacks if Qaddafi did not change his policy supporting terrorism. Although Reagan did not expect Qaddafi to change, he did hope it would "hasten his demise."¹⁷³ Ironically, the raid gave credibility to Qaddafi's well worn rhetoric that the imperialists would stop at nothing to destroy his revolution.¹⁷⁴ If he had not believed his claim himself before the raid, he had good reason to believe it after. There is no specific act from which Qaddafi can be said to have been deterred. However, several indisputable facts had intrusively made their way into his decision process. The US could bring superior military power to bear on Libya. The Americans clearly had the resolve to use it. The Libyan military was virtually powerless to resist an American attack. The USSR or anyone else for that matter could not be relied on to come to his aid. He fully realized that there were Libyan dissidents who might be emboldened by further US actions to fulfill the American objective and depose him. These facts clearly weighed heavily into Qaddafi's security equation. It would be impossible for him to ignore. The assessment of 1986 shortly after the US raid is that some degree of

suasion had been achieved. Qaddafi was reassured that the US policy was serious and could result in military action. Overall, he was not compelled to cease his support for terrorism. However, he could be deterred from specific acts directed at US targets. The raid had certainly greatly increased his risk and made the potential costs a matter of personal survival and regime existence. In theory, this shift in influence favored the US. Some decisions that Qaddafi had previously made on the assumption of minimal risk and cost took on new costs. Qaddafi could have been and perhaps even was deterred from certain acts. The cost to the US was well worth the potential benefits; Qaddafi was definitely reassured of US policy, he was possibly deterred, and the US policy to compel a change was strengthened.

Containment, 1987 to 1995

The period since the military confrontations in 1986 has seen a tenuous status quo characterized by two trends: a US policy of continued opposition and the inexorable decline of Libya. The US has maintained a policy of opposition to further isolate, embarrass, and weaken Qaddafi. Previously, the measures pursued by the US were unilateral, but in the last decade the US has been relatively successful in expanding multilateral efforts. Other than a repeat of the 1981 incident with the *USS NIMITZ* CVBG in 1989 (military confrontation in the Gulf of Sidra), US opposition has been largely diplomatic and economic but underwritten by credible military presence. President Clinton's National Security Advisor Anthony Lake describes current US policy toward "backlash states" as a truncated version of containment.¹⁷⁵

The US application of diplomatic, economic, and military

pressure have steadily increased Qaddafi's isolation. At first mostly unilateral but gaining in multilateral appeal, US measures have accentuated Libya's differences with the US and more importantly with Europe.¹⁷⁶ Most pundits who have rushed to judge US policy in selected slices or in the immediate aftermath of armed confrontation have roundly condemned US policy as counterproductive or downright imperialistic.¹⁷⁷ However, Libya has been in progressive decline since 1980. Qaddafi's successes in foreign policy have been few and fleeting. A brief review of his overarching foreign policy goals exposes abject failure. In his quest to dominate the spheres of Islam, Africa, and the Arab world, he has been rebuffed. Islamic fundamentalists vehemently oppose him and may even one day depose him. African nations are wary of him; they trade with him but do not follow him. The Arab world at times sympathetic to Qaddafi, but, like an insanely eccentric uncle, keep him at arm's length and relegated to the attic of Arab society. His other primary goal to "weaken the West" has witnessed the rise of the US role in regional security and pervasive American influence in the Middle East. His obsession with the destruction of Israel may be the impetus for his own downfall. Progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process continues to isolate Qaddafi further as old allies cross to the other side. His hatred for Israel is the crux of his foreign policy; Arab acceptance and recognition of Israel threatens to undermine the legitimacy of his regime.¹⁷⁸

Unlike the previous sections, analysis of this period does not trace events but rather focuses on the trends of Libyan decline as a goal of US policy buttressed by military presence. During the period

1987 to 1995, Libya slowly retreated from foreign military intervention, endured a steady dissipation of its economic vitality, experienced increasing pressure from internal dissent, realized its military vulnerability, and maintained a nebulous policy towards terrorism.

Libya had been meddling in Chad's internal affairs for the duration of that country's civil war. Despite occasional setbacks from French intervention and US military presence mostly in the form of aid and some supporting forces, Qaddafi had managed to remain inextricably involved in Chad. In February 1986, he was still supporting Chadian rebels with troops and equipment. Whether or not Qaddafi's military confrontation with the US in early 1986 was the precise turning point for his military prospects abroad is uncertain. Nevertheless, from that point forward Qaddafi's military adventurism would start an overall trend of reverses.

In late 1986, Qaddafi had a falling out with the Chadian rebels he was supporting. In an odd twist, Chad's government came to the rebel's aid and launched a massive attack with extensive US and French aid in January 1987. The Chadians routed the Libyans inflicting huge losses in men and material. The US and France wisely reinforced success with increased aid later that year. Contrary to early plans, France decided to continue to maintain its military presence of troops and aircraft in Chad thereby enhancing the balance of power in favor of Chad. By August, Chad had eradicated the Libyan presence; however, Libya was able to reoccupy the contested Aouzou strip before an OAU cease-fire could be implemented in September. Nevertheless, Qaddafi and the Libyan military had suffered a humiliating defeat to an inferior

Chadian force. The US and France continued to maintain high levels of support to Chad. France also kept a highly visible military presence.¹⁷⁹ Cursory evaluation deduces that Chad compelled Libya to cease its aggression. This is absolutely true, but how was the Chadian position enhanced? French military presence and US military aid logically affected the balance of power. It may not have been decisive, but its application supported both French and US policy.

In 1988, Qaddafi and his government were perceptibly better behaved. Libya finally recognized Chad in May 1988 dropping the pretenses for annexation, although retaining the Aouzou strip. Chad continued to hold a significant number of Libyan Prisoners-of-War from 1987 as a future bargaining chip. In 1989, Libya and Chad signed a peace agreement, but the Aouzou strip and Libyan POW issues remained unresolved. In 1991, another coup in Chad brought Libyan backed Idris Deby to power. However, he was French trained and quickly made assurances of friendship to both France and Libya. Instituting democratic reforms, Deby seems to have made himself palatable to all. He continues to enjoy French support and Libya has maintained a diminishing profile.¹⁸⁰ Finally, Libya signed a peace treaty with Chad in May 1994 acknowledging Chadian sovereignty over the Aouzou strip.¹⁸¹

Thus, no active remnants of Libyan military intervention abroad remain. During this same period, Qaddafi also withdrew Libyan forces stationed near the Egyptian border for the last decade. Previously inimical to Algeria and Tunisia, he made overtures to Algeria for some form of economic and political union and restored diplomatic relations with Tunisia.¹⁸² The conventional wisdom held and largely still holds

the assumption that economic sanctions are not a viable coercive tool, especially in the case of Libya and its copious oil wealth. The fact is the sanctions helped to erode the Libyan economy over the last fifteen years. Admittedly, the world oil glut since 1981 dealt the main blow to a poorly managed national economy. However, economic sanctions definitely exacerbated the Libyan economic situation. By 1988, the Libyan economy seemed severely underdeveloped outside of the oil industry. The most chronic symptoms were dreadfully low oil prices, inflation, and shortages of food and basic necessities.¹⁸³

The US and UK indicted two Libyan officials for supporting the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. Qaddafi has refused to turn them over to the West. The US and UK successfully obtained UN economic sanctions to compel Libya to comply with extradition of the suspects. The sanctions were put into effect in 1992 and 1993. The UN sanctions included a prohibition of international air transportation links with Libya, an embargo on arms trading, and restrictions on Libyan diplomatic representatives a broad. The further isolation had ominous consequences for Libya. Qaddafi had been trying for the last three years to repair Arab and Western relations. Libya has been pursuing economic relief through the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), a consortium of North African nations (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya) attempting to foster economic cooperation much like the pattern of the European Community. The UN sanctions posed a significant dilemma for AMU members. They found that to abide by the sanctions meant ending their trade with Libya.¹⁸⁴

Isolation and universal economic sanctions had real effects on Libya. In 1994, the journal World Trade described the growing lucrative business for US companies in the Middle East, but they cautiously noted that "Libya and Iraq do not even rate a first thought."¹⁸⁵ By 1995, the promising Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) had made some slight progress in better economic performance, unrestricted travel between countries, and more effective payment arrangements between central banks. However, the AMU was woefully behind on its time table for free trade in 1992, a customs union in 1995, and a common market by 2000. Little progress had been made toward the first goal, free trade, much less the subsequent goals.¹⁸⁶ The UN sanctions had made their endeavors much harder.

In 1995, the economic sanctions continued to undermine the Libyan economy. The original Reagan sanctions were not too painful, but the intensification of sanctions by the UN and a 25 year low in oil prices in real terms is hurting Libyan revenues. There is no doubt of the "deleterious effects of UN sanctions." The hapless Libyan military has been further hamstrung by the arms embargo. The embargo on strategic oil equipment has been even more devastating to Libya's decaying oil industry infrastructure. The banning of air flights has hampered trade and few countries have diplomatic relations with Libya. Overseas Libyan financial investments are frozen in many countries. Qaddafi is stunned. He did not think it would last and two years later signs of real economic pain were beginning to show.¹⁸⁷

Qaddafi had hoped for better relations with President Clinton, but it was not to be. Qaddafi "no longer underestimates US antipathy for him."¹⁸⁷ In March 1995, the US National Security Advisor, Anthony

Lake, was calling for a global embargo of Libyan oil. Such a measure would undoubtedly shatter the remainder of the Libyan economy. The European response to this proposal has been chilly and enthusiasm for existing sanctions is waning. Of course, Qaddafi must keep in mind that the Europeans have been unwilling partners all along; yet, his isolation has progressed far beyond what the pundits had predicted was possible given European reservations.

As in any oppressive regime, Qaddafi is perpetually plagued by dissension and occasional coup attempts. There is no accurate accounting of exactly how many coup attempts have been made over the last two decades, but there have been enough to justify his elaborate personal security measures. His intricate network of paramilitary internal security forces especially the Revolutionary Committees have alienated much of the Libyan public in their zeal to preserve the revolution. Already in 1988, there was growing despair and dissatisfaction among the middle class, students and intellectuals, the professional military, and tribal sectors of Libyan society, those most affected by sanctions. In general, there was a "mounting sense that Qaddafi had squandered Libyan resources in misadventures."¹⁸⁹

Qaddafi now finds domestic dissent and opposition everywhere. The most serious development for Qaddafi was that even among Saharan tribes his rule has come into question. In 1990, tribal infighting broke out between the Qadhafa (Qaddafi's tribe) and the Migarha (his right hand man, Major Jallud's tribe) in Sepha. The violent dispute arose out of the claim by the Migarha that Major Jallud was coequal to Qaddafi.

The al-Sanusi family has reemerged as a serious force in Libya. The family of the deposed King Idris has chosen his grand nephew, Prince Idris al-Sanusi, to be the new Libyan monarch in a campaign to oust Qaddafi. The Prince has met with US and UK authorities as well as several other European and Arab leaders. He has made a serious attempt to unify opposition to Qaddafi, but some of the dissidents may have also reacted against the Prince. Another opposition group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, was reportedly funded by Saudi Arabia and Iraq (before the Gulf war in 1991).¹⁹⁰

The Libyan military has been disconcerting and disappointing to Qaddafi. Qaddafi constantly worries that a coup is brewing in the military. The army and air force are deprived of ammunition and fuel to preclude any coup attempts. Trucks are maintained separate from the troops. The officers are allowed on the bases only a few hours a day to minimize their opportunity to foment rebellion. All Libyan government employees are paid late, but the armed forces are paid last and much later than others. The army has grown somewhat insolent to Qaddafi. The dilemma for Qaddafi is that he has realized from the military's poor record that he needs a professional military, but he could never trust them.¹⁹¹

The Libyan military's pitiful performance has not only disappointed Qaddafi but also caused him to reevaluate his policies. Qaddafi realized his limited ability to deter attack from the US, Israel, or Egypt. He has little faith in his military. He dreads a repeat of the 1986 US raid. The Libyan air force performed poorly again in 1989 when two Libyan Mig-23 fighters were lost to the US Navy over

the Gulf.¹⁹² The unavoidable facts are that every time he challenges the US Navy in the Gulf of Sidra, it will cost him men and material. His ability to defend his coast from US power projection is virtually non-existent. In conventional warfare, his army was nearly destroyed by admittedly inferior Chadian forces. US military presence and its occasional confrontations undoubtedly made an impression on Qaddafi. His decision making was influenced by concrete demonstrations of real capabilities. When he considers military action or supporting terrorism, he must now factor his military's proven inability to support such policy. Some may argue that this stark reality has not compelled Qaddafi to change his policies, but it is perfectly reasonable and logical to deduce deterrence. His capability was weakened and proven inadequate, so he has had to alter any course of action requiring military capability. When Qaddafi has had to forgo an action or policy for this reason, US power deterred; US military presence achieved suasion.

During the early 1990s, US military presence has become even more formidable. The demise of the USSR leaving the US as the sole superpower has given Qaddafi cause to pause.¹⁹³ The suspension of Soviet and Warsaw Pact support eroded his power base.¹⁹⁴ He no longer has the option of hiding behind the USSR as a counter-balance to US demands. Furthermore, he has "watched in horror as US military and diplomatic influence in the Middle East reached unprecedented levels." There is more US military presence in the Middle East now. The US enjoys greater military access to the Middle East. There are more US/Arab defense agreements. Qaddafi's goal to eradicate Western influence has been shut

out. The US effort is pervasive and continues unabated. Currently, US joint military exercises in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco "box him in." Even worse, Qaddafi was alarmed by the NATO initiative in February 1995 to start dialogue with Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania for their expansion program, "Partnership for Peace." Malta, right on Libya's front porch, actually joined.¹⁹⁵

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a particularly vexing problem for the West. Qaddafi fully appreciates the potential influence of such power, but his strategy has been complicated by US military presence. Unable to use his conventional forces, he is stockpiling chemical weapons. Libya lacks a delivery system, but is developing one with North Korea. However, he stoically noted that Saddam Hussein's chemical arsenal and record of use did not deter anyone in DESERT STORM. Qaddafi would like to have a nuclear weapon, but he appears to have made little progress in developing any capability. Furthermore, he is deterred from aggressively pursuing it because he realizes that "he narrowly escaped military confrontation with the US in 1990 over the Rabta Chemical weapons plant and again in 1992 over his refusal to hand over the Lockerbie agents." He must be wary of another showdown.¹⁹⁶

Qaddafi earned a reputation as a "thorn in Western flesh" in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s he is finding that difficult to live down and portray himself as more moderate.¹⁹⁷ His defiant intransigence with regard to Israel binds him to support for terrorism. Even as the Rejectionist states have slipped into the peace process, he still urges radical groups to use whatever means possible to obstruct peace with

Israel. He pledges to provide aid to HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad for the liberation of Palestine.¹⁹⁸ Since the Lockerbie incident in 1988, the US and UK have held that resolution of that bombing is the only path for Qaddafi to gain relief from mounting international pressure. His refusal to comply with extradition of the Libyan suspects "limits any flexibility in Libyan foreign policy."¹⁹⁹ Even if Libya is truly compelled to renounce support for terrorism, it will be extremely difficult to convince the West as long as Qaddafi is still in power. The West cynically believes "Qaddafi's restraint is calculated to reduce Libya's political isolation."²⁰⁰

"In the international system and the Arab world, Libya is more isolated than any time since Qaddafi seized power." His clear foreign policy failures have wrought tremendous economic strain on Libya and have brought his regime's legitimacy into question.²⁰¹ Whatever action Qaddafi takes or whatever course his policy pursues, Qaddafi must reconcile an unavoidable pervasive truth. "The possibility of unilateral US military action always looms in the distance." Therefore, "Qaddafi has moderated his behavior."²⁰² Military presence has been integral to US policy and key in enabling coordinated applications of national power.

Endnotes

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²P. Edward Haley, Qaddafi and the United States since 1969 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 17.

³Schuler, 200.

⁴Haley, 9.

⁵John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 80, 40, 159-161. Great Britain also abandoned their air base at Tobruk about the same time.

⁶Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1986), 119.

⁷Haley, 18-19.

⁸El-Khawas, 181.

⁹Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 767.

¹⁰Lillian Craig Harris, Libya: Qadhafi's Revolution and the Modern State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 86.

¹¹Cooley, 101.

¹²Ibid., 109-113.

¹³Haley, 5, 9, 248, 12-14.

¹⁴Schuler, 207.

¹⁵El-Khawas, 121-122.

¹⁶"Libya's Qaddafi charges . . .," US News and World Report 83, 6 (8 August 1977): 37. This article was a compilation of excerpts from an interview with Qaddafi.

¹⁷Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Hearings on International Terrorism 95th Cong., 1st sess., 14 September 1977, Congressional Information Service, 2-3. The lists were provided by the State Department per request of Senator Javits.

¹⁸Haley, 35, 51.

¹⁹Robert Joseph Metzger, "Libya, Qaddafi and the Bomb: A Recipe for Disaster" (MMAS Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), 68.

²⁰Luther B. Ray III and Roy D. Kimerling, "Libya: A Country in Transition Seeking to Assert its Influence" (A Group Study Project, US Army War College, 1983), 8; and Harris, 18-19. The information

regarding the domestic turning point in Libya was compiled from these two sources.

²¹Haley, 73-75.

²²El-Khawas, 129.

²³"Libya-Egypt Clash - Latest Threat to Mideast Peace," US News and World Report 83, 6 (8 August 1977): 37-38.

²⁴Cooley, 118.

²⁵"Libya-Egypt Clash," 36.

²⁶"Qaddafi Charges," 36.

²⁷Congress, House, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Hearings on State Sponsored Terrorism 95th Cong., 1st sess., 8 June 1977, Congressional Information Service H461-66.1, 122.

²⁸Robert P. Haffa, Jr., The Half War: Planning US Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1963-1983 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 52-53, 60.

²⁹"Qaddafi Charges," 37.

³⁰"Why the US Continues to Suspect Qaddafi," US News and World Report 83, 6 (8 August 1977): 38; Haley, 147.

³¹Cooley, 80-92; Simons, 299.

³²Patricia Ann O'Conner, ed., Historic Documents of 1977 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1978), 829.

³³El-Khawas, 133-134; Haley, 74-76.

³⁴President Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Address" (19 January 1978), in Historic Documents of 1978 edited by Patricia Ann O'Connor, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1979), 7, 17.

³⁵Haley, 70, 79.

³⁶Cooley, 195-213; Haley, 96-99.

³⁷Smith Hempstone, "Libya: Another Nagging Headache for Sadat," US News and World Report 84, 14 (10 April 1978): 39-40.

³⁸Haley, 39, 50.

³⁹Patricia Ann O'Connor, ed., "Response to Camp David," Historic Documents of 1978 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1979), 607.

⁴⁰Haley, 78, 81, 86-87.

⁴¹Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as an Instrument of US Policy in Southwest Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 12-13.

⁴²Ibid., 61.

⁴³Haffa, Jr., 61.

⁴⁴Johnson, 6, 15, 61.

⁴⁵Haffa, Jr., 61.

⁴⁶Johnson, 13-15.

⁴⁷Haley, 147; El-Khawas, 125; Cooley, 252. It was this Libyan effort to procure aircraft and gain some influence with the US that led to the infamous Billy Carter affair. The Libyans coopted President Carter's brother in order to exploit their relationship. While a supreme embarrassment, this affair had no appreciable effect on policy.

⁴⁸President Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Address" January 1979, Historic Documents of 1979 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980), 69.

⁴⁹Geoff Simons, Libya: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 299-300.

⁵⁰Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, News Conference 11 January 1979, Department of State Bulletin (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 7.

⁵¹Haley, 83.

⁵²El-Khawas, 143.

⁵³Haley, 85.

⁵⁴Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on the Omnibus Antiterrorism Act of 1979 96th Cong., 1st sess., 30 march 1979, CIS Abstract S401-62.1, 962.

⁵⁵Haley, 187-189; Simons, 308.

⁵⁶President Jimmy Carter, "Letter to The Speaker of The House and President of The Senate," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 1979 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1980), 2294-2295.

⁵⁷President Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Address," Historic Documents of 1980 edited by John L. Moore, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981), 33.

⁵⁸Johnson, 7.

⁵⁹Ibid., 8, 10.

⁶⁰Ibid., 9, 6.

⁶¹Ibid., 63, 112, 16.

⁶²Ibid., 65, 34, 62. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, wanted the RDJTF to be mobile, light, and not tied to NATO.

⁶³Ibid., 111, 68, 64, 75, 82.

⁶⁴Metzger, 66.

⁶⁵El-Khawas, 155, 121; Simons, 308.

⁶⁶Haley, 220-221; El-Khawas, 124.

⁶⁷Simons, 300.

⁶⁸Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., "From SLOC Protection to a National Maritime Strategy: The US Navy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1984," in In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1984), 356.

⁶⁹Cooley, 266.

⁷⁰Kennedy Jr., 356.

⁷¹Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: headlong into confrontation?" International Affairs 58 (Winter 1981/1982): 15.

⁷²El-Khawas, 125; Haley, 226; Kennedy, Jr., 356; Simons, 300. All these authors gave similar accounts except El-Khawas. El-Khawas asserted that the Libyans had indeed shot down an RC-135.

⁷³Metzger, 47.

⁷⁴Haley, 198-204.

⁷⁵Joseph Fromm and Dennis Mullin, "What Reagan is really after in Libya," US News and World Report 90, 31 (2 May 1981): 32.

⁷⁶Johnson, 98.

⁷⁷Schuler, 199-200.

⁷⁸Ibid., 205-209.

⁷⁹El-Khawas, 147-154.

⁸⁰Cooley, 160-161.

⁸¹Johnson, 33-34, 39.

⁸²Simons, 300.

⁸³El-Khawas, 149-150.

⁸⁴Haley, 250, 252-255.

⁸⁵Schuler, 204.

⁸⁶Schuler, 204.

⁸⁷Haley, 111; Metzger, 66.

⁸⁸Carolyn Goldinger, ed., "CIA Terrorism Report" (15 June 1981), Historic Documents of 1981 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982), 462-467.

⁸⁹Cooley, 82.

⁹⁰Lisa Anderson, "Libya's Qaddafi: Still in Command?" Current History 86 (Fall 1987): 62.

⁹¹Cooley, 227-228; Haley, 255.

⁹²Wright, 13.

⁹³Haley, 248.

⁹⁴Ibid., 248-249

⁹⁵Ibid., 248-149.

⁹⁶Wright, 13.

⁹⁷Fromm and Mullin, 31.

⁹⁸Haley, 213.

⁹⁹Simons, 301.

¹⁰⁰Wright, 16; Fromm and Mullin, 31. Niger, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia all wanted Qaddafi restrained.

¹⁰¹Simons, 302.

¹⁰²Fromm and Mullin, 32.

¹⁰³El-Khawas, 154-155.

¹⁰⁴Simons, 301.

¹⁰⁵El-Khawas, 143.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 156.

¹⁰⁷Cooley, 250-251, 240.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 266.

¹⁰⁹Simons, 301.

¹¹⁰Pat Towell, "Military strikes against Libya receive Capitol Hill support: some concerns on war powers," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 44 (29 March 1986): 7.

¹¹¹Cooley, 265.

¹¹²Kennedy Jr., 357; Cooley, 266-267; Wright, 15.

¹¹³"US and Libya - Heading for a Showdown?" US New and World Report 91 (31 August 1981): 16-17.

- ¹¹⁴Ibid., 16-17.
- ¹¹⁵Kennedy, Jr., 357.
- ¹¹⁶Wright, 16.
- ¹¹⁷Schuler, 200.
- ¹¹⁸Cooley, 268.
- ¹¹⁹El-Khawas, 126; Schuler, 199.
- ¹²⁰ Metzger, 67.
- ¹²¹El-Khawas, 159-160.
- ¹²²Schuler, 207.
- ¹²³Haley, 262; Johnson, 99.
- ¹²⁴El-Khawas, 202; Haley 259.
- ¹²⁵Towell, 7.
- ¹²⁶Cooley, 269.
- ¹²⁷Haley, 248, 265; El-Khawas, 162.
- ¹²⁸Schuler, 212.
- ¹²⁹Cooley, 235-239.
- ¹³⁰El-Khawas, 161.
- ¹³¹Wright, 14.
- ¹³²Cooley, 284.
- ¹³³El-Khawas, 161, 163-164.
- ¹³⁴Simons, 302.
- ¹³⁵Congress, Senate, Commerce Committee, "Export Restrictions"
CIS Abstract S381-31.1 (18 March 1982), 799.
- ¹³⁶Cooley, 269-273.
- ¹³⁷Ibid., 282.
- ¹³⁸El-Khawas, 145-146, 165-168.
- ¹³⁹Simons, 303; Kennedy, Jr., 361.
- ¹⁴⁰Kennedy, Jr., 361.
- ¹⁴¹El-Khawas, 168-174.

¹⁴²Kennedy, Jr., 361. It was routine for Libyan aircraft to investigate naval maneuvers and be uneventfully escorted away by US aircraft.

¹⁴³President Ronald Reagan, "State of the Union Address" (1982), Historic Documents of 1982 edited by Carolyn Goldinger (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1983), 83.

¹⁴⁴The most notable act during this period that is believed attributable to Libya was the mining of Red Sea and Gulf of Suez in mid-1984. Harris, 89.

¹⁴⁵Towell, 7.

¹⁴⁶Anderson, 68. As a memorial for SW2(DV) Robert Stethem, the US Navy has commissioned one of its new Aegis Destroyers in his honor: *USS STETHEM* (DDG-63).

¹⁴⁷Towell, 5.

¹⁴⁸Harris, 93-94.

¹⁴⁹Anderson, 65. Libya had earned Iraq's enmity for supporting Iran in the Iran-Iraq war.

¹⁵⁰Towell, 5.

¹⁵¹El-Khawas, 174.

¹⁵²Anderson, 68.

¹⁵³Harris, 92.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 90.

¹⁵⁵Anderson, 68.

¹⁵⁶Harris, 127, 108-110, 116, 118-119.

¹⁵⁷Schuler, 210.

¹⁵⁸Anderson, 66.

¹⁵⁹El-Khawas, 175-177; Harris, 117.

¹⁶⁰Anderson, 68.

¹⁶¹David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1987), 16-17.

¹⁶²Towell, 7.

¹⁶²Ibid., 5-7.

¹⁶⁴Anderson, 68. The author contends that the US naval exercise was specially provocative to induce Libyan dissidents to rebel. There were no signs of domestic unrest.

- ¹⁶⁵Blundy and Lycett, 4-5; Simons, 315-316; Anderson, 68.
- ¹⁶⁶Simons, 318-319; Anderson, 86; Blundy and Lycett, 8-11.
- ¹⁶⁷Anderson, 86.
- ¹⁶⁸Ibid., 86-87.
- ¹⁶⁹Harris, 102.
- ¹⁷⁰Ibid., 102.
- ¹⁷¹Anderson, 86.
- ¹⁷²Harris, 130; Anderson, 87.
- ¹⁷³Ibid., 101-102.
- ¹⁷⁴Anderson, 87.
- ¹⁷⁵Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs 73, 2 (March/April 1994): 55.
- ¹⁷⁶Harris, 104-105.
- ¹⁷⁷El-Khawas, 182; Simons, 328-329. El-Khawas charges both Reagan and Qaddafi personally with intransigence to the detriment of both nations. Simons portrays Qaddafi as a hapless victim of Western Realpolitik. Sympathetic to third world eccentricities, Simons's blatant disdain for any pursuit of Western policy is distracting not to mention annoying. Nevertheless, a good exposition of events despite patently skewed analysis.
- ¹⁷⁸James H. Wyllie, "Libya -- Regime Stress," Jane's Intelligence Review 7, 12 (December 1995), 554.
- ¹⁷⁹Simons, 275-277.
- ¹⁸⁰Simons, 277.
- ¹⁸¹Wyllie, 555.
- ¹⁸²William H. Lewis, "Libya: The Strategic Realities," US and Libya: Future Policy Choices (Washington, DC: International Security Council, 1988), 17-18.
- ¹⁸³"Record of Proceedings," US and Libya: Future Policy Choices (Washington, DC: International Security Council, 1988), 4, 7.
- ¹⁸⁴George Joffre, "The New Libyan Crisis," Jane's Intelligence Review 4, 6 (June 1992): 261-262.
- ¹⁸⁵John Lyden, "At you services," World Trade 7, 6 (July 1994): 34, 36.
- ¹⁸⁶Eric Bell and Mohammed Finaish, "Arab Maghreb Union - Economic integration in the Arab Maghreb Union," Middle East Executive Reports

18, 11 (November 1995): 10-12.

¹⁸⁷Wyllie, 554-555.

¹⁸⁸Robert Waller, "Libyan Threat Perception," Jane's Intelligence Review 7, 9 (September 1995): 409.

¹⁸⁹Lewis, 24-25.

¹⁹⁰"Qaddafi faces the most serious threat to his survival," Defense & Foreign Affairs 18, 7 (July 1990): 40.

¹⁹¹Ibid., 40.

¹⁹²Waller, 408.

¹⁹³Simons, 246.

¹⁹⁴"Qaddafi faces," 40.

¹⁹⁵Waller, 410.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., 408-409.

¹⁹⁷Simons, 298.

¹⁹⁸Department of State, "Patterns in Global Terrorism: 1994," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 23.

¹⁹⁹Wyllie, 554.

²⁰⁰Waller, 410.

²⁰¹Wyllie, 555.

²⁰²Waller, 409.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE PRESENCE DOCTRINE

Military presence is an abstruse concept. Most people involved in planning or executing foreign policy know of military presence and may even be able to describe it in broad terms, but few understand its appropriate application or comprehend its potential ramifications. Presence is akin to advertising. When an executive of a large popular soft drink company was asked if he thought that advertising was affective and merited continuation, he replied: "I don't know, but I sure wouldn't do without it." That is essentially the prevailing view of military presence. No one in the foreign policy or defense community would forgo "overseas presence," but few can effectively apply this important military instrument of national power.

The conclusion of this thesis is in the positive: Military presence is an effective means of influencing conflict management/resolution in contemporary midlevel conflicts. To some degree, this might seem a blinding flash of the obvious. However, in typical military parlance, this concluding statement is oversimplified and implies palpable decision. Military presence is a tool of influence. The National Military Strategy (NMS) has two overarching strategic concepts. "Power Projection" is applied to "Fight and Win" thereby gaining relatively swift decision. "Overseas Presence" is applied to create influences consistent with US policy thereby achieving suasion.

"Overseas Presence" infers peacetime application of military power; therein lies a salient nuance for effective management/resolution of conflict. The application of presence is not normally found in an Operations Order (OPORD). That is not to say it should not be there and with viable doctrine it could be there. The point is that military presence is more of a standard operating procedure routinely applied to a theater or situation in a long term effort to shape that theater or situation and as appropriate enable decision or suasion.

Mechanics of Suasion (Patterns for measure)

The application of the military instrument to obtain decision is an inherently more felicitous concept for the soldier and the statesman. Literature and theory abound on the topic whereas presence and suasion seem more esoteric. Clausewitz provided a tidy dictum to describe the conventional application of the military for decision: "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."¹ The decision here is obtained through compellence by force or perhaps more precisely coercion. Suasion is effective influence; it has only a perceptible effect. Employing Clausewitz's paradigm elucidates how suasion is achieved.

Presence is an act of influence to compel another to do our will.
Presence is an act of influence to deter another from his will to act.
Presence is an act of influence to reassure another of our will.

As Clausewitz would have it, policy should clearly determine what desired influence is sought. In other words, National Security policy identifies an interest and what instruments of national power should be applied to attain political objectives consistent with that interest.

If the military instrument in the form of presence is chosen, military strategists and foreign policy strategists evaluate all the potential players and determine what influence is required to secure their action or inaction in support of US policy. The mission for presence is to achieve suasion. Therefore, the military strategist must plan presence operations to exercise the appropriate influence. Some may be compelled to action or inaction. Some may be deterred from action or inaction. Some may be reassured of our action or inaction. One point of clarification, compellence is based on the premise that an existing action or inaction is the activity to be changed and deterrence is based on the premise that a specific action or inaction is to be precluded.

Presence is a means to exercise influence and, as such, must be properly applied lest effort be expended creating a wrong or even worse an unknown influence. This is a cause and effect relationship. Military presence causes some effect on the other players in a given theater or situation. That effect is often intangible and presents what Adam Siegel would call the "game of perception" or the perception dilemma.² Presence must create or foster a specific perception that causes a player to act in concert with our intended influence. This is further complicated by actual or potential action. Presence can be the stimulating action or more often it is the harbinger of potential further action. In order to affect another's perception, a means of influence must have capability, communication, and credibility. As with presence, a capability must exist that can either conduct or convey the ability to carry out a certain action. Presence and its intent must be effectively communicated. There are two dimensions that must be

communicated, what and why. Presence must be made known. All players must know what capability is available and what it can do. Purpose must be communicated; why is a capability there. This is where it is imperative that diplomatic and military efforts be coordinated. It is much more sensible and efficient diplomatically to communicate the influence sought than to rely on the visceral assessments of perhaps unsophisticated international players faced with some awesome but ambiguous military capability. The linchpin to influence is credibility. Others must, indeed, believe that a capability can enable latent actions and more importantly that you have the resolve to conduct those actions. Resolve is particularly difficult to convey. Presence alone may be adequate, or perhaps communicating convincing rhetoric, or very often a record of previous action is required to establish such credibility.

There are various means of influence, like economic sanctions or diplomatic isolation. There is also another unorthodox mutant application of the military instrument--covert action to include terrorism by state and nonstate players. Some may argue that it is not a military application. However, if you remove the fanatical trappings and transcend the repulsive sentiments evoked, it is an application of force against a perceived center of gravity or no more than a means to increase cost to an enemy (an adulterated form of attrition). For covert action to yield effective influence, it is not unlike presence; both operate within the same parameters. Covert action must have a capability to infiltrate and conduct operations of the nature threatened. A political group may claim responsibility and communicate

their intentions or desires. Terrorism must have credibility, which is usually established by record of use. A bomb scare creates anxiety, but if it is in the aftermath of a real terrorist bombing, then it can create panic. All this accrues into influence once the perception is established that a people are vulnerable to terrorism. If the perceived cost of fighting it is too high or the potential benefit too low, the target of the influence may succumb or acquiesce. The terrorists have gained influence by compelling or deterring action or inaction.

Presence and terrorism are not the same in many respects, but they both strive to influence through perception. There are two sides to perception that must be considered for effective application. We have already discussed the perception created in the target by the protagonist's capability, communication, and credibility. However, his perception of us must also target his perception of himself. In other words, presence must convey potential action or inaction that will convince a target that his cost would be unacceptable, his benefit negligible, his risk intolerable, or some favorable combination thereof. By weighing into his security equation, presence can affect his variables thereby altering available options due to his perceived feasibility, acceptability, or suitability.

Ultimately, a created perception fostering a desired influence achieves suasion. The policy objective may be anything from ensuring unrestricted access to an area to protecting the territorial integrity of a regional ally to stopping an activity inimical to our interests. Presence demonstrates action or communicates potential action that significantly alters a target state's cost, benefit, and risk. If the

target state realizes that that his policy his untenable, it will be compelled to cease an activity or deterred from ever starting.

Reassurance can work in two ways. First, this influence can reassure all players of our interests. Second, it can reassure an ally that in his policy calculations, he can confidently weigh US commitment into his security equation. Other factors from all instruments of power are at work and must be duly accounted. However, whenever another has a choice and chooses a policy option consistent with US policy, presence in some degree has compelled, deterred or reassured those participants. The theater or situation has been shaped; suasion was achieved.

Suasion Was Achieved with Libya

Whatever policy the US chose with regard to Libya that policy had to consider and appropriately incorporate all instruments of national power. The policy of restraint pursued by the Carter administration was not necessarily an incorrect approach. However, that policy did fail to balance all the instruments of national power. Diplomacy had primacy, but it was limited by the lack of full diplomatic relations and the recurring discord over terrorism. Economic measures were only cursory restrictions on military or potential military equipment exports to Libya. The military instrument was deployed in the Middle East, most notably with the RDJTF, but no cogent strategy designed to use the military with regard to Libya existed. Despite this oversight, the presence of the RDJTF did influence Qaddafi. While not specifically directed at him, he considered it a threat to Pan-Arabism and was further motivated to eradicate Western influence. The point is

that all military presence creates perceptions; it must be assessed and integrated into policy on a global, regional, and individual basis. The Carter administration had military forces representing various capabilities in the region, but intentions toward Libya were not accurately communicated if at all. Furthermore, Qaddafi's perception attached virtually no credibility to US military presence. Therefore, whatever influence did occur was errant and beyond the control of the Carter administration to shape the situation favorably or to enable further action effectively.

Aside from the Reagan administration policy shift to opposition, Reagan undertook significant economic measures and integrated military presence into his overall strategy to isolate, embarrass, and weaken Libya's government. Every administration from Carter to Clinton has considered military intervention in Libya imprudent. However, administrations since Reagan have applied the military instrument in the form of presence as part of an overall strategy. Regardless of suasion, presence was a military application supportive of US policy. Even if the lack of definitive suasion was conceded, at least the military instrument was supporting US policy and not inadvertently acting counter to it.

There is no doubt that military presence affected Qaddafi's perception even though to what degree is debatable. A significant first step was that presence finally attached cost to Qaddafi's policies. Until 1981, Qaddafi supported terrorism and exported subversion with near impunity. Routine military presence became a tangible reminder of the potential costs for continuing his radical policies. Furthermore,

Qaddafi's occasional brushes with the sword of presence clearly communicated its sharpness. Libyan encounters with the US Navy in the Gulf of Sidra were convenient by-products of presence for US policy. OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON was "active presence" specifically designed to reach out and literally touch Qaddafi where he lives. First, military presence enabled the US raid. Second, it was an aggressive intentional action to demonstrate overtly the capabilities of US military presence and indisputably communicate patent US disapproval and propensity to enable further unilateral action. A third disturbing dimension for Qaddafi was that the US was apparently unconstrained by any prospect of Soviet interference. The effect of presence and each particular action was to increase individually and collectively the cost to Qaddafi for inimical policies. Whether he heeded the American message or not, he certainly had to contend with an increased cost variable, both real and potential.

The ends Qaddafi sought became more elusive. Qaddafi did much himself to obstruct his quest for hegemony in the various spheres of influence he had targeted. However, US military presence highlighted his pariah status. Attention from the US military was a constant reminder to Libya's neighbors that to follow Qaddafi was tantamount to lining up against a super power. Qaddafi's other primary foreign policy goal to drive Western influence from the Middle East was most tangibly thwarted by military presence. Instead of Western influence retreating from his aggressive and belligerent policies, those policies were drawing increased Western attention most tangibly in the form of more military presence. Contrary to his desires, Qaddafi was boxed in by Western

military presence with an eye specifically for him. The US maintained a Naval presence of his coast, the US Air Force was routinely deployed to Egypt and Sudan, the RDJTF was a periodic ground presence, and the US military conducted regular joint exercises with Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. The French covered his southern flank with a substantial military presence in Chad. This military presence marginalized his influence with Arab nations willing to negotiate with Israel. Western military presence provided cover for those countries who individually were intimidated by Qaddafi to pursue policies inimical to his wishes. Military presence was not the sole factor defeating Qaddafi's foreign policy goals, but it was the most obvious manifestation of the benefits denied him.

The third variable in any decision, risk, was undoubtedly affected. US and French military presence had established credibility. Integral to this credibility was a clear record of presence ready to enable whatever action was deemed appropriate. Qaddafi could no longer count on Western acquiescence. He was faced with indisputable risk for any radical policy decision.

This thesis concludes that military presence exerted influence. The analysis and the logical review of the impact on Qaddafi's cost, benefit, and risk assessments support an assertion of fact. The assertion that influence existed is actually simple and somewhat academic. However, the question of suasion is still more difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, the analysis identified long term trends in Libyan policy behavior that indicate suasion occurred.

Asserting that deterrence was achieved is the most difficult influence to prove because it requires Libyan inaction be attributed to US action. It is virtually impossible to state with certainty that an act of will that did not occur would have otherwise occurred. In logical terms, proving something exists (just find one example) is much simpler than proving something did or does not exist. However, long-term trends in Qaddafi's foreign policy show deletion or decline of certain activities that would indicate deterrence. There are three trends in Libyan behavior that bode well for deterrence: short-term military encounters in the Gulf of Sidra, military intervention abroad, and terrorism.

Focusing on the microcosm of US-Libyan military encounters in the Gulf there is a trend of short term deterrence. It appears that deterrence can be a perishable commodity that must be periodically renewed. US military forces had been operating in the Gulf for many years. In 1980, there were two incidents of Libyan aircraft harassing USAF aircraft off the coast of Libya. Encounters between US-Libyan aircraft were routine, but each time Qaddafi became more belligerent his aircraft and naval vessels became more aggressive. Libyan aircraft and naval vessels confronted US military presence in 1981, 1986, and 1989. Each time, it cost Qaddafi men and material and the US suffered no losses. After each confrontation, US-Libyan military encounters were either avoided or returned to the previous routine. Qaddafi has not renounced his claim on the Gulf of Sidra, but his avoidance of military confrontation over that issue indicates at least temporary deterrence. This trend is consistent with John Mearsheimer's theory of "conventional

deterrence." Whenever Qaddafi felt he could achieve a "limited aim" by a swift action embarrassing the US, he would attack US forces. As soon as swift action failed and Qaddafi was faced with a battle of attrition for a limited aim with the undaunted military presence of a super power, he was deterred from further action. Mearsheimer also suggests that such deterrence is best maintained by periodic confrontations that clearly demonstrate resolve.³

The case for deterrence of Libyan military intervention is based on a self-evident two decade decline and apparent deletion of that activity by the mid-1990s. In the 1970s, Qaddafi was unhesitant to dispatch troops to Chad or Uganda, or engage in a border skirmish with Egypt. He was also accused of incursions into Sudan. Egypt's strength and alignment with the US as evidenced by US military presence had convinced Qaddafi to withdraw his troops from the Egyptian border by 1988. Intervention other than in Chad quickly became untenable and unproductive. Withdrawal from Chad was slow and painful, but the combined long term pressure of US and French military presence in Chad and throughout the region ensured that Qaddafi could never tip the balance decidedly in his favor. Over the entire span, he was faced with a war of attrition buttressed by Western military presence. Eventually, the cost became too high and the benefits too small; Qaddafi finally withdrew completely in 1994. Thus, his last military intervention ended in failure. He has not started any new military interventions since the 1970s. As of this writing, Qaddafi is not engaged in any military intervention and the indications are that this trend will continue into the foreseeable future. Suasion was achieved. Qaddafi has been

deterred from military intervention largely through long term combined military presence. However, successful suasion could also lead to other undesirable and possibly destabilizing actions. Qaddafi is currently charged with building a chemical weapons facility to deter US conventional arms with a weapon of mass destruction.

Qaddafi has not abandoned terrorism. However, it appears that terrorism targeting Westerners has declined since the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 and the UTA flight 772 in 1989. Unfortunately, due to the intractability of terrorism, it would be mere conjecture to assert that Qaddafi had been deterred from further attacks on Westerners. We cannot accurately speculate what Qaddafi might have done although we can discern effects from what he has ceased doing. Deterrence of terrorism is too tenuous to assert, but the next section will examine how Qaddafi has modified his policies toward terrorism.

Qaddafi has probably not changed his view of the world nor relinquished his foreign policy goals. However, the analysis indicates that he has been compelled to modify his behavior and alter his strategies. Qaddafi is shunned by Islamic fundamentalists, rebuffed by most Arab nations, and distrusted by his African neighbors.⁴ He has no hope of dominating the Muslim world and precious little more hope in the Arab world as Israel moves painfully and inexorably toward acceptance. However, he could conceivably attain hegemony in Africa, but his venue of conquest has changed. Qaddafi now pursues his dream of a "Greater Libya" dominating North Africa indirectly through the Arab Maghreb Union. Military interventions and exporting subversion were not obtaining the desired benefits while at the same time increasing the

cost to Qaddafi with growing Western military presence inimical to his foreign policy goals. He has not forsaken his goal of North African hegemony, but Qaddafi was compelled to modify his behavior and alter his foreign policy strategy. In this long, comprehensive campaign, combined military presence was integral to achieving suasion.

In his drive to "weaken the West," Qaddafi seems to have also been compelled to modify his policies even with regard to terrorism. As noted earlier, there appears to have been a decline in Libyan sponsored terrorism targeting Westerners. However, Qaddafi has continued substantial support to terrorist groups targeting Israel whom he views as a proxy for the West, especially the US. A 1994 report on global terrorism by the US Department of State cites no more acts of terrorism specifically targeting Westerners since the Pan Am and UTA bombings in 1988 and 1989 respectfully. Some sources have even disputed Libyan culpability in these incidents. Qaddafi is only suspected in the disappearance of a Libyan dissident in Egypt in 1993 and continued support for HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad albeit low profile.⁵ The 1986 US raid on Libya (EL DORADO CANYON) clearly made an impression on Qaddafi. The West retaliated in kind for attacks on the West. Exorbitant cost, evaporating benefits, and substantial risk of further action by the US compelled Qaddafi to reevaluate and more closely scrutinize the ramifications of policies inimical to the West. Suasion was achieved with military presence in the vanguard as evidenced by this 1996 press report regarding Qaddafi's dabbling in chemical weapons:

There's less America bashing by Muammar Qaddafi these days - but that doesn't mean Washington is about to let up on the Libyan leader. Defense Secretary William Perry last week suggested that it may take US military force to shut down a suspected chemical weapons

plant Qaddafi is building under a mountain, . . . In the past, the mere prospect of American military action has had an effect: After Washington threatened to bomb Libya's Rabta chemical plant in 1990, Qaddafi shut it down, claiming that a fire had damaged it.⁶

US military presence had one more dimension of influence on Qaddafi. He was reassured of American intentions, resolve, and ability to enable further action. US policy had for some time expressed displeasure with Libyan activities. However, Qaddafi failed to heed American protests until underscored by military presence. The US Naval presence nearly continuously reminded Qaddafi of US policy intentions. The virtual nature of US military presence and willingness to stand and fight when challenged communicated American resolve. The entire record of US-Libyan encounters established credibility. However, US capability and credibility to enable further action was ostentatiously demonstrated by the US raid in 1986 (OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON). That raid left no doubt in Qaddafi's mind that the US would and could act forcefully and expand the scope of applicable force in the theater. He was reassured of US policy and commitment; suasion was achieved.

Analysis of presence in US-Libyan relations revealed that suasion manifested itself in several aspects. One particular theme recurrent in every application of military presence that achieved suasion was protracted operations. The campaign or operation took a long time. Applications of military presence require perseverance. This common characteristic is not surprising. Long term commitment is merely the nature of military applications in peacetime as a means of influence as opposed to military applications in wartime as a means of coercion. This is a salient difference between suasion and decision. The American way of war is to apply overwhelming force in a supreme

effort for swift decision. This idiosyncrasy of American military culture is one of the reasons that military presence is an abstruse concept. The general perception for Americans is that military solutions are quick, so it is difficult to accept much less plan military solutions like presence as protracted campaigns.

Corollary: Third Party Suasion

Another conclusion drawn from the analysis is a corollary to the thesis: "third party suasion." Military presence is not a directional vehicle that can be applied to only one target without exponential ramifications throughout a region and possibly the globe. Like electromagnetic waves, military presence emanates to all within range and that range with today's high speed information technology is essentially global. Any players aware of US military presence anywhere in the world can intercept their own perceptions. That perception often has innate influence, hence "third party suasion."

A. Allies Reassured of US Commitment

The most common form of "third party suasion" is reassurance to American allies. While reassurance is a recurring goal of military presence, any effort to reassure a particular ally is duly noted by all American friends and allies. Any nation that relies on or cooperates with the US for its security interests will be acutely interested in any test of American resolve. When US military presence failed to support the Shah of Iran, Saudi Arabia and others in the region lost faith in US capability and credibility to deal with the growing Soviet and Iranian threats in the region. Only after a robust response of enhanced

military presence to the attack of South Yemen on North Yemen did Saudi Arabia regain confidence in US commitment to the region. Presumably, others in the region were also watching and ultimately reassured by the US response to South Yemen in 1979 and the establishment of the RDJTF. Again in 1986, the US Navy escorted reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in and out of the Persian Gulf in OPERATION EARNEST WILL. This operation solidly demonstrated US commitment to the region thereby reassuring friends and foes of our resolve.

B. Hesitant Partners Compelled to Go Along

Another form of "third party suasion" was compulsion of hesitant partners. Contrary to a finite perception that the West blindly follows a US lead, many American allies more often than not have earnest reservations about US initiatives. Military presence is a convenient vehicle for the US to unilaterally implement early phases of certain policies. It underscores US commitment, subtly indicates the direction intended by US policy, and above all retains the initiative. Reticent allies will realize that to be party to a solution they must cooperate with the vanguard. France encouraged to intervene in Chad in 1983 by proactive US increases in military presence that threatened France's perceived primacy in North Africa. European powers were reluctant in every phase of US policy toward Libya. Each confrontation with Libya compelled European allies to cooperate further with US initiatives in an effort to moderate unilateral US policy.

C. Other Potential Aggressors Deterred

In the same way that other nations amicable to the US are reassured by demonstrations of American resolve, those inimical to the US can be deterred. Whenever US military presence forcefully influences a belligerent, "third party suasion" may deter other would-be aggressors by the latent consequences exhibited and enabled by US military presence. The Reagan administration certainly intended to make Libya an example of the inevitable fate for a pariah state. Although only conjecture, US military presence concentrated on Libya may have deterred other "rejectionist" states from continuing some aspects of their radical policies toward Israel and the West. It is impossible to state what terrorist groups might have been deterred by US pressure on Qaddafi in the form of military presence. However, it is certain that they had to contend with the specter of American reprisals for their activities whenever US military presence was in their realm.

Appropriate Means

Military presence is a viable vehicle to achieve suasion. The US can use suasion to manage and resolve contemporary mid-level conflicts. However, military presence must have the appropriate means. It must be joint and combined. It must be centered on the concept of enabling increased influence, greater presence, and power projection. Finally, the US must adequately consider force structure and budget implications in order to maintain presence in the vanguard of peacetime military applications.

A. Joint and Combined Presence

Advocating joint and combined military presence operations is not a cursory salute to a current fad. The foreseeable future appears to be without global conflict. The imminent challenges will be managing and resolving regional conflicts. Military presence will be the preferred option because nations can wield measured applications of force within peacetime parameters. Joint and combined operations both exploit and enhance military presence; they are mutually empowering. Nations engaged in combined missions find military presence well suited for their purposes. It is a viable military application that can exercise perseverance without incurring obligation. Combined operations appear to be the wave of the future for two reasons.

First, fiscal constraints are forcing many American allies to pare defense capabilities. These reductions are making unilateral actions nearly impossible for many countries. Combined operations offer not only safety in numbers but enough numbers to conduct effective operations. "For sustained, expeditionary missions that will offer an enemy the prospect--and reality--of greater force being held in reserve, NATO's multilateral operations need US carrier power, amphibious and sealift capabilities, and Aegis long-range antiair component."⁷ Similar statements could be made about US ground and air power. The point is that economy may dictate that combined presence operations are the sole option for many countries and any multilateral endeavor will look to the US for weight and depth.

Second, in the wake of the bipolar security system sustained by the Cold War, the world has resumed an extensive experiment in

collective security. Collective security is attractive for several reasons. It offers legitimacy and political cover. However, what is more important, it can provide relief from competing in cost prohibitive regional balance of power systems. In a collective security system, nations with minimal defense capabilities can call on the weight of the entire system to counter regional aggressors. While there appears to be widespread support for such a system, most are still reluctant to commit to the collective application of force. However, military presence is an ideal application of measured force in a peacetime context. The prominent advantage of military presence is that management and resolution of conflict does not seek quick suasion. Participants not only have time for political maneuvering but can also postpone substantial commitment until more favorable circumstances prevail.

Aside from being mandated, the joint approach to military presence is sensible for two reasons. A joint force is greater than the sum of its services and the concept of enabling is the linchpin to both military presence and power projection. Admiral William A. Owens has stated that there are two approaches to joint operations: specialization and synergism. Both have advantages, but he advocates synergism because it "blends particular service strengths on a mission basis to provide higher combat output than either any single service or the sum of individual service contributions could produce." However, Admiral Owens provides an even more important and crucial reason to "embrace synergism because it enshrines enabling."⁸

B. Enabling

The concept of enabling is the keystone to military presence. This concept was first advanced in the US Navy's 1992 White Paper "...From the Sea." Enabling is the concept that each service, in addition to accomplishing its traditional missions, "ought to operate continually with the purpose of aiding and facilitating operations of the other service components that will be involved in conflict."⁹ Military presence is the epitome of enabling. All military presence operations are designed to communicate latent capability. Whatever service(s) are conducting presence, they should be prepared with contingencies for escalation. Military presence is designed to achieve suasion, but the threat of forced decision must be innate to any effective presence operation. This implicit threat represents the military instrument as a whole, which will be a joint approach. Colin S. Gray provides a synopsis that brilliantly captures the essence of both synergism and enabling:

It is true that because the seat of political purpose must rest on land, seapower, airpower, and spacepower typically will play enabling roles, which is to say roles that enable conflict to be conducted successfully on land. Contrary to the apparent implication of that point, however, advantage at sea, in the air, or in space quite literally may provide a decisive edge in war overall.¹⁰

Several examples are provided to elucidate enabling in military presence. Spacepower is omnipresent and can enable any operation. Seapower can enable any form of power projection by controlling the maritime flank of any target. Airpower can enable any operation by ensuring at a minimum air superiority. Landpower can enable presence by controlling or prepositioning vital staging bases and access points. In

the grand scheme, military presence can enable diplomatic and economic measures.

C. Force Structure and Budget Implications

While this thesis has concluded military presence is a viable vehicle for defense policy, there are perilous force structure and budget implications looming. The National Security Strategy (NSS) is grounded in "engagement" and the National Military Strategy (NMS) has rightly answered the call with a robust strategy for "overseas presence." Unfortunately, the current reality is fiscally reduced military forces able to conduct presence. At a time when the US capability to deal with more than one simultaneous Medium Regional Crisis (MRC) is inexorably diminishing, the primary peacetime military means for managing and resolving midlevel conflicts, "overseas presence," is receding from its global reaches. The challenge facing defense and security strategists is determining an adequate and appropriate force structure that can employ presence to effectively manage and resolve midlevel conflicts precluding a scenario of multiple MRCs beyond US capability. Mahan's admonition is timely: Retain enough capability to allow the nation time to bring its entire wealth and power to bear.¹¹

Framework for Presence Doctrine

The NSS and NMS accept and advocate military presence, but there is no overarching doctrine for its formulation and implementation. Effective application demands a cogent doctrine and long-term strategy that is not only joint but interagency in nature. Military presence is

inextricably intertwined with diplomacy and vital to the economic engine. However, policymakers seldom plan and employ presence until a crisis is imminent. During periods of violent peace, the US cannot afford to not have military presence integrated into an interagency approach.

Phased Operations (not necessarily sequenced)

Doctrine for military presence requires further research and development. This thesis recommends the following framework for phased operations: Virtual presence, Passive presence, Enabling presence, and Active presence. Strategists should develop each phase based on a holistic application of all instruments of national power. These phases are not necessarily sequenced. In practice, multiple phases would operate simultaneously. If anything, each phase would build on the others.

Virtual Presence:

Virtual presence is the mere existence of a capability. This phase builds on the concept advanced by the US Air Force White Paper, "Global Presence" (1995). A capability exists, but it is not deployed except for space assets, which are omnipresent. Communication relies solely on diplomacy. Credibility relies solely on reputation. While many nations acknowledge US capability, suasion is difficult because diplomacy and reputation must create a perception consistent with the influence sought. US policy would best employ this phase to reassure allies who are predisposed to American interests.

Passive Presence:

Passive presence is similar to the concept of "overseas presence" advocated by the NMS. A capability is deployed and its presence communicates intent and commitment. Persistent presence establishes credibility. Routine combined exercises, portcalls, visits, and exchanges are typical examples of passive presence. This phase is crucial to combined operations and building interoperability. It will "facilitate organizing coalitions for collective defense."¹² Again, the best employment is to reassure allies of US commitment. However, perseverance in passive presence can feasibly deter weak or hesitant aggressors. Compellence is difficult without targeting particular nations for a specific perception.

Enabling Presence:

Enabling presence is the vanguard of any peacetime military application. Enabling should be a common thread in all military presence operations. Regardless of scope or degree, strategists should plan every application of presence with the inherent capability to enable enhanced presence or power projection. Prudence dictates that escalation be a perpetual branch or sequel. This is the pinnacle of joint synergism. Each service conducting presence in a particular theater must ensure that its operations enable other services in entry, exit, or complementary operations. Presence must communicate a specific perception in each unique situation to achieve suasion. Enabling presence gives strategists and commanders the latitude to tailor military applications to the needs of dynamic theaters. Enabling

presence has the capacity to reassure, deter, and compel. However, in practice, reassurance and deterrence are the most likely forms of suasion.

Active Presence:

Active presence is an application of measured military force in that gray part of the spectrum between peace and war. Commanders must prepare for the possibility of active presence in all applications of presence. Active presence can be intentional with ulterior contingencies or transpire from coincidental confrontation. Limited strikes, like the 1986 US raid on Libya or the 1993 Tomahawk strike on Iraq, are the most prominent forms of active presence. Such applications are conducive for the credibility vital to deterrence. Active presence should achieve any form of suasion or it should be poised to transition to open hostility and secure decision. Compellence is difficult, but active presence is most likely to compel by indisputable evidence of the high cost, diminished benefit, and significant risk for continuing inimical activities.

Military presence is an effective means of influencing conflict management/resolution in contemporary midlevel conflicts. In fact, during periods of relative global peace, it will be the primary application of the military instrument of national power. Future perils dictate that the US must not neglect military capabilities designed for decision. However, military presence is vital to shaping the international scene in the interim and can postpone or even preclude future crises. Swift decision is desirable, but suasion is a more

acceptable option. Sun Tzu put it best: "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."¹³

Endnotes

¹Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

²Adam B. Siegel, To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises: The Role of US Naval Forces (Alexandria, VA: Center for naval Analyses, 1995), 3.

³John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 63-66. His theory is that the efficacy of deterrence relies on the strategies available to the attacker. Mearsheimer delineates three possible offensive strategies: "attrition, blitzkrieg, and limited aims." All three consider weaponry and balance of forces. Attrition infers protracted commitment and high costs; deterrence is most probable when attackers are faced with attrition. Blitzkrieg implies swift victory by some superiority; deterrence is most likely to fail when attackers perceive a quick decision. The first two strategies seek total defeat. While limited aims strategy only seeks a limited goal, a battle strategy for attaining the limited goal requires a truncated blitzkrieg or attrition. Again, if attackers have capacity for a blitzkrieg to attain the objective and then shift to defense, deterrence usually fails. If an attacker faces a battle of attrition to achieve the objective, deterrence usually succeeds. "Threat of war of attrition is the bedrock of conventional deterrence."

⁴James Wyllie. "Libya - Regime Stress," Jane's Intelligence Review 7, no. 12 (December 1995): 555.

⁵"Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994," (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 1995), 22-23.

⁶Richard J. Newman, "The Qaddafi Question," US News and World Report 20, no. 15 (15 April 1996): 15.

⁷Alexander Wooley, "A European Navy Far from Home," US Naval Institute Proceedings 122, no. 3 (March 1996): 54.

⁸William A. Owens, "Living Jointness," Joint Force Quarterly 3 (Winter 1993/1994): 7-8.

⁹Ibid., 10.

¹⁰Colin S. Gray, "The Limits of Seapower: Joint Warfare and Unity of Conflict," Joint Force Quarterly 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 54-55.

¹¹Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1918), 30.

¹²David S. Yost, "The Future of US Overseas Presence," Joint Force Quarterly 8 (Summer 1995): 72.

¹³Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

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