

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM POST 9/11;  
COMPARISON IN ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS  
BETWEEN A SUPERPOWER AND A SMALL NATION**

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## ABSTRACT

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The attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001, were a defining moment in history. The attacks changed the world. The threats had changed and security became a global issue. The U.S. set forth a grand agenda to rid the world from the horror of terrorism. The U.S. required that nations around the world supported the global war on terrorism. An unprecedented coalition was gathered post 9/11 to go after the terrorists and those who harbored them in Afghanistan. When the fight against terrorism was expanded to also include Iraq, several nations departed the broad coalition that was in place. Norway was one of these nations.

This research paper analyzes which fundamental changes that had occurred in international relations after the attack on Iraq. It analyzes and compares how a superpower and a small nation develop their ends, ways, and means based on values, fundamental beliefs and national interests. It analyzes the basis for agreement on strategy, but also where differences occur. This paper concludes that Norway, for major political reasons, departed somewhere between Afghanistan and Iraq due to a superpowers concepts, obscured motives and a lack of indisputable legitimacy through an unambiguous U.N. resolution.



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# THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM POST 9/11; A COMPARISON IN ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS BETWEEN A SUPERPOWER AND A SMALL NATION

## INTRODUCTION

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, and drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. *Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.* From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the U.S. as a hostile regime [emphasis added].  
President George W. Bush<sup>1</sup>

After September 11, President Bush asked the world to stand with the U.S. against the terrorists who had attacked the country. In the years since, however, he has broadened that request and altered its tone. No longer is Bush asking the world to join a common struggle; instead, he is demanding that it follow along as the U.S. wages its own battle against the threats the president has defined. September 11 proved, Bush has said, that the institutions, alliances, and rules of the past are no longer adequate to protect the American people. The U.S., Bush has warned, will act where it perceives an actual, possible, or potential connection between terrorists and dangerous technology.<sup>2</sup> According to Madeleine Albright the current U.S. administration sets the bar high for friends and allies. Is it true that you feel it when Washington points at you?

The world had seen acts of terrorism long before September 11, 2001, but at that day the face of terrorism became so visible in all its cruelty that it could not be regarded as just another terrorist act any longer. The attacks on the U.S. at that day showed the level of sophistication among the terrorists and the level of disregard for their own and innocent people's lives in pursuing their cause. At the same time the fight against terrorism became more than just a task among all others – it became *the* mission to counter future threats. The war on terrorism had started. War is, however, a serious business. The reaction is more intense in the country in which the attacks occur, even though a large number of nations were directly affected by the loss of citizens in the attacks. For nations on the periphery of the attacks and not directly affected by loss of lives, like Norway, it became a matter of solidarity – both as a close ally through NATO, but also as a longtime friend. Since the end of World War II Norway has fully

understood that the U.S. is the irreplaceable power in securing her national sovereignty. The support was also based on another major deliberation – terrorism does not recognize any borders. No one nation can guarantee that an act of terrorism will not happen on its soil, thus the support post 9/11 became a matter of national security as much as an act of solidarity. Moreover, the impact of the event was inescapably global in that the U.S. lies at the center of world politics and the global economic system. The nations of the world are increasingly interdependent, and the terrorist acts in all their horror were televised all over the world and brought into peoples' homes and governments' and politicians' offices. Everybody had a stake in what happened in the aftermath of the world's most devastating acts of terror. For Norway it became natural to support the major goals of the war on terrorism.

After the attacks on September 11, the U.S. put together a historic, worldwide coalition to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan and destroy al-Qaida. Major players around the world, including Europe, supported the enterprise. Less than two years after Afghanistan the U.S. went to war again, but this time to overthrow the regime in Iraq. Most of the same countries that had backed the U.S. in Afghanistan bluntly opposed the campaign.<sup>3</sup> The sentiments in the U.N rose to a high level and transatlantic cooperation suffered major setbacks. Hardly any nation spoke in favor of the regime in Baghdad. On the contrary, most governments would probably like to see the regime disappear. Why, then, did the coalition crack? Many may have seen a shift in the U.S.'s justification for a war and questioned the motives. The efforts to achieve a second U.N resolution failed, and there were signals from the White House that a second resolution was not needed. Was this the first test of a national security strategy that preached preemption? Was it the Bush administration's rhetoric and style that alienated rather than persuaded, especially in light of Washington's two-year history of scorn for international institutions and agreements? "Make no mistake about it: the choice for sure is between two visions of the world."<sup>4</sup> Is the French Foreign Minister hitting the nail on the head when he points out that the disagreements are fundamental?

Nations' history, culture and traditions will guide their principal decisions within the global society. Nations will be guided by what serves their national interests best. They will act according to the total resources they can bring to bear, and in ways that support their beliefs and core interests. A superpower can bring to bear all instruments of power in a decisive way and can thus deal with challenges directly. It can act unilaterally, and it possesses enough power to disregard established behavior in the international arena if it is in its interest to do so. On September 11, the U.S. was attacked and it had a huge obligation to itself and its people. The U.S. had to act and to show results. Smaller nations are typically forced to deal with the

same challenges indirectly; either based on international law or through multilateral arrangements. Immediately after September 11, Norway became a follower, but departed as most other nations in the case of Iraq. Norway was once more faced with the unpleasant decision – to go along with major allies or stand firm behind the U.N. Such decisions are based on important deliberations where the nations' values, interests, objectives and risk assessments come into play. The government has to take the domestic political situation and the sentiment of the people into consideration. In Norway there has been a long tradition of a broad agreement among the political parties on major issues in foreign and security policy. This tradition has had a stabilizing effect nationally. When the United States went to war against Iraq after only convincing four members of the U.N. Security Council to back the action<sup>5</sup>, the Norwegian Prime Minister had already told President Bush in a private session that Norway could not support the war for *major political reasons*.

This research paper will analyze and compare the ends, ways and means of the two different nations post 9/11, and establish where the differences occurred and where a superpower and a small nation may separate in their strategic decisions.

## **GENERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

The great moments of international order building have tended to come after major wars, as winning states have undertaken to reconstruct the post-war world. The U.S. was at that juncture in 1945, and took a leading role in shaping world order. The winning state has three broad choices. It can dominate, abandon – or transform its favorable postwar power position into a durable order that commands the allegiance of the other states within the order.<sup>6</sup> The third choice was pursued after the end of World War II. The experiences up to then, and especially the failure of the League of Nations, made this approach logic. The efforts to institutionalize the postwar security relations between potential adversaries were strong. The U.N. Charter was adopted in 1945 and served as a tool to regulate behavior between states. It would gradually serve as a way to deal with international peace and security issues, as well as a host of other programs to alleviate human sufferings around the world and pursue human rights. The grand ambition was to make life better for all people and rid the world from the horror of wars. The creation of the U.N. was a starting point for the larger nations to pursue their interests and perhaps convince future adversaries of their good intentions. At the same time it became the very important framework for smaller nations whose strength and protection would lie in the multilateral organizational framework. The U.N. is the embodiment of what the famous

Norwegian, Fridtjof Nansen, observed in the 1920's – that the lawful regulation of conflict is the strategy of the weaker. Other organizational frameworks that became important to build a more stable and predictable world were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European framework, later to become the European Union (EU). The postwar institutions came in many guises – regional, global, economic, security, multilateral, and bilateral. While this institutionalization of power served smaller nations to enhance their security and participation in world politics, it also brought smaller nations to a closer relationship with larger powers. For Norway this has caused heated national debates, especially during the Cold War. Bordering the Soviet Union, Norway had to take several interests into account. After the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trygve Lie, became the first Secretary General of the U.N., the general description of the Norwegian foreign policy has been: “As pro-American as it dared, as pro-Soviet as it had to be, and as pro-U.N. as it possibly could be.” Larger nations, on the other hand, would have to accept limits on their power. The U.S. did attempt to lock other states into these institutions while simultaneously leaving it as unencumbered as possible.<sup>7</sup> After all, the large powers that set the stage for the organizational framework were aware that they would not go along with anything that was not supporting their own selfish interests.

The end of the Cold War has not only eliminated a source of cohesion among the industrial democracies; it has also led to a unipolar distribution of power. In both economic and military spheres, the U.S. leads its nearest rival by a larger margin than has any other leading state in the last three centuries.<sup>8</sup> The break-up of the Cold War left the U.S. as the world's remaining superpower. This power could be used in different ways – it could be used to dominate world politics and take advantage of an unprecedented power status, or maintain the institutionalized framework to pursue national interests. Even with the imperfection of the organizational framework – wars have after all occurred even with the present international system – nations have recognized that these wars never have involved the great powers in military conflict with each other. In relations between the U.S. and Western Europe and within the Western Hemisphere, America's historic ideals have considerable applicability. Here the idealist version of peace based on democracy and economic progress demonstrates its relevance. States are democratic; economies are market-oriented; wars are inconceivable except at the periphery, where they may be triggered by ethnic conflicts. Military preparations are a response to threats from outside the area.<sup>9</sup> From being a most troubled continent for centuries, where the U.S. in two world wars shed blood on the battlefield, the institutional enterprise that the European nations launched after WW II, have served the transatlantic

connections well. This enterprise has been very useful for the synchronization of strategic objectives, ways and means against common threats.

The world had seen terrorist acts for many years before 9/11 occurred. Based on these acts, nations and organizations had taken precautions and issued policy and strategy documents in which combating terrorism was a mission among others. The attacks on September 11 made it clear that the world had come to a dramatic moment of change. It had taken many years since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, to reach the point when nations no longer under the larger threat of an invasion had started to plan for other scenarios. The question was, however, what kind of scenarios? September 11 showed the world one likely scenario and the true meaning of asymmetric threats. The outrage in the U.S. was tangible. The President of the U.S. struggled with the early messages to the people. In his earliest address to the nation he made a far-reaching declaration: "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."<sup>10</sup> The day after the attacks, the President stated that the attacks were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.<sup>11</sup> U.S. Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle cautioned the president to use care in his rhetoric. "War is a strong word."<sup>12</sup> But the extent of the American thought process and the sentiments in the administration were out in the open already. What may not have been internationally known at this point was the actual thinking on Iraq.

The Pentagon had been working for months on developing a military option for Iraq. The Secretary of Defense asked the question about Iraq and raised the possibility that they could take advantage of the opportunity offered by the terrorist attacks to go after Saddam immediately. His deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, was committed to a policy that would make Iraq a principal target of the first round in the war on terrorism.<sup>13</sup> September 11 made the case. A letter that was sent to President Clinton on January 26, 1998 – among others signed by D. Rumsfeld and P. Wolfowitz – urged the President to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. The strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power.<sup>14</sup> If the notion of regime change was on the U.S. agenda, it was certainly not a part of the U.N. vocabulary. For President Bush, September 11 must have come as a revelation, leading him to the startled conclusion that the globe had changed in ways gravely hazardous to the security – indeed, the very survival – of the U.S. This conclusion soon led Bush to a fateful decision: to depart, in fundamental ways, from the approach that had characterized U.S. foreign policy for more than half a century. Soon, reliance on alliances had been replaced by redemption through preemption; the shock of force

trumped the hard work of diplomacy, and long-time relationships were redefined. The U.S. was under attack and there seemed to be no way that the U.S. would restrict its options in doing what was perceived right. It had an obligation to those who were killed in the September 11 attacks and to the rest of the American people. Others should enjoy the obligation that the U.S. felt it had to rid the world of the emerging threats. The U.S. would once more bring to bear all its resources to another kind of war – the war on terrorism. Nations around the world became more aware that their security might be affected by terrorism, but the transition from building a wide-ranging coalition to fight in Afghanistan to the war on Iraq became a step too far for the U.S. The U.S. was at this time action-oriented. War was declared – military preparations were ongoing. An overwhelming military capability is usually a blessing. Together with a perceived ideology for its use it may become a concern. Europeans in general feel that the U.S. resorts too easily to the use of the military instrument of power. This is in a way natural; today Europe's diplomatic and economic strength far outweighs its military capability, but it may equally be a matter of history and culture. The Iraq question showed the potential for new dividing lines, internally in the U.S., in relation to Europe, Russia, and within alliances like NATO. Through some months in 2002 and 2003 the political Norway was a passive witness to developments she could not influence, and in the end she was forced to make the unpleasant decision to choose side.<sup>15</sup> The rhetoric rose to unbelievable levels. A German Minister compared President Bush with Hitler. She was fired. The American Secretary of Defense placed Germany in the same box as Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. He was probably not celebrated in the State Department for those words.<sup>16</sup>

The French newspaper *Le Monde*'s headline after the attacks, "We are all Americans today", illustrates the sentiment of many nations and peoples at that day. There was no lack of sympathy with the larger cause to free innocent people from these horrible threats of the future. All nations have their defining moments in history, and most certainly the U.S. From an isolationist tendency up to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the U.S. was drawn into WW I. It was attacked on 7 December 1941, and full force drawn into WW II from that time on. It was attacked on 11 September 2001, and committed itself to a global war on terrorism. At that time it was not clear what the Bush-administration's strategic vision or grand strategy was. Then, however, it could be built on a wave of sympathy. The defining moment of 9/11 paved the way for a clear set of strategic objectives, and the ways and means to be utilized to pursue those objectives. All these elements of strategy were announced piecemealed in the wake of 9/11, and eventually summarized in the September 2002 issue of the "National Security Strategy of the United States of America." By that time, the war in Afghanistan was ongoing and a possible

attack on Iraq was looming. The discussions rose high among allies and friends because of the latter "enterprise." When the U.S. President on 17 March 2003,<sup>17</sup> announced that Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours, something fundamental had changed.

### **THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE**

The norms that tie the international society together are facing an evolutionary change.<sup>18</sup> This evolution occurs due to changing perceptions of what is right and wrong, the relationship between states and between state and their people, and the international society's responsibility for what is happening within each and every state. The international society is not a legal body in the sense that it can act like the police or courts within states. But the international society is not a lawless room where the rights belong to the strongest. For more that 350 years, since the modern state system – defined by the treaty of Westphalia of 1648 – was established, one has seen a gradual development toward certain basic rules in the cooperation between states. Norway has been actively engaged in building a solid system for international law and order. Norway has always been a strong supporter of the U.N. and will continue to be. One important aspect of the U.N. Charter is that the use of military power between states is prohibited unless it is a matter of self-defense or the U.N. authorizes use of force because international peace and security is threatened. September 11 showed that no spot on the earth could be immune from possible terrorist threats. The terrorist acts changed the thinking about international politics and security. The first of which was the thinking of asymmetric threats. The previous military planning was based on fighting an "equal" military opponent within an allied framework. Now, that adversary is gone. War as a "game" between two comparative opponents is no longer a relevant approach. On the contrary, the attacks on September 11 have shown that an economically and militarily inferior opponent can impose grave damage, fear and insecurity. Security has become global. Traditional views on the importance of territory are fading. War in the traditional sense, between states, is a rare occurrence. Not only will this change the way we think about military planning. It also changes the way we think about foreign and security policy and relations in the institutionalized system.

Peaceful co-existence among states is more likely to happen if we are able to create a common platform of values like democracy, human rights and market economy. The equal distribution of welfare and wealth, however, has not occurred to the satisfaction of the many. Globalization has not had the wanted affect everywhere, and not only does poverty create problems, it also makes nations fall apart. Failed states may create a room for criminal activities and terrorism. This begs the question whether it is time to rethink the concept of sovereignty

and which rights and obligations sovereign states should have in the future. This is clearly a minefield, but it is perhaps no longer a given that all states should enjoy the same respect for their own internal affairs.<sup>19</sup> There *are* differences between nations in their will and ability to husband their own internal affairs by recognized ruling principles and international commitments. A failure to get things right in internal affairs may spill over to neighbors or others to a level where it becomes a threat to international peace and security. Those discussions, however, belong in bodies with the highest perceived moral authority. If stronger nations take the lead and decide these issues on their own, many nations in the third world will associate this with new-colonialism and the western societies' self-declared mission in the world. While the principle of non-intervention most likely has prevented conflicts in the world, it has put the state before the populace. It may even have been abused. In a new world order with revised threat perceptions and global non-state actors, can an emerging discussion concerning the conditions for sovereignty be disregarded?

This discussion has already started. Immediately after 9/11 President Bush stated, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists and those who harbor them".<sup>20</sup> Nations that harbor terrorists will increasingly be compared with those that give direct support. This is new in international law. Israel tried to get acceptance for such a view in the U.N. in 1985 after it had attacked the PLO office in Tunisia. Its argument was that as long as Tunisia was unable to prevent attacks from their soil, Israel was in its right to attack as a matter of self-defense. This argument was heavily opposed in the U.N. where 14 out of 15 nations voted against Israel, while the U.S. abstained.<sup>21</sup> This notion seemed to change after 9/11. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368<sup>22</sup> says, "those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable". We are moving away from time-honored principles in the international law, like the principle of neutrality. Enforced economic sanctions, for instance, are binding for all nations. It becomes nearly impossible for nations to remain neutral in international affairs any longer. "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists". The message from the world's superpower was clear, but does it diminish the independent policies and strategies of smaller nations?

The principle of self-defense and its practice will also be discussed after 9/11. There was broad international agreement that the U.S. had the necessary basis in the international law to attack the al-Qaida network and the Taliban regime after the terrorist attacks. The U.S. was under armed attack, and the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 from 12 September refers to the right of individual and collective self-defense. No mandate is required to impose self-defense measures. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made a similar interpretation

on 12 September. NATO decided that, if it is determined that the attack against the U.S. was directed from abroad, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This was the first time in the alliance's history that Article 5 has been invoked.<sup>23</sup> One possible argument against this interpretation is that the attacks were not from another state, but from non-state actors. In that case we are talking about criminal acts and not armed attack. The international law, however, talks about armed attack, not the source from where it is generated. It would seem problematic if a fairly strict interpretation of the international law prevented a nation from taking counter actions against terrorism, which is at least passively supported by another state. By such an interpretation the international law would have no answer to the threat that many western countries see as the most dangerous in the future. A discrepancy between what is perceived and what is legal may in this case undermine the international law.<sup>24</sup>

What is self-defense against terrorism? The usual definitions of self-defense underscore the principles of proportionality. But how are counter measures proportionate to the terrorist attacks on September 11 and who decides? It seems to be a common international understanding that the U.S. and coalition attacks on al-Qaida and the Taliban regime were proportionate in the sense that they were focused and sought to reduce collateral damage. It is not, however, equally understood or accepted that a nation that has been attacked has an automatic right to expand the reaction without showing the link between the original attack and the counter-attack. Iraq illustrates this problem. The U.S. was ultimately perceived as acting preemptively and unilaterally against Iraq even though a coalition of the willing was gathered. The motives were highly disputed – no less now, in the aftermath of the war. No direct link between the September 11 attacks and Iraq has thus far been convincingly proven, nor have weapons of mass destruction been found in Iraq. The matter of preemption and unilateral action has been debated in Europe, and internally in the U.S., and will continue to be on the agenda. Given the precedent it may create in other parts of the world the issue is immensely important for the U.N. since most people around the world still perceive this organization as the ultimate moral authority for peace and security. The organization can only be, however, what the nations want it to become, thus these fundamental issues have to be placed on the agenda to save necessary respect for the basic rules in the international society.

Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. *Every nation has a choice to make.* In this conflict, *there is no neutral ground.* If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril [emphasis added].

President George W. Bush<sup>25</sup>

The leader of the only remaining superpower in the world issued the above statement. It was not a statement from the U.N. Secretary General. Even though it was issued at a time when the U.S. had already declared war against terrorism and directed its military to take action in Afghanistan, it still moves the international law. International law is created through the consent of states. Behind this understanding is the assumption that states are sovereign and, accordingly, can be bound by no higher law without their consent. Prior to the twentieth century, customary international law dealt with state actors. Terrorism was not addressed in traditional international law relating to the recourse to force.<sup>26</sup> Can the U.S. change this understanding by force, and make unilateral changes to the U.N. Charter? Henry Kissinger says that the U.S. must translate its values into answers to some hard questions: What, for our survival, must we seek to prevent no matter how painful the means? What, to be true to ourselves, must we try to accomplish no matter how small the attainable international consensus, and, if necessary, entirely on our own? What wrongs is it essential that we right? What goals are simply beyond our capacity?<sup>27</sup> The dilemma is that U.S. allies may condemn such a rejection of multilateralism and may be unwilling to extend to the U.S. the rights it seems to adopt. This may not serve the larger cause in the fight against terrorism, and the overarching principle that order in the international system serves both the smaller and the larger in the long run.

#### **DILEMMAS IN THE STRATEGY FRAMEWORK**

In 1950 the U.S. national security authorities, in a document called NSC-68, concluded that that nation and its people had to take new and fateful decisions. Within the past 35 years the world had experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It had witnessed two revolutions, a collapse of five empires, and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems. The international distribution of power had been fundamentally altered. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.<sup>28</sup> Under the looming threat of a cold war with the Soviet Union after World War II, the U.S. started the determined efforts of seizing the initiatives from the Soviet Union in winning the war of ideas in the free world. The U.S. thought that the survival of the free world was at stake. At the same time the U.S. was of the opinion that within the next 4-5 years the Soviet Union would possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack.<sup>29</sup> The nuclear weapons race and the cold war had in fact begun and it could not proceed unopposed. Even though there may be differences in opinion whether NSC-68 represents a strategy or not, the document is without

doubt a manifestation of the strategy of *containment and deterrence*. By 1989, the Soviet Union had collapsed under the economic burden of the arms race, and was about to surrender its East European “empire”. The U.S. could with some justification declare victory for its policy, or strategy of strength.<sup>30</sup> Strategies for old and new threats, however, require a fundamental purpose. For the U.S. those are found in the Constitution of the U.S. Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Individual freedom; Free and democratic system; and to fight if necessary to defend our way of life.<sup>31</sup> The world would see more of these values as the U.S. worked to find its way after the terrorist attacks in September 2001.

Norway gained its independence in 1905 after nearly 600 years in a union with either Denmark or Sweden. The Norwegian people did not strive for much else than being at peace and building a solid democracy and a modern economy. The government kept a low profile as far as foreign policy was concerned even though it signed an “integrity treaty” with major European powers in 1907. Norway wanted primarily guarantees for its neutrality. The question of neutrality arose in 1919 as Norway was asked by the Allies to join the League of Nations. The Norwegian parliament ratified the pact in 1920 with a majority vote, but the government reserved itself from participation in military sanctions. It became clear for Norway, however, that a small nation could not divorce itself from being a part of power politics when entering an organization. In 1936 Norway, the Scandinavian neighbors and other small nations declared that they no longer felt committed by the “treaty” obligations. Even under the emerging threat of Nazi-Germany in the late 1930’s the Norwegian parliament unanimously endorsed neutrality. The policy of neutrality was de facto revoked when Norway was attacked by Nazi-Germany in April 1940. Norway surrendered after two months of fight, and was later occupied for five years. This experience, together with the threat of a rising Soviet Union made Norway a founding member of NATO in 1949. This happened after negotiations to establish a Scandinavian defense arrangement had stranded. Norway’s decision to become a member of NATO was a drastic step away from the policy of neutrality, but this national approach had become accepted in the Norwegian People’s minds. From this, one can identify three formative periods in the evolution of Norwegian foreign policy: 1905-1910, when the classic Norwegian “neutralism” took shape; the inter-war period, when Norway wrapped herself in the mantle of a missionary for international law and disarmament; and the 1940’s during which the country allied itself with great powers and became an active participant in international power politics.<sup>32</sup> From that moment Norway had abandoned an independent role in developing national foreign and security policy. She has ever since been a staunch supporter of international cooperation and multilateral organizations. Norway has sought to pursue the country’s goals through cooperation

with other nations. In global issues the participation in the U.N. has been and is a cornerstone in Norwegian foreign policy. The importance and respect for international law is a viable policy for a small nation, and the Norwegian Foreign Minister for over 20 years, Halvar Lange, said that two principles guide us above all others: (1) The commitment to follow the U.N. Charter, (2) The commitment not to do anything that reduces the significance of the U.N. The long lines from the “missionary” phase of Norwegian foreign policy to the strong support to the U.N. and to the global efforts to mediate in conflicts are very visible. This engagement has to be seen in light of a fundamental wish for a better world with less suffering – the humanitarian imperative. It also recognizes the fact that a safer world, even though most of the conflicts after 1945 have been far away from Norway, will also benefit Norway in the long run. Norway participated actively in the creation of the U.N. even though the victors of WW II dominated the process, e.g. through positions, mandates and arrangements for the Security Council. The struggles between the larger and smaller nations were obvious, not the least about the larger nations’ role in the world organization. Norway, strangely enough, supported a dominating role for the big powers. This was based on a pragmatic view that agreement between the big powers would benefit Norway.<sup>33</sup> The fundamental views of the U.N. role as far as world peace and security continues to be Norwegian policy, and they stood the test when Norway had to explain to the U.S. why she could not support the war on Iraq. The arguments were principal and in accordance with fundamental Norwegian views on international law and the role of the U.N.

Strategy is usually defined as the relationship among *ends*, *ways*, and *means*. *Ends* are the objectives or goals sought. *Means* are the resources available to pursue the objectives. *Ways*, or methods, are how one organizes and applies the resources.<sup>34</sup> Countries may apply strategies in different ways. The U.S. has a national security strategy hierarchy that is guiding the nation’s efforts in pursuing its national interests in the world. Other countries may choose other words to describe what objectives they want to pursue, with what resources and how. Norway has no tradition of developing national strategies, security strategies, or a grand strategy. Advanced strategic thinking is much more developed, and maybe more useful, within the superpowers. On the other hand there are strategies developed to achieve established Norwegian national policies and goals, e.g. foreign policy goals, security policy goals etc. There may be historic or cultural reasons why a small nation does not use the word strategy. One possible explanation is that the word strategy may have connotations in the Norwegian language that may be misunderstood by the majority of the population. It may not even be politically prudent in a certain geopolitical security situation in that the word strategy may imply a more offensive attitude. It is right and natural for a country to have ambitions to exert as much

influence internationally as possible. But ambitions need to be related to a priority of interests, and be carefully calibrated to what is possible.<sup>35</sup> It is not in a small nation's interest to upset neighbors by sending ambiguous signals, especially if that neighbor is a major player on the international arena and has wide ranging security interests. Based on the experiences from being an occupied country during World War II, but also as a matter of farsighted foreign policy in not dealing with challenges unilaterally, Norway has for more than 50 years solved its security policy issues through NATO. This multilateral framework has served Norwegian interests well in that we have seen no major conflict on our soil after 1945. Norway could enjoy the umbrella of security protection from a range of nations, of which the U.S. has always stood out as the main guarantor for our security. Today, however, this image of only importing security through an alliance is being challenged. Norway finds herself in a situation where she has signed an alliance strategy (NATO's new Strategic Concept of 1999). It has not developed a national security strategy on its own, but signed up for one through an alliance. This alliance has been forced to transform over the past 12 years to adapt to new security challenges. And, the U.S. as the world's remaining superpower has been a driving force in revising the trends in NATO so that it also meets the national interests of the U.S. NATO has become more proactive and far-reaching in its strategy to remain relevant to future needs – some may say more offensive in nature – and this trend causes skeptical views in countries where the defensive character of NATO was the cornerstone of the security needs.

This shows a dilemma in the strategy development of small nations. Large nations with global interests will typically use alliances to actively pursue their national interests and if possible make any alliance a way in which they can employ means in the pursuance of their strategic objectives. Small nations, however, may develop security strategies on their own, but will find themselves squeezed between their own national interests and the interests that at any time are developed through the alliance framework. For Norway, who sees NATO as the cornerstone of its security interests and the U.S. as the "irreplaceable power" for its own security guarantees, it becomes nearly impossible to play an all out independent role as far as national security strategies are concerned. Small nations usually do not have the material resources to employ national instruments of power decisively, e.g. the economic and military instruments of power. There are ways, however, that a small nation can compensate for its lack of material resources and that is to enhance its "symbolic power". Norway has traditionally been an important actor as far as development aid and humanitarian efforts, peace mediation and environment are concerned. This kind of "soft power" renders access and moral authority on the international arena that may serve the nation well.<sup>36</sup> The magazine Newsweek some time ago

published a list of the world's most powerful nations, and had ranked Norway number 9 – right after China! Newsweek's explanation of Norway's influence was high standard of living and prestigious diplomacy. Through Norway's traditional role as a peace broker and our support to the U.N. organization and development aid, Norway possesses significant "soft power". Regardless of the accuracy of the above assessment, this is a remarkable position for a small nation with only 4.5 million people. Politically it will be used for whatever it is worth. It reflects, however, where Norway may enhance her inherent strengths and how to offset weaknesses.

NATO is obviously not the only organizational framework that affects national policies or strategies. The U.S. is the dominant power in all the organizations in which it is a member, so also in the U.N. It is, however, an arena where nations pursue their interests on an equal footing. While the U.S. will use the U.N to actively pursue its own national interests, the disagreements within the U.N. before the war on Iraq show that a superpower may assess whether the organization serves its national interests or not. The U.S. put the relevance of the U.N. to test prior to the attack on Iraq. This happened in a climate where the closest allies were in disagreement about the immediacy of the threat. The U.S. has clearly shown that it will reserve the right to act alone if necessary, and the strategy to support this was developed in the wake of 9/11 when the nation felt uniquely vulnerable. This may lead to a new discussion in the U.N. about the role of the organization, but for most nations the U.N. represents something fundamental and an anchor for international law and a body of moral authority. This is also the best argument for it to address the fundamental changes in international relations post September 11.

Small nations may sign up to strategies through the alliances in which they are members. They can do little to prevent such a trend if they still want to enjoy the benefits of an alliance. Membership in organizations and alliances implies a certain reduction of individual sovereignty, but does not take away the individual's right to determine. However, the ends may be defined through compromises in an alliance, and solidarity rests hard in an organization. The means that Norway possesses are still a reflection of inherent national resources and the will to allocate resources to the different instruments of power. The ways are dependent on the available resources, but are to a large extent driven by the alliance commitments, or commitments to bi- or multilateral relationships that serves national interests in the long run. The relationship with the U.S. is from a Norwegian perspective vital and cannot be replaced, even though it may be perceived as taking a more offensive stand in the world in being too closely aligned with a superpower. For national policies and strategies, however, it remains a balancing act not to become a subdued puppet state versus maintaining fundamental beliefs and core national

interests in the long perspective. The latter is after all about political prudence and a sound understanding of the values and beliefs of the government, the parliament and the people.

### **NATIONAL OBJECTIVES (ENDS)**

..Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and -women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror (...) *Terrorist attacks* can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they *cannot touch the foundation of America*. These acts shattered steel, but *they cannot dent the steel of American resolve*[emphasis added].

President George W. Bush<sup>37</sup>

Strategy is the domain of the senior leader at the higher echelons of the state, the military, business corporations, or other institutions. It is comprehensive, it provides direction, its purpose is control, and it is fundamentally concerned with the application of power. The underlying assumption from a national perspective is that states and other competitive entities have interests that they will pursue to the best of their abilities. Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement of these interests through the application of the instruments of power. Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests.<sup>38</sup>

The perceived threat to the U.S. and other western countries after World War II was the massive build-up of a military – including nuclear – and ideological force around the Soviet Union. At Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946 former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke of the Soviet Union's having dropped an "iron curtain" on eastern and east central Europe.<sup>39</sup> From very early on after the end of World War II, as the U.S. was at the top of its influential power in the world, it created a strategy that for ever since would create many dependent relationships around the world. The threat from the Soviet Union could be met by a rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength in the free world.<sup>40</sup> The objective was to contain communism and Soviet influence in the free world. Norway was one of the many beneficiaries of such assistance, better known as the Marshall Plan. The ties between the U.S. and Norway were further enhanced as the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. The Europeans were somewhat calmed by joining an organization that promised that an attack on one of the members would be regarded as an attack on all. A multilateral framework became a very important concept to avoid large military confrontation in Europe for over 50 years. Strangely

enough, September 12, 2001, the same alliance had to invoke its article 5 based on a terrorist attack on the continental U.S. Many Europeans, as well as Americans, woke up to a completely different strategic setting.

No less than after the World War II the behavior of the U.S. after 9/11 is rooted in the pursuit, protection, and promotion of its interests. The most basic are the survival interests of the nation-state – its territory, its people, and its sovereignty. The outrage was tangible and the resolve was overwhelming. The major difference between a large and smaller nation, however, is that a superpower like the U.S. has the capability to exercise effective control of its territory and people beyond its own borders – and to a large extent it has the capability to pursue such actions alone. One year after the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. the new “National Security Strategy of the U.S.” was published, and it laid out the national interests and objectives of the U.S. based on fundamental values and beliefs. Since the first major terrorist attack on American soil in the World Trade Center in 1993, and the subsequent attacks on American property in 1996 and 1998, this new security strategy reflects a fundamental change in what is the overarching goal for the immediate future – the *fight against terrorism*.

The emotions in America and especially in the political leadership rose high in the aftermath of September 11. The new NSS in a way reflects that, but there are many fundamental ideas in the National Security Strategy that can unite as well. The strategy clearly states that the U.S. stands for: human dignity; the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. The goals to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.<sup>41</sup> While these core values and beliefs may be shared by many nations, there are some statements in the strategy that imply a change from earlier thinking and may cause problems for nations that want to rally with the U.S. The U.S. will not restrict itself from acting alone and preemptively, if necessary, to exercise its right to self-defense. The U.S. will, if necessary, act against emerging threats before they are fully formed as a matter of common sense and self-defense.<sup>42</sup> The matter of preemption has been widely discussed ever since the security strategy came out, and it may be contested as far as international law is concerned. It may also be seen as undermining the international security system that tirelessly has been developed since WW II. On the other hand, the world had not seen the true effects of modern terrorism and the effect of non-state actors with global reach before 9/11. A relevant question is whether the current U.N. Charter is appropriate for the international law of the future. While there is logic in the argument that new technology and capabilities among potential adversaries have to be taken into

consideration, there is also an argument that fundamental uncertainty calls for necessary restraint. The fear is that the world's only remaining superpower establishes its own rules, bases its actions on faulty assumptions – or even worse – becomes directed more by ideology than hard facts in its fight against terrorism. This change in policy challenges relationships among states, in that a superpower challenges international rules because its instruments of power allows it to, while small states never will have enough power to confront accepted international law.

Europeans and Americans are not destined to go their separate ways. But they could end up doing so if policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic act on the assumption that fundamentally different world-views now make useful cooperation impossible. The reality is that despite their differences, in an age of globalization and mass terrorism, no two regions of the world have more in common nor more to lose if they fail to stand together in an effort to promote common values and interests around the globe. Now is the time to stop pretending that either the United States or Europe can manage on its own.<sup>43</sup> This sentiment seem to be shared by many observers regardless of the rather bullish words that have been passed across the Atlantic since the prelude to the war on Iraq. The rift across the Atlantic is not new: American opposition to the seizure of the Suez Canal by the French, British and Israeli troops in the 1950's; France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in the 1960's; the battle over Euro-missiles in the early 1980's; and the deep acrimony over how to stop war in the Balkans a decade ago.<sup>44</sup> The history shows that the two great continents will be able to bridge the gap of opinions, even though the recent disagreements may have been unprecedented in their intensity. In his article "Power and Weakness", Robert Kagan states that it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. He continues by saying that the reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure.<sup>45</sup> The reason for this may be the power gap that exists between the two continents, but some kind of jealousy in this respect does not give the full answer. Since the U.S. can employ all instruments of power decisively, it may be inclined to "fix" problems, while the Europeans – still not a fully united entity – normally resort to "managing" problems. Regardless of differences in power, the Europeans and Americans are still those who share most values and interests in the world. Norway is a European state, but not a member of the EU. The cooperation within the European community is, however, extensive. Norway has traditionally maintained close ties with the U.S. and intends to pursue that link for national security reasons. Norway is politically and ideally located between the European and the Atlantic, but will normally be a "spectator" to rifts across the Atlantic as we have seen them,

and with limited level of influence. Norway's most favored position would obviously not be the one where she would have to choose between the two. On the contrary, Norway's only viable strategy is to maintain two tiers – one transatlantic to the U.S. and one to Europe. But sometimes destiny puts you there, and like Norway had to choose between important allies or the U.N. in the Suez-conflict in the 1950's, she also had to make a choice about the war on Iraq.

President Bush clearly stated the strategic objective in an address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American people September 20, 2001: "Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." In the same speech, President Bush thus identified the threats: "The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-Qaida. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing USS Cole."<sup>46</sup> The strategic objective was no less than a grand ambition of global reach, but was well in line with the first statements after 9/11 – the war on terror must be won because it is an attack on America's most precious values; freedom, democracy and the American way of life.

The NSS broadens the perspective about the fight against terrorism. It says that defending the Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the U.S. Government. That task has changed dramatically after 9/11. The enemy is terrorism. The priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach. We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. We will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism. We will wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. While we recognize that our best defense is a good offense, we are also strengthening America's homeland security. Through proactive responses to emerging threats the U.S. will strive to promote global security and extend benefits of freedom across the globe.<sup>47</sup> The U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued in July 2002, was developed to mobilize and organize the U.S. in response to terrorist attacks.<sup>48</sup> The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in February 2003, further elaborates parts of the NSS, and focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach U.S. borders.<sup>49</sup> The latter document outlines the "four fronts" – or the 4D strategy – that will guide actions against terrorism: *Defeat* terrorist organizations of global reach; *Deny* further sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; *Diminish* the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; *Defend* the U.S., citizens, and interests at home and abroad. In his article "Preparing for the Next Attack", William J. Perry says that the U.S. essentially depended on one single strategy in the Cold War era: deterrence. Post 9/11 the U.S. can add two more to the mix:

prevention and defense. The strategic objectives would be to *deter* terrorists or those who harbor them; *prevent* attacks by curbing emerging threats before they can spread; and *defend* the homeland, citizens and interests by a variety of defensive and offensive measures.

The NSS elaborates what the U.S. believes in and what its values and overarching goals are. These are sound and democratic ideals that may be widely shared by nations. Post 9/11 the overall objective is to fight terrorism – a task that is enduring, global and requires decisive action. The strategic objectives will be to defeat terrorism, to deter and prevent further attacks, as well as defending the homeland. The difference between a superpower and a small nation that share basic values is not so much a matter of objectives – as it is a matter of how power will be exercised to achieve them.

### **STRATEGIC CONCEPTS (WAYS)**

This weekend I am engaged in extensive sessions with members of my National Security Council, as we plan *a comprehensive assault on terrorism*. This will be a different kind of conflict against a different kind of enemy. This is a conflict without battlefields or beachheads, a conflict with opponents who believe they are invisible (...) those who make war against the U.S. have chosen their own destruction. Victory against terrorism will not take place in a single battle, but in *a series of decisive actions against terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them*. We are planning a *broad and sustained campaign* to secure our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism. And we are *determined to see this conflict through*. Americans of every faith and background are *committed to this goal* [emphasis added].  
President George W. Bush<sup>50</sup>

Historical examples show how the U.S. has developed ways to achieve the overall objectives.<sup>51</sup> The overall objective during the Cold War was to contain communism and to deter against nuclear attack. The U.S. infused large amounts of money into the devastated economies of Western Europe through what was called the Marshall Plan. This would remove one of the potential sources of appeal for communist ideology. The Marshall Plan is therefore an example of a “way” in which the U.S. applied the economic “means” in pursuit of its overall strategic objective. NATO provides an excellent illustration of how the U.S. employed the military instrument of national power as part of its overall grand strategy. The Europeans were encouraged to rely on the military capabilities of the U.S., especially the nuclear umbrella. NATO was thus used as a “way” in which the U.S. applied the military “means” in pursuit of its overall strategic objective.

The NSS elaborates on the conceptual framework for achieving the strategic goals.<sup>52</sup> One of the ways will be to *strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism* and work to *prevent attacks*

against the U.S. and its friends. The first priority will be to *disrupt and destroy* terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control and communications; materiel support; and finances. The U.S. will strive to enlist the support of the international community, but will not hesitate to act alone – preemptively if necessary – to exercise its right to self-defense. The U.S. will encourage state powers and regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists, and work with allies to disrupt financing. The NSS underscores that the U.S. is committed to lasting organizations like the U.N., the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these alliances. To say it with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's words: "When it comes to the war on terrorism the mission has to determine the coalition, not the other way around."<sup>53</sup> The U.S. will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. Public diplomacy will be used to promote democratic values, or at least ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not grow. The U.S. recognizes that the best defense is a good offense, and it will guide the capabilities to fight terrorism. On the other hand, the U.S. puts homeland security and homeland defense as one of its top priorities, and has consequently established huge organizational changes to its federal administration structure (Department of Homeland Security) and to its military command structure (U.S. Northern Command).

After September 11 the U.S. put together an unprecedented coalition to fight terrorism and to punish the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. In an address to the Nation on October 7, 2001, President Bush said: "On my orders, The U.S. has begun strikes against al-Qaida terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime (...). We are supported by the collective will of the world."<sup>54</sup> The motives of the coalition members to join this fight may vary. There is hardly any doubt, however, that the fundamental beliefs of what is right and wrong, together with general perceptions of the values that most nations would want the global community to be guided by, were reasons to rally with the U.S. It was first and foremost a question of principle, sympathy and solidarity. Thus, the Norwegian government decided 30 November to offer military support to the U.S. in Afghanistan and the majority in the Parliament later endorsed that decision. Secondly, every nation understood at that moment in time that terrorism knew no borders and had shown another face than earlier portrayed. This fight was perceived as legitimate and just. The U.S. was building a coalition as a way to defeat the

terrorist networks and to deter other states that were harboring terrorist networks or organizations. This notion was supported by the actions taken by the U.N. and NATO.

On September 12, 2001, the U.N. unanimously adopted resolution 1368 (2001), which condemned the terrorist acts and where council members expressed their readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the attacks and combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with Charter responsibilities. On September 28, 2001, the Security Council adopted a comprehensive resolution 1373 (2001), which lays out steps and strategies to combat international terrorism. The Security Council also established a committee to monitor the implementation of the resolution and called on every nation to report on action they had taken to that end no later than 90 days after 28 September. Among those steps and strategies were suppressing the financing of terrorism and improving international cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism activities.<sup>55</sup> In her report to the U.N. Norway stated that she as of 5 October 2001 had adopted the necessary enabling legislation in order to implement Security Council resolution 1373. It was also emphasized that Norway is a party to all the global anti-terrorism treaties that are in force.<sup>56</sup> In addressing the U.N. Security Council on November 12, 2001, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the goals are to prevent further terrorist attacks and to bring the guilty to justice. He continued to say that international terrorism could only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach. He pointed out the importance of humanitarian assistance to those who were caught in between, and to get to the breeding grounds of terrorism. All means available must be employed he said – political, legal, military and financial. He urged the UN to take the lead in hammering out a long-term strategy for combating terrorism. He pointed out that the actions taken in Afghanistan were based on the inherent right of self-defense – which UN SC resolution 1368 (2001) had mandated.<sup>57</sup> Through this statement Norwegian authorities underlined the broad agreement with the strategic objectives in the fight against terrorism, but also presented concepts that the global community should pursue. Norway's history of humanitarian efforts came to light, and so did the search for the deeper-rooted causes of terrorism and the UN's role in the fight against international terrorism. All of which are areas where Norway could effectively use her "soft power" most effectively.

The NATO Council made the decision on 12 September 2001, to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This is the core clause of the NATO Charter that states that an armed attack on one Ally shall be considered an attack against them all. It is the most profound expression of Alliance solidarity. Initially it was invoked provisionally, pending determination that the attacks were directed from abroad, but confirmed on 2 October. At the request of the U.S.

the allies agreed on 4 October to take eight measures to implement it and expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. These included measures such as intelligence sharing, provide assistance to allies that may be threatened, provide increased security for U.S. facilities, "backfill" selected Allied assets required to support operations against terrorism, blanket overflight clearances, and U.S. access to ports, airfields of Allies to be used in the war against terrorism. On 8 October, five NATO AWACS aircraft flew to the U.S. to assist in counter-terrorism operations, and on 9 October NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean set off for the Eastern Mediterranean to participate in the campaign against terrorism. As the U.S. and U.K. began their campaign in Afghanistan on 7 October, NATO was not directly participating as an Alliance, but all members supported the operations. The U.S., however, had made use of NATO as a matter of deterrence, prevention and defense of the homeland. In addition, the U.S. had used NATO to facilitate the defeat of the terrorist networks and current leadership in Afghanistan. Not only NATO, but also OAS and ANZUS quickly invoked their treaty obligations to support the U.S.

The world's financial institutions were put on notice – if you support, sponsor, or do business with terrorists, you will not do business with the U.S. the U.S. President stated 7 November.<sup>58</sup> The U.S. had launched its first offensive in the war on terrorism on September 23 by freezing the U.S.-based assets of those individuals and organizations involved with terrorism. A vast number of nations supported the financial war on terror. The European Union took an important decision when it decided to freeze financial assets of 27 individuals/organizations that could be connected to terrorism. These individuals/organizations were the same as the ones U.S. had identified, and thus the EU became a vital partner in the financial war on terrorism. EU also became important in the law enforcement arena. In an extraordinary summit held September 21, 2001, the EU foreign ministers adopted a plan for foreign policy, law enforcement and financial issues that had to be implemented to counter terrorism. One substantial decision was to create a new European Counter-Terrorism Task Force attached to EUROPOL.<sup>59</sup> The European Police cooperation may thus become the EU's common front against terrorism and organized crime, and in cooperation with American federal law enforcement a vital partnership for a common cause. Even though Norway is not a member of the EU, she shares a vast number of common interests. She will therefore in many instances use the European framework to promote her own interests and also will rally with general European decisions in major security policy issues.

Partnerships were used as ways to achieve the strategic objectives. A coalition framework, however, was used to actively defeat the enemy by military means in Afghanistan –

most likely because of the primacy that the U.S. would have in a coalition, and the expediency by which decision-making could be conducted. Experiences from the NATO operations in Serbia in 1999 were probably part of the decision. Herein lie also some of the differences between the large actors on both sides of the Atlantic. Javier Solana, responsible for defense and security policy issues in the EU, explains this by saying that the U.S. is preoccupied with fighting a war against terrorism, while the EU is concerned about how to combat this threat through long-term security measures. All organizational frameworks, however, do what they can do, and the EU's financial, diplomatic and humanitarian roles are far greater than its military role. Thus, all EU-members strive for an international society where the rule of law presides and to uphold the importance of the UN. The solidarity with the U.S. in general, however, and the vital interests of many nations to maintain good relations to a superpower, will lead nations individually to rally with the big in certain cases. This was the case as far as the war on Iraq. Members of the EU and NATO took different paths. The existing organizational frameworks were trembling. Were they no longer useful ways to pursue the objectives – at least in the eyes of the U.S? Shared values and interests may still be the glue that holds organizations together. Politics is after all pragmatism – what do nations gain most from in a long perspective?

The Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, stated in an article in a Norwegian newspaper on 2 October 2002, that the government for a long time had been preoccupied with raising focus on the root causes to terrorism, extremism and fanaticism.<sup>60</sup> At an expert meeting in Oslo 10 June 2003, he said that while people expect the political leaders to provide security and that counter-terrorism measures work, we need to know more about the environment that nurtures hate, fanaticism, and ultimately terrorism. This is how we will prevail in the fight against terrorism. We must identify the underlying conditions that terrorists and the “godfathers of terror” seek to exploit in order to diminish them. What we need is a global coalition of reason and determination backed up by our combined resources.<sup>61</sup> The Prime Minister was paving the way for a conference in New York 22 September 2003, which he had called for and named “Fighting Terrorism for Humanity”. The symbolism was strong; two years after the September 11 attacks and held in New York City the day before the opening of the General Debate in the U.N. It was meant to be a high-level political conference of heads-of-state and government, together with scholars and religious leaders. At the conference, the Prime Minister underscored that we have to do more than what we are currently doing with military, law enforcement, financial and judicial means. We must broaden and enhance our campaign against evil by shedding new light on the root causes of terrorism. By doing that we will help develop more effective measures in fighting terrorism, he continued.<sup>62</sup> The conference was a way to achieve common strategic objectives.

But the problem will not be fixed overnight by a conference. It is one step on a long road to manage a problem. Does this initiative clash with the perceived strategic culture of the U.S? If the problem can't be fixed, don't waste your time on it? Speaking softly doesn't always get you there – the big stick must be kept intact and ready to be used. It is in the diplomatic arena, however, that a small nation can exercise power well beyond the size of the country, population and economy should indicate.

A small nation will always be wary of a superpower's actions. Two factors have to be observed. It is in our interest that a benign hegemonic power is politically and militarily efficient. It would be detrimental to the global war on terrorism if there were no response to the attacks on September 11. It is hardly ever acceptable to give in to political pressure or abstain from taking counter measures. Symbolic reactions, like the counter measures the Clinton administration took after the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, are not solutions. Such actions most likely cause more aggravation. They do not get to the roots, but will be perceived as revenge only. Counter measures must be swift and directed, passivity may encourage further terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the hegemonic power has a responsibility to lead by example and uphold values that tie us together – democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Western democracies have proven survivable as a system, and it was not due to the military, but due to their normative, political and economic attraction. Many will urge the U.S. to lead by norms rather than by “storms” (the use of force). International criticism about the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay illustrates this point. We all want nations to abide by internationally recognized rules since that gives the best basis for peaceful co-existence. If nations defend their actions based on “exceptional circumstances” it is exactly the same arguments that antidemocratic regimes have used for years. The western world has usually rejected these arguments. This point becomes even more important when the hegemonic power itself is the victim of a very exceptional situation. It is in this respect somewhat comforting when Colin Powell in his article “A Strategy of Partnerships”<sup>63</sup> says; “some observers have exaggerated both the scope of preemption in foreign policy and the centrality of preemption in U.S. strategy as a whole. It only applies to the undeterrable threats that come from non-state actors such as terrorist groups. It was never meant to displace deterrence, only to supplement it. He continues to say that our strategy is not defined by preemption. Above all, the president's strategy is one of partnerships that strongly affirm the vital role of NATO and other U.S. alliances – including the UN. The possession of vast territory, raw physical resources, and brute power guarantees neither prosperity nor peace. Investment in human capital, social trust, trade, and cooperation within and among nations do”, Colin Powell reiterates. These are ways that eventually may

bridge the gap between the U.S. and some of its vital partners in the continuing fight against terrorism. From the establishment of a strong coalition after 9/11 that fought the terrorists and the government harboring them in Afghanistan, to the disagreements and sour climate that was created as the American intentions toward Iraq became clear, it will – through all of the above – be possible to regain the momentum in international relations so that we can build networks of democracies as a defense with offensive capability against the networks of terrorists organizations and their supporters. Colin Powell's candid concluding remarks to the above-mentioned article bear witness to this: "It would be churlish to claim that the Bush administration's foreign policy has been error-free from the start. We are human beings; we all make mistakes. But we have always pursued the enlightened self-interest of the American people, and in our purposes and our principles there are no mistakes."<sup>64</sup>

Existing partnerships served the U.S. well in deterring and preventing further attacks, as well as indirectly defeating the terrorists and their networks. Ad-hoc partnerships were used to decisively employ the military instrument of power. The latter did not prevent Norway from taking part with military means – as long as the question of legitimacy was unambiguous. When the U.S. expanded the initial reaction without clear evidence of the link to the original attack, and created doubt about the motives, Norway suffered political heartburn. Preemption and regime change are still not attractive concepts for nations that view legitimacy through the U.N. Charter.

#### **NATIONAL POWER (MEANS)**

Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct *every resource at our command* – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network [emphasis added].  
President George W. Bush<sup>65</sup>

The instruments, or elements of power are clearly laid out as the resources (means) for the attainment of national objectives and goals. They are simply the power base of the nation, or more specifically – the national power that the U.S. possesses in relation to the opponent. The means that a nation possesses to pursue objectives and interests normally fall into four broad categories of national power – or instruments of power.<sup>66</sup> They are political/diplomatic, informational, military, and economic; often referred to by the acronym "DIME". For the specific situation post 9/11 one tends to expand the list to include measures such as law enforcement,

border control, and intelligence. The national instruments of power shall make sure that the nations strategy and its objectives are met.

The U.S.'s power base is today unprecedented in a global context. The U.S. has an enormous economy; eight times bigger than China's, and 22 percent bigger than the European Union's. Its military power is unrivaled; it spends more on its armed forces than the next dozen or more countries combined and produces weaponry so much better than that of any conceivable competition that talk of "full-spectrum dominance" does not seem exaggerated. The U.S. is now an empire in all but name.<sup>67</sup> National power is, however, relative. The diplomatic instrument of power was used to create a worldwide coalition against terrorism immediately after 9/11. The political/diplomatic efforts with respect to the war in Iraq, however, failed to maintain that broad coalition. Information was actively used to define global terrorism as the major threat in the future, and in particular that there would be no end to the fight against terrorists and those who harbor them. It also became essential not to victimize all Muslims and attack a religion. The world was, however, not convinced by the U.S. information campaign that Iraq represented such an imminent threat to peace and security that it warranted military action. Operation "Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan started 7 October 2001, and enjoyed the support of several allies and friends. The military campaign showed an unequalled ability to project military power decisively, in the sense that the Taliban regime was removed from power and the al-Qaida network was dislocated. The U.S. showed an equally impressive military power projection capability as it went to war in Iraq in March 2003. The U.S.'s ability to fight decisively is uncontested, however, the peace has not been won in either Afghanistan or Iraq yet.

The U.S. leadership also used economic power to disrupt terrorist financial networks. The world financial community moved to starve the terrorists of their financial support. Within the first 100 days of the war on terrorism, 196 countries supported the financial war on terrorism and more than 140 countries acted to freeze terrorist assets.<sup>68</sup> The U.S. used its economic might to finance the military actions, however with steadily increasing budget deficits, and to defend the country against further attacks as well as providing humanitarian aid to people in Afghanistan and elsewhere. As far as law enforcement the U.S. has led a global dragnet to help bring terrorists to justice and help prevent future terrorist acts. The U.S. created the "Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force" to prevent terrorists from entering the U.S., and initiated global sharing of law enforcement information. The U.S. also implemented tough new anti-terrorism laws and tightened awareness and facilitated anti-terrorism efforts domestically through a rather controversial Patriot Act. The most notable efforts to protect America against further attacks were the homeland security initiatives. Through strengthened intelligence efforts, and the

creation of the Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council, the U.S. eventually stood up the Department for Homeland Security and a new combatant command – the U.S. Northern Command.

Regardless of all these resources, the fact of the matter is that a country that accounts for nearly a third of total world output, now has such surprising trouble in getting what it wants. It struggles to get control of two countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. In a special edition of Newsweek,<sup>69</sup> Niall Ferguson argues that it is necessary to rethink what we mean by power. We confuse that concept with other, quite different things: wealth and weaponry – influence and appeal. It is quite possible to have a great deal of all these things, yet to have only limited power. One has to weigh the instruments of power and their usefulness against short- or long-term effects. Donald Rumsfeld's memo of 12 October 2003, admitted a vital point to this effect. America is not clearly winning the war on terror. We lack the metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring more than are being recruited and deployed against us, the memo asked?<sup>70</sup> This is why the French Foreign Minister, Dominique De Villepen, says that they do not think that military power alone brings about more security, but that there is a need for a broad political strategy that is defined by the international community. He realizes the U.S. trauma post 9/11, but also that with power comes vulnerability. In the face of this vulnerability traditional use of force will not work. The nature of power is changing. It has to be consistent with the people's aspirations, De Villepen continues, and refers to the people's demonstrations in 2003 over war and peace, over justice and unequal development. The big lesson from the war in Iraq, he says, is that the international community should remain united, and that if you want to be effective, you need legitimacy (incarnated by the U.N.)<sup>71</sup> Some may claim that the U.S. – based on its historic traditions – resort more easily to brute power because it possesses it, is more impatient in resorting to "hard power", and is more occupied by "fixing" problems than "managing" them. In his article "Playing to Win", Samuel P. Huntington makes an argument that the U.S. should use force only if it can intervene rapidly, in an offensive mode, in a decisive manner, and so far as possible with overwhelming force, with a view to defeating enemy military forces in the shortest time possible. He advocates that this is grounded in American social and institutional values, and that this is the way that suits the Americans.<sup>72</sup> It is probably in this respect that the separation between the U.S. as a superpower – with a superpower's means – and a small nation like Norway is greatest. Within the realm of the resolutions and decisions that were taken in the U.N., NATO and the E.U. post 9/11, Norway would utilize her instruments of power and implement concrete measures to support the big scheme of events. Norway, being a strong supporter of multilateral organizations

and the clause of solidarity that goes with it, but also a close friend of the U.S. on a bilateral basis, also supported the U.S. – led coalition in Afghanistan militarily. A whole range of niche capabilities was sent; among them fighter- and transport aircraft, Special Forces, mine clearing teams etc. Norway would also uphold her reputation as a nation that takes humanitarian issues seriously. Less than one month after 9/11 Norway had doubled her humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and she had also argued that the military mine clearing unit was being offered to alleviate the current humanitarian situation in the country. The population in Norway hardly ever contests the contributions for humanitarian tasks, but the government had to answer tough questions about the participation and tasks of the F-16 fighter aircraft and Special Forces based on the potential for collateral damage – especially involving innocent civilians. Even though the government could enjoy opinion polls showing that over 64 percent of the population supported that Norway rallied with the U.S. in the war on terrorism,<sup>73</sup> there will always be some domestic scrutiny of deploying military means abroad. That is the case even if the U.N. has mandated an operation, but less so if the question of legitimacy is undisputed.

“We cannot lend our support to this war. Norway has consistently maintained that any military action must have a firm basis in international law in the form of a new decision by the Security Council. No such resolution has been adopted.” The Norwegian Prime Minister stated Norwegian official policy on the situation in Iraq in a statement to the Parliament 21 March 2003.<sup>74</sup> From the broad agreement on the war in Afghanistan, Norway had to make the tough decision to choose between two parties among allies. For political reasons, Norway had to choose the U.N. track instead of the U.S. track. Even though the Government was of the opinion that the substantive requirements for the use of force in accordance with the U.N. Charter and Resolution 1441 was clearly met, a new resolution would have provided an indisputable basis for the use of force. The U.K. and Denmark argued differently on the issue of international law. Therefore the Norwegian government underlined that its decision was based on an overall assessment of the situation and that it had reached a *political* conclusion. Norway had once more underscored the principle that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security lies with the U.N. Security Council. Norway could not commit military means unless there was a new resolution, but offered – in due time – resources to provide humanitarian support and to rebuild Iraq. The Norwegian military forces that eventually deployed to Iraq after the end of major combat operations was announced did so under the above-mentioned terms and according to a new U.N. resolution.

“Norway – a superpower.” So read the headline in a Norwegian newspaper in December last year.<sup>75</sup> People in general would not see this as a true statement by any definition, but it was

based on the mentioned assessment by Newsweek magazine.<sup>76</sup> The magazine ranked Norway as the ninth most powerful country in the world! The U.S. was obviously ranked as the most powerful. The premise for the power ranking is this: If America's troubles in Iraq show the limits of economic and military might, then what is power, and who has it now? Money and guns are critical, but not the sole source of national power. Power is also diplomatic influence, moral authority, and technological prowess. Norway's high ranking was explained this way: A high quality of life, diplomatic prestige and a bit of oil offset a lack of big money and weapons. Commentary in Norway would pursue this ranking by underlining the important role of "soft power" and Norway's prominent role as a peace broker. Norway's humanitarian efforts have always been in the front seat. A national scrutiny like this reinforces the effects you may gain from employing your means. But, it is not all about employing the "soft power". If you believe in organizational structures as ways to employ your military means, you also have to share a burden. Norway also has to export security through military means to be guaranteed import of the same if need be. This is really the essence of alliance solidarity, which is a cornerstone in Norwegian security policy. A good example of this is Norway's strong support of the needs that Turkey defined as particularly important to her as the war in Iraq unfolded.

The employment of national instruments of power is to a large degree defined by how many resources a nation possesses and the effects a nation may gain from using them. In this respect there is a large difference between a superpower and a small nation. The U.S. can employ instruments of power unilaterally and decisively if deemed necessary, while Norway will in most – if not all – cases be influenced by decisions in organizations to which she belongs. On the other hand, Norway would typically gain most effect (e.g. international respect) from its actions through organizations. There are exceptions to this, however. The Norwegian diplomatic efforts with a focus on humanitarian efforts and peace mediation are obviously noticed. Worthwhile noticing is also the fact that even though the military means that Norway deploys are small, they are highly specialized and capable, and often requested to stay longer than they originally intended to. A flag on the ground is not a symbol to be underestimated if you seek influence.

## **CONCLUSION**

In his article "U.S. National Security Interests Today", George D. Schwab, portrays the sentiments in the U.S. post 9/11 in this way: "Perhaps even more traumatic to Americans than the threat posed by militant Marxist-Leninist ideology that was factored into Soviet foreign policy in the cold war years were September 11, 2001, and December 7, 1941. Both dates are carved

in the consciousness of the American people and in the history of the country, preventing a peace-loving and fundamentally inward-looking people from forgetting that they were attacked in their home country. To ignore or underestimate the significance of these events would be to fail to understand the thinking that animates U.S. foreign policy decision makers as they articulate national security interests.”<sup>77</sup>

The National Security Strategy of the U.S. reflects this sentiment. While the U.S. commits itself to organizations and partnerships to pursue national interests and goals, the NSS also addresses the fundamental changes in risk assessments and what they imply as far as enhanced security – both domestically and globally. The U.S. has the power to act decisively, and states its intentions to do so – preemptively – if the conditions are met. But who decides when the conditions are met? Can the superpower, even though in possession of the means, act as the judge, jury and the executioner? Between a hegemon – that post 9/11 feels itself uniquely vulnerable and with a global power projection capability – and a small nation that views the U.N. Security Council as the primary body for international peace and security, there may be different opinions of what is legitimate action. The broader goals post 9/11 may easily be shared between a superpower and a small nation, but the ways and means will ultimately have to stand the test of the nations’ fundamental beliefs – in relation to the government itself, the parliament and the people.

Norway and the U.S. have over the years developed strong ties and a close relationship. During and after the Cold War Norway has considered the U.S. as the irreplaceable power for her own security guarantees – through NATO as well as bilaterally. The relationship with the U.S. is therefore the most important aspect of Norwegian foreign policy. As a prudent strategy of the weaker, Norway’s traditions and history speak in favor of international cooperation and multilateralism. The perceived American unilateralism is thus a concern and a challenge, particularly if it leads to a rift across the Atlantic. Norway’s comfort zone would be one where she does not have to choose between Europe and the U.S. The basis for similar views on strategic objectives as well as ways and means to pursue them, have been developed over years through organizational frameworks. The view of the smaller would be that pursuance of goals through these frameworks would enhance global security in the longer perspective. It will always lead to some aggravation if or when a superpower perceives those frameworks irrelevant to the achievement of its goals – especially if made a rule rather than an exception.

Norway supported wholeheartedly the different initiatives that were taken in the aftermath of 9/11. She implemented resolutions from the U.N., NATO and the EU, and supported the U.S.-led coalition’s fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. Through different measures and by active

use of all the national instruments of power, Norway contributed to the global war against terrorism. The broad coalition that the U.S. assembled post 9/11 is unprecedented. Existing and new partnerships were used to pursue a strategy of building networks against networks, to smoke out the terrorists and to put pressure on nations that harbor them. To go after Iraq in the same vein, however, was a step too far. The international solidarity was hard pressed, and traditional allies within organizations took different stands. When forced to choose between allies, nations have to go to the roots of their beliefs. Norway could not support the war on Iraq for major political reasons. Norway was not in favor of either the regime of Saddam Hussein or the prospects of that regime possessing weapons of mass destruction. But she was not convinced of the immediacy of the case – besides, the U.S. was perceived to show neglect for the issue of legitimacy. Was Iraq the test of preemption? The skepticism rose high as the motives were unclear – was regime change the real issue? “The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason,..”. These are the words of Paul Wolfowitz in an interview with Vanity Fair 9 May 2003.<sup>78</sup> If there is a seed of suspicion in the motives for military intervention, it will have to stand the test against moral, legal and political decency. Preemption and regime change are not yet in the U.N. vocabulary, and they are not yet ripe concepts for the majority of nations. It will not be in Norway’s core national interests to do anything that undermines the authority of the U.N. If the U.S. continues to pursue its national interests through the same body, it will most likely achieve the moral, legal and political authority to make necessary changes post 9/11 and to enjoy the power of persuasion and influence.

WORD COUNT= 15.107



## ENDNOTES

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<sup>30</sup> Olav Riste, "Facing the 21<sup>st</sup> century: New and old dilemmas for Norwegian foreign policy"; (DNAK, *Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek* nr. 13 – 2001).

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