

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

EFFECTS OF SERVICE CULTURE ON JOINT OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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## ABSTRACT

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There is no doubt among today's professional officer corps that joint operations are the only way that America's armed forces will conduct all future contingency operations. To be truly effective, the officer corps must possess an inherently joint mindset to fully employ the military element of national power. Joint officer management is codified in Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy, of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, or GNA for short. Title IV specifies a complete system of joint officer management to include management policies, promotion objectives, education requirements and utilization and experience requirements. Seventeen years after the passing of the GNA, how much progress have the Services made towards implementing the spirit of the law in addition to the letter of the law? Do the officer cultures of the Services support or hinder the joint officer management policies of the GNA? This research project discusses the background and origins of the GNA, the existing joint atmosphere at the time and what the GNA attempted to fix. It then discusses organizational culture and its effects on the behavior of the members of the organization and how it applies to the military services. It highlights the officer cultures of the military services and their perspectives on joint assignments. This project concludes with recommendations for change or improvement in service cultures, as needed to fully support the spirit and intent of the GNA.



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## EFFECTS OF SERVICE CULTURE ON JOINT OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS

There is no doubt among today's professional officer corps that joint operations are the only way that America's armed forces will conduct all future contingency operations. To be truly effective, the officer corps must possess an inherently joint mindset to fully employ the military element of national power. Joint officer management is codified in Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy, of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, or GNA for short. Title IV specifies a complete system of joint officer management to include management policies, promotion objectives, education requirements and utilization and experience requirements.

Seventeen years after the passing of the GNA, how much progress have the Services made towards implementing the spirit of the law in addition to the letter of the law? Do the officer cultures of the Services support or hinder the joint officer management policies of the GNA?

The future defense needs of our country require officers who are well versed in joint operations. This proficiency is developed in three ways: institutional education, field experience, and self development. To answer the questions above, I will discuss the background and origins of the GNA. What was the existing joint atmosphere at the time and what did GNA attempt to fix? Next I will discuss organizational culture and its effects on the behavior of the members of the organization and how it applies to the military services. I will then discuss the officer cultures of the military services and their perspectives on joint assignments. The paper will look at how well the Services are preparing officers for joint capability based on how well they are assigning officers to the schools and joint assignments that provide the institutional education and field experiences needed for success in the joint environment. I will then make recommendations for change or improvement in service cultures, as needed to fully support the spirit and intent of the GNA. I will finish with conclusions that can be drawn from this paper.

### THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986

"Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."

— President George W. Bush<sup>1</sup>

In President George W. Bush's graduation address to the United States Military Academy's Corps of Cadets and graduating Class of 2002, he established the foundation for the National Security Strategy of the United States of America in the post September 11, 2001 paradigm. The U.S. Armed Forces, as one of the major institutions of American national security, will play a significant role in achieving the goals of the National Security Strategy. The senior leaders of the Department of Defense (DOD), in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), have outlined four key goals of the defense strategy that will determine how the U.S. Armed Forces will support the National Security Strategy:

- Assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments;
- Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends;
- Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure; and
- Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.<sup>2</sup>

The defense strategy has shifted from a threat-based approach to a capabilities based approach to defense.<sup>3</sup> To meet the challenges of a capabilities based approach, joint and combined forces capable of rapid movement and integration will be required, forces that are light, lethal and maneuverable, survivable and readily deployed and employed.<sup>4</sup> The success of future joint operations requires a "flexible, reliable, and effective joint command and control architecture that provides the flexibility to maneuver, sustain, and protect U.S. forces across the battlefield in a timely manner."<sup>5</sup>

Never before in our Nation's history has it been more important for the officers in the U.S. Armed Forces to fully immerse themselves in the culture of "jointness". The Nation will continue to seek the synergy and efficiency of joint and combined operations to meet defense goals. This was recognized long before the events of September 11, 2001 changed the shape of the landscape of future military operations.

#### ORIGINS OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

The poor performance of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army in the Spanish-American War led to the early efforts to reform military operations, resulting in the formation of the Joint Army-Navy Board and later the War-Navy-State Board. The American Joint Chiefs was established during World War II to coordinate war efforts with the British Chiefs of Staff and used by

President Roosevelt to carry out his policies for the conduct of the war.<sup>6</sup> The National Security Act of 1947 formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body consisting of the three service chiefs and the Chief of Staff to the President. While the Act caused significant reform and brought a degree of unification to the military establishment, it failed to clarify lines of command, authority, and responsibility among the uniformed military services, the military departments, the DOD and the President.<sup>7</sup>

There have been three major attempts since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 to achieve the needed clarification and reform the DOD. The first occurred in 1953 when President Eisenhower sought to bring more centralization to the Defense Department by strengthening the authority of the Secretary, giving the Chairman greater latitude in managing the Joint Chiefs, and providing clarity to the operational chain of command.<sup>8</sup> The second attempt at reform came about during the Kennedy Administration. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara concentrated on the formulation of strategy and the allocation of resources to support the strategy. The resulting Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is still in use today.<sup>9</sup> The PPBS, in conjunction with increased Congressional interest and the resultant reliance on civilian analysts and defense intellectuals, led to civilian competition with the Joint Chiefs in their primary function of providing military advice to the President. America's failure in Vietnam, to include the military's performance in the field and the lack of credibility suffered by the senior military leadership, contributed to the high degree of civilian interference that would permeate the system for the remainder of the 1970s and into the 1980s. The failure of Desert One, the attempted rescue of American hostages in Iran, became another symbol of the perceived incompetence of the U.S. Armed Forces.<sup>10</sup>

While serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General David C. Jones recognized the need for reform in the joint system. After several years of attempting to reform the system from within, he recognized that the necessary changes needed to come from outside the system. In 1982, Jones asked the House Armed Services Committee to reform the system.<sup>11</sup> After four years of in-depth research and tenacious debate, the GNA was enacted in 1986. The principle congressional findings leading to the passage of the GNA held that the quality of officers being assigned to the joint arena was inadequate. The best officers were staying in their respective services because there was little incentive to "go joint". Service priorities and practices, if continued without outside alteration, would never address the issue.<sup>12</sup> The GNA sought to rectify the services' current practices by outlining specific guidelines for joint officer management.

## TITLE IV, JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY

Title IV of the GNA established procedures for the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of joint duty officers. Specific provisions of Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy that I will address include:

- Require that an officer may not be selected as a joint specialty officer (JSO) until he/she completes the joint professional military education (JPME) program and completes a joint tour of duty.
- Direct the Secretary of Defense to designate at least 1000 critical joint duty assignments (JDA) that must always be filled by JSOs.
- Required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the qualification of officers assigned to JDAs, to include joint service officers not serving in JDAs, are such that the average promotion rates of their service will be achieved or exceeded.
- Required that no officer may be promoted to general or flag rank unless he/she has served in a JDA. This provision is subject to waiver by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>13</sup>

Following initial implementation of the policy, DOD submitted requests for modification in 1987 that were included in the Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (FY88 and FY89) National Defense Authorization Acts. Congress did not allow modifications that would compromise the spirit and goals of the GNA. Allowed modifications included the reduction of tour lengths for JDAs for field grade officers to three years and for general/flag officers to two years. It also allowed waivers in the experience and education requirements, delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense the authority to designate joint specialists, and allowed cumulative credit for joint tour assignments.<sup>14</sup> Other changes included: in 1993, recognizing the changing nature of employing troops, Congress allowed joint tour credit for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.<sup>15</sup> Congress also allowed the services to assign graduates from JPME to a joint position in either their first or second assignment following graduation.<sup>16</sup>

### INTENT OF TITLE IV

The intent of Title IV was to improve the performance and effectiveness of joint organizations by enhancing the quality, stability, and experience of officers in JDAs. Keys to the Services supporting the intent and spirit of the GNA are sharing quality officers with the joint community and not disadvantaging those officers with joint experience. The message being sent to the Services by Congress is very clear – joint duty is important. Associating the ultimate

selection of general and flag officers with joint experience clearly indicates the quality of officer that was envisioned by Congressional leaders.<sup>17</sup>

The intent of Title IV is clear, but is there a discrepancy between joint and Service interests that is demonstrated by existing Service personnel policies? The Professional Military Education Panel in 1987 considered the problem of “creating acceptance that the [JSO] career path was good for both the Services and the officer corps.”<sup>18</sup> Do the officer cultures of the Services allow the problem to still exist today? To answer that question, we must look at organizational cultures and their effects on members of the organization.

## **THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE**

What is the importance of culture to an organization? Professor Edgar H. Schein, a Professor of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and recognized expert in the field of organizational culture, suggests that an organization’s culture develops to help it cope with its environment.<sup>19</sup> An understanding of an organization’s culture will provide insights as to why organizations and the people in them do things a particular way and how they act in certain situations or under certain conditions. The information presented in the following section will provide the framework for identifying the cultures of the military Services. It will also provide the framework for identifying possible changes needed to bring the Services in line with the spirit and intent of the GNA and possible methodologies for making that change. It will also lay the responsibility for those changes squarely on the shoulders of the senior leadership of the Services.

### **WHAT IS ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE?**

There are several definitions for organizational culture. Two of them are listed below:

- a set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of people that are largely tacit among members and are clearly relevant and distinctive to the particular group which are also passed on to new members
- the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are: learned responses to the group’s problems of survival in its external environment and its problems of internal integration; are shared by members of an organization; that operate unconsciously; and that define in a basic “taken for granted” fashion in an organization’s view of itself and its environment<sup>20</sup>

The definitions above suggest that there are two schools of thought, or camps, that exist in the study of organizational culture and strategies for its application. The first camp views organizational culture as implicit in social life. Culture emerges from the natural process of individuals transforming themselves into tribes, communities, nations, or other social groupings. The second camp is of the view that organizational culture is an explicit social product arising from social interaction either as an intentional or unintentional consequence of behavior. Culture is comprised of distinct observable forms such as language, ceremonies, customs, use of symbols, tools or technology, that groups of people create through social interaction and use to confront the broader social environment. The second view is the most relevant to the analysis of organizational culture in the military services and to the change strategies leaders can employ to change behavior.<sup>21</sup>

Professor Schein characterizes culture as consisting of three levels. The level that is the most visible to observers is behavior and artifacts.<sup>22</sup> The next level of culture contains the group's values. The values of the group will determine behavior, but are not as easily observable as the behaviors are.<sup>23</sup> At the deepest level of culture are the assumptions and beliefs. Schein states that assumptions grow out of values until they are taken for granted and drop out of awareness.<sup>24</sup>

To fully understand an organization's culture, one must understand all three levels of its culture. Additionally essential to identifying and understanding the organizational culture is the need to recognize the group or "cultural unit" that "owns" the culture. An organization may have many different cultures (Airborne? Mechanized? Special Forces?) or subcultures (officer, enlisted). Identifying the cultural unit will lead to better understanding the culture.<sup>25</sup>

#### THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER IN PRODUCING CHANGE

An organization's culture is created, maintained and transformed by people. The culture is also created and maintained in part by the organization's leadership. The leaders at the executive level generate the organization's ideology, articulate the core values, and specify the norms. The organization's *values* express the preference for particular behaviors or outcomes, while the organization's *norms* express the behaviors that are accepted by others. The values and norms are the acceptable means of pursuing the organization's goals.<sup>26</sup>

Realizing that organizational cultures provide group members with a reliable means to interpret a highly ambiguous environment, it is the leader's responsibility to specify the features of the environment that are relevant to the organization and then provide the supporting assumptions and rationale for its operating strategies. The leaders need to recognize that their

cultural messages should specifically address cultural ambiguities associated with subculture practices within the organization, and limit their attempts to eliminate distinctions that are important to the subculture's identities. Another way to say this is that leaders stand a better chance to create or transform an organization's culture if they understand, accept, and foster productive aspects of organizational subcultures and consistently communicate how members must perform in order for the organization to achieve its objectives. Productive cultural change will occur if leaders correctly analyze the organization's existing culture, and evaluate it against the cultural attributes needed to achieve strategic objectives.<sup>27</sup>

As stated in the beginning of this section, the information presented provides the framework for identifying the cultures of the military Services. It also provides the framework for identifying possible changes needed to bring the Services in line with the spirit and intent of the GNA and possible methodologies for making that change. It also lays the responsibility for those changes squarely on the shoulders of the senior leadership of the Services. We will now look at applying these frameworks to the military culture.

### **IDENTIFYING SERVICE CULTURES**

Carl Builder, a researcher with the Rand Corporation, said, "characterizing institutions can be amusing (or painful). Giving institutions a personality is a way of giving them a face that can be remembered, recalled, and applied in evaluating future behavior or circumstances."<sup>28</sup> Builder argues that the most powerful institutions in the national security arena are the military services and much of their behavior is dictated by their distinct organizational personalities.<sup>29</sup> According to Builder, "Despite the logical wrappings of defense planning, there is considerable evidence that the qualities of the U.S. military forces are determined more by the cultural and institutional preferences for certain kinds of military forces than by the 'threat'. There are many ways to interpret a threat; there are many ways to deal with any particular interpretation of a threat."<sup>30</sup> He also argues that the attitudes of individual service members are, by extension, a subset of organizational attitudes within the service.<sup>31</sup> In this section, I will attempt to apply a personality to the Services that may give us insight into determining the effect that "personality" has on JDAs.

#### **THE ARMY**

The culture of the Army is one that takes its "greatest pride in their [individual] skill as opposed to their possessions."<sup>32</sup> Barbara Tuchman states, "Traditionally the American Army considered itself the neutral instrument of state power. It exists to carry out the government's

orders, and when ordered it does not ask 'Why?' or 'What for?'"<sup>33</sup> The Army has the unique distinction of being able to conduct "prompt and sustained operations on land throughout the entire spectrum of crisis, and to ... [operate] as part of the joint war fighting team envisioned in JV 2010."<sup>34</sup>

Selfless service and acknowledging the Army's role as part of the Joint Team are hallmarks of Army operational doctrine. Doctrine for success on the battlefield requires cooperation between all Army branches, and coupling operations with Air Force, Marine and Navy forces increases the probability of success.<sup>35</sup>

## THE NAVY

The Navy bases its cultural identity on independence and stature. One of the distinct traditions of the Navy, which is aggressively promulgated in its training programs, is the time-honored tradition of "independent command at sea."<sup>36</sup> "It is about wielding sea power as the most important and flexible kind of military power for America as a maritime nation. The means to those ends are the institution and its traditions, which provide permanence beyond the people who serve them."<sup>37</sup> General David C. Jones, former CJCS, succinctly captured the Navy's preferred mode of operation. He states, "The Department of the Navy is the most strategically independent of the Services – it has its own army, navy, and air force. It is least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all assets, and be left alone."<sup>38</sup>

The Navy strongly advocates that the physical presence of carrier battle groups far outweighs any notions of "virtual global presence." The Navy also asserts that Presidents historically select the maritime services as the "force of choice" for intervention. This choice becomes more applicable as most of the world's population is concentrated within a few hundred miles of the littoral regions.<sup>39</sup>

## THE AIR FORCE

"The Air Force sees itself as the embodiment of an idea, a concept of warfare, a strategy made possible and sustained by technology. The bond is not an institution, but the love of flying machines and flight."<sup>40</sup> "The Air Force is the keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war – the technological marvels of flight that have been adopted for war."<sup>41</sup> "The Air Force can talk of the 'enemy as a system' or of 'striking plural strategic centers of gravity,' but few people in [or outside] the Air Force know what those phrases mean."<sup>42</sup> This type of techno-speak of the Air Force strategy is symbolic of the Service's identity.

## THE MARINES

The U.S. Marine Corps is unique in that it has its own culture and a shared culture with the Navy. Marines pride themselves on adapting to the mission and being able to operate in the air, on land, and at sea. Their motto of "Semper Fidelis" (Always Faithful) embodies the essence of the Marine Corps.<sup>43</sup>

Given the above, do the Service cultures hinder or support Joint Officer Assignments? Do they maintain a bias towards keeping the best quality officers for their own needs? Does the need to get Service expertise for promotion compete with time available for joint duty? Is there a Service reluctance to release officers for JPME? The following section will address those questions as well as the Services' record for meeting GNA guidelines.

## SERVICE CULTURES AND JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

The Services maintain a great deal of influence over joint officer management and prefer to tightly control their officers. This influence is due to the fact that the Services nominate their officers for promotions and clearly those nominations will be based on Service qualifications.<sup>44</sup> The Services ultimately control which schools and assignments officers will fill. However, whether or not an officer attends JPME or serves in a JDA is a combination of the officer's zeal in seeking and requesting those slots and the Services' determination to fill those assignments and seats. The Services' cultures will affect both of these. This section will explore how the Services employ their influence over joint officer management.

## JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

According to a December 2002 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the DOD has satisfactorily met the provisions in the GNA that require it to develop officers in joint matters through education by establishing a two-phased JPME program. The act did not establish specific numerical requirements and DOD also has not determined the number of officers who should complete the JPME program. In FY2001, only one-third of the officers serving in joint organizations had completed both phases of JPME.<sup>45</sup>

DOD incorporated the first phase of JPME into the curricula of the Services' intermediate and senior level professional military education schools. The second phase of JPME is offered in residence at the National Defense University's Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, and at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C. Although DOD assigns approximately 3,000 active duty officers to joint assignments each year, the three schools collectively have approximately 1,200 seats available annually for active

duty officers. This is cited by the GAO as a significant contributing factor to not educating all officers assigned to joint billets.<sup>46</sup>

Additionally, the Joint Forces Staff College, where most officers receive the second phase, is operating at 83 percent of its 906-seat capacity. The number of unfilled seats has risen significantly in recent years, from a low of 12 empty seats in FY 1998 to a high of 154 empty seats in FY2001. DOD officials cited pressing needs to assign officers to the increasing number of military operations as a major reason for the vacancies.<sup>47</sup> Among the Services, the Air Force took the best advantage of the education, filling 101 percent of its allocated seats between FY1996 and FY2001. It was able to fill 16 additional seats above its allocation that had been left vacant by the other Services. The Marines were next by filling 96 percent, followed by the Army at 89 percent, and finally the Navy at 85 percent.<sup>48</sup> The high number of Air Force attendance rates is indicative of the technologically based culture of the Air Force, and the importance it places on education opportunities.

Officers interviewed for the GAO report indicated the importance of completing the first phase of JPME because, they perceived, in most Services there is a clear correlation between completion of the first phase and promotion potential. In the Army and Air Force, completion of the first phase has become a prerequisite for promotion to lieutenant colonel, if not by policy, then at least by practice. In all Services, completion of the first phase, whether or not it is an absolute requirement, is looked upon favorably for promotion purposes.<sup>49</sup> Of the interviewed officers that had completed the second phase of JPME, only 78 percent felt that it was important to their careers. Many felt that completion of the second phase was only important to those officers that desired to be general or flag officers.<sup>50</sup>

Another recent study provides insights into the Services' cultural influences on joint education. The Navy has generally preferred its leaders spend more time "at sea" or in some operational assignment rather than spending time enriching their personal education. The Air Force tends to fall at the other end of the spectrum, especially since it relies so much upon technology and the knowledge of how to best use it. The Marines, although part of the Department of the Navy, have a very different culture from the Navy. The Marines are focused on self-sufficiency and joint operations. The Navy transports the Marines, but the Marines have their own integrated air and ground forces for operation ashore. The Army's leaders, however, are most comfortable learning within their own ranks.<sup>51</sup> The percentage of fill for seats at the Joint Forces Staff College for the second phase of JPME seems to support these findings. Granted, there are other factors involved in not filling seats that have nothing to do with attitudes

toward JPME. Filling the seats is not the only measure of how services view joint officer development, but it is a telling indicator.

#### JOINT DUTY POSITIONS

The GAO reports that DOD has surpassed certain provisions in the act that require it to assign officers who meet specified criteria to joint positions. However, DOD has also increasingly relied on allowable waivers and has not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with officers who hold a joint specialty designation. This number reached an all-time high in FY2001 when DOD did not fill 477, or 59 percent, of its critical joint duty billets with JSOs.<sup>52</sup> The most frequently cited reason for not filling the positions with JSOs was because the commander of the joint organization believed the best-qualified officer for the position was not a JSO.<sup>53</sup>

The Services have generally been reluctant, particularly in the Army and the Navy, to change officer career paths to accommodate joint duty.<sup>54</sup> Currently, only 29 percent of JSOs return to a joint assignment once; less than 10 percent return twice.<sup>55</sup> Services' concerns over assigning officers to complete JPME and serve in joint assignments indicates that it is extremely difficult to fit both the joint experiences and the Service experiences, which they consider equally important, into a typical career path.<sup>56</sup> They have argued that the complexity of what goes on within each Service is so great and the skills demanded so high that one cannot afford the luxury of learning about other Services. This argument has led to the parochial view that taking time away from the responsibility of mastering the mores, operational doctrine, and the systems of one's own Service is counterproductive.<sup>57</sup>

However, personnel detailers talk in private both about the demoralization junior officers sense at not earning joint qualifications soon enough, and the growing pressure to exclude from joint assignments any officer who is not rated first or second among several peers in yearly evaluations.<sup>58</sup>

A review of the biographies of Service Chiefs and regional Combatant Commanders indicates that "jointness" may not be as prestigious as having served well in one's Service. The biographies demonstrate that prior duties as a commander in the officer's parent Service receive top billing over previous joint experience. Commands of Service units dominate the biographies, as do accomplishments within that officer's Service. While this may be logical for Service Chiefs, the job of Combatant Commander should require an extensive knowledge of joint capabilities as well as joint experiences. This appears not to be the case, based on the biographies of the current and recent Combatant Commanders. A possible reason for the lack of emphasis on previous joint experience might be that there are very few joint commands and

many joint staff positions. It is far more prestigious to highlight commands one has held over staff positions, joint or other wise. Another possible reason is that these officers have spent a great deal more time working for their parent Service than they have in JDAs, and therefore lack the joint experiences to spotlight in their biographies. While there is no doubt that officers need to learn their trade in one of the Services and perform well and demonstrate their potential for increased responsibility in that Service, it appears that Service performance is more prestigious than jointness, even when citing credentials for the most senior joint billets.<sup>59</sup>

#### PROMOTION GOALS

The Services view the promotion comparisons developed by Congress to be too difficult and cumbersome, leading to misperceptions. Among the misperceptions are that all officers in joint tours have to be promoted, and that an officer must serve a joint tour to be promoted. In reality, some officers serving in joint assignments are not being promoted, and serving in a joint billet is not a prerequisite for promotion below general and flag officer ranks.<sup>60</sup>

DOD has made progress, but it is still not fully meeting provisions to promote mid-grade officers (majors, lieutenant commanders, lieutenant colonels, commanders, colonels and Navy captains) who are serving or who have served in joint positions at rates not less than the promotion rates of their peers who have not served in joint positions. Between FY1995 and FY 2001, DOD met more than 90 percent of its promotion goals for officers who served on the Joint Staff, almost 75 percent of its promotion goals for JSOs, and just over 70 percent of its promotion goals for all other officers who served in joint positions.<sup>61</sup>

Further analysis of these statistics show that although DOD is having the most success meeting the promotion goals of officers that have served on the Joint Staff, the agency is less successful of meeting the goals in the other two categories. For JSOs, the GAO was unable to pinpoint any particular problems in specific pay grades or Services. The GNA standard for JSOs has been temporarily reduced through December 2004, from meeting the promotion rates of officers serving in the Service headquarters to meeting the rates of other officers in the same service, pay grade and specialty. Compared to the lower standard, DOD would have met the standard, with few exceptions, between FY88 and FY01.<sup>62</sup> Since 1996, DOD has been working on proposed legislation that will make the lower standard permanent. DOD feels the change provides a more accurate assessment of the quality of officers the Services assign to joint duty assignments.<sup>63</sup>

For the third category, officers assigned to other joint organizations, DOD has made the least significant progress. With few exceptions between FY95 and FY01, all services met the

goals for promotion to lieutenant colonel and commander. The most significant problems occur in promotion to colonel and Navy captain. The Navy has failed to meet this goal for its officers every year since FY88. The Army has only met this goal twice – FY95 and FY01. The Air Force has been the most consistent at meeting the goal, but failed to meet it four years in a row, from FY98 to FY01. The Marine Corps consistently failed to meet the goal from FY88 to FY94, but has met it every year except FY01.<sup>64</sup>

Looking at promotions for colonel/Navy captain through major general during the period FY96 to FY00, the Services' record can be characterized as poor. The Air Force failed to meet the objectives on 13 occasions. For comparable ranks, the Navy failed to meet the objectives on 15 occasions. The Army failed on 12 occasions and the Marine Corps failed on 11 occasions. This record suggests that the Services either did not provide the right officers for joint duty, JSO designations, or failed to provide adequate career opportunities to those officers that were not selected for promotion to the next higher grade. It also suggests that further DOD emphasis is needed to meet the provisions of the GNA.<sup>65</sup>

Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki stated, "...the selection of senior leaders will be based on their joint warfighting abilities, leadership, and capacity for innovation and change."<sup>66</sup> The data above creates a difficult situation. These numbers can easily lead to the perception that joint duty is an unwise career move. Officers will continue to watch the results of command, school and promotion boards to make sure that a JDA does not become a career ender.<sup>67</sup>

#### PROMOTION TO GENERAL/FLAG OFFICER

DOD has promoted more officers with previous joint experience to general and flag officer. However, in FY2001, DOD relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote 25 percent of the officers to these senior pay grades. DOD's reliance on good-of-the-service waivers to promote officers is one indicator of how DOD is promoting its senior leadership. This waiver applies most directly to the population of general and flag officers that are likely to be assigned to senior leadership positions in joint organizations. In 2000, the Secretary of Defense established a policy that restricts good-of-the-service waivers to 10 percent of total promotions to general and flag officer ranks each year.<sup>68</sup>

Between FY89 and FY01, DOD approved 185 good-of-the-service waivers, representing 11 percent of the promotions to general and flag officer ranks. This indicates that the Services are currently, for the most part, complying with the spirit of this provision of the GNA. This may become more difficult in the out years. Beginning in FY2008, officers will have to meet the

requirements of a JSO in order to be promoted to general and flag officer, to include both phases of JPME and a full tour of duty in a joint billet. Looking at the FY2001 promotion statistics as an indicator of where the Services need to go, of the 124 officers promoted to the general and flag ranks, 58, or 47 percent, did not meet the JSO requirements. By Service, this included 18 of the 43 officers promoted in the Air Force (42%); 18 of 40 in the Army (45%); 19 of 33 in the Navy (58%); and 3 of 8 in the Marine Corps (38%).<sup>69</sup>

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

This paper has shown that the Services have come a long way towards implementing the personnel provisions of the GNA, but there is still some work to do. It is apparent the Services continue to hold sway over their officers and the cultures of the Services continue to shape the perceptions and choices those officers make as they navigate through their careers of service to the Nation. A strong perception exists that time spent away from one's Service, especially working in a joint billet, is potentially detrimental to an officer's successful career. Joint billets compete for the same time in an officer's career timeline with Service billets that are considered critical for selection to the next higher rank. The Services may talk "joint", but as shown earlier the records of the top officers (Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders) belies that attitude. Officers understand the requirement to and usefulness of obtaining a joint education and experience, but they are forced to walk a tightrope between competing joint and Service requirements as they attempt to progress along successful career paths.<sup>70</sup> Deriding jointness was once a sign of service parochialism. In the wake of the GNA, however, jointness has become an instrument for transcending parochialism.<sup>71</sup> In other words, the importance of the "Joint Team" is above that of the individual Services. While "jointness" is the desired path for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, it is important to note Bernard Trainor's warning that service cultures are intangibles that need to be aligned with national defense goals, not suppressed.<sup>72</sup>

## **JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION**

The GAO reported that 24 percent of the officers they surveyed responded that the second phase of JPME held little to no importance for them. These officers reported that the course was too long, redundant with the first phase of JPME, and of little value added.<sup>73</sup> Additionally, some of the general and flag officers interviewed for the GAO report stated that they did not check officers' records for credit for the second phase of JPME and that they did not view the lack of this phase as an issue.<sup>74</sup> As a JSO and graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, I fully agree with the above findings. I recommend redesigning JPME in order to

combine the current two-phase JPME into a single phase, taught at the Services' intermediate and senior level colleges, just as phase one is being taught today. Eliminating redundancies and conducting the program in one phase should add very little additional workload to the schools. The National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces already include both phases in their respective curriculum. Advantages to this recommendation include the resource savings that would result from consolidation and eliminating the program at the Armed Forces Staff College. It would also increase the number of officers that receive the education. Seats would not be limited to only those available at the Armed Forces Staff College. The major disadvantage is that it would reduce the students' exposure to members of the other Services during the Phase II education phase. As it currently stands, the classes at the Armed Forces Staff College are a balanced mix from the Services, whereas the parent Service dominates the populations of the Service schools. Implementation of this recommendation would be a significant undertaking. The GNA does not specifically direct a two-tiered system for JPME. In 1987, Congress established the Professional Military Education Panel, chaired by Congressman Ike Skelton (D-Mo), currently the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee. The panel issued a report in 1989 recommending the two-phase approach to JPME, based on the Service balance of Phase II classes.<sup>75</sup> Mr. Skelton believes that living and working together as a joint team during Phase II is the key aspect of the program. Mr. Skelton is reportedly strongly opposed to combining the two courses.<sup>76</sup>

#### JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS AND CAREER MANAGEMENT

Officers need to believe that joint duty is desirable in order for them to actively seek them and for the Services to actively assign them. There are two ways the Services can implement policy changes to make joint duty more attractive. The first recommended change is to make JDAs for majors and lieutenant commanders "branch qualifying" (and its equivalent for the other non-Army Services). The major advantage of this recommendation is that it will eliminate much of the pressure to fit a joint assignment into the career path that is already crowded with parent Service requirements. A potential adverse impact of this change is that it may create perceptions of selection board discriminators, that a "joint" branch qualifying position is more favorable to a "Service" branch qualifying position.

The second recommendation is to make joint duty a precondition for colonel and Navy captain level command. The advantage to this change is that it would encourage the "best and brightest" officers to pursue joint duty and equally penalize those officers that shun joint assignments in favor staying in the comfort zone of their own parent Service.

## PROMOTIONS

The promotion guidelines of the GNA sufficiently provide the encouragement and incentives for officers to pursue joint duty. The major advantage of the guidelines is that they serve to remove any selection board prejudice from JDAs. There are no disadvantages to this recommendation. What is required is tougher enforcement of the standards by DOD. The Secretary of Defense must aggressively push the Service Chiefs to implement policies that address their specific issues that keep them from meeting the promotion objectives.

## CONCLUSION

In the end, it appears that without changes to the joint officer management policies and systems, Service perspectives will continue to control officer promotions and assignments, and the onus to gain joint experience will remain on each individual leader. Without change jointness will remain a second priority to Service initiatives at least in the realm of, "creating acceptance that the JSO career path is good for both the Service and officer corps."<sup>77</sup>

## THE ROLE OF SERVICE LEADERSHIP

I have discussed earlier the importance of leaders and leadership in making changes to organizational cultures. The same holds true for the Services and their senior leaders. The generals and flag officers own the officer cultures of the Services. They hold the keys, through their policy-making abilities, to articulate the core values and, more importantly, specify the norms for the Services. The norm to be specified is that jointness is valued in the Services, and demonstrate that value through strict and rigorous application of the personnel management provisions of the GNA. The intangible reward for officers is in knowing that one has provided dedicated and selfless service to the Nation. The tangible reward for officers is promotion and advancement throughout a successful career. Senior leaders must transmit throughout their respective Services that jointness is good for both the Service and their officer corps, thus establishing the permanence of jointness in their cultures.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 15, 2002), 5.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), III-IV.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>6</sup> Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing the Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 161; Allan R. Millet et. al., The Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Critical Analysis (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), 8-9; and Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 4-7; quoted in Christopher A. Yunkis, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992), 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> Edgar F. Raines, Jr. and David R. Campbell, The Army and The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on Command, Control and Coordination of the Armed Forces, 1942-1985 (Washington: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 31-43; quoted in Christopher A. Yunkis, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992), 3-4.

<sup>8</sup> James A. Blackwell and Barry M. Blechman, eds., Making Defense Reform Work (Washington, Brassey's (US), 1990), 1-3; quoted in Christopher A. Yunkis, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992), 4.

<sup>9</sup> Raines, 109-112; quoted in Christopher A. Yunkis, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992), 4.

<sup>10</sup> David C. Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," Armed Forces Journal International 119, (March 1982), 62-72; quoted in Christopher A. Yunkis, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992), 5.

<sup>11</sup> James R. Locher III, "Building on the Goldwater-Nichols Act," in *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1999), 13.

<sup>12</sup> Don M. Snider, "Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession," *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003): 27.

<sup>13</sup> Congress, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Title IV, Chapter 38, Section 661, 1 October 1986; quoted in Arthur A. Strange III, *Continued Pitfalls With Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2001), 2-3.

<sup>14</sup> Katherine L. Brown, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management?, Report (Maxwell Air Force base: U.S. Air Command and Staff College, 22 December 2000), 9; quoted in Arthur A. Strange III, *Continued Pitfalls With Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2001), 4.

<sup>15</sup> Kathleen Medlock, A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership (Public Law 100-180, Section 1301), Doctoral Dissertation (George Mason University, 1995), 67; quoted in Arthur A. Strange III, *Continued Pitfalls With Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2001), 4.

<sup>16</sup> Congress, Public Law 103-357, Sections 932-933, (1993); quoted in Arthur A. Strange III, *Continued Pitfalls With Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2001), 4.

<sup>17</sup> Terry J. Young, *Title IV-Joint Officer Personnel Policy: A Peace Dividend is Required*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 6 March 1992), 10.

<sup>18</sup> Michael D. Palatas, ed., Professional Military Education for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Warrior: Conference Proceedings 15-16 January 1998, (Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA: 1998), 1-20; quoted in J. Richard Jordan III, *Is the Military On Track to Achieve Joint Objectives as Outlined in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act?: A Look at Joint Officer Management policies 1986-200*, Report (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 4 February 2002), 1.

<sup>19</sup> Strategic Leadership and Decision Making, Chapter 16 (n.p., n.d.); available from <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/strat-ldr-dm/cont.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 Nov 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore, MD: John's Hopkins University Press, 1989), 10.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 8; 9.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>33</sup> Barbara W. Tuchman, "Human Nature is Responsible" in The American Military: Opposing Viewpoints, edited by David L. Bender, (St. Paul, MN: Greenhaven Press, 1983), 74; quoted in David M. Casmus, *Organizational Culture and the Imperatives for Implementing Joint Vision 2010*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1 April 1997), 7.

<sup>34</sup> GEN Dennis J. Reimer, Army Vision 2010, Washington, DC, September 1996., 18; quoted in David M. Casmus, *Organizational Culture and the Imperatives for Implementing Joint Vision 2010*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1 April 1997), 7.

<sup>35</sup> David M. Casmus, *Organizational Culture and the Imperatives for Implementing Joint Vision 2010*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1 April 1997), 7.

<sup>36</sup> Builder, 19.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>38</sup> GEN (Ret) Davis C. Jones, "What's Wrong with Our Defense Establishment," New York Times Magazine, November 7, 1982, 73; quoted in David M. Casmus, *Organizational Culture and the Imperatives for Implementing Joint Vision 2010*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1 April 1997), 7.

<sup>39</sup> Casmus, 7-8.

<sup>40</sup> Builder, 32.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>42</sup> COL Richard Szafranski, USAF, "Interservice Rivalry in Action, The Endless Roles and Missions Refrain," *Airpower Journal* 10 (Summer 1996): 54; quoted in David M. Casmus, *Organizational Culture and the Imperatives for Implementing Joint Vision 2010*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1 April 1997), 8.

<sup>43</sup> Casmus, 8.

<sup>44</sup> J. Richard Jordan III, *Is the Military On Track to Achieve Joint Objectives as Outlined in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act?: A Look at Joint Officer Management policies 1986-2000*, Report (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 4 February 2002), 11.

<sup>45</sup> General Accounting Office, *Joint Officer Development Has Improved, But a Strategic Approach is Needed* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, December 2002), 2.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-9.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>51</sup> Jordan, 14.

<sup>52</sup> GAO, 15.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>54</sup> Arthur A. Strange III, *Continued Pitfalls With Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2001), 12.

<sup>55</sup> Brown, 21., quoted in Strange, 12.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Strange, 12.

<sup>58</sup> Seth Cropsey, "The Limits of Jointness," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1993): 77.

<sup>59</sup> Jordan, 12-13.

<sup>60</sup> Strange, 13.

<sup>61</sup> GAO, 3.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 22-23.

<sup>63</sup> LtCol Tim Nelson, Joint Staff J-1, "Joint Officer Management (JOM) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME): Legislative Proposals," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 2 February 2004.

<sup>64</sup> GAO, 24.

<sup>65</sup> Strange, 13.

<sup>66</sup> GEN Eric Shinseki, "Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army", (23 June 1999); quoted in Dwayne K. Wagner, *Preparing Officers for Joint Leadership*, Monograph (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 15 May 2001), 24.

<sup>67</sup> Dwayne K. Wagner, *Preparing Officers for Joint Leadership*, Monograph (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 15 May 2001), 24.

<sup>68</sup> GAO, 20.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>70</sup> Jordan, 1.

<sup>71</sup> Steven L. Canby, "Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended Consequences," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 72.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 69.

<sup>73</sup> GAO, 12.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 12-13.

<sup>75</sup> Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, *Joint Professional Military Education Phase II*, Report Number 98-156, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 16 June 1998), 2.

<sup>76</sup> The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a guest speaker to a seminar of the U.S. Army War College.

<sup>77</sup> Palatas, 1-20; quoted in Jordan, 17.



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