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14. ABSTRACT Perhaps the greatest psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign is the one in which the PSYOP community has exalted the effectiveness of their trade as a combat multiplier and peacetime contributor in the pursuit of national and military objectives. This often one-sided viewpoint dismisses the difficulty of PSYOP assessment and only exacerbates the key problem of which the total PSYOP program suffers. The Combatant Commander needs full disclosure of the facts based on the PSYOP principle of truthfulness. The reader is introduced to the doctrinal definitions of PSYOP and Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) and examples of PSYOP used in Operations ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. The thesis for this research paper is that PSYOP measures of effectiveness (MOE) are a significant problem that the Combatant Commander will need to address in planning and the actual conduct of war. The purpose of this paper is to assist the Combatant Commander in gaining a greater understanding of PSYOP MOE by exploring: 1) the scope of the problem, 2) the methods and procedures used to address the problem, and 3) four broad recommendations.					
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PSYOP AND THE PROBLEM OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)
FOR THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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18 May 2004

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Abstract

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The reader is introduced to the doctrinal definitions of PSYOP and Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) and examples of PSYOP used in Operations ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. The thesis for this research paper is that PSYOP measures of effectiveness (MOE) are a significant problem that the Combatant Commander will need to address in planning and the actual conduct of war. The purpose of this paper is to assist the Combatant Commander in gaining a greater understanding of PSYOP MOE by exploring: 1) the scope of the problem, 2) the methods and procedures used to address the problem, and 3) four broad recommendations.

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INTRODUCTION

To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.

Sun Tzu

Perhaps the greatest psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign is the one in which the PSYOP community has exalted the effectiveness of their trade as a combat multiplier and peacetime contributor in the pursuit of national and military objectives. Members of the PSYOP community oftentimes present a slightly one-sided portrayal of PSYOPS as “an extremely imaginative and versatile force multiplier”¹ despite undisclosed shortcomings manifested in an inadequate system of assessment. Their upbeat message is convincingly conveyed in military journals, periodicals, briefings, and a plethora of joint and service publications. The 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG) even published a 20-page brochure with full color glossies to vaunt the effectiveness of PSYOP support to NATO’s resolution of the Kosovo crisis during Operation ALLIED FORCE.² A similar brochure detailing PSYOP support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan is nearing the final stages for mass production and distribution. There is no question that PSYOP is a proven combat multiplier, but the Combatant Commander needs full disclosure of the facts based on the PSYOP principle of truthfulness.

A former Commanding General of Special Operations Command, General Henry Hugh Shelton, is credited with the adage “do not confuse enthusiasm with capability.” It is the opinion of the writer that muted thoughts on the difficulty of PSYOP assessment only exacerbate the key problem of which the total PSYOP program suffers. The thesis for this research paper is intended to show that PSYOP measures of effectiveness (MOE) is a significant problem that the Combatant Commander will need to address in planning and the

actual conduct of war. With this in mind, the purpose of this paper is to assist the Combatant Commander in gaining a greater understanding of PSYOP MOE by exploring: 1) the scope of the problem, 2) the methods and procedures being used to address the problem, and 3) four broad recommendations as a result of this research. A common understanding of just exactly what is PSYOP is necessary before delving into the morass of PSYOP MOE.

WHAT IS PSYOP?

*There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind.
In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind.*

Napoleon Bonaparte

The layperson often uses the terms Information Operations (IO) and psychological operations interchangeably and with little knowledge of the distinction between the two. Military professionals fluent in the dialect of operational art understand this distinction. PSYOP is a subset of IO and therefore, the two are not semantically equivalent. Joint Publication 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations” defines IO as “actions taken to affect an adversary’s information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.”³ Joint Publication 3-13 further divides IO into two major subdivisions: offensive and defensive information operations. PSYOP falls into the category of offensive information operations. Joint Publication 3-13 defines offensive IO as:

Offensive IO is the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision-makers to achieve or promote specific objectives. These capabilities and activities include, but are not limited to, operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, physical attack and/or destruction, and special information operations, and could include computer network attack.⁴

The definition for PSYOP can be found in Joint Publication 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations”:

Psychological operations are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.⁵

IO and PSYOP are integral to military operations planned and conducted by the Combatant or subordinate Joint Force Commander. IO and PSYOP are used to shape the battlefield at all levels of warfare. The three categories of military PSYOP, strategic, operational, and tactical, are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of U.S. military, political, and economic power and resolve. When used effectively, PSYOP can reduce the efficiency of enemy forces and can create dissidence and disaffection among their ranks. The categories of military PSYOP from Joint Publication 3-53 are consolidated in Table 1. The lines of distinction between the different levels continue to become blurred by tactical actions conducted by “strategic corporals” with strategic implications. But nonetheless, it is the operational level that is the primary focus of this research effort.

Strategic PSYOP	International information activities conducted by U.S. Government (USG) agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of U.S. goals and objectives during peacetime and in times of conflict. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense (DOD) assets.
Operational PSYOP	Conducted across the range of military operations, including during peacetime, in a defined operational area to promote the effectiveness of the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) campaigns and strategies.
Tactical PSYOP	Conducted in the area assigned a tactical commander across the range of military operations to support the tactical mission against opposing forces.

Figure 1. Three categories of PSYOP⁶

Each military service has the inherent capability to support the geographic Combatant or Joint Force Commander's PSYOP objectives. Aircraft, ships, and other military equipment can have psychological effects on an enemy through presence, weapons employment, or delivery of products like leaflets and radio and television broadcasts. A look at European Command's (EUCOM's) Operation ALLIED FORCE and Central Command's (CENTCOM's) Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan will acquaint the reader with some typical PSYOP activities.

PSYOP IN OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

Killing the enemy's courage is as vital as killing his troops.

Carl Von Clausewitz

On 24 March 1999 Operation Plan (OPLAN) 10601 "ALLIED FORCE" was executed by Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, as a NATO contingency response plan to end Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. Operation NOBLE ANVIL was the American component of the NATO response to promote stability, cooperation, and security in the Kosovo region. A Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) was established to plan and execute psychological operations for Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL.

The JPOTF designed a PSYOP campaign consisting of information disseminated by leaflets, handbills, posters, and radio and television broadcasts. The JPOTF "mission was to get the message of truth to the diverse masses, which included Serb military, police forces in Kosovo, and the civilian population in Belgrade as well as in the small towns and villages throughout the remainder of Serbia, and to Kosovo refugees in Albania and Macedonia."⁷

PSYOP was a combat multiplier in NOBLE ANVIL and a peacetime contributor for Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE humanitarian relief operations in Albania.

During the 78-day air campaign, the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group produced over 40 different kinds of leaflets for distribution. Special operations MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft airdropped over 100 million leaflets over Serbia. Air Force B-52 and F-16 aircraft airdropped 4.5 million more leaflets using MK-129 leaflet bombs.⁸ Special operations EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft transmitted both radio and television broadcasts aimed to counter the distorted reports to the Serbian populace by their own government. Commando Solo blanketed Belgrade and Northern Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and southern Serbia with a valuable antidote of "Allied Voice Radio and Television" to counter Serb propaganda.

The Joint Task Force Commander, Admiral J.O. Ellis, sent out an appreciation letter dated 14 July 1999 thanking those soldiers, airmen and civilians that served in and supported the key role psychological operations played throughout Operation ALLIED FORCE. In his letter he stated, "Although difficult to measure, I truly believe your efforts had a significant impact on the success of the operation."⁹ Central to the purpose and focus of this research is Admiral Ellis' words "difficult to measure." Before going off on that tangent let's turn our attention to psychological operations in Afghanistan.

PSYOP IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

One cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public opinion, which is tremendously molded by the press and other forms of propaganda.

General Douglas MacArthur, US Army

On 7 October 2001, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Afghanistan (OEF-AFG) commenced combat offensive actions under CENTCOM's Commander General Tommy Franks. OEF-AFG was the American military response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist

attacks on the United States of America. The military objectives included the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure, the capture of Al-Qaeda leaders and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.

On 15 October 2001, leaflet drops began to fall over a country considered by some as “ideal” for psychological operations.¹⁰ PSYOP missions were an integral part of OEF-AFG. “The PSYOP radio and leaflet missions have become major, major vehicles in DOD’s effort to counter the information monopoly once held by the Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban faction.”¹¹ A 30 July 2002 update briefing¹² received from the 4th POG exalts the accomplishments of U.S. psychological warfare operators in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Their presentation professed the delivery of more than 80 million leaflets and broadcast of 121 radio programs. More than 5,000 radios have been provided to the Afghan people and US broadcasting brings music to people for the first time in more than six years.¹³ Today’s semi-permissive environment affords the opportunity to augment the PSYOP effort with a ground-based radio station, Radio Malumat, and a local Sulh newspaper.

PSYOP themes and “messages include calls for Taliban defections; assurances that the U.S. is intervening in Afghanistan to help its people, not to attack them; and explanations of how the Taliban and Osama bin Laden are oppressing the country and forcing a corrupt form of Islam on the Afghan citizens.”¹⁴ It is almost impossible to know how many people are tuning in to the radio broadcasts or reading U.S. leaflets, but there is anecdotal evidence to suggest the message is being heard.¹⁵ The Pentagon has gotten feedback from the Northern Alliance that the messages are getting through. Before reviewing the anecdotal evidence let’s explore the concept of measure of effectiveness, or more commonly called MOE.

MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)

The truth is not simply what you think it is; it is the circumstances in which it is said, to who, what, and how it is said.

Vaclav Havel

PSYOP MOE is the non-kinetic equivalent of battle damage assessment (BDA) for kinetic weapons. Joint Publication 1-02, “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” emphasizes the general importance of measures of effectiveness as a prerequisite to the performance of combat assessment. Reports on how many leaflets dropped or how many hours of radio and television programming broadcasted do not equate to a measure of effectiveness. Turning once again to Joint Publication 3-53, “a PSYOP measure of effectiveness provides a systematic means of assessing and reporting the impact a PSYOP program (series of PSYOP products and actions) has on specific foreign TAs (target audiences).”¹⁶ Therefore, conveying the message is only a small part of the PSYOP MOE equation. After the message is transmitted, the real challenge lies in measuring 1) if the intended message was received, and 2) if the desired impact on emotions, motives, attitudes, objective reasoning and behaviors was achieved on the targeted audience. This is the challenge that has the IO and PSYOP communities perplexed.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

To seduce the enemy’s soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter.

Flavius Vegetius Renatus, c. 378 AD

First, the cause and effect assessment of human emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behaviors of organizations, groups or individuals is simply no easy task.

Combat leaders have enough difficulty in assessing the human behavior and motives of their own troops, much less that of enemy's fielded forces possibly in denied territory.

Secondly, the assessment of MOE is largely an ad hoc ability shared between the JPOTF and J-2 intelligence function without clear distinction of ultimate responsibility. The collaborative effort relies heavily on the linkage of "anecdotal" evidence tied to impact indicators and PSYOP objectives in order to gauge PSYOP effectiveness.

"By determining the measures in the planning process, PSYOP planners ensure that organic assets and PSYOP enablers, such as intelligence, are identified to assist in evaluating MOEs for the execution of psychological operations. Evaluating the effectiveness may take weeks or longer given the inherent difficulties and complexity of determining cause and effect relationships with respect to human behavior."¹⁷

A third problem stems from the inability to determine if the intended message sent is the one that was received. Despite leaflets hitting the target city of Belgrade, a critical Steve Collins argued the intended message was amiss where:

...the psychological themes were often heavy handed and clumsily packaged. These qualities caused many Serbs to be turned off by NATO's information efforts. Betraying an astonishingly shallow knowledge of the political and cultural dynamics of the region, NATO propagandists made the mistake in many of their products of tying the Serbian desire to push the ethnic Albanians from Kosovo to a perceived loyalty to Milosevic. Instead, many Serbs agreed with Milosevic's goals in Kosovo, but not necessarily with his methods of carrying out his policies in Serbia. Rather than trying to widen the gap between the Serbian people and Milosevic by acknowledging a legitimate right of Yugoslavia to govern Kosovo while, at the same time, condemning the methods used by the minions of Milosevic as barbaric, NATO's message was one of widespread condemnation of nearly all Serbs.¹⁸

Which brings us to the fourth issue of timeliness. Mr. Steve Collins' article is dated 30 May 2000, almost one year after NATO suspended air strikes on 10 June 1999. More often than not, the full benefit of the PSYOP campaign is not realized until after military operations have already subsided. This is way too late for the Combatant or Joint Force

Commander decision-maker. A continuous PSYOP MOE assessment process is critical in order for the Commander to revise his situation estimate or adjust operations as necessary. Timely adjustments may be necessary for PSYOP products, the PSYOP plan, or the entire war effort.

A fifth trouble spot is the development - or the lack of - PSYOP MOE in the planning phase. “Development of MOE and their associated impact indicators (derived from measurable supporting PSYOP objectives) must be done during the planning process.”¹⁹ A telephone interview with two former JPOTF PSYOP officers indicates MOE were never developed to support ALLIED FORCE or OEF-AFG OPLANs. Major Wayne Bergeron, 8th PSYOP Battalion officer said of OEF-AFG PSYOP, “...there was never a separate document produced on MOE. What did occur was that various MOE were collected based on the PSYOP objectives and PSYOP supporting objectives – but this occurred after the fact as operations were being conducted.”²⁰

A sixth area emanates from scant attention paid to the specific topic of PSYOP MOE in joint doctrine. Of 67 pages devoted to Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations in Joint Publication 3-53, only seven lines of text are reserved for its amplification. The importance of PSYOP MOE is relegated to footnote buried in a parenthetical sub-heading or “bowleg.”²¹

A seventh point is derived from a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force report²² that is highly critical of EC-130E Commando Solo in ALLIED FORCE operations. The report zeroed in on “receivability, receipt and receptivity” as PSYOP MOE challenges for Commando Solo radio and television broadcasts.²³ A telephone interview with a former Commander of the 193rd Special Operations Squadron concurred with the report’s findings by saying “our greatest challenge is in determining whether our signal is being received.”²⁴

Lastly, is the enduring nature of the PSYOP MOE problem set. The bewildering problem of measuring PSYOP effectiveness distinct from other combat multipliers is not a new one. Over three decades ago the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, now DARPA) teamed up with Human Sciences Research, Inc. to address the “high priority pressing problems” of PSYOP effectiveness in the Vietnam War.

The primary objectives of the contracted effort are to develop and validate criteria by which to measure the effectiveness of psyop programs, to develop and assist in the establishment of a system of evaluation that can be used by psyoperators, both U.S. and Vietnamese, and to help develop broad theoretical principles which will provide a general foundation for the conduct of psyops in an insurgent environment wherever it may occur.²⁵

The PSYOP MOE issue has confounded the PSYOP community for at least 30 years. So just what are we doing about it?

CURRENT METHODS AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM

The real target in war is the mind of the enemy command, not the bodies of his troops. If we operate against his troops it is fundamentally for the effect that action will produce on the mind and will of the commander; indeed, the trend of warfare and development of new weapons-aircraft and tanks-promise to give us increased and more direct opportunities of striking at this psychological target.

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 1944

On 10 January 2004 U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) acquired oversight of the Defense Department’s information operations and global command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. On this day President George W. Bush signed Change 2 to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) that identified USSTRATCOM as the Department of Defense (DOD) advocate for integrating the military effects of information operations. In a testimony before the House Armed Services committee on 5 February 2004, Air Force General Richard

Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), said the change reflects “the U.S. military’s increased emphasis on a global view.”

USSTRATCOM by no means has taken this new responsibility lightly. Major Glen Wiggy, STRATCOM Chief, Network and Analysis Branch, provided a sneak preview of STRATCOM’s intent to develop IO effectiveness manuals comparable to existing Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals for kinetic weapon systems.²⁶ USSTRATCOM/PR, Policy, Resources, and Requirements Directorate, will host an IO Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (IO-JMEM) working group on 17-18 May 2004 to initiate the effort. “The purpose of the meeting is to establish a working body for promoting, developing, and utilizing IO tools, models, and measures of effectiveness similar to the conventional JMEM already established under the Joint Technical Coordination Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG-ME).”²⁷ It is in this venue that USSTRATCOM will unveil their IO

quantitative effectiveness model concept that will eventually provide Combatant Commanders with expanded courses of action utilizing non-kinetic weapon systems. IO JMEM will also contribute to Predictive Battlespace Awareness initiatives supporting DOD’s transformational goals of Operational Net Assessment.




Figure 2. STRATCOM’s PSYOP MOE Model²⁸

Not to be outdone by USSTRATCOM is US Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) Special Operations Forces (SOF) PSYOP modernization initiatives directed by Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld's FY 2004-2009 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). His guidance specifically tasked USSOCOM to create and modernize a Strategic PSYOP force based on recommendations contained in the DSB report mentioned earlier. The CJCS General Myers then appointed Commander, USSOCOM (COMSOC) as lead agent for Joint PSYOP doctrine.²⁹ COMSOC then published a Joint Psychological Forces (JPF 2020) vision statement stating his intentions to review Service PSYOP doctrine for consistency with Joint PSYOP doctrine; recommend PSYOP policy guidance to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and U.S. Military Commanders as required; develop PSYOP concepts to support national security objectives; and, in conjunction with the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Information Operations (DDIO), function as the proponent for all joint PSYOP equipment acquisitions, equipment issues, and methods of dissemination of PSYOP products.³⁰ USSOCOM's efforts are intended to synchronize the national level application of Strategic Influence with that of the Combatant Commander's regional Information Operations (IO) campaigns.

A by-product of USSOCOM's JPF 2020 is a contract chartered by MITRE Corporation to develop a methodology for calculating PSYOP MOE. The MITRE project is led by Ms. Virginia "Ginger" Grimes. Ms. Grimes has completed a draft proposal³¹ of her work describing an innovative solution for the difficult and complex PSYOP MOE task. Her Value Focused Thinking approach is based on two components: 1) Decision Analysis techniques and 2) inputs from three Subject Matter Experts or SMEs. Appendix A of her paper describes Value Focused Thinking as a Decision Analysis technique that is appropriate

“for providing commanders with the necessary decision insight” to the PSYOP MOE dilemma. Three SMEs with over 60 years of experience in PSYOP at the strategic, operational, tactical and interagency levels provided the “value components” necessary for a contingency-based PSYOP MOE. “This is a more difficult area than peacetime applications, but they felt that more combatant commanders require MOE results during times of conflict to gauge follow-on activities.”³² The Value Focused Thinking PSYOP methodology will make its opening debut at STRATCOM’s IO-JMEM Conference mentioned earlier. “The methodology has been demonstrated and shown to produce results that are consistent with PSYOP action assessments by the SMEs” touts Ms. Grimes in her proposal paper.

There exists within the PSYOP community two camps with differing viewpoints on how to solve the PSYOP MOE conundrum. There are those who believe the objective methodology currently pursued by STRATCOM and USSOCOM is the way to go. The opposing camp favors more subjective measures like surveys and “anecdotal” evidence for PSYOP effectiveness. First let’s briefly explore a survey recently completed in Afghanistan.

The 4th POG administered a survey to measure the effectiveness of Radio Malumat and the Sulh newspaper in a wartime environment between 11 June and 30 August 2003. A 4th POG briefing³³ hails this survey as the first scientific effort to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP media. The briefing is summarized in the next two paragraphs:

The survey was designed to determine: 1) the effectiveness of Radio Malumat broadcasts and the Sulh newspaper in reaching the Afghan people and affecting their attitudes and behaviors; 2) changes that should be made in the content, broadcast or distribution of both Radio Malumat and the Sulh newspaper to enhance their effectiveness;

and 3) the extent and characteristics of popular support for various prominent Afghan leaders.

The survey instrument was comprised of 36 questions and partially based on the Common Ground Productions (CGP) Rapid Survey Method: A New Survey Tool For Broadcasters in War Zones (www.cgponline.org/research/index.htm). The survey was field tested in Afghanistan twice before the final survey was administered. The survey was completed by native speakers in Dari and Pashto who administered 2905 surveys in seven Afghan cities. Security concerns prevented inclusion of other population centers.

The survey concluded that Radio Malumat was listened to by a substantial number of Afghans of all ethnic groups, genders and professions. Unlike Commando Solo in ALLIED FORCE, Radio Malumat was determined to have a weak signal which limited its audience to those individuals within range of nearby transmitters located in the vicinity of Kabul and Kandahar. The survey indicated a loyal audience with a strong belief and understanding of the message transmitted. The radio audience was determined to have a particular fondness for tuning in between 2000 and 2200 hours in the evening. One can begin to see the benefit of this kind of information to the Combatant Commander. The Commander may want to increase the transmission power in order to extend the “aural reach” to other major urban areas or target significant programming messages between 2000-2200 hours to influence the greatest number of people.

Another subjective method for measuring PSYOP effectiveness is through anecdotal evidence or reporting. This is an unscientific method for evaluating PSYOP MOE and yet it is the most prevalent form used throughout the PSYOP community. MOE is determined by the revelation of impact indicators specifically linked to PSYOP objectives. Anecdotal

reporting comes from virtually anywhere: raw intelligence reports, tactical PSYOP units in the field, open source media, internet, and prisoner of war debriefings to name a few.

An example of anecdotal evidence in an Afghanistan scenario might go something like this. The PSYOP objective is to influence the Taliban to disperse from the Tora Bora region. A combination of leaflets and radio broadcast are used to disseminate a tersely worded message targeted at the Taliban to disperse from the Tora Bora caves or succumb to bombing within the next 48 hours. After perusing imagery intelligence (IMINT) reports, the PSYOP officer takes notice that the “IR hotspots in the Tora Bora region have disappeared” and declares PSYOP has been effective. But is it really? Nonetheless, this is how it is done.

Another example of anecdotal evidence comes from ALLIED FORCE. “One of the best impact indicators which demonstrates effectiveness, is enemy counter-propaganda.”³⁴ Serb civil-defense headquarters put out warnings to avoid touching leaflets, claiming that they were booby trapped with bio-chemical agents. “If they didn’t notice, they wouldn’t complain, right?” said a former Operations Officer of the 4th POG.³⁵

Our attention is now drawn to the doctrinal void in PSYOP MOE. The path of this research led to the desk of doctrine writer SFC Robert Kellogg who is a nine-year veteran of PSYOP in Bosnia (Operation DELIBERATE FORGE), ALLIED FORCE, and OEF-AFG. SFC Kellogg has written, as an ad hoc fix to the shortcoming in joint doctrine, an article³⁶ (to be published this summer) emphasizing the importance of MOE development in PSYOP. Impetus for writing the paper was his extreme frustration trying to implement “vague, unclear and incomplete plans.” SFC Kellogg stated, “I wrote the paper because doctrine, at this point, does not clearly articulate to the level of detail I think is what a well thought out PSYOP plan would look like.” The circulation of “unapproved gouge” is quite

common in the military. In this case it is helping to fill in where joint doctrine is devoid. As mentioned above, SFC Kellogg's "white paper" has been submitted for publication in the United States Army Special Warfare Center and School Special Warfare magazine.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The enemy bombards our front not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen also throw down leaflets which are intended to kill our soul.

Field Marshall Paul Von Hindenburg, 1847-1934

At the outset, this research project never purported to derive a magical formula to solve the PSYOP MOE problem. Rather the intent was to expose a difficulty area that restrains PSYOP from realizing its full effectiveness as a combat multiplier. However, during the course of this examination four broad areas have emerged for improving the odds of overcoming the PSYOP MOE hurdle:

- As the central research and development organization for DOD, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is encouraged to develop practical methods for measuring PSYOP effectiveness. The Defense Science Board report to the Secretary of Defense made a similar plea. There is no evidence to suggest DARPA has moved on the DSB request.

- Doctrinal emphasis is necessary to elevate PSYOP MOE to a more prominent position than its current status as parenthetical "bowlegs" in joint doctrine. SFC Kellogg's passion to publish a PSYOP MOE-based article in a military professional journal speaks volumes to the yearnings for published guidance and the increasing importance and relevance of PSYOP MOE in an effects-based environment.

- Combatant or Joint Force Commanders must insist on the development of PSYOP MOE during both the planning and execution of military operations. Commanders own the “systematized process” in which MOE are established and evaluated. MOE should not be optional, as was the case in ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM.

- Monitor the outcome of the IO-JMEM conference. The conference may provide the scientific means by which the Combatant or Joint Force Commander can quantitatively predict the cause and effect relationship in the PSYOP MOE equation.

CONCLUSION

Combatant and Joint Force Commanders have most likely been indoctrinated with the mantra espousing the strength of PSYOP as a combat multiplier designed to reduce the efficiency of enemy troops. Of less notoriety but of complimentary importance is a significant weakness identified in the concept of measure of effectiveness. Assessment misgivings are directly related to the difficult task of measuring the cause and effect relationship in human behavior. The difficulty and enduring nature of the problem possibly explains the lackadaisical approach to MOE in planning and joint doctrine. All Commanders are encouraged to follow the lead set by USSTRATCOM and USSOCOM and revitalize the importance of PSYOP MOE in doctrine, planning and conduct of military operations. Hopefully the IO-JMEMS conference will result in the development of both objective and subjective MOE methodologies that can provide a means of non-kinetic battle damage assessment that ultimately will benefit the Commander’s estimate of the situation prior to cessation of military operations. A Commander who understands and appreciates the pros and cons of psychological operations will guard against the temptation to confuse enthusiasm with capability.

Notes

¹ Jeffrey B. Jones and Michael P. Mathews, “PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC,” Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer 1995): 28.

² “Psychological Operations Support to Operation ALLIED FORCE,” (4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C.: 1999).

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13 (Washington DC: 9 October 1998), I-1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I-10.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53 (Washington, DC: 5 September 2003), ix.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ix.

⁷ “Psychological Operations & Allied Forces,” n.d., <<http://www.psywarrior.com/kosovo.html>> [19 April 2004].

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ “Psychological Operations Support to Operation ALLIED FORCE,” (4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C.: 1999), inside front cover.

¹⁰ Adam J. Hebert, “DOD Officials Call Afghanistan “Ideal” for Psychological Operations,” Inside The Pentagon, 8 November 2001, <<http://newmedia.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=500&folder=10&paper=236>> [29 March 2004].

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Wayne P. Bergeron, <bergerow@usasoc.soc.socom.mil> “OEF Info: General Brown Update Briefing attached,” [E-mail to David Sammons <David.sammons@nwc.navy.mil>] 4 May 2004.

¹³ “Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan,” n.d., <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm>> [19 April 2004].

¹⁴ Adam J. Hebert, “Afghanistan “Ideal” for PSYOP.”

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-53, I-6.

¹⁷ Ibid., I-7.

¹⁸ Steven Collins, “Shaping Perceptions During the Latest Balkans’ Imbroglia,” 30 May 2000, < <http://www.psywarrior.com/shapingperceptionsbalkans.html>> [19 April 2004].

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-53, I-6.

²⁰ Wayne P. Bergeron, <bergerow@soc.mil> “Re: no subject,” [E-mail to David Sammons <David.sammons@nwc.navy.mil>] 5 May 2004.

²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-53, I-6.

²² Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict,” May 2000, < <http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/>> [19 April 2004].

²³ Ibid, 28.

²⁴ Gerald Otterbein, former 193rd Special Operations Squadron Commander, Harrisburg, PA, telephone conversation with author, 25 April 2004.

²⁵ Ernest F. Bairdain and Edith M. Bairdain, Psychological Operations Studies-Vietnam, (Human Sciences Research, Inc. for Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC: 1970), 7, DTIC AD509404.

²⁶ Glenn Wiggy, <Wiggyg@stratcom.mil> “IO-JMEMS Info,” [E-mail to David Sammons <David.sammons@nwc.navy.mil>] 30 April 2004.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002 (CJCSI 3110.01 Series), CJCSI 3110.05C (Washington DC: 2003), C-1.

³⁰ Virginia Grimes, <grimesv1@socom.mil> “PSYOP Vision,” [E-mail to David Sammons <David.sammons@nwc.navy.mil>] 29 April 2004. E-mail attachment United States Special Operations Command Joint Psychological Vision, Cover Letter.

³¹ Virginia Grimes, <grimesv1@socom.mil>, “RE: RFI,” [E-mail to David Sammons <David.sammons@nwc.navy.mil>] 26 April 2004. With E-mail attachment “Measures of Effectiveness for Psychological Operations (PSYOP).”

³² Ibid., 2.

³³ “Psychological Operations in Afghanistan: Measuring the Effectiveness of Radio Malumat and the Sulh Newspaper.” 4th Psychological Operations Group Briefing, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, n.d.

³⁴ “Psychological Operations Support to Operation ALLIED FORCE,” (4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C.: 1999), back cover.

³⁵ Harold Kennedy, “PSYOP Units Encouraged to Modernize Their Equipment,” National Defense Magazine, February 2000, <<http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/national-defense/psyops-units.htm>> [30 March 2004].

³⁶ Robert Kellogg, <Kelloggr@soc.mil> [E-mail to David Sammons <David.sammons@nwc.navy.mil>] 5 May 2004. With E-mail attachment “PSYOP Evaluation: Planning is the Missing Link (unpublished).”

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