

AU/AWC/RWP077/97-04

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

WARRIORS DON'T DO WINDOWS?

WHO SAYS?, SINCE WHEN?

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Curriculum Requirements

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April 1997

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# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE <b>APR 1997</b>		2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>		3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Warriors Don't Do Windows? Why Say?, Since When?</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Air University Press Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6615</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>UU</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>65</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

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## *Contents*

	Page
DISCLAIMER .....	ii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .....	v
LIST OF TABLES .....	vi
ABSTRACT.....	vii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
HAS THE WORLD CHANGED ITS HOUSEKEEPING NEEDS?.....	4
End of Cold War Changes Parties to The Contract.....	4
Shutters Removed From Windows (New Panes/Pains).....	6
WHAT IS THE STRATEGY FOR DOING WINDOWS? (FLOORS, BATHROOMS, ETC.).....	9
The National Security Strategy .....	9
“Engaged”Cleaning–More Often .....	9
“Enlargement”-Increased Scope of Work .....	10
The Political Contract with the Military.....	11
The National Military Strategy.....	12
“Windows” Are Part of The Concept of Work .....	12
Caps On The Resources With Which To Do The Work.....	13
STRATEGY SAYS: DO WINDOWS (OOTW); YES OR NO? .....	16
Some Warriors Still Say No!.....	16
Oh Yes, It Is Your Job! .....	21
Historically .....	21
Politically.....	22
By Statutory Action.....	23
By Regulatory Action.....	23
Morally .....	24
Because of Capability.....	25
WHICH WARRIOR WASHES WINDOWS? .....	28
“Window”(OOTW) Specialists in the Profession of Arms.....	29
By Statutory Action.....	29

SOF Doctrine.....	30
SOF Organizations .....	31
SOF Capabilities and Competencies .....	32
What’s the “Window” Washer’s Past Employment Record? .....	35
Vietnam and Beirut .....	36
Somalia.....	37
Bosnia.....	38
Panama and Provide Comfort.....	40
Other “Windows” .....	40
WHAT WAITS FOR WARRIORS AND WINDOWS?.....	45
Expert Expectations .....	45
Expert Recommendations .....	47
CONCLUSION.....	51
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	54

*Illustrations*

	<i>Page</i>
Figure 1. “New Problem of Internal War” .....	7
Figure 2. New Internal War Cycle .....	17
Figure 3. Historical OOTW .....	22

## *Tables*

	<i>Page</i>
Table 1. Achieving National Military Objectives .....	12
Table 2. Budget Trends .....	14
Table 3. Defense Spending .....	14

### *Abstract*

The end of the Cold War has provided the United States a respite from the focused geopolitical and military policy of “containment.” Unfortunately, without the stability coerced by a bipolar world, the shutters have come off and the shades have gone up on the windows to a new world disorder. The world has a multipolar, interdependent, global economy, but the legacy of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, religious and ethnic extremism generates increasing threats to that free-market, democratic ideal the American public wants for all countries. The current National Security Strategy is one of “engagement and enlargement” or preventive diplomacy. The National Military Strategy is one of “flexible and selective engagement” or preventive deterrence. Both of these strategies emphasize the use of military forces for considerable work other than fighting the nation’s wars.

Without having a peer competitor in the world, as far as military power is concerned, there is now immense pressure to use the military as the arbitrator, peacemaker and savior to the world. Why should the military be given the task of doing these “windows” or operations other than war (OOTW)? This report considers the for and against arguments in the decision to expand the military’s “non-traditional” roles and missions. It also analyzes various operations to support the arguments. The findings reflect that the military can do and will continue to do an excellent job in operations short of war, as they have done in the past. However, the readiness of a force structure necessary to

maintain “war-fighting” capabilities, must not be left in jeopardy. The report’s conclusion includes a determination that a smaller force and budget can still accomplish both the primary mission of fighting the country’s wars, as well as the myriad peacetime engagements and conflict preventions it’s leaders request. The capabilities of one uniquely trained command has proven time and again it not only has the skill and will to handle the full spectrum of armed conflict, but also the cultural, social, and technical know-how to do the more complex chores of nation-building and humanitarian operations. They are appropriately characterized as Special Operations personnel. Their use in the supported role instead of the supporting one will maximize efficiencies and effectiveness in cleaning the world’s “windows” during the hiatus from major wars. And yet, our “house” can remain protected by a conventional force without its readiness compromised.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*Our planet will be filled with barbarism for a long time to come. Violence is epidemic in this post-Cold War of raging national, religious, ethnic and racial conflict. When vital US interests are directly threatened, of course we must be prepared to fight. But in many cases we must accept the sad necessity of living with tragedies that are beyond our power to control or our wisdom to cure. What President Kennedy said in 1961 applies more than ever today: ‘We must face the fact that the US is neither omnipotent nor omniscient—that we are only 6% of the world’s population—that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94%—that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.*

—Arthur D. Schlesinger Jr.

The above quote on what American foreign policy should be is not much different from the perspective the Chad military have of their responsibilities. On a military to military assistance visit to Chad the American contingent was attempting to convince the Chad armed forces that they should use their country’s military resources to improve their social, economic and political stability by doing public works and civil affairs. However, Chad military personnel, as traditional, elitist warriors, refused to even talk about such proposals. This caused the American contingent to express their frustration in outbursts and prompted the comment from one listener that “obviously, warriors don’t do windows,” at least in Chad.<sup>1</sup> Should the United States military be this constrained? Can they be limited to fighting and winning only the nation’s wars? If they are going to be

tasked to do *operations other than war* (OOTW), what force structure can balance the need to be ready to fight wars (destroy houses) and in the meantime routinely resolve conflicts short of war (cleaning windows, bathrooms and floors of houses), such as nation-building, counterdrug/counter terrorist operations, arms control and peace operations?

The purpose of this report is to discuss the apparent paradigm shift in what our civilian leaders require of their military instrument of power. Now that the Cold War is over the national security strategy includes the reaffirmation of democracy as a primary objective. Further, a key to current foreign policy is global free market economics that will consolidate and strengthen democratic gains. In order to achieve these ends a peaceful process is sought for resolving societal conflicts, for generating needed reforms and making transitions in governments. Without a peer competitor or major military threat in the short term, other non-vital and simply humanitarian interests are consuming ever decreasing military budgets and personnel. It is the thesis of this project that this is a viable focus for our country and the military clearly has a duty, competency and capability for these roles and missions.

The scope of this paper is to address: one; *why* the military can do these chores, despite contrary arguments or only if specific military criteria are met prior to executing authorized civilian edicts and two; *who*, specifically in the armed forces, is already prepared to continue doing these *outside ordinarily tasked works*, and can do so without compromising readiness or fiscal parameters. This paper does not argue the issues concerning civil-military relations. The basic assumption is that the American military will never threaten the principal of civilian control over this instrument of political

power. But OOTW does require a new cooperation and coordination with national and international nonmilitary agencies, organizations and coalitions to achieve objectives more political than military. The success or failure in achieving these objectives is becoming difficult to determine. Regardless of the protestations, difficulties and potential long term nature of these taskings, both the pains and the “panes” can be and should be resolved by a greater emphasis and expansion of our existing “warrior-diplomat” organization—the Special Operation Forces.

### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Bryan Shaw, interview by author, AWC/AU, Maxwell AFB, AL, October 1996

## Chapter 2

### **Has the World Changed Its Housekeeping Needs?**

*The world now taking shape is not only new but new in entirely new ways. Something is happening to the nation-state itself. Governments, everywhere, irrespective of ideology, appear inadequate to the new challenges...*

—Richard J. Barnet

### **End of Cold War Changes Parties to The Contract**

According to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, an analysis of the emerging international system has at least three geostrategic perspectives: “from the top, major powers have changed; [among states], there are categories determined by success at establishing democracy and free market prosperity; and from the bottom transnational problems have become a more important part of the world scene.”<sup>1</sup> In addition, the overriding characteristics of the world’s environment involve uncertainties and changes which are more numerous and complex than during the Cold War. Have the major powers changed? At the end of the Cold War some would argue that the US became the sole major power and the world unipolar. However, the US has not shown a proclivity to dominate the world to the exclusion of those countries that had major status before. The cooperation between these powers may have lost its edge over time, but fortunately disagreements are open to discussion and economic and political blocs have not been

consolidated. A clash among the great powers; therefore, does not seem likely in the near future and the US remains the primary source of capabilities to “do unto others.”<sup>2</sup>

The Cold War’s end also ended the categories of states based on an industrialized and free world, a communist world, and an underdeveloped third world. Categories of states in the new world order (or disorder) can now be characterized as:

1. market democracies—free, prosperous and being joined by newly industrialized countries in East Asia, parts of Latin America and Central Europe;
2. transitional states—ex-communist, India, South Africa, progressing from lower economic baselines, risking freedom and prosperity by authoritarian politics, politicized economies and low economic development;
3. troubled states—primarily in Africa, falling behind economically, politically, ecologically and plagued with uncontrolled ethnic and religious extremism.<sup>3</sup>

Another characterization more traditionally classifies states by “tiers.”<sup>4</sup> The “First Tier” countries form the core of global, quality economies with shared ideologies and minor conflicts while the “Second Tier” is now formed of socialist and one-time “third world” states.<sup>5</sup> More specifically, this second tier is further subdivided into those states that are: developed economically, but have fragile democracies; resource rich non-democracies with little developed infrastructure; partially developed with some qualitative economic improvement; and developing with some developable prospects.<sup>6</sup> Finally, in this lower second tier one finds: “failed states, failing states, and states with the potential to fail.”<sup>7</sup> Failed states are those where virtual anarchy exists(ed)—Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, Bosnia; failing states are actively becoming failed states—Ethiopia, Georgia, Zaire; and potential to fail states have economic misery, authoritarian rule, but no catalyst, as yet—successor states to the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup>


Some countries have characteristics of more than one group. In any event, conflicts that arise from or between these states are a reflection of the change in the world’s state

and non-state actors; their relative strengths and weaknesses in a new international, interdependent, geo-economic system. Bi-polarization is gone and though the United States is perhaps the lone super power, the world is more aptly described as being multipolar in terms of exerting national power. What does that mean for the world's post-cold war stability? With more parties left unrestrained by what Seyom Brown calls "strategic indifferen(ce)" on the part of major powers, the world is left with the continuation of long-time repressed hostilities, rogue states, rogue groups and what Dr. Donald Snow terms "new internal wars."<sup>9</sup>

### **Shutters Removed From Windows (New Panes/Pains)**

The "containment" effect of the Cold War powers prevented the window panes(pains) of the world from breaking and showering glass onto other states. Unfortunately, the two sides ignored building long term self-sustaining economics and political systems for new nations. Providing military and economic aid to weak and corrupt regimes did nothing to promote democratic politics, market economies or institutions to support them.<sup>10</sup> When the shutters came off there was an explosion in the above-mentioned numbers of countries already in a failed nation-state status or trying to prevent becoming one, which Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner describe as "utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community."<sup>11</sup>

The result is that the problems in the world are concentrated in the old third-world countries and can generally be categorized as being political, economic and ethnic or religious in nature. Figure 1 is one example of the relationship where the objective in many cases is simply to "subjugate or eliminate the minority."<sup>12</sup> This is evidenced by



**Figure 1. “New Problem of Internal War”**

conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia and Haiti which provide reasons for interventions by outside powers. They generate the media and an emotional appeal for humanitarian or peace operations regardless of a direct or distinct threat to U.S. interests. It is the escalation of such conflicts which affect more of the world as mass migrations to other countries create disasters extraterritorially.

A listing of these pains/”panes” gives a more graphic idea of the nature and extent of the operations short of war for which the U.S. and the world provide resources. U.S.

Army Field Manual 100-5 describes separately:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| Noncombatant Evacuation Operations<br>(Mogadishu)     | Nation Assistance<br>(Somalia)          |
| Arms Control  | Security Assistance                     |
| Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief<br>(Rwanda)   | Peacekeeping<br>(Bosnia)                |
| Support to Domestic Authorities<br>(Hurricane Andrew) | Counterdrug<br>(Peru/Bolivia)           |
| Counterterrorism<br>(Achilles Lauro)                  | Peace Enforcement<br>(Haiti and Beirut) |
| Show of Force<br>(Kuwait)                             | Attacks and Raids<br>(Libya)            |

The following list of United Nations peacekeeping operations provides a global view of the “windows” that rest of the world has also thought deserved attention:<sup>13</sup>

UNTSO (Israel)	UNMOGIP (India & Pakistan)	UNFICYP (Cyprus)
UNDOF (Golan Heights)	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait)
MINORSO (West Sahara)	UNOMIG (Georgia)	UNOMIL (Liberia)
UNMIH (Haiti)	UNAMIR (Rwanda)	UNMOT (Tajikistan)
UNAVEM (Angola)	UNPROFOR (Bosnia)	UNPREDEP (Macedonia)
UNMIBH (Bosnia)	UNMOP (Croatia)	UNTAES (East Slavonia)
UNEF I (Israel-Egypt)	ONUC (Congo)	UNTEA (West New Guinea)
UNYOM (Yemen)	UNEF II (Sinai)	UNIIMOG (Iraq-Iran)
ONUSAL (El Salvador)	UNTAC (Cambodia)	UNOSOM (Somalia)

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Strategic Assessment 1996 Instruments of US Forces*, National Defense University Press, National Defense University, Ft McNair, Washington D.C., November 1995, p.1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>4</sup> Donald M. Snow, “New Internal War” lecture, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, September 1996.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Donald M. Snow, “New Internal Wars,” *Uncivil Wars* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 93-114.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in Snow, 85.

<sup>10</sup> Robert H. Dorff, “Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability,” *Parameters*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, (Published by US Army War College, Summer 1996), 17-31.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Dorff, 89.

<sup>12</sup> Snow, lecture.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 3

### What Is the Strategy for Doing Windows? (floors, bathrooms, etc.)

*Short of war we have no strategy or comprehensive plan to address the challenges of political violence... We will need the courage to depart from conventional institutional norms and the vision to maintain a pragmatic defense posture increasingly relevant to a world characterized by neither war nor peace.*

—Unknown

### The National Security Strategy

#### “Engaged” Cleaning—More Often

Presently, how do our political leaders view the United States’ role in dealing with the post-cold war order and disorders? President Clinton’s administration has a National Security Strategy (NSS) that is “premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies is disappearing”; that our economy must be revitalized to sustain the military, foreign initiatives and global influence.<sup>1</sup> The strategy identifies dangers that have become threats to our national security because of a global economy, instantaneous communications and near borderless international consequences from national or regional conflicts.<sup>2</sup> Military nationalism, religious and ethnic conflicts, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, terrorism and drug trafficking destabilize interdependent

democracies and economies and; therefore, “we can and must make the difference through our engagement.”<sup>3</sup>

Currently, the NSS has three central objectives or components: enhancing security, bolstering economic prosperity and promoting democracy. These are mutually supportive.

Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Free market nations with growing economies and open trade ties are more likely to feel secure and work toward freedom...Democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate...to meet security threats, promote free trade and sustainable development. These goals are supported by ensuring America remains *engaged* in the world...<sup>4</sup>

#### **“Enlargement”-Increased Scope of Work**

The previous articulated goals are also supported by “...*enlarging* the community of secure, free market and democratic nations.”<sup>5</sup> But this broader scope of objectives is better defined by the enlargement of the tasks involved when facing the threats of the new world order. In addition, one must consider that the NSS expands the use of its various instruments of power, including the military, to protecting not only the nation’s “vital interests,” but more generally “our [unqualified] interests and our values...”<sup>6</sup> This includes not tolerating gross violations of human rights even if within a nation’s sovereign borders.

“As the world’s greatest power we have global interests as well as responsibilities. We cannot solve our own problems at home unless the world is more peaceful, democratic and prosperous.”<sup>7</sup> Within this context the NSS envisions measures to stop democratic reversals, enhance security with humanitarian assistance, stem disruption from the migration of refugees and correct the national infrastructure and economic

conditions that are the cause of instability.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, from this highest level comes the expanded responsibility to keep threats from festering, deter aggression, foster the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts and track global problems. In the execution of this national strategy military force is recognized as an “indispensable element “ of the nation’s power along with economic and political measures.”<sup>9</sup>

### **The Political Contract with the Military**

The primary focus of military involvement is in enhancing security. The national strategy requires unilateral and more often cooperative, multinational solutions, but military forces are planned as critical to the success of this strategy. The US “must deploy robust and flexible military forces that can face four principal dangers”:

1. Weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, chemical
2. Regional instability—border disputes; ethnic, religious, and territorial aggression
3. Transnational dangers—terrorism, drug trafficking, refugee migration
4. Dangers to democracy and reform—humanitarian and disaster relief<sup>10</sup>

The latter two categories specifically call for specialized units and capabilities.

Peace operations are clearly identified as a means to support the NSS.<sup>11</sup> In peace operations the national strategy envisions certain military assets supporting the situation before a combat response is required. Airlift, intelligence and communications will continue to be offered. In meeting the goals of promoting democracy military forces are also inextricably involved. The strategy emphasizes that these resources will be used to deal with torture, tyranny and repression for ideological and moral reasons as well as pragmatic ones.”<sup>12</sup> Certainly the NSS leaves no doubt that warriors are expected and relied upon to “do the nation’s windows.”

## The National Military Strategy

### “Windows” Are Part of The Concept of Work

The armed forces, assigned the political mandate to do OOTW, the country’s windows, have at least given lip-service to it by incorporating these missions in their own National Military Strategy (NMS). It is one of flexible and selective engagement that “accepts the challenge of the ‘new strategic era’ to advance national interests in peacetime.”<sup>13</sup> The objectives, components and tasks are represented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Achieving National Military Objectives**

Promote Stability Through Regional Cooperation and Constructive Interaction		Thwart Aggression Through Credible Deterrence and Robust War Fighting Capabilities	
Peacetime Engagement		Deterrence & Conflict Prevention	Fight and Win
Military to Military Contacts Nation Assistance Security Assistance Humanitarian Operations Counterdrug/terrorism Peacekeeping	Nuclear Deterrence  Regional Alliances Crisis Response Arms Control Noncombatant Evacuation Sanction Enforcement Peace Enforcement	Clear objective-Decisive force War Power Projection Fight Combined/Joint Win Information War Counter WMD Two MRC focus Force Generation Win the Peace	

**Source:** *National Military Strategy 1995*, (Washington: GPO 1995) p. 4.

Peacetime engagement describes non-combat activities that military members daily engage in, world-wide. The programs build stability by increasing mutual trust, familiarity, communications, training, interoperability and educational exchanges. Nation assistance counters lawlessness, subversion and insurgency while security assistance reduces the need for a large overseas presence. Humanitarian operations offer unique capabilities in logistics and security for disasters and refugee contingencies.

Peacekeeping is expressly recognized as “different from traditional military operations in the tasks and capabilities they require,” but for which appropriate doctrine and training continues to be developed.<sup>14</sup> This “military strategy also envisions vigorous efforts” in the deterrence and conflict prevention tasks that include: one, “adapting regional alliances to changes in the new geostrategic environment by facilitating participation in non-traditional out of area peace operations...” and two, peace enforcement that is characterized by a “gray zone between peace and war,...the use of force or threat of force, interwoven with diplomatic and economic efforts, often involving both governmental and nongovernmental organizations(NGOs).”<sup>15</sup>

### **Caps On The Resources With Which To Do The Work**

This NMS, or plan , admits the world’s issues are more complex, more regional and more diverse. It also sees that combating the security dangers means a high operational tempo with the need for “warriors” to be flexible, ready and capable of responding quickly and decisively.<sup>16</sup> However, the armed forces have been facing trends that will continue to reflect budgetary concerns when no major threat is on the horizon. The emphasis will be on a smaller, more efficient, integrated Guard-Reserve-active duty force with limited presence overseas. One senior officer observed that: “in 1992 there was a 25% reduction pursuant to General Colin Powell’s ‘Base Force’; in 1993 bombers, missiles and other items dropped in strategic arms reductions lowered forces 33%; in 1994 the ‘Bottoms Up Review’ represented a 40% reduction slope; and that in 1997 the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) based on a balanced budget initiative could mean further reductions.”<sup>17</sup>

Also in the NMS is an expectation that from 1989 to 1999 the military will see:

1. total active end strength down to 1,445,000 people from 2,130,000;
2. Army divisions decline from 18 to 10;
3. Air Force fighter wings drop from 24 to 13;
4. Navy battle force ships fall from 567 to 346;
5. Marine Corps force structure remain, but reduced by 23,00 personnel;
6. the Selected Reserve decline to 894,000 from 1,170,000 and;
7. the Coast Guard's end strength go from 44,000 to 36,300.<sup>18</sup>

These trends are further represented in Tables 2 and Table 3 below.<sup>19</sup>

**Table 2. Budget Trends**

Figures compiled by the Pentagon's comptroller show the downward trend in end strength and spending for each branch of the service between fiscal 1990 and fiscal 1997, which began Oct 1. Spending figures are adjusted for inflation to 1997 dollars.

**End strengths for each service:**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Army</b>	<b>Navy</b>	<b>Marine Corps</b>	<b>Navy/ Marines</b>	<b>Air Force</b>	<b>Total</b>
1990	\$751,000	583,000	197,000	780,000	539,000	2,070,000
1997	495,000	407,000	174,000	581,000	381,000	1,457,000
Change	-256,000	-176,000	-23,000	-199,000	-158,000	-613,000
% change	-34.1	-30.2	-11.7	-25.5	-29.3	-29.6

**Spending for each service (in billions of dollars):**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Army</b>	<b>Navy</b>	<b>Marine Corps</b>	<b>Navy/ Marines</b>	<b>Air Force</b>	<b>Total</b>
1990	\$95.3	---	---	118.7	113.5	327.5
1997	61.2	---	---	75.8	72.3	209.3
Change	-34.1	---	---	-42.9	-41.2	-118.2
% change	-35.8	---	---	-36.1	-36.3	-36.1

**Table 3. Defense Spending**

**Defense spending**

Shown is the Clinton administration's budget proposal for fiscal 1998 and future years. Budget authority (spending commitments) for 1998 is \$2.8 billion above what the administration last year planned for 1998, but \$2.1 billion below the level Congress appropriated- for 1997. While budget authority can reflect commitments of more than one year, budget outlays are the actual spending proposed in a given year. Figures are in billions.

	<b>FY '97</b>	<b>FY '98</b>	<b>FY '99</b>	<b>FY '00</b>	<b>FY '01</b>	<b>FY '02</b>
<b>Budget Authority</b>	\$250.0	\$250.7	\$256.3	\$262.8	\$269.6	\$277.5
<b>Outlays</b>	\$254.3	\$247.5	\$249.3	\$255.2	\$256.2	

With the prospects of doing more and more with less and less, the “high ops tempo” of certain units, and a concern for not having a trained force for “war fighting,” is it any wonder discouraging words are heard. Yes, still often echoes the popular refrains of “it’s not my job” or “I’m here to fly and to fight” or “I signed on to fight not feed” and “warriors don’t do windows.”

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington: GPO, February 1996), i.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, iii.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 33-34.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, iii.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 13-17.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 22

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 41

<sup>13</sup> *National Military Strategy 1995*, Cover letter by CJCS Gen John Shalikashvili, (Washington: GPO 1995).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 8-9.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-12.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>17</sup> General Viccellio, Jr., CINC, AF Mobility Command, lecture, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 22 January 1997.

<sup>18</sup> *NMS*, 17.

<sup>19</sup> Editorial, *Air Force Times*, 20 January 1997, 14.

## Chapter 4

### Strategy Says: Do Windows (OOTW); Yes or No?

*Constabulary missions are different from fighting and winning wars...more police-like than war-like. They are reactive more than proactive....The purpose...is not to defeat an enemy,...there can be no expectation of winning-any more than we can expect to win a war against crime-we can only hope to reduce violations to a more acceptable level. These are conditions for which neither our equipment nor our doctrine have been designed. We design our forces for speed, stealth, destructiveness, payload, and range. Our doctrine emphasizes surprise, initiative, freedom of action, mass, shock, and the principals of war. These qualities are only occasionally pertinent to constabulary missions.*

—Carl H. Builder


### Some Warriors Still Say No!

Lt Col Charles Dunlap, a National War College award-winning essayist and judge advocate, provocatively espouses that the “armed forces [should] focus exclusively on indisputably military duties” and “not diffuse our energies away from our fundamental responsibilities for war-fighting”<sup>1</sup> Often voiced concerns about doing OOTW are that: it politicizes the military instead of professionalizing it and undermines civilian control; the tasks create a disinclination to be “fighters” and; the risks of casualties is not offset by national interests. Dunlap’s arguments are usually well-received and lend support to those arguing against restoration of democracy missions like Haiti, humanitarian support to Rwanda and Somalia, counterdrug operations in Latin America and a panoply of peace

operations. Doug Bandow opposes intervention in Central Africa because we “compound foreign tragedies by making casualties of our fellow citizens.”<sup>2</sup> He argues that the crises in the world are the same, only the victims differ and;

...it is not right to expect 18 year old Americans to be guardians of a de facto global empire, risking their lives when their own nation’s security is not at stake....Americans like to solve problems, but we can’t put dissolving nation-states back together and the underlying causes of bitter conflicts that go back centuries will not disappear with the presence of US soldiers. At worst we’ll find ourselves taking sides and dying in a civil war like Lebanon.<sup>3</sup>

Nothing illustrates this better than Dr. Snow’s graphic perspective of the never-ending new internal war cycle shown in Figure 2. If there is no breaking this cycle, why get on the carousel?



**Figure 2. New Internal War Cycle**

Dr. David Sorenson writes that peacekeeping can have a drastic impact on the identity of “*professional*” soldiers.<sup>4</sup> The events surrounding operations in Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993) are to him “bitter experiences” that are reasons for avoiding low intensity conflict (LIC) and peace operations in the future.<sup>5</sup> There are three other instances which exemplify the different training needed to be internalized so success and survival are ensured regardless of the occasion. First, the untrained military stood by and watched Haiti policemen beat those welcoming American soldiers. Second, an Army captain attempts to investigate human rights abuse without authority when the situation changed in Haiti from combat to peacekeeping. Finally, an investigator in the Blackhawk shutdown incident over Iraq stated that comprehensive training for understanding the rules of engagement were not received so that personnel exercised enough precaution or restraint as the situation changed.<sup>6</sup> Sorenson’s research provides the following laundry list of objections:<sup>7</sup>

1. military duties are secondary to political, economic, and humanitarian concerns which results in a decline of readiness and training
2. few feel assignments in LIC or peace operations are career-enhancing nor are they the best incentive for recruitment and retention
3. in budgetary declines, war fighting responsibilities should have emphasis
4. duty in LIC causes morale problems- policing is long term boredom
5. massive application of force replaced by combat management is costly and inconclusive; the enemy is illusive and unidentifiable
6. traditional barriers between civilians and military erode

Morris Janowitz says, “The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.”<sup>8</sup> C.C. Moskos opines that “Rather than being concerned only with the efficient achievement of victory...the peace keeper is charged with

maintaining the peace even to the detriment of military considerations.<sup>9</sup> This distinction is set out in two different Army field manuals. FM 100-5 provides guidance on pre-conditioned responses for combat operations, including violent offensive action.<sup>10</sup> FM 100-23 gives criteria for peace operations that include restraint, control of consent, level of violence and impartiality.<sup>11</sup>

The resistance continues despite national policy embracing OOTW more and more. Ever since the United States “won all the battles, but lost the war” in Vietnam, the military has taken a position that, despite the primacy of civilian control, limited operations still need to meet certain criteria before the military is employed- why go, if winning is not predetermined or of great importance. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger argues that before troops are committed:<sup>12</sup>

1. “vital” interests must be at stake
2. the US must commit in sufficient numbers to win
3. political and military objectives must be clearly defined
4. objectives and forces must be continually reassessed
5. support from the American people be present
6. it is means of last resort

Others including the Department of Defense (DOD) advocate that these tasks are the responsibility of other federally funded agencies—whether it be the State Department, Drug Enforcement Agency or the United Nations. These agencies have been responsible in the past and are doctrinally and operationally distinct from or incompatible with armed forces trained for war. More importantly, is the established policy that American forces shall not be commanded or controlled by other than their own military. Involvement with these other activities, again degrades command, control, proficiency and readiness. “Let George do it if he’s in charge” is an excusatory approach.

As with most “do this or do that” decisions, the “bottom line” is really the financial aspect. Difficult, complex, long-term operations require personnel, equipment and other resources that we have seen are in decline. But when the maid has to be let go because the home owner wants a new car, then who is going to protect the house *and* clean it at the same time? Large portions of the US population, represented by Congress, are typically latent-isolationists or concerned with domestic issues rather than foreign policy. Without a pure military threat their budgetary restraints will always have a direct influence on the military’s attitude for OOTW, even if there were no other objections. But the problem is aggravated when the forces that are being kept ready for war have their fund depleted for *unplanned* OOTW. When this happens the military has to ask for reimbursement or special appropriations. In the meantime, normal readiness, training and operations are suspended and there is no incentive to engage or expand these taskings in the future. Our new Defense Secretary recognizes the funding/tasking dilemma, “We are faced with a choice of reducing our commitment or reducing our capability....We’re over committed and underfunded.”<sup>13</sup> Certainly, with this evidence is there any reply when a warrior, asked to do windows, replies, “It’s not my job!”

## **Oh Yes, It Is Your Job!**

*....the distinction between warfare and crime is becoming less clear every day, especially when such lethal materials and expertise are being smuggled across borders, when organized crime groups are involved in smuggling everything from weapons of mass destruction, to drugs, to illegal aliens, and when terrorists maintain sophisticated international financial networks....In the process of improving our defenses we must be mindful of our political traditions that separate civilian law enforcement from the military and limit government's intrusion into our lives, but these important sensitivities must not be allowed to paralyze us.*

—Senator Sam Nunn

### **Historically**

The evidence is overwhelming that the military has been doing OOTW and “windows” on a routine basis since its formation. Indeed, if one were to calculate the amount of time spent “doing wars” versus the years spent accomplishing the other economic, political or social objectives that military capabilities have traditionally been used for, how can nay sayers now classify, with any credibility, such activities as “outside the scope of their employment.” What are the “windows” the military has done in the past? Figure 3 reflects a number of operations involving civil affairs, protection of US citizens and property in foreign countries, law enforcement, humanitarian and disaster relief:

**Civil Affairs**<sup>14</sup>

Exploration of America's West, roads, telegraphs, forts and ports  
Governmental authority in Southern States and Alaska

Panama Canal construction  
Oceanic and foreign marine exploration  
Mail service  
Forest fire watch

**Humanitarian**<sup>17</sup>

Berlin Airlift  
Crop dusting in Los Angeles, Oregon, Philippines Nicaragua  
Volcano evacuations(Congo, Costa Rica)

**Protection of US Assets**<sup>15</sup>

- Stop piracy out of Libya  
Assist NEO/Boxer Rebellion(China)

**Law Enforcement**<sup>16</sup>

- Indian uprisings  
Pursuit of Pancho Villa(Mexico)

**Disaster Relief**<sup>18</sup>

Flood relief in Texas, Ethiopia,

**Figure 3. Historical OOTW**

The hue and cry that the military should not do constabulary missions is also not supported: “Historically,...the American military has been assigned constabulary missions in peacetime and in the aftermath of wars. Ours have included the pacification of the West, the suppression of rebellions in the Philippines, and occupations of Germany, Russia, Japan and Iraq in the wakes of two world wars and one major regional contingency-not to mention many constabulary interventions into Latin America.”<sup>19</sup> There may be a need to prioritize because of smaller forces and budgets, but to say the above are not military missions is an error. They may be the only challenges for the military in the next twenty years.

**Politically**

“Operations directed at alleviating human suffering and meeting the needs of victims of social dislocation, economic strife, political conflict or natural disasters can, in some cases, be the best foreign policy instrument available to the United States.”<sup>20</sup> As described above the NSS and the NMS state that OOTW are of national interest, specifically designating them military missions. The strategy does not relegate them to secondary

resources, personnel, equipment or logistics. More importantly, there is no debate that it is the civilian leadership that determines national interests. These “lesser” operations were never what the military should not or could not do, but ones leadership chose to ignore/suppress when the Cold War chore was more important. Once the threat changed more attention could be paid to these “brushfires.” If a primary goal is to deter war and deal with threats before they become “forest fires,” responding below a level requiring combat meets the “stability strategy.” Finally, if humanitarian (and other interests) are central to our national security strategy, visible examples of human rights violations raise questions about the US commitment to that policy.<sup>21</sup>

### **By Statutory Action**

Organizationally, the US Army Special Forces were established in the early 1950s to take up the need for trained personnel to do OOTW.<sup>22</sup> In 1986 Senators William Cohen and Sam Nunn sponsored legislation that mandated appointment of an assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, as well as the creation of a unified command, US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), to improve capabilities in these areas.<sup>23</sup> Congress has also specifically identified and legislated that the military be used for noncombat roles. The United States Code, Title 10, provides statutory authority for enforcing federal laws, aiding civilian law enforcement and assisting humanitarian efforts.<sup>24</sup>

### **By Regulatory Action**

Despite protestations on getting involved in OOTW, the strategy for doing so has been further institutionalized in doctrine and service publications. Presently, joint

doctrine is a primer on these missions. In particular, Joint Pub 3-07 recognizes that a wide range of operations in peacetime to compel compliance (strikes, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, etc.) is necessary to demonstrate US resolve and capability.<sup>25</sup> Military forces help “keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands.”<sup>26</sup> A detailed description and definition of each type of activity such as humanitarian assistance, support in counterdrug operations, arms control, and peacekeeping is provided along with examples of each.<sup>27</sup>

### **Morally**

*The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is that good men do nothing.*

—Ed Burke

Perhaps the most recent and emotional rationale for intervention by the military in peacekeeping and humanitarian actions is that it is the “right thing to do” or “we’ve got to do something.” This justification is used despite any clear, direct or possibly indirect consequence on US national interests. As James Holl says, “There is little mystery regarding where the world’s deadly conflicts are or the extent of the damage that they bring. The list is sadly familiar to most informed people...” and in light of the decision to provide military forces in Bosnia, this argument was used to avoid not only adverse world opinion, but a guilty conscience.<sup>28</sup> Edward Luttwak argues for intervention because if belligerents see no particular penalty is paid for illegal warfare then there is no deterrence-self imposed restraint erodes everywhere. He also states that the US “moral economy is damaged if it remains passive witness to aggressions replete with atrocities on a large scale.”<sup>29</sup>

A Catholic priest, Father Hehir adds a perspective on societal ethics that goes beyond the international exception that allows intervention in genocide situations. He writes; “In the face of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and in the face of other circumstances where the chance of escalation to global war is significantly minimized, there may be a higher obligation to intervene.”<sup>30</sup> Murdock comments on Zaire and Rwanda: “Why intervene? Because by ignoring the region’s agonies so long the West is partially responsible for them...just as it was two years ago...the region has little strategic value,...but opposing genocide shouldn’t be just a geopolitical calculation. Washington must play the leader now...to save tens of thousands of lives and to help prevent future horrors.”<sup>31</sup> The “moral high ground” is a potent position.

### **Because of Capability**

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer recently noted proudly that “we’ve done the Somalias, the Bosnias, the Haitis, the security at the Olympics, and the firefighting in western states”...and they’ve all been done well.<sup>32</sup> It is the simple fact that no other instrument of power really can effectuate political intent quite so quickly or with desired results as well that the military is the “method of choice.” Reimer, in speaking about the future, referred to the Army’s long tradition of doing other things than winning the nation’s wars; as being the “rapid reaction force for the global village;...providing a range of military operations short of war.”<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, the “windows” arguably capable of being done are nation-building, responding to natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances and civic action projects-the land force has the flexibility to do a range of missions across a continuum from peace to war.<sup>34</sup>

There is no better resource than the Air Force for rapid airlift, logistics, surveillance and maintaining air supremacy. Steven Metz suggests that the US Air Force would not require any radical changes in force structure to be more active in peace support operations, instead attitudes training and doctrine need to be adjusted to take account of new tasks.<sup>35</sup> The US Navy is capable of maintaining a forward presence, providing the bulk of logistical support and rapid littoral response. These capabilities will be discussed more later, but it is clear no other entity can compete in a contract for this work. If the national decision makers determine it is in the national interest to use a master in these chores rather than an apprentice, then no reluctance should be shown in “climbing the ladder and cleaning that window.” Some are harder to get to, take more time to clean and may get dirty again. Ultimately, there must be a realization that failed states and these new disorders will not simply go away. Clearly, there are sufficient reasons for “doing something;” the longer problems exist the more likely they challenge regional stability and international peace.”<sup>36</sup>

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Charles J Dunlap, Jr., “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” *Parameters*, Winter 1992-93, 287.

<sup>2</sup>Doug Bandow, “We Can’t Cure All Global Ills,” *USA Today*, 12 November 1996.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>David S. Sorenson, “Soldiers, States, And Systems: Civil-Military Relations in The Post-Cold War World” (Paper originally presented at The Merston Center Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Ohio State University, December, 1992), 18.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>James G. Andrus, *Aircraft Investigation Board Report, US Army UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter 97-2600 and 88-26060*, USAF Board President, 27 May 1994, Vol.1(executive summary).

<sup>7</sup>Sorenson, 27-32.

<sup>8</sup>Quoted in Sorenson, 18.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

## Notes

<sup>10</sup> US Department of the Army, *Operations*, FM 100-5 (Washington, June 1993), 2- to 2-12.

<sup>11</sup> US Department of the Army, *Peace Operations*, FM 100-23 (Washington, 8 April 1994), 1-5 to 1-8.

<sup>12</sup> *Ethics and American Power*, (Washington D.C.- Ethics and Public Policy Center), May 1995, 7-8.

<sup>13</sup> James Kittlefield, "The Last Superpower," *Government Executive*, December 1994, 14.

<sup>14</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn, 1993), 29.

<sup>15</sup> Carl E. Mundy, Jr, "The Marines are Old Hands at Humanitarian Intervention," *Armed Forces Journal International*, February 1993, 42-44.

<sup>16</sup> Ronald R. Fogleman, "Air Force in Operations Other than War," *Defense Issues*, Vol. 10, No 1, 1.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Bruce D. Callender, "A History of Helping," *Air Force Magazine*, 76 (March 1994), 76,79.

<sup>19</sup> Carl H. Builder, "Ten Messages for the Chief from One Member of the Strategic Warfare Panel of the Air Force 2025 Study," 25 January 1996 draft of presentation to the SAW panel 12-14 February 1996, Maxwell AFB, AL, 16.

<sup>20</sup> Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, October 1993, 75.

<sup>21</sup> Dorff, 20-21.

<sup>22</sup> Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Beret* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 171.

<sup>23</sup> John Collins, *Special Operations Forces, An Assessment 1986-1993* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service 1993), 8-9.

<sup>24</sup> Armed Forces, 10 United States Code, Secs 332, 371-380, 401-402 (1991).

<sup>25</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, 16 June 1995, viii.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., III-1 to III-15.

<sup>28</sup> James E. Holl, *The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Common Parameters: Conditions Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1996).

<sup>29</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, May/June 1995, Published 1995 by Council on Foreign Relations, 109,114.

<sup>30</sup> Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "When Intervention Gets the Green Light," *Washington Post*, 20 September 1996, 23.

<sup>31</sup> Murdock, *USA Today*, 1,12.

<sup>32</sup> Quoted in Patrick Pexton, "Future Seizes Operations Other Than War," *Army Times*, 19 November 1996, 8.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Steven Metz, "The Air Force Role in United Nations Peacekeeping," *Airpower Journal*, 7(4) 1993, 68,84.

<sup>36</sup> Dorff, 17.

## Chapter 5

### Which Warrior Washes Windows?

*Young man,' the professor said, 'the reason the dinosaur is extinct is that it couldn't turn around fast enough*

—Anonymous

*The fact that these[military operations] are 'other than war' implies that they are less important, significant, costly or deadly. All these assumptions are false.*

—Grant T. Hammond

We now know *why* the military is going to do OOTW. But *who* in the military can actually accomplish these missions without sacrificing the 'different' readiness demanded for fighting wars? There has been an obvious and increasingly pronounced emphasis for "special" people and places to be identified for conducting these other operations. President Bush supported improved UN and US peacekeeping efforts to include specifically developed and trained units for unilateral or multinational peace operations.<sup>1</sup> Now President Clinton also calls for a UN peacekeeping headquarters, planning staff, and logistics center.<sup>2</sup> The reality is that these operations compete for time, personnel and, more importantly, the budget. Can there still be a compromise between having forces ready to fight wars as well as being trained and capable to do everything else? Boutros Boutros-Ghali, while Secretary General of the UN requested member countries to "hold ready, at an agreed period of notice, *specially trained*, (emphasis added), units for

peacekeeping service.”<sup>3</sup> Boutros-Gahli’s request provides the namesake answer: *special operations forces (SOF)*.

## **“Window”(OOTW) Specialists in the Profession of Arms**

### **By Statutory Action**

As mentioned previously, Congress legislated that the military do OOTW, but they have gone further. Eleven years ago Senators Cohen (our current Secretary of Defense) and Nunn also conceived the idea that a particular part of the military should be chartered to carry out counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, psychological operations and civil affairs.<sup>4</sup> William Boykin states that, “Congress was trying to tell the Executive Branch to look beyond the Cold War. More than direct military power is required to cope with terrorism, insurgency, counter insurgency and other forms of low intensity conflict.”<sup>5</sup> Before this special operation units had been successful in part, but less than stellar performances in Iran, Grenada, Vietnam, Beirut and other situations drove law makers to force the Defense Department to consider a unified combat command for special operations.<sup>6</sup> Subsequently, *Public Law 99-661, The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987*, directed the formation of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).<sup>7</sup> It created a specific budget for SOF, Major Force Program 11, and required that SOF commanders in unified commands be general officers.<sup>8</sup> Public Law 100-80, passed in December 1987, and Public Law 100-456, passed in September 1988, authorized CINCUSOC to develop and procure SOF unique equipment and direct and control all funds for units assigned to USSOCOM, respectively.<sup>9</sup>

## **SOF Doctrine**

Joint Pub 3-05 and the 1996 Posture Statement of the US Special Operations Forces also provide definitive, and institutionalized authority for SOF assuming the *lead* and the *supported* role in OOTW and not the supporting position- of “essential tasks that the military must perform under the NSS and NMS, SOF can play the lead role in all.”<sup>10</sup> The role of SOF is expressly given three purposes in the Defense Secretary’s Report to the President and Congress:

1. Expand range of options for decision makers in crisis and conflicts below the threshold of war: e.g. terrorism, insurgency, sabotage;
2. Act as force multipliers for conventional forces;
3. Expand capabilities requiring exceptional sensitivity, noncombatant missions, humanitarian and security assistance, and peace operations.<sup>11</sup>

However, doctrine is even more specific as to why SOF should be what CINCSOC calls, “warrior diplomats.”

SOF are not bound by any specific environment and missions may be conducted across the entire operational continuum with a focus on strategic, operational or tactical objectives.<sup>12</sup> Originally, five principal missions were detailed for SOF: unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense and counterterrorism.<sup>13</sup> Currently, counter-proliferation, psychological operations, civil affairs, and information warfare have been elevated to separate principal missions.<sup>14</sup> However, joint doctrine also expressly states that the inherent capabilities of SOF make them suitable for humanitarian actions, counterdrug and recovery operations.<sup>15</sup> In addition, the 1996 *Posture Statement* includes security assistance, countermining activities, coalition support and special activities.<sup>16</sup> Peacetime military operations are specifically recognized as a method of providing humanitarian assistance or training indigenous

personnel to develop a military/paramilitary infrastructure and capability- to remove the underlying causes of armed conflict or war.<sup>17</sup> Within this framework *Joint Pub 3-0* is referenced. For joint tasks it includes such roles as peace building, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace operations.<sup>18</sup> Clearly, these activities are also within the scope of the “windows” for special operations.

### **SOF Organizations**

USSOCOM’s four component SOCs are: the Army Special Operations Command; Air Force Special Operations Command; Naval Special Warfare Command and; the Joint Special Operations Command.<sup>19</sup> The Army is responsible for active and reserve special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, civil affairs and psychological operations.<sup>20</sup> The Air Force is responsible for world-wide deployment of active duty, guard and reserve SOF that provide airlift, suppressing fires/close air support, search and recovery, psychological operations, forward arming and refueling, reconnaissance, weather observations and communications in remote and austere locations.<sup>21</sup> The Navy provides maritime and riverine sea-air-land (Seal) teams, special boat teams.<sup>22</sup> The Joint Command, established in 1980, is a joint headquarters to study special operations requirements, ensure interoperability/standardization, plan and conduct joint exercises and training, and develop joint special operation tactics.<sup>23</sup>

These special operation commands (SOC) and their resources are organized to be the geographical or theater commander’s source of expertise in all areas of special operations, with a separate element to plan and control the employment of SOF.<sup>24</sup> SOC resources are matched to mission requirements and joint special operation task forces are established when required. SOF units are also prepared to operate with combined forces.<sup>25</sup>

## **SOF Capabilities and Competencies**

The organizational description of units give some idea of their potential capabilities. But to get a real idea of how these personnel are ideally suited to OOTW tasks we must look at the manpower skills and equipment that fulfills doctrinal and organizational responsibilities. A summary of some SOF characteristics include:

### **JOINT PUB 3-05<sup>26</sup>**

- Detailed area or geographical orientation, including mastery of language, customs and culture.
- Capability to execute *all foreseeable* operations in the full range of the area's environmental conditions
- Small units with high personal and professional levels of maturity
- Experienced or trained usually in more than one principal field: engineering, medicine, public safety, economics, agriculture, and legal systems. *The only civil affair and psychological operations in the Defense Department*(emphasis added).
- Capable of advising, training and assisting indigenous populations, officials or other US forces in peacetime military operations, hostilities short of war and war

### **1996 POSTURE STATEMENT<sup>27</sup>**

- Rapidly deployable, flexible, versatile in penetration and strike capabilities; responding with speed,
- stealth and precision by land, sea and air
- Total Force concept implementation. About 44,000 end strength for FY 97 with approximately one-third from reserve and national guard units
- Retention of SOF officers and enlisted personnel generally remains above service averages. Job satisfaction/morale surveys indicate high
- Special operations training can be institutionalized by service; provided for specific mission tasks
- or joint with conventional forces of the US or host nations

The above is nothing less than a blueprint with specifications in the OOTW contract that are precisely tailored for the military “window” experts. Apparently, and more importantly, there is every intention of improving these capabilities in the future. *Joint*

*Vision 2010* is a “template for how America’s military will channel vitality and innovation in our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness.”<sup>28</sup> Four trends are noted: increasing precision weapons and delivery; increasing the menu of weapons from traditional lethality to nonlethal; increased stealth and invisibility of our forces and; improvements in information integration from sensors to shooters.<sup>29</sup> This embraces humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and the fact that these are already core competencies of SOF.

USSOCOM’s vision for the future, *SOF 2020*, builds on *Joint Vision 2010* and states, “SOF will be regionally oriented—culturally, linguistically and politically—while remaining a rapidly deployable, agile, joint force with capabilities ranging from less-than-lethal to precision surgical strikes.”<sup>30</sup> SOF will be prepared to respond “asymmetrically to both traditional and nontraditional forms of conflict.”<sup>31</sup> This vision provides core characteristics that correspond to the above trends and make SOF the “First Force.”<sup>32</sup> The expectations are that “SOF ‘Warrior Diplomats’ will...influence, advise, train and interact with foreign forces and populations.”<sup>33</sup>

Individually, the services have also signed up to the need to dealing with new problems. A Naval Studies Board recommended emphasis in intelligence and psychological operations because of handling populations on land, boarding ships, as refugees at sea and countering terrorists; specifically recommending the Marines be included in the capability to integrate “appropriate” Army units into their operations.<sup>34</sup> This was because they already had significant competency in dealing with populations from psychological operations to establishing civil governments and keeping civic order.<sup>35</sup> The committee concludes that “joint” attention to research and technology must

be given for subduing populations “in relatively benign ways...less-than-lethal means to make them immobile or passive.”<sup>36</sup> Better ways to rapidly establish feeding, holding and screening areas by foams, slimes, nausea generators, and instantly hardening liquid barriers are also techniques usable against drug lords, bandits and terrorists.<sup>37</sup>

One other body politic further substantiates that SOF are the warriors of choice as a total force for accomplishing new roles and missions. In a National Security Report the Reserve Officer’s Association note that by 2001 the National Guard and Reserve will have been reduced another 20% from 1996 levels, but comprise 3% more (35 to 38%) of the total military force.<sup>38</sup> More specifically, the total Army will be 50% Guard and Reserve personnel which provide the following capabilities:<sup>39</sup>

**Army Reserve**

- Will have 100% of the forces that provide fresh water supply, 95% of civil affairs units, 85%
- of medical brigades, 75% of chemical defense battalions and 70% of heavy combat engineer
- battalions
- Will have combat forces for two major regional conflicts (8 divisions, 15 enhanced brigades,
- 3 combat units)

**Air Force Reserve**

- Will have 80% of the aerial port units; 60% of tactical airlift, air rescue and recovery and; 50% of aerial refueling units

**Navy Reserve**

- Will have 100% of heavy logistics support units, 90% of the cargo loading units and 60% of the mobile construction battalions

In March 1996, the Association reported that the Army National Guard’s combat forces far exceeded a two major regional conflict requirement and that less than ten brigades were necessary for success in war. Therefore, they recommended that even with the reduction of forces and budget decline reserve combat forces could be eliminated, some

others converted to peace operations and the readiness of the reserve and total force would not suffer. The point being that these specialty reserve forces could easily and best be employed by integration with the active duty joint special operations forces.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, what are the actual numbers involved in cost and manpower for “doing windows” with SOF versus some other demolition employee? General Ronald Fogleman believes OOTWs “don’t affect the readiness of the majority of our “fighting forces.”<sup>41</sup> He stated that of the 391,000 personnel on active duty in the Air Force, 81,000 were forward-stationed in Europe, the Pacific or Southern Command, but operationally only 10,320 were away from their homes supporting some crisis or contingency—“if you stand back and look objectively at that; 10,320 people out of a force of 391,000 is not very many people.”<sup>42</sup> In every operation SOF assets have participated. Further, generally SOF resources constitute a small portion of the Defense Department’s budget with Fiscal Year 1997 funding at \$3,06 billion.<sup>43</sup> The US has a ready, highly capable and flexible joint special operations force that can do missions spanning the entire spectrum of conflict, but they do so with only 1.4% of the manpower (46,000 personnel) and 1.3 % of the defense budget actually dedicated to SOF operations.<sup>44</sup> This last statistic is the evidence that SOF provides “more bang for the buck,” more efficiency, effectiveness and force multiplication with which to leverage military capabilities.

### **What’s the “Window” Washer’s Past Employment Record?**

On paper, at least, we have seen that the military and especially SOF should be the obvious and logical choice for OOTW. However, detractors still abound and the reality of many past operations short of war is that they indeed had problems in their execution

and the fulfillment of objectives. Yet, it was not necessarily that the use of the military was wrong, but the way it was used or the command and control by the wrong kind of forces that created the issues. Individual and tactical capabilities(will and skill) were less at fault than the lack of clarity or knowledge of the strategic objectives. An assessment of an assortment of operations follows.

### **Vietnam and Beirut**

Most would agree that strategically the Vietnam conflict was a broken window that conventional forces did not, or could not fix, given their strategic limitations. However, studies of how one aspect of the war was prosecuted is significantly positive.<sup>45</sup> For the time that Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAP) functioned they “worked superbly.”<sup>46</sup> A CAP had 35 men; 20 local militia, 14 Marines, and a Navy Corpsman trained in customs, courtesies, culture and language. They shared ideas, lived together in hamlets and expanded civic action programs.<sup>47</sup> As predecessors to the future use of the Army Special Forces, CAP marines worked with the US Agency for International Development, the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, CARE and Catholic Relief Service.<sup>48</sup> Between 1965 and 1968 CAPs enhanced cohesion and reliability of militia forces and was a tactical success in eliminating the Viet Cong influence.<sup>49</sup> General Lewis W. Walt, the Third Marine Amphibious Force commander in 1965 recalls, “the instructions of Vietnam veterans to those going to the Nicaragua and Haiti campaigns as lessons on how to “temper the fight with an understanding of the people, compassion towards them, and the exercise of good works in the midst of war.”<sup>50</sup>

To have a military “presence” in Beirut, Lebanon, was the articulated objective or mission of the marines in 1982. That mission crept into peacekeeping without a change

in force structure, tactics, and training, but it did not fail because of military incapacity. As in Vietnam it was the misidentification of the need, threat, and risk by political decision makers.<sup>51</sup>

## **Somalia**

The following list gives a good picture of African struggles that sets the stage for intervention:

<b>Africa's Longest Wars-Number Dead Since 1980<sup>52</sup></b>					
Sudan	1983-	500,000-1 million	Ethiopia	1970-91	450,000-1 million
Mozambique	1979-91	450,000-1 million	Uganda	1980-	100,000-500,000
Angola	1975-91	300,000-500,000	Somalia	1982-	300,000-400,000

Refugees running for their lives, becoming a burden on their neighbor's food supply and economics; rampant crime, looting, and blockages of civilian relief efforts that the West Pakistani UN force could not handle brought US intervention to Somalia in 1992.<sup>53</sup> The objective of President Bush was limited to "opening the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended."<sup>54</sup> Those objectives were met to stop the dying. The Army Rangers, Marines and Air Force SOF could be lauded for their humanitarian support. What happened next was a shift to nation building and then to taking sides under Clinton's administration.<sup>55</sup> But was the failure of achieving the "new" objectives because the use of military force was inappropriate or was it more a factor of using the military for a more risk-oriented role without accepting that escalating a situation naturally increases casualties? It is inconsistent to want to use force and expect to do so risk free, The retreat from Somalia was again, not because the military failed, but that the public and politics failed to support recognizable threats. No operation where survival is at issue and

emotions overcome logic will result in zero loss. The real test is minimizing losses by using the right assets, the right way, at the right time and for the length of time necessary. Crocker makes the point that at least Somalia was “left better than we found it.”<sup>56</sup>

## **Bosnia**

The jury is still out for the most part in this continuing operation. However, the first ground mission (UN Protection Force) attempt at peacekeeping and delivering food, water and medical supplies was successful to a point. SOF played a key role in initializing contact with the parties for civil affairs and humanitarian relief and as Hiatt says, “What was done was far more useful than doing nothing...Some military missions may be justified if they improve a situation without curing it.”<sup>57</sup> Unfortunately, the Implementation Force (IFOR) assumed the mission of peace enforcement and had to create a secure environment before nation building, restoration of the economy, elections, refugee resettlement and arms control could proceed. According to William Johnsen’s strategic study this operation has been a benchmark with the one year deadline forcing the factions to resolve issues rather than IFOR and other international organizations having to do it all.<sup>58</sup> Implementing the military provision of the accords is proceeding more smoothly than expected, but the civil elements are not; therefore in his opinion there needs to be a long term effort to “sustain a safe, secure atmosphere where the other elements of the peace process can function.”<sup>59</sup> His conclusion is emphatic as far as this “window” of the world is concerned: “military forces...have played a critical and successful role in halting conflict and bringing stability to the region..., the basis of a lasting settlement will depend to a significant degree on the ability of an outside military force...that provide[s] unique capabilities essential for conduct of the mission (e.g., attack

helicopters, intelligence, theater communications, civil affairs and psychological operations).”<sup>60</sup> Clearly, an endorsement for SOF taking the lead.

A retired Army Colonel writes that “IFOR worked: military presence was overwhelming and immediately effective...that was the easy part. Now comes the truly heroic task of nation building and establishing confidence and trust among the factions.”<sup>61</sup> Thus, “the beat goes on” for warriors doing “windows” and with fewer numbers needed. General John Shalikashvili reminds us that stabilization is working, but though IFOR required 17,000 troops, the follow on force was to be 8,500 in 1997 and only 5,500 in 1998.<sup>62</sup> Critics contend the military is ill suited to nation building (in Bosnia) but peace is still being maintained and really, at what cost? Christopher Shepherd responds to John Hillen’s concerns that OOTW missions take time from training other combat skills (assuming SOF are not used) with the assertion that the benefits outweigh the costs/risks.”<sup>63</sup> There may be some inability to execute combat missions if policy makers do not recognize a need for force structure adjustments. However, the risk of war is now less out of the area, as well as within. In addition, a relatively small decrease in proficiency on some combat tasks is offset by over a year of relative peace in a historically violent region; time in which progress has been made toward a lasting solution to some of the area’s problems; and the prevention of a spread of the conflict—“those benefits are well worth the costs.”<sup>64</sup> Lastly, General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces and commander of US Forces in Europe states that the Bosnia deployment “has helped [troop] readiness. In the area of communications, intelligence and logistics readiness has gone up and reenlistments are higher than the Army’s goals because of the troop’s sense of mission and purpose.”<sup>65</sup>

## **Panama and Provide Comfort**

An analysis of two other operations also validates the thesis that SOF are essential for OOTW and results would have improved if they had been the supported vice the supporting force. Operation Promote Liberty was primarily a nation building operation to re-establish democracy in Panama in conjunction with Operation Just Cause which was to eliminate Manuel Noreiga. The major effort required setting up a trained civilian police force.<sup>66</sup> Deficiencies included legitimizing the civilian government too soon, premature and uncoordinated interagency transition of responsibilities, and a lack of civilian capabilities in training/maintaining indigenous discipline.<sup>67</sup> Those problems, according to Major James Klingaman, would have been resolved or precluded with SOF oversight. Operation Provide Comfort provided assistance to the Kurdish refugees fleeing Saddam Hussein's repression-a humanitarian endeavor with a facet of peace enforcement. Though the conventional forces ran a successful operation, Klingaman's analysis, revealed that special operations were the "glue" that [held] the operation together, provided it synergy," and kept lines of communication open to all involved.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, these cases represent the basis for institutionalizing SOCOM for future humanitarian operations.

## **Other "Windows"**

Indirect military intervention worked well in El Salvador. It took eleven years, six billion dollars, and twenty American lives, and the result was a democratic government working on human rights and market reforms.<sup>69</sup> This civil war assistance was low profile and supported by a long term commitment. It did not fail because the right military

(special operations) had the opportunity, training and ability to do the task of counterinsurgency.<sup>70</sup>

President Clinton, pleased with his selective use of the military in Haiti, stated that, “Democracy is back and the flow of desperate refugees has stopped.”<sup>71</sup> Another successful employment of SOF occurred when the US accomplished its first-ever military training program in formerly Marxist Mozambique during July 1996. It was a “low-key” operation involving eleven members of the 3rd Airborne Group, US Special Forces focusing on small-units and leadership.<sup>72</sup> And we should not forget the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) that reinforced the embassy in Liberia for four months, ensuring their security and resupply while disorder ruled the day.<sup>73</sup> Finally, it is to be noted that Special Forces, providing unique support, transportation and communication to the Military Operation and Mission in Ecuador and Peru, have kept the remote border dispute quiet since brief war arose in 1995.<sup>74</sup>

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>President George Bush, “The United Nations: Forging a Genuine Global Community,” *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol.3, No.39, September 28,1992, 721-724.

<sup>2</sup>President William Clinton, “Reforming the United Nations,” *Vital Speeches*,” October 15, 1993.

<sup>3</sup>Boutros Boutros-Gahli, “Empowering the United Nations,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/1993, 89-102.

<sup>4</sup>William G. Boykin, *Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Legislation: What Was Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled*,”(Individual Study Project, US Army War College, 1991), 35.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*Public Law 99-661*, 533.

<sup>8</sup>John M. Collins, *Special Operations Forces, An Assessment 1986-1993* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 1993), 8-9.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 9-10.

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<sup>10</sup>*Department of Defense Annual Report to the Congress, Part IV: Defense Components Chapter 22: Special Operations Forces, 199-204, March 1996, 199.*

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1992), I-6.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup>*USSOF Posture Statement* (Washington DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1996), 31-32.

<sup>15</sup>JCS, *Joint Pub 3-05, II-2.*

<sup>16</sup>*SOF Posture Statement, 32.*

<sup>17</sup>JCS, *Joint Pub 3-05, I-8.*

<sup>18</sup>JCS, *Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1993), G-3, 15.

<sup>19</sup>JCS, *Joint Pub 3-05, III-1.*

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, Appendix A, 1-8.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, Appendix C, C-3 to C-5.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, Appendix B, B-1 to B-3.

<sup>23</sup>*SOF Posture Statement, 42.*

<sup>24</sup>JCS, *Joint Pub 3-05, III-3.*

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, III-6,7.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, I-7, II-13, Appendixes A-7, B-3.

<sup>27</sup>*SOF Posture Statement, 2-7.*

<sup>28</sup>*Joint Vision 2010, 1.*

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 11-13.

<sup>30</sup>*Special Operations Forces Vision 2020, 22.*

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>34</sup>Naval Studies Board, *The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century*, National Research Council, (National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1996), 87-88.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup>“Reserve Officer’s Association National Security Report, GAO Testimony: Reserve Issues Pertaining to Readiness,” *The Officer*, Vol. LXXII, No. 5, May 1996, 20-21.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup>General Ronald Fogleman, interview with Al Rod reporter for *Maxwell Gunter Dispatch*, 23 August 1996, 5.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup>*1996 SOF Posture Statement, 29.*

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Dennis R. Lewis, *Operations Other than War: Limitations, Temptations, and Prescriptions*, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1995, (Air University (US) Air War College, Defense analytical study), 8-11.

<sup>46</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr, *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 175.

<sup>47</sup> David H. Wagner, "A Handful of Marines (CAP)," *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1968, 141.

<sup>48</sup> D.L. Evans, Jr, "USMC Civil Affairs in Vietnam," *The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1985), 318.

<sup>49</sup> Lewis, 8-11.

<sup>50</sup> Quoted in Lewis, 9.

<sup>51</sup> Casper Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York Warner Books, Inc. 1990), 105.

<sup>52</sup> Rick Hurckes, *Military Missions Other Than War-2025*, Maxwell AFB, AL, May 1995. 2 Vols. (Air University (US) Air Command and Staff College Research paper), II-85.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., II-84.

<sup>54</sup> President George Bush, "Humanitarian Mission to Somalia" US Department of State Dispatch, Vol.13, No. 49 (December 7, 1992), 865.

<sup>55</sup> John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 23, No 1, (Jan/Feb 1994), 60.

<sup>56</sup> Chester A. Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia-Not Everything Went Wrong," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, May/June 1995, Published by Council on Foreign Relations, 3.

<sup>57</sup> Fred Hiatt, "Shaky Grounds for Military Intervention," *Washington Post*, 7 October 1996, 21.

<sup>58</sup> William T. Johnsen, "US Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, Not A Sprint," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 20 Jun 1996, 1.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>61</sup> Alexander Gerry, "The IFOR," *The Officer*, \_\_\_\_

<sup>62</sup> George C. Wilson, "Troops Stay Busy with New Missions," *Air Force Times*, 2 December 1996.

<sup>63</sup> Christopher L. Shepherd, "Minor Expense in the Purchase of Peace," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 December 1996, 23.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Dana Priest, *Washington Post*, 14 January 1997, 11.

<sup>66</sup> James J. Klingaman, *Proponency for Military Operations Other Than War: The Case for the United States Special Operations Command*, MA Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1995, 51-59.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 72.

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<sup>69</sup>Victor M Rosello, "Lessons from El Salvador," *Parameters*, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Winter 1993-94), 100-102.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup>Bryan Bender, "Clinton: Military Has Been Successful Foreign Policy Tool," *Defense Daily*, 6 August 1996, 205.

<sup>72</sup>"US Helps Train Mozambique Soldiers," *Washington Times*, 4 August 1996, 9.

<sup>73</sup>"Marines Pull Out Of Liberia," *Navy Times*, 12 August 1996, 2

<sup>74</sup>Jorge Banaks, *United Press International* release in the *Washington Times*, 14 January 1997, 10.

## Chapter 6

### What Waits for Warriors and Windows?

*Our foreign policy successes have occurred] because we refuse to listen to those who said that with the Cold War over America could choose escapism over engagement....The fact is America remains the indispensable nation. There are times when America, and only America, can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear. Of course, we can't take on all the world's burden. But where our interests and values demand it and where we can make a difference, America must act and lead.*

—President William Clinton

### Expert Expectations

As already alluded to the foundation of the world's "house" does not appear threatened by any major catastrophe in the next twenty five years. Yet, a number of uncovered "windows" are chipped, broken or need putty and paint on their frames. A few insights and perceptions from those that have been involved, are involved or will be involved in applying armed forces short of war follow. Army Chief of Staff General Reimer expects that "operations other than war are going to be the norm, the nation needs an adequate number of soldiers to do those missions and if we trade off too much end strength, later we will pay that bill in blood."<sup>1</sup> This comment was part of an interview concerning the Army's *Vision 2010*. Each service has prepared a vision statement as has the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Shalikashvili- *Joint Vision 2010*. General

Shalikashvili believes the military must change with the changing demands on the world and the United States. He argues that interventions like Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda must be in future plans even though they are not a direct threat because we must “make sure we shape the environment in such a way so that these lesser threats to our lesser interests don’t grow...into something worse.”<sup>2</sup> Retired General Vessey, a former CJCS with 46 years of military service, echoes the current Chairman: “...forces are needed to defend against ‘big accidents’ that could grow out little accidents like in the past—and there are a lot of those out there.”<sup>3</sup>

The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Fogleman acknowledges that the use of military forces for peacekeeping and other non-warfighting operations “is a reality that needs to be addressed as a part of the QDR, especially ‘lesser regional contingencies’...like those carried out in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda.”<sup>4</sup> He states that during the last major defense strategy review in 1993, known as the “Bottom Up Review,” these operations were not an issue because they were handled ad hoc—an approach using left over forces that needs to change.<sup>5</sup> Major General Krulak, Commandant of the US Marine Corps is of the opinion that the Marines have always had the lead in doing “such other things as the President may direct,” and is proud to have the Marines improving on these OOTW even with reduced strength and budget.<sup>6</sup> He adds that “within three blocks you can have a soldier wrapping a baby, spreading one’s arms to separate sides or defending himself with arms and the military has to change its socialization to do this.”<sup>7</sup> Of singular importance is the expectations of newly appointed Defense Secretary Cohen. He stresses that deployments for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions will continue. “While we are not and cannot be the world’s

policeman,” he says, “neither can we become a prisoner of world events, isolated, tucked safely away in a continental cocoon.”<sup>8</sup>

### **Expert Recommendations**

The military, and especially SOF, clearly meet the future employment contract specifications and expectations of our nation’s strategy based on their core competencies and capabilities. However, the experts have, as we have seen above, also have identified concerns from a force structure perspective and provide relevant suggestions for maintaining readiness as resources decline. One retired general advises that, “consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and new strategies to strengthen democratic institutions,” but it is enough forces to conduct military civic action that will be the means for achieving US objectives around the globe.<sup>9</sup> Dr. Grant Hammond looks for more development of the new warrior/ peacemaker/observer/monitor that can culturally engage, enlarge and institutionalize social, economic and geopolitical principals.<sup>10</sup> General(ret) Vessey argues that, on the eve of the QDR, the Guard and the Reserve need to be integrated even more than they are now into OOTW and that the Rangers/Special Operations forces also need to be increased.<sup>11</sup>

General Fogleman states that based on realities force structure should be shaped to better handle operations other than war: “you ought to equip them and focus them on non-warfighting missions.”<sup>12</sup> His formula for the future force structure is one capable of winning one and a half major conflicts with others left to handle one-half or one quarter challenges which may require meeting the NSS with an expansion of expeditionary mobile forces.<sup>13</sup> General Reimer recommends more psychological operations and civil

affairs personnel as well as security police, combat support and combat service support units because the new style of war requires a different fighter.<sup>14</sup> The CJCS also realizes that though US troops are not prepared to be international policemen, their new roles are a change that the QDR should consider in designing future forces.<sup>15</sup> The consensus is that more specialists in OOTW are necessary and that “war readiness” or inability to respond to fighting the nation’s wars need not suffer.

A most insightful article concerning improvement of OOTW capabilities comes from Colonel (ret) Mendel. He notes that civilian agencies cannot handle OOTW tasks because they have no response to military power against them nor the organizational or logistical assets for large operations.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, he makes a number of suggestions. First, there should be a standing joint military planning staff for OOTW with apportioned forces that would be trained to join with government, non-government and international organizations in dealing with operations short of war. If permanent, the command would develop expertise in interagency and international matters; act unilaterally or with others; be cost effective and; avoid the degradation of readiness in conventional forces by relieving them of OOTW missions.<sup>17</sup> Mendel recommends liaison representatives from private, interagency and non-governmental organizations work with his idea of a “joint engagement command (JEC) reporting directly to the national command authorities or serving as a sub-unified command of USSOC.”<sup>18</sup> Organized functionally, his JEC would have Reserves playing a major role with engineers, medical, civil affairs, security police, security assistance and logistics components in addition to special operations personnel that include psychological operations and intelligence units.<sup>19</sup> In this way Mendel believes with a “better organizing of what is now on hand” you do not create more force

structure and “the Armed Forces could remain unbedeviled by OOTW missions, free to concentrate on training for decisive battles of annihilation.”<sup>20</sup> It is the contention of this paper that Mendel’s principals are sound; however creating a JEC is duplication of existing effort already available in USSOC and but another layer of unneeded military bureaucracy.

One last observation comes from a white paper by the Strategic Aerospace Warfare Study panel that assumes that militarily, at least until 2025, no singular power or combination of hostile powers will develop to match US superiority. Any attempt to challenge the US would be evolutionary/progressive and visible which would allow sufficient reaction time for meeting any spectrum of warfare.<sup>21</sup> Thus, a force structure with a greater ratio of SOF, integrated with Guard and Reservists (who do a great portion of OOTW already), will be better able to do all the nation’s windows as well as have plenty of time to take care of the “house.” SOF are force multipliers. Their expertise, maturity and technology allows more tasks to be accomplished with fewer numbers. Their ability to already work within the Total Force concept, with coalition forces and indigenous personnel further reduces the numbers required for active duty US forces. Our special “subcontractors” in the profession of arms are more efficient and effective in doing the growing assortment of “odd job” than our general contractors.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Paxton, *Army Times*, 8.

<sup>2</sup> General John Shalikashvili, *USA Today*, 11 December 1996, 1.

<sup>3</sup> General Jack Vessey, lecture Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 8 January 1997.

<sup>4</sup> Bill Getz, *Washington Times*, 8 January 1997, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Major General Krulak, lecture at Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 15 January 1997.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Rick Maze, *Air Force Times*, 3 February 1997, 3.

<sup>9</sup> General (ret) Fred F. Woerner, Jr, "Introduction," *Joint Pub 3-07*, 16 January 1995,

I-1.

<sup>10</sup> Dr. Grant Hammond, lecture Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1996-97.

<sup>11</sup> Vessey.

<sup>12</sup> Getz, *Washington Times*.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Reimer, AWC lecture.

<sup>15</sup> Shalikhvili, *USA Today*

<sup>16</sup> William W. Mendel, "New Forces for Engagement Policy," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Institute of National Strategic Studies, NDU, Washington DC, Vol. 10, Winter 1995-96), 28-29.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> *Aerospace Power for the 21st Century: A Theory to Fly By*, A White Paper from the Strategic Aerospace Warfare Study Panel, 4 October 1996, 28.

## Chapter 7

### Conclusion

*Peacekeeping is not a mission for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.*

— Boutros Boutros-Gahli

The above quote has at least two caveats: one, peace operations (or any other OOTW) are not *normally* missions the armed forces as a *whole* are groomed for, which are those requiring the overwhelming application and mass of combat power. Two, soldiers can do OOTW, have done them and done them well, and will do even better in the future when the force structure is properly adjusted for these taskings. In fact, depending on the situational dynamics it is now more critical to have the capability to deter war and exercise preventive diplomacy than to have, without a military threat to the nation's survival on the horizon, a force unable to react to anything but war. Unfortunately, there are still many proponents of not having the military do anything but prepare for total war; and it would not be surprising to find most of them within the military. It is time to stop the breast-beating. Doing OOTW and “windows” are tasks the military has done for a long time, even in past periods of austerity. Now that resources are again at a premium, but the world's threats have changed there is no need to eliminate those programs which are the most effective, efficient and intelligent method of realizing our national security objectives.

“Windows” are already within the military’s contractual obligations and will increase their relevance through predictably greater participation in United Nation sanctioned operations. The actual forces committed for these OOTW are available, ready, willing and able. The special operations units and the organizational structure to meet foreseeable contingencies is in existence. These conflicts are more political in nature than military; just exactly what special forces (culturally, linguistically and regionally oriented) are primarily staffed to do in a joint, combined and interagency way. This partnership workability reduces the overall numbers of US forces, but they are still too few, to do too much, for so many. All that is needed is an emphasis on expanding special operations forces including the continued integration of Guard and Reserves. The numbers do not have to be large- technology, training, and talent allow more to be accomplished with less—and mass applications of force will not be needed anyway. Operational tempo for all forces can be reduced and yet, if combat operations are necessary the core of conventional warriors will still be ready. More importantly, SOF are trained to handle the full spectrum of conflict between humanitarian combat roles. They can make the transition to combat readiness from a very restrictive rules of engagement environment very quickly, thereby reducing a need for a large standing military of just “war fighters”

We must not lose sight of the fact that with an ever broadening definition of national security, our military should not be burdened with doing these “windows” alone. As the windows of the world become more difficult to clean, the more they affect the rest of the house. A crack in one pane can lead to a broken window and the “cold” returning. It is time to reorganize a little, do some preventive maintenance and acknowledge that “home

care” (nation-building) is requires long term presence. The peace and quiet enjoyment of the household requires effort on the part of the entire family so IGOs, NGOs, private organizations and other instruments of power from around the world are needed to provide not just a military peace, but a social, economic and political peace. The SOF have a special dedication and capability to deter wars by involvement in operations other than war. They are, or should be, the basic building blocks for “engaging and enlarging” as befits our NSS.

In this post cold war period, without major world conflict a threat, OOTW should be considered “windows of opportunity” for stabilizing the world, promoting social and economic equity, and minimizing the disastrous effects of failed states. Let us not pay lip service to warrior diplomacy. Let us step up to being the world’s leader in values, for our own interests and back from a neo isolationism. Lt Col Robert Poyner leaves us with this thought: As “we move from adolescence to adulthood,...[we] put simpler things behind us and enter a far more complex, sophisticated world...and realize that many nontraditional taskings...(e.g. humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peacemaking, counternarcotics, etc.) nestle quite well under the framework of projecting influence, which could be a helping hand just as easily as a fist.”<sup>1</sup> The military’s special operations forces are the mature specialists to “handle” the most fragile “windows.”

### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Robert D. Poyner, “Childhood’s End: A Personal View of the Future of Air Power and the Air Force,” *Airpower Journal*, Vol. X, No. 2, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL, Summer 1996, 116.

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