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**FIGHTING TERRORISM WITH STRATEGY:**

**REVISITING COMPETING VISIONS**

By

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements  
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## Preface

My year in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Security Studies Program gave me a rare opportunity to devote a significant amount of time and energy to learning more about the national security of our great nation. The freedom to choose a research topic led me to consider numerous options, but after the atrocities of 11 September 2001, I was compelled to research and report on options for America's long-term response to the deadly threat of international terrorism. I hope this report sheds light on those options and the arguments that support them.

I am grateful to the faculty, fellows, and students of the MIT Security Studies Program for freely and thoughtfully expressing their views on this important topic. Their insights led me to research numerous approaches and arguments that I would have otherwise failed to consider. I am particularly indebted to the other military fellows at MIT—COL Kevin Benson (USA), Col David Mollahan (USMC) and Lt Cmdr David Sliwinski (USN)—for offering their diverse perspectives on national strategy and military operations. I extend a special thanks to my research advisor, Professor Harvey M. Sapolsky, for his wise counsel, thought-provoking conversation and enduring patience. Finally, as always, I am forever thankful to my wife Donna, and our children Rachel and Matthew, for their love, support and understanding.

### **Abstract**

The end of the Cold War was an opportunity for the United States to select and adhere to a new grand strategy, but a new approach was never chosen because America did not face a threat of sufficient magnitude to make a choice necessary. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, some have argued that the age of strategic ambiguity known as the post-Cold War period is over, and the threat of international terrorism requires America to make a grand strategic choice. This paper examines those choices by presenting four post-Cold War strategy options—neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy—and examining them through a counterterrorism lens. Specifically, it employs a set of critical strategic questions about the war on terrorism and cites post-9-11 ideas from the proponents of each strategy to answer those questions. Based on those answers, each grand strategy is critiqued by applying a disciplined counterterrorism framework to the reveal tensions inherent in each approach. Finally, while the military cannot make grand strategy or force consistency in its application, it must be able to support it. To that end, this paper proposes capabilities that the United States Air Force (USAF) should enhance or acquire to support the war on terrorism depending on the grand strategy selected.

This paper does not recommend a grand strategy or counterterrorism approach. The goal is to present all approaches in an objective and coherent manner. Once all of the approaches are presented, conclusions are drawn by comparing and contrasting the various approaches. While many insights are offered, there are four primary conclusions. First, the increased emphasis on the terrorist threat has not been a catalyst for significant changes in the four competing grand strategies. Second, proponents of each of the grand strategies differ significantly in their approaches to the war on terrorism. Third, information superiority will be a primary USAF capability in the war on terrorism, regardless of the grand strategy pursued. Finally, proponents of neo-isolationism offer the most broad-based approach to the war on terrorism, but their strategy may conflict with other national interests.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

The end of the Cold War brought with it the opportunity for Americans to debate new approaches to national security.<sup>1</sup> The defeat of the Soviet threat, which dominated American security policy for four decades, created expectations for a revised national security policy template—a template that would capitalize on a changed strategic environment and offer a coherent approach to the international use of American power.<sup>2</sup> Four competing visions or grand strategies emerged in public discourse: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.<sup>3</sup> Although variations of each strategy have competed for dominance in

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<sup>1</sup> This opportunity is noted in numerous publications. Two examples are Cindy Williams, ed., *Holding the Line: US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 19; Thomas H. Henriksen, ed., *Foreign Policy for America in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), vii.

<sup>2</sup> These expectations are outlined in Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Irony of American Power,” *First Things* 81, (March 1998): n.p., on-line, Internet, 8 December 2001, available from <http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9803/articles/bacevich.html>; and Michael E. Brown et al., ed., *America's Strategic Choices* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), ix.

<sup>3</sup> Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-97): 5. There are differing views regarding the number of grand strategic alternatives that comprise the grand strategic spectrum at any given time. For example, Posen and Ross themselves use five in Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing U.S. Grand Strategies,” in *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century* ed. Robert J. Lieber (New York: Longman, 1997), 100-134. Art offers seven in Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998-99): 101-106. Three are posed in Zalmay Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War,” *Washington Quarterly* 2, no. 18 (Spring 1995): 89-95. For the purposes of this paper, the four visions adequately cover the spectrum of choices.

the post-Cold War world, none of them have been adopted as a guide for America's foreign policy.<sup>4</sup>

How much longer will it take for America to select a grand strategy? Does America really need one? According to two leading scholars on this subject, "an *ad hoc* approach is probably inevitable until a crisis impels a choice."<sup>5</sup> Indeed, historical evidence suggests that America makes strategic choices when major national security threats are perceived and the population is committed to the cause.<sup>6</sup> The atrocities of 11 September 2001 (9-11) may present a national security crisis of sufficient gravity to impel the United States toward a single grand strategy. On 12 September 2001, Professor Barry R. Posen implied this type of significant national security milestone by stating "the post-Cold War world ended yesterday"<sup>7</sup> adding "the United States needs to reassess what it stands for in international politics."<sup>8</sup> Later, Posen went on to say:

It's not clear to me that Al Qaeda...is interested in transforming the United States of America one way or the other. It's interested in transforming United States foreign policy. The attack here is on the American foreign policy essentially from Pakistan to North Africa. The choices here are about an active foreign policy, safety at home, and freedom at home. Some larger discussion of what U.S. foreign policy should be now that the Soviet Union is gone is

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<sup>4</sup> Failure to settle on a grand strategy is noted in Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 5-7; Brown, ix; and Walter A. McDougall, "Contra Globalization and U.S. Hegemony," in *Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-first Century*, 118-119.

<sup>5</sup> Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 53. Crisis is also linked to a grand strategic selection in Henriksen, ed., *Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-first Century*, vii.

<sup>6</sup> McDougall, 123-125; Bacevich, n.p.; and Henrikson, "From the Berlin Wall's Collapse to the New Century," in *Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-first Century*, 1. For example, the perceived threat from communism led the U.S. to adopt a strategy of containment during the Cold War.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in Sarah H. Wright, "International experts warn of threats, challenges," *MIT Tech Talk*, 19 September 2001.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Eun J. Lee, "Tuesday's Attacks Discussed at CIS Forum," *MIT Tech Talk*, 14 September 2001.

needed, and it didn't really happen in the '90s. We're evading this question. It's a question that sooner or later we'll have to confront — particularly if it turns out that Al Qaeda is determined, organized [and] persistent.<sup>9</sup>

Posen's characterization of 9-11 as a catalyst for an increased focus on grand strategic issues has been echoed by others. One scholar claims that 9-11 has already “triggered the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of U.S. foreign policy.”<sup>10</sup> Others have invoked 9-11 to energize support for their longstanding arguments for a less ambitious grand strategy.<sup>11</sup> Others, like former Secretary of the Navy James Webb, argue that the need for the United States to select a clear grand strategy is of supreme importance, not only to help combat terrorism, but also to ensure that other important national security concerns are not minimized in deference to the current crisis.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, before 9-11, counterterrorism discussions were often divorced from broader strategic concerns. Despite past myopic tendencies, articulating options for the war on terrorism in a grand strategic context is supported by the fact that counterterrorism policy and general foreign policy intersect at many junctures, and behavior that supports counterterrorism may do harm to broader strategic efforts. A template is needed for America to appropriately use

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<sup>9</sup> Barry R. Posen, transcript of interview by Jon Keller in “What Happens Next?” n.p., online, Internet, 5 December 2001, available from <http://www.bostonmagazine.com/highlights/roundtable.shtm>.

<sup>10</sup> Stephen M. Walt, “Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 26, no.3 (Winter 2001-02): 56.

<sup>11</sup> Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, “A New Grand Strategy,” *Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 1 (January 2002): 36-42. Before 9-11, Layne had been a consistent proponent of a relatively inactive grand strategy. Some examples are: Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5-51; and Christopher Layne, “Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?” *World Policy Journal* 15, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 8-28.

<sup>12</sup> James Webb, “A New Doctrine For New Wars,” *Wall Street Journal*, 30 November 2001.

its power, allocate its resources and act in a consistent and coherent manner.<sup>13</sup> Choices about using national power, allocating national resources, and conducting foreign policy involve trade-offs that are ultimately questions of grand strategy.<sup>14</sup>

Certainly the projected length and significance of the struggle against terrorism supports the notion that it should be addressed in a grand strategic context. Unlike the end of the Cold War, which was characterized by *removal* of a longstanding threat, 9-11 marks the *beginning* of a long national security struggle against a worldwide menace. As this paper will illustrate, there are dissenting views about how the war should be conducted, but President Bush,<sup>15</sup> members of Congress,<sup>16</sup> scholars,<sup>17</sup> journalists<sup>18</sup> and military officials<sup>19</sup> all tend to agree that the struggle will be lengthy—perhaps never-ending—and comparisons to the Cold War abound.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> These notions are expressed in Ian O. Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 126-127; Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 6-10, 29, 219-221; and Raphael F. Perl, *Terrorism, the Future, and*

*U.S. Foreign Policy*, CRS Issue Brief IB10027, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 2 November 2001), CRS-5.

<sup>14</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War World,” in *Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-first Century*, 26. Gaddis states “If grand strategy is indeed the calculated relationship of means to large ends, then...those ends cannot be everything everybody wants: just as means must be subordinated to end, ends in turn must be disciplined by available means.”

<sup>15</sup> George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” *News and Policies*, 20 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 December 2001, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>. “I ask for your patience...in what will be a long struggle.”

<sup>16</sup> For example, Mark Souder, U.S. Congressman, “War on Terrorism,” 28 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 February 2002, available from <http://www.house.gov/souder/terrorism.html>. “all Americans need to stay resolute through what is going to be a long struggle.”

Although the release of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) could be seen as an indication of what lies ahead with respect to America's strategic choices, as a Department of Defense publication, it lacks the authority to articulate a grand strategy. Indeed, the publication of the 2001 QDR prior to the release of a national security strategy (NSS) has been questioned.<sup>21</sup> Additionally, past inconsistencies between published national security strategies and actual application of American power leave experts and scholars skeptical as to the relevance of an NSS as an accurate description of a grand strategy.<sup>22</sup>

Although the Bush administration has yet to publish a NSS, the President has offered a "doctrine" of sorts concerning the war on terrorism:

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<sup>17</sup> For example, Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," *International Security* 26, no.3 (Winter 2001-02): 55. "The United States faces a long war..."

<sup>18</sup> For example David E. Sanger and Patrick E. Tyler, "Wartime Forges a Unified Front for Bush Aides," *New York Times*, 23 December 2001. "...no one predicted that the footsteps of history would take them into a war against terrorism that has no end in sight."

<sup>19</sup> For example Gen. John P. Jumper, "Nation needs us now more than ever," *U.S. Air Force Policy Digest*, December 2001, 1. "This will be a long struggle..."

<sup>20</sup> Many have made this comparison. Some examples are: Anatol Lieven, "Fighting Terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief#7*, October 2001, 1, on-line, Internet, 8 January 2002, available from <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Lieven-7.pdf>; and Michael Howard, "What's in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1, (January-February, 2002): 8-13; and Marvin Olasky, "Let them come to Clio," *TownHall.com*, 27 December 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 2 January 2002, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/marvinolasky/mo20011227.shtml>.

<sup>21</sup> Department of Defense, "Background Briefing on the Quadrennial Defense Review," *Department of Defense News Transcript*, 14 June 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 28 December 2002, available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/t06142001\\_t614bckg.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/t06142001_t614bckg.html).

<sup>22</sup> Williams, 18; and McDougall, 126-130.

We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."<sup>23</sup>

These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are... Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world."<sup>24</sup>

These statements clearly articulate American resolve to the rest of the world, but they do not give insight into how far the United States is willing to go to fight the war on terrorism—a question that is reportedly the subject of much concern both inside and outside the United States government.<sup>25</sup> To lend more clarity to the “Bush Doctrine,” one can ask a set of related questions about American interests and objectives, threats to those interests and objectives, appropriate responses to those threats and principles that should guide counterterrorism policy and strategy. Does the United States have a vital interest in eradicating all terrorism, or just some of it? Is America willing to attack state sponsors of terrorism preemptively? Unilaterally? What role does the United States play once the fighting stops? Given that these are the same types of questions that help shape grand strategies,<sup>26</sup> it is indeed appropriate to explore options for America’s war on terrorism in a grand strategic context.

While Posen has briefly speculated on each of the competing visions through a 9-11 lens, opting to advocate a strategy of selective engagement as the best approach to fighting the war on

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<sup>23</sup> Bush, “Address to a Joint Session”.

<sup>24</sup> George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” *State of the Union*, 29 January 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 30 January 2002, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

<sup>25</sup> Karen DeYoung, “‘Doctrine’ Awaits Definition,” *Washington Post*, 16 October 2001; and David E. Sanger, “Bush Aides Say Tough Tone Put Foes on Notice,” *New York Times*, 31 January 2002.

<sup>26</sup> Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 5.

terror, he states that “outlines are not clear.”<sup>27</sup> This paper adds clarity by looking at each of the competing visions from a counterterrorism perspective. It employs a set of critical strategic questions about the war on terrorism and cites post-9-11 ideas from the proponents of each strategy to answer those questions. Based on those answers, each grand strategy is critiqued by applying a disciplined counterterrorism framework to the reveal tensions inherent in each approach. Finally, while the military cannot make grand strategy or force consistency in its application, it must be able to support it. To that end, this paper proposes capabilities that the United States Air Force (USAF) should enhance or acquire to support the war on terrorism depending on the grand strategy selected. This paper does not recommend a grand strategy or counterterrorism approach. The goal is to present all approaches in an objective and coherent manner. Once all of the approaches are presented, conclusions are drawn by comparing and contrasting the various approaches.

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<sup>27</sup> Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 53-55.

## Chapter 2

### Frameworks for Analyzing Grand Strategy, Counterterrorism, and USAF Capabilities

Linking thoughts on grand strategy, counterterrorism and USAF capabilities requires at least some common definitions to serve as a foundation for further discussion. For example, there are several ways to approach grand strategy depending on the extent to which one focuses on specific instruments of power.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, the term “counterterrorism” has been used to describe efforts directed at either domestic or international terrorism.<sup>29</sup> One could also limit a USAF capabilities discussion to direct combat competencies versus the entire portfolio of missions and weapon systems the USAF can accomplish. For the purposes of this paper, the analysis is confined to the war on terrorism, which limits the discussion to some degree. First, similar to Posen and Ross, grand strategy is discussed more in terms of military and political power, and less in terms of economic power.<sup>30</sup> Second, this paper focuses exclusively on international (versus domestic) terrorism, where international terrorism is “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country.”<sup>31</sup> Third, the discussion of USAF capabilities is bound by using the six USAF core competencies as a template for analysis.

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<sup>28</sup> See Robert J. Art, “A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” in *America's Strategic Choices* ed. Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997) 51-52.

<sup>29</sup> Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 8, 33. On page 8 Pillar uses counterterrorism with respect to state sponsors of international terrorism and on page 33 he refers to counterterrorism in a discussion of domestic terrorist Timothy McVeigh.

<sup>30</sup> Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-97): 8.

<sup>31</sup> *Foreign Relations and Intercourse Act, US Code*, vol. 22, sec. 2656f (1936).

## Grand Strategy

As a means to broadly present the four alternatives for grand strategy, this paper uses a very general definition of grand strategy itself: “grand strategy is the calculated relationship of means to large ends.”<sup>32</sup> The “large ends” are essentially where America wants to go. This visionary destination is not defined in terms of geography, but rather in terms of interests.<sup>33</sup> This paper adopts the tiered approach to national interests articulated in the 1999 National Security Strategy. Specifically, use of military power is guaranteed to defend vital (survival, safety and vitality) interests, conditional to defend important (well-being and global character) interests, and rare in support of humanitarian interests.<sup>34</sup> Obviously, every state would like to survive, be secure and exist in a benign or congenial environment, but beyond those obvious vital interests, consensus fades and the means to get to the destination becomes even more debatable. Defining the destination, and deciding how best to employ means, or instruments of power, to move toward (or remain at) the destination while minimizing resistance and ensuring an innocuous or favorable environment are the salient issues of the grand strategy debate.<sup>35</sup>

Although the purpose of this paper is not to present a detailed discussion of grand strategy, a general description of the consensus and divergence regarding America’s place in the post-Cold War world is useful as a basis for explaining the four competing visions. Most agree that the end of the Cold War marked America’s arrival at a favorable destination—a place with the United States as the sole superpower. There was also general consensus that America’s

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<sup>32</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War World,” in *Foreign Policy for America in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives*, ed. Thomas H. Henriksen (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), 17.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 17, 22.

<sup>34</sup> The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1999), 1-2, 19-20; on-line, Internet, 13 February 2002, available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other\\_pubs/nssr99.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/nssr99.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> Gaddis, 22-29.

should preserve its superiority.<sup>36</sup> However, opinions diverged on grand strategic questions about vital interests, how to use America's power, how much power to preserve, and how to interact with the international system and reduce resistance in a world that may not see benefits in American superiority.<sup>37</sup> The four competing visions essentially represent different paths to destinations that ostensibly assure long-term security and prosperity for America. While the four visions are not mutually exclusive, each offers efficiencies and benefits that cannot be realized by indiscriminately moving from one to the other.<sup>38</sup> Some have perceived the post-Cold War behavior of the United States as inconsistent, seemingly based on capricious changes in grand strategy, or no grand strategy at all. They cite a relatively innocuous security environment as a factor in giving America the luxury of practicing strategic skittishness without significant consequences.<sup>39</sup> Some believe the 9-11 attacks have dissolved that luxury.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> The favorable position of post-Cold War America and the consensus on remaining powerful are alluded to in Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," *International Security* 26, no.3 (Winter 2001-02): 52-53; and Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Irony of American Power," *First Things* 81, (March 1998): n.p., on-line, Internet, 8 December 2001, available from <http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9803/articles/bacevich.html>.

<sup>37</sup> This divergence is the basis for the competition noted in Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-97): 5-53. Walter A. McDougall, "Contra Globalization and U.S. Hegemony," in *Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-first Century*, 126-135, describes the divergence as a struggle between neo-liberals and neo-conservatives.

<sup>38</sup> Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 52-53.

<sup>39</sup> These criticisms and their low-cost consequences appear in Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Security* 26, no.3 (Winter 2001-02): 58; Josef Joffe, "Bismarck or Britain: Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," in *America's Strategic Choices*, 99-100; and James Kurth, "American Strategy in the Global Era," *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 7.

<sup>40</sup> See for example Walt, 58, "On September 11, however, al-Qaeda demonstrated that the cost of U.S. global engagement was larger than Americans thought"; and Christopher Layne and

Using the concepts of *interests*, *means employment* and *minimizing environmental resistance*, the four grand strategies are presented below in abbreviated form, in an effort to articulate primarily those aspects that relate to the subsequent discussion about the war on terrorism.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, pre-9-11 stances on terrorism are described.

### **Neo-isolationism**

#### **Interests**

Neo-isolationists restrict their view of vital and important national interests, usually by subtracting containment from the previous set of Cold War vital interests and pointing to what is left,<sup>42</sup> or by stating them in terms of what Americans should be expected to pay for, fight for and if necessary, die for.<sup>43</sup> In either case, the answer is protection of *America*—its prosperity, property, security and political sovereignty—and not protection of overseas regions.<sup>44</sup> They

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Benjamin Schwarz, “A New Grand Strategy,” *Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 1 (January 2002): 36, “...the costs seemed to be tolerably low. But the September 11 attacks have proved otherwise.”

<sup>41</sup> As with all generalizations, my descriptions will distort the arguments of any single proponent to some degree.

<sup>42</sup> Evidence of this calculation is exists in Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” in *America’s Strategic Choices*, 200-201, 204, 210; and Alan Tonelson, “Superpower Without a Sword,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 166-167; Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” *International Security* 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 86; and Earl C. Ravenal, “The Case for Adjustment,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 81 (Winter 1990-91): 3, 14-15, 18.

<sup>43</sup> These sentiments are expressed in Doug Bandow, “Keeping the Troops and the Money at Home,” *Current History* 93, no. 579 (January 1994): 8-12; and Patrick J. Buchanan, “America First—and Second, and Third,” *National Interest*, no. 19 (Spring 1990): 78; and Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 202.

<sup>44</sup> Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 201-204; Buchanan, 78; Bandow, 10; Ravenal, 15; and Tonelson, 166-167, 179. A narrow interest in protecting America may compel some neo-isolationists to grudgingly commit to limited, temporary overseas presence. See for example Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 204, 220-224; and Tonelson, 179 in which the case is made for

reject the notion that ideological crusades with no direct link to America's security or prosperity, like spreading democracy or supporting human rights abroad, should move the United States to draw the sword or open the wallet.<sup>45</sup>

### **Means Employment**

Consistent with their narrow view of interests, neo-isolationists prefer a restrained use of military power,<sup>46</sup> but not total economic and political withdrawal.<sup>47</sup> Despite their penchant for military restraint, neo-isolationists are not pacifists—they support a superior military force and depend on nuclear weapons to support their stance—but superiority and the deterrence that goes with it can be had for far less blood and treasure by withdrawing from foreign garrisons and focusing on America's security.<sup>48</sup> Not surprisingly, they are fond of quoting John Quincy Adams who said “America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”<sup>49</sup> Entanglements that commit the United States to foreign intervention for the sake of others, like NATO, should be shed. With vast oceans to the east and west, and weak, peace-loving neighbors to the north and south, the probability that the United States will need the help of others to realize security and prosperity is dwarfed by the likelihood that wealthy alliance

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limited presence in the Persian Gulf. However, this commitment is motivated only by concern for the narrow set of neo-isolationist interests, not by a desire to help others defend themselves.

<sup>45</sup> Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 202-203, 205; Ravenal, 15; Buchanan, 81; Bandow, 9-13; and Tonelson, 167.

<sup>46</sup> Arguments for military restraint appear in Benjamin Schwarz, “Leading the world vs. dominating it,” *Christian Science Monitor Electric Edition*, 21 April 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 8 January 2002, available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/04/21/p8s3.htm>; Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 200-201; Bandow, 11-13; Tonelson, 167, 179; Buchanan, 79; and Ravenal, 14-16.

<sup>47</sup> Schwartz, n.p., “America can be engaged in world affairs without attempting to dominate them”; and Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 200-201, “The restraint we prescribe should not be misdescribed as a total withdrawal from the world.”

<sup>48</sup> Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 201-202, 207-209; Buchanan, 80; Bandow, 8-13; Ravenal, 15-18; Tonelson, 167, 175, 179.

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in Schwartz, n.p.; Bandow, 13; and Buchanan, 77.

members will shirk their security responsibilities and draw the United States into a conflict that has little to do with America's vital interests.<sup>50</sup>

### **Minimizing Environmental Resistance**

Environmental resistance is largely a moot point for neo-isolationists because America, having obtained the "luxury of uninvolvedness," should generally choose not to operate internationally.<sup>51</sup> Neo-isolationism seems to subscribe to an inherently self-regulating international system that, absent America's involvement, remains relatively benign to United States interests and prone to dissipating excess energy and ambitions at the regional level.<sup>52</sup> Artificially suppressing regional perturbations via United States intervention at best delays a return to normalcy, and at worst creates additional disturbances aimed at America's vital interests. Consequently, America stays more secure by keeping out of the affairs of others.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, neo-isolationists reject calls for American presence or intervention to reduce the probability of a great power war or to stem the rise of a peer competitor that would threaten vital interests. They generally maintain that regional balancing makes great power wars unlikely, and America's presence in a region *increases* the possibility of peer competition, suppresses balancing behavior and denies the United States the option of abstaining from a great power war, even if vital American interests are not at stake.<sup>54</sup> When it comes to the international system,

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<sup>50</sup> These arguments for shedding alliances are outlined in Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 203, 207, 210-220; Buchanan, 80-81; Bandow, 13; and Tonelson, 179.

<sup>51</sup> Bandow, 12; and Ravenal, 1.

<sup>52</sup> The perception of a relatively harmless, self-balancing international system is alluded to in Ravenal, 7-8; Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 204-206, 208-209; Bandow, 12.

<sup>53</sup> See for example Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing," 87; Ravenal, 8; Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 206, 208 ; Bandow, 11, 13; Buchanan, 81; and Tonelson, 178-179.

<sup>54</sup> The follies of military presence and intervention are stated in Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 8-9; Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 204-206, 208, 225-232; Earl C. Ravenal, "Isolationism" as the Denial of Intervention: What Foreign Policy Is and Isn't," *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing* No. 57, 27 April 2000, 5, on-line, Internet, 17 December 2001, available from <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb57.pdf>.

neo-isolationists might turn the old adage sideways by proclaiming “nothing ventured, nothing lost.”

### **Pre-9-11 Terrorism Stance**

Before 9-11, some neo-isolationists claimed that reduced international presence and activism has the added benefit of diminishing the threat of terrorism against the United States.<sup>55</sup> They backed this claim with data from a Defense Science Board study which showed a “strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.”<sup>56</sup> Despite their distaste for the international use of military power, neo-isolationists agreed that terrorist attacks against the United States would be a legitimate catalyst for a military response.<sup>57</sup>

### **Selective Engagement**

#### **Interests**

Selective engagement advocates do not argue with the vital interests espoused by neo-isolationists,<sup>58</sup> but they cast a wider net by fusing American prosperity and security with a short list of external conditions. Hence, these conditions—suppressed proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, great power peace, and divided control of Persian Gulf oil reserves—become vital interests worth defending with the international use of military

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<sup>55</sup> Gohlz, Press and Sapolsky, 225; Bandow, “Keeping the Troops and the Money at Home,” 11; Doug Bandow, “Leave Mideast Alone,” *USA Today*, 30 June 1993; Doug Bandow, “Scaling Down in a Safer World,” *Washington Post*, 22 March 2000.

<sup>56</sup> Cited in Ivan Eland, “Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record,” *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing* No. 50, 17 December 1998, 2, on-line, Internet, 13 February 2002, available from <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb50.pdf>.

<sup>57</sup> Gohlz, Press and Sapolsky, 201, 225; and Ravenal, “Isolationism as the Denial of Intervention,” 5-6.

<sup>58</sup> Neo-isolationist interests are explicitly included in Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998-99): 80; and Art, “A Defensible Defense,” 53.

power.<sup>59</sup> The link between these conditions and American prosperity and security is drawn as follows. First, NBC weapons used by rogue states or terrorists are judged to be a significant threat to homeland security.<sup>60</sup> Second, great power wars threaten both American security and prosperity. They make it more difficult to control NBC weapons, they invariably draw in the United States, and strong economic ties to the great powers impact American prosperity.<sup>61</sup> Third, dividing control of Persian Gulf oil reserves prevents a hostile regional hegemon from controlling oil prices to the detriment of the world economy and American prosperity.<sup>62</sup> Selective engagers recognize the value of interests like democratization and human rights

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<sup>59</sup> These interests are listed in Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 83-95. The short list of vital interests varies. Posen and Ross limit the list to great power peace, but Posen, a selective engager, believes the United States should oppose the rise of a Eurasian hegemon in Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 17. Others have different lists at different times. For example, in an earlier work, Art includes protection of Israel and South Korea in Art, "Defensible Defense, 53-54. Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 2 (June 1990): 8-12, 18 lists great power peace and nuclear nonproliferation as vital interests, and mentions the Persian Gulf as the only allowable third world intervention. Art, "Geopolitics Updated," as the most recent declaration of selective engagement vital interests, is used for this paper.

<sup>60</sup> The perils of this threat are outlined in Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 84-88; Art, "Defensible Defense, 69-70; and Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 19.

<sup>61</sup> The negative impacts of great power wars are detailed in Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 89-92; Van Evera, "Europe Matters," 8-11; and Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 17-20.

<sup>62</sup> Rationale for managing control of Persian Gulf oil is discussed in Art, "Geopolitics Updated," 92-95; Van Evera, "Europe Matters," 18; and Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 19-20.

preservation, but they view them as less than vital<sup>63</sup> and rarely acquiesce to the use of military power to pursue them,<sup>64</sup> arguing that assuming a “global policeman” role is infeasible.<sup>65</sup>

### **Means Employment**

Selective engagement is a preventive (versus reactive) strategy—its advocates opt to employ the limited supply of military resources to forestall trouble, thereby lowering the probability that America will have to react. Consequently, selective engagers prefer to use military power as insurance against the low probability/high consequence threats of NBC attacks, great power war, and oil market manipulation.<sup>66</sup> Selective engagement proponents argue that overseas military presence in regions that matter most—eastern and western Eurasia and the Persian Gulf—serves to lower the probability of these calamities.<sup>67</sup> The presence of American forces and the inclusion of allies under the nuclear umbrella of the United States helps to suppress great power security competitions, thereby curbing or controlling the spread of NBC weapons, reducing the likelihood America will suffer an NBC attack, and lowering the risk of

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<sup>63</sup> The secondary nature of these interests is alluded to in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 95; Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 2; and Art, “Defensible Defense,” 87.

<sup>64</sup> For example, Art lists prevention of “genocidal-like mass murders” as a possible scenario in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 100; and Van Evera makes similar concessions for use of force in a few low cost/high probability for success cases in Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 32; while Art lists four criteria for US intervention in Art, “Defensible Defense,” 87-90, but questions whether the military is even useful for this type of effort.

<sup>65</sup> Global policing is cited as an undesirable activity in Art, “Defensible Defense,” 54, 74, 90; Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 101; Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 24-31; and Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 18.

<sup>66</sup> The preventive approach as insurance against bigger trouble is outlined in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 81, 84-95 105; Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 8-12, 18; Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 18; and Art, “Defensible Defense,” 95-96.

<sup>67</sup> The prudence of engaging in these regions is explained in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 81, 84-95; Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 20; Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 8-12, 18.

great power war.<sup>68</sup> Additionally, American military power in the Middle East can help prevent the rise of a hostile regional hegemon bent on holding oil reserves hostage.<sup>69</sup> Selective engagement suggests a cost-benefit analysis in which the price of some level of engagement now is worth the advantage of avoiding expensive catastrophes later.<sup>70</sup> Consequently, selective engagers are sensitive to mission creep, seeking to avoid increases that tilt the cost-benefit equation in favor of isolationism.<sup>71</sup> Similarly, selective engagers embrace alliances that help lighten the security load, reassure allies and negate the need for ad hoc coalition building should deterrence fail.<sup>72</sup>

### **Minimizing Environmental Resistance**

Selective engagers seek to minimize environmental resistance by managing the balancing process and by providing American leadership in the areas matter most. Like neo-isolationists, selective engagers believe in regional balancing, but every system has flaws, and the importance of preserving great power peace makes balancing the process worth managing.<sup>73</sup> While selective engagers are drawn to security alliances to help facilitate peace, it is unrealistic to count on these organizations to get the job done—American leadership is needed.<sup>74</sup> Like neo-isolationists,

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<sup>68</sup> These connections are made in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 81, 84-92; Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 8-12; and Art, “Defensible Defense,” 73-75.

<sup>69</sup> U.S. presence is justified in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 92-95; Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 18; Art, “Defensible Defense,” 92-93; and Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 19-20.

<sup>70</sup> This key concept is outlined in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 81, 83, 106, 111; and Art, “Defensible Defense,” 95-96.

<sup>71</sup> This sensitivity is alluded to in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 106-109, 111-113; and Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 23.

<sup>72</sup> The efficacy of alliances is expounded on in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 81-82, 105-106; and Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 20.

<sup>73</sup> Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 18; Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 81, 91-92; and Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 10.

<sup>74</sup> The importance of American leadership is described in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 82; and Art, “Defensible Defense,” 95.

selective engagers are sensitive to meddling in the affairs of others, but they believe that their form of engagement can be done with minimal backlash, and may even advance some less-than-vital interests.<sup>75</sup> Selective engagement advocates validate their view of the international system by pointing to history—when the United States was engaged during the Cold War, great power war was avoided. Conversely, American involvement in WWI and WWII was preceded by a period of non-engagement.<sup>76</sup> When it comes to the international system, selective engagers might turn the old adage sideways by proclaiming “*something* ventured, nothing *lost*.”

### **Pre-9-11 Terrorism Stance**

Before 9-11, at least one selective engagement proponent worried about NBC terrorism. He contended that selective engagement helps reduce the likelihood of such an event by reducing the spread of NBC weapons, but conceded that terrorists may be difficult to deter.<sup>77</sup> As advocates of a preventive strategy that relies heavily on deterrence, selective engagers presumably realized this vulnerability and apparently addressed it by conditionally supporting the preemptive use of military force to remove the threat of terrorism.<sup>78</sup>

### **Cooperative Security**

#### **Interests**

Cooperative security proponents argue that, with the passing of the Cold War, the basic security concerns that led to the formulation of vital national interests have either disappeared, or lack sufficient plausibility to monopolize the focus of America’s grand strategy.<sup>79</sup> Rather than

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<sup>75</sup> Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 100-101, 109-111. Art states the best way to realize lesser interests is to protect vital interests and makes the case that American engagement should serve others too, not just the U.S.

<sup>76</sup> This historical argument is made in Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 90; Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 9; and Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 23.

<sup>77</sup> Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 84-88.

<sup>78</sup> Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 89; and Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 31.

<sup>79</sup> This argument appears in Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, Occasional Paper (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992) 1, 4, 58; John D. Steinbruner, “Business as Usual?” *Brookings Review* 10, no.

perpetuating the shortsighted state-versus-state struggle for military power that has dominated history, cooperative security aspires to a higher calling in which the traditional national interests of America and those of the great powers are subordinated to the international interests of peace and cooperation.<sup>80</sup> Consequently, cooperative security advocates seek to increase the clout of international institutions like the United Nations.<sup>81</sup> World peace, facilitated by the cooperative efforts of the international community, is elevated to a quasi-vital national interest worthy of the use of cooperative military power.<sup>82</sup> Although world peace as a project is idealistically attractive, some cooperative security advocates also frame it in terms of self-interest. This more pragmatic explanation holds that the increasingly rapid dissemination of technology makes

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3 (Summer 1992): 12-15; John D. Steinbruner, "Problems of Predominance: Implications of the U.S. Military Advantage," *Brookings Review* 14, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 14-15, 17; Madeleine K. Albright, "Realism and Idealism in American Foreign Policy Today," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 5, no. 26, 27 June 1994, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 January 2002, available from <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no26.html>; and Llewellyn D. Howell, "Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy Legacy," *USA Today Magazine*, World Watcher Section 129, no. 2668 (January 2001): 25.

<sup>80</sup> The primacy of global interests is detailed in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 4, 36, 41, 58-59; and Jagat Mehta, "Cooperative Security: From the Bottom Up," *Boston Review*, June-August 1993, n.p., on-line, Internet, 27 January 2002, available from <http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR18.3/mehta.html>.

<sup>81</sup> Calls for increased institutional power are voiced in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 24-25, 28; Eqbal Ahmad, "At the Cold War's End: A World of Pain," *Boston Review*, June-August 1993, n.p., on-line, Internet, 27 January 2002, available from <http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR18.3/ahmad.html>; Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, no. 96 (Fall 1991): 7-11, 20; Mehta, "Cooperative Security: From the Bottom Up," n.p.; Tobias Debiel, "Strengthening the UN as an Effective World Authority: Cooperative Security Versus Hegemonic Crisis Management," *Global Governance* 6, no. 1 (January-March 2000): 25-26, 30, 39.

<sup>82</sup> America's global responsibility to contribute militarily to world peace are note in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 7-11; Albright, "Realism and Idealism," n.p.; and Howell, 25.

American military superiority an ephemeral phenomenon unless members of the international community see value in prolonging it, albeit in a less potent form, by restraining their quest for military parity or supremacy.<sup>83</sup> Since most states have (or should have) an interest in preventing war and reducing military expenditures, the international community should acquiesce to, or even welcome some degree of American military superiority if it is used in concert with others in support of global peace.<sup>84</sup> Elevating global peace to the realm of a vital interest is also supported by the view that in an increasingly interconnected and unregulated world, war and its unsavory by-products are contagious and may eventually impact everyone. Small wars spawn larger ones. Weapons proliferation spurs more proliferation. Domination sparks the desire to dominate. Economic stresses from distant wars impact the global economy.<sup>85</sup> Indeed, rather than bending to short-term concerns about the costs and risks of engagement, cooperative security advocates believe their approach can help prevent these undesirable activities and ultimately serve the long-term interest of America and the world.<sup>86</sup> Assuring human rights and spreading democracy are seen as useful methods of preventing the spread of war and restraining weapons proliferation; consequently, cooperative security proponents are inclined to favor cooperative intervention in support of these ideals.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> This line of reasoning is spelled out in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 5-7, 50-51.

<sup>84</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 5, 22-23, 25-30; and Janne E. Nolan, "Cooperative Security in the United States," in *America's Strategic Choices*, rev. ed., ed. Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000) 179-180.

<sup>85</sup> These sentiments are expressed Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 4-7, 13, 19-21, 31-35, 56-58; Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions," 25; Albright, "Realism and Idealism," n.p.; and Howell, 25.

<sup>86</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 6-10, 19, 46, 58; and Albright, "Realism and Idealism," n.p.

<sup>87</sup> The virtues of altruistic intervention are espoused in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 10, 56-58; Albright, "Realism and Idealism," n.p.; Charles A. Kupchan, "...And Fractured U.S. Resolve," *Washington Post*, 13 June 1999; Charles A. Kupchan, "Illiberal Illusions: Restoring Democracies Good Name," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 3 (May/June 1998): 124-125; Mehta, "Cooperative Security: From the Bottom Up," n.p.; Debiel, "Strengthening the UN," 26, 36.

## Means Employment

Like selective engagement, cooperative security is a preventive strategy, but it places few limits on the trouble it seeks to prevent.<sup>88</sup> Indeed, some of its proponents admit that their efforts to prevent war will probably never be realized, but they maintain that cooperatively moving toward peace is feasible and intrinsically virtuous.<sup>89</sup> Others are content to institutionalize peace one region at a time.<sup>90</sup> In order to move toward global peace, cooperative security advocates outline an internationally endorsed system of constraints and incentives designed to deter aggression and reward compliance.<sup>91</sup> Constraints on the size and composition of military forces are based on the premise that their existence is only warranted to defend national territory or assist in United Nations' efforts to persuade aggressors to comply with the system.<sup>92</sup> States that live within the framework of the system reap the rewards of enhanced trade and advanced technology.<sup>93</sup> Those that do not comply risk the effects of economic sanctions and cooperative

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<sup>88</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 7-8, 10, are ready to take on war in general, circumstances that lead to war, weapons proliferation, intrastate conflict, and arms racing. Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict Intrastate," 7, claims "security is multidimensional in character, demanding attention not only to political and diplomatic disputes but also to such factors as economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, and human rights abuses."

<sup>89</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 9. "Cooperative security is, and probably will remain, an aspiration that will be only incompletely fulfilled."

<sup>90</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, "Life after Pax Americana," *World Policy Journal* 16, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 26. "The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia."

<sup>91</sup> The most detailed description of this elaborate system appears in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 8, 9, 11-24, 30, 35-36, 38-41. A shorter description of a "cooperative system of international security" appears in Mehta, "Cooperative Security: From the Bottom Up," n.p.

<sup>92</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 11, 20.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 39-41.

military power.<sup>94</sup> Advocates deny envisioning a world government,<sup>95</sup> but cooperative security does entail states relinquishing at least some of their traditional decision making authorities and acquiescing to intrusive international inspections.<sup>96</sup> Additionally, by constraining the level of offensive capability held by any single state, a fully implemented cooperative security system could greatly reduce the prospects for victory in a unilateral military attack.<sup>97</sup> Simply put, employing means in a cooperative security setting favors consultation over confrontation, reassurance over deterrence, transparency over secrecy and interdependence over unilateralism.<sup>98</sup>

### **Minimizing Environmental Resistance**

Cooperative security advocates claim that the international environment is interdependent.<sup>99</sup> Choosing to preserve overwhelming military superiority and acting primarily out of self-interest increases environmental resistance. While this resistance may not pose a serious threat in the short run, continuing on an inherently intimidating course prolongs a pattern of national rivalry that could have dangerous consequences.<sup>100</sup> Integrating a downsized military

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<sup>94</sup> The perils on uncooperative behavior are discussed in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 25, 40, 43; and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” *International Security* 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 132.

<sup>95</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 10.

<sup>96</sup> Examples of sovereignty sacrifices can be found in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 5, 11, 38-41; Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and Europe,” 118-120, 131-132; and Debiel, “Strengthening the UN,” 30.

<sup>97</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 20; Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and Europe,” 124, 126, 136; and Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 26.

<sup>98</sup> Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict Intrastate,” 7.

<sup>99</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 4-7; Albright, “Realism and Idealism,” n.p.; Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 25; and Llewellyn D. Howell, “Readiness and War in a Globalized System,” *USA Today Magazine*, World Watcher Section 129, no. 2666 (November 2002): 21. Howell points out that war—any war—has a negative impact on America’s economy. “In a globalized system, when we militarily set upon an opponent, the opponent is us.”

<sup>100</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 4-7; and Steinbruner, “Problems of Predominance,” 14-17.

into a cooperative security architecture ameliorates the security dilemma associated with a competitive stance by transforming America from a rival to a partner that acts in concert with, and for the good of the international community.<sup>101</sup> When it comes to the international system, cooperative security advocates might proclaim “all for one and one for all.”<sup>102</sup>

### **Pre-9-11 Terrorism Stance**

Before 9-11, some cooperative security advocates argued that America’s overwhelming military firepower leads competitors to asymmetric strategies that resemble terrorism.<sup>103</sup> Additionally, like selective engagers, cooperative security advocates cited nuclear terrorism as one of several justifications for continued emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation.<sup>104</sup> Finally, cooperative security advocates saw acts terrorism primarily as law enforcement problems. “America will use every available diplomatic, judicial, economic and—when necessary—

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<sup>101</sup> This favorable end state is described in Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 4-7; and Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and Europe,” 133-137.

<sup>102</sup> This characterization is quoted from Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 24-25.

<sup>103</sup> Steinbruner, “Problems of Predominance,” 14-17; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,” *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998): 81.

<sup>104</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 13; Mehta, “Cooperative Security: From the Bottom Up,” n.p.; and Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow, 86-87.

military tool” against terrorists.<sup>105</sup> But ultimately, terrorism as a phenomenon was best addressed by targeting its root causes.<sup>106</sup>

### **Primacy**

### **Interests**

Primacy is a proactive strategy—it seeks to actively shape the international environment.<sup>107</sup> Primacy advocates argue that America’s prosperity and security are best enhanced and prolonged by ensuring and exercising international supremacy—militarily,

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<sup>105</sup> Madeleine K. Albright, “Transcript: Albright Remarks Of Africa Bombing Suspect Arrest,” *United States Information Agency*, 27 August 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 14 February 2002, available from

<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/98082703.htm>. Also, Howell, “Bill Clinton’s Foreign Policy Legacy,” 25 states “The forces to respond to such problems are police, not armies.”; and Eqbal Ahmad, “Straight Talk on Terrorism,” lecture, University of Colorado at Boulder, 12 October 1998, transcribed in *Monthly Review* 53, no. 8 (January 2002): 54, “Military solutions cause more problems than they solve.”

<sup>106</sup> Llewellyn D. Howell, “Terrorism: Politics by Other Means,” *USA Today Magazine*, World Watcher Section 127, no. 2644 (January 1999): 25. Howell attributes the expansion of terrorism to “rising population; increasing disparities in wealth and benefits; the expansion of religious extremism; and increased technology and knowledge of it.” These—not the individual terrorists—are the most lucrative targets.

<sup>107</sup> The active nature of primacy is described in Zalmay Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War,” *Washington Quarterly* 2, no. 18 (Spring 1995): 89-95; Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*, (San Francisco, Calif.: Encounter Books, 2000), 12; James W. Ceasar, “The Great Divide: American Internationalism and its Opponents,” in *Present Dangers*, 40; James Kurth, “American Strategy in the Global Era,” *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 23; and Frederick W. Kagan, “The Decline of America’s Armed Forces,” in *Present Dangers*, 265.

economically and politically.<sup>108</sup> The Cold War was a long struggle that America won, but the world remains a very dangerous place.<sup>109</sup> Primacists go to great lengths to identify potential threats to justify their position, but even without serious competitors, the United States cannot afford to lose its pre-eminence. Indeed, unrevealed hazards certainly lurk in the future and an international order favorable to America and the world can best be secured with a good dose of America's global influence.<sup>110</sup> History shows an America prone to retrench in the wake of victory, only to re-emerge to address major crises at a high cost in blood and treasure.<sup>111</sup> Primacists argue that it is time we accept our responsibility as a global leader, prevent crises by shaping the international environment based on our principles, and act as a "benevolent hegemon" for our own good, and the good of rest of the world.<sup>112</sup> Absent the stabilizing effect of American power and influence, new competitors are bound to rise, old enemies could re-create

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<sup>108</sup> United States supremacy is a foundational theme that pervades virtually all primacy works. Some examples are Ceasar, 40; and William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996): 20, 23.

<sup>109</sup> According to Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, vii – viii, "the world has, indeed, become a more perilous place after the squandered decade of the 1990s."

<sup>110</sup> Perhaps the most poignant example of primacy's requirement for America to exercise its power in order to maintain a favorable international order is Frederick W. Kagan, 265, "Today we must deter not one present foe, but any and all possible future foes." Other examples include Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 21; Kurth, "Global Era," 22-23; Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment?" 94; and Dick Cheney, "Active Leadership? You Better Believe It," *New York Times*, 15 March 1992.

<sup>111</sup> The historical roots of primacy are articulated in Cheney, "Active Leadership?"; Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment?" 101. The lower cost of deterrence versus war is most explicitly identified in Kristol and Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," 26.

<sup>112</sup> These ideas are expressed in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 12, 23-24; Ceasar, 27, 31; Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire," *Foreign Policy*, no. 111 (Summer 1998): n.p., on-line, Internet, 26 December 2001, available from <http://www.ceip.org/people/kagbenev.htm>; Kristol and Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," 20-23; and Cheney, "Active Leadership?"

themselves, allies may shirk security responsibilities and small conflicts may grow.<sup>113</sup> Primacy advocates maintain that continued American dominion in a post-Cold War world helps prevent the next crisis, and leaves the United States in an optimal position to act quickly should its preeminence fail to deter a malicious actor.<sup>114</sup> While other strategies suggest some degree of American superiority as a means to an end, primacy holds that active American supremacy is both a means to prevent or address trouble and an end in the sense that primacy is “a strategy aimed at preserving American hegemony.”<sup>115</sup> Hence, maintaining American primacy is a vital interest.<sup>116</sup>

Aside from pre-eminence, primacists tend to withhold judgment on what else constitutes a vital interest.<sup>117</sup> Based on the premise that unrivaled American power and an unquestionable commitment to act will deter much of the conflict in the world, some primacists argue that their strategy can result in less intervention.<sup>118</sup> Whatever the case, decisions about when and how to intervene (i.e. what is or is not a vital interest) are ultimately reduced to decisions about

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<sup>113</sup> The dangers of a world without the positive influence of America are expounded on in Ceasar, 40, 42; Kagan, “Benevolent Empire,” n.p.; Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, vii, 4, 12; Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 89-91, 93-94; Frederick W. Kagan, 259-264; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Grand Chessboard,” *Harvard International Review* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997/1998): 48-49.

<sup>114</sup> Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 16; : Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 26; and Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 102.

<sup>115</sup> Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 14.

<sup>116</sup> The “art” of using military power to maintain primacy—which, by definition, makes it a vital interest—is illustrated in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 13-14; Ceasar, 40; Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 97, 106.

<sup>117</sup> “Determining what is in America’s national interest is an art, not a science.” Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 13. Similar ideas are articulated in Ceasar, 40.

<sup>118</sup> Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 13; and Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 94-97.

preserving America's status as a principled global leader.<sup>119</sup> Although primacy and cooperative security are on opposite ends of the realist-idealist continuum, it is worth noting that both share an interest in world peace, although primacists are not interested in sacrificing sovereignty to attain it.<sup>120</sup>

### **Means Employment**

While American supremacy is a goal of primacy advocates, they maintain that simply marshaling overwhelming capabilities falls short of their vision.<sup>121</sup> Primacy, by definition, seeks to maximize American power, and power is the ability to influence others.<sup>122</sup> However, others will not be influenced if they do not believe that America's overwhelming capabilities will ever be used—either against them or in their support. Primacy cannot be maintained from afar. Hence, primacy involves employing American means to establish and maintain credibility as a global hegemon.<sup>123</sup> Consequently, America may choose to act preemptively, and usually with great speed and decisive impact, favoring the need for prompt action over concerns about international sensitivities.<sup>124</sup> While proponents of the other strategies use declining defense budgets to support their arguments, primacy advocates realize their approach is expensive and

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<sup>119</sup> This formulation is most prevalent in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 13-14; Robert Kagan, "Kosovo and the Echoes of Isolationism," *New York Times*, 24 March 1999; and Jeffrey Gedmin, "Europe and NATO: Saving the Alliance," in *Present Dangers*, 181-182.

<sup>120</sup> A comparison of liberal internationalism to conservative internationalism (primacy) is presented in Ceasar, 29.

<sup>121</sup> The notion of an "Arsenal of Democracy" is rejected in Ceasar, 27.

<sup>122</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 68.

<sup>123</sup> This signaling behavior is explained in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 12-17.

<sup>124</sup> Perhaps the most concise statement on this is "strongest power decides to act, with or without the others" in Kagan, "Benevolent Empire," n.p. The need for decisive action is also discussed in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 12-17; Ceasar, 26-27; Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment?" 101; and Charles Krauthammer, "The New Unilateralism," *Washington Post*, 8 June 2001.

often plea for more defense spending, arguing that the benefits of primacy are worth the costs.<sup>125</sup> Primacists value security alliances, but tend to address them in terms of the need for America to lead them and the importance of that leadership in maintaining credibility as a global hegemon.<sup>126</sup> Rather than viewing multilateralism as a prerequisite for action, unilateral action, and the capability to pursue it, is viewed as a means to coerce allies to take up the cause.<sup>127</sup>

### **Minimizing Environmental Resistance**

Primacy proponents believe that American pre-dominance reduces environmental resistance. Allies see the advantages of American leadership,<sup>128</sup> while enemies or potential rivals are deterred from even contemplating competition or conflict.<sup>129</sup> Hostile regimes that do not grasp the futility of competing with America will obviously increase environmental resistance, but primacists claim that their approach will transform them—either by use of force, or through the grim prospect of a long-term competition with the United States and its allies that gradually erodes the conceptual foundations of their misguided strategy.<sup>130</sup> Primacy advocates recognize

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<sup>125</sup> Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 15-16; Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 106; Frederick W. Kagan, 263-264.

<sup>126</sup> Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 15-16; Gedmin, 181-182; Ceasar, 35-36; Cheney, “Active Leadership?”; and Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 95-96.

<sup>127</sup> The most explicit statement on this is “multilateralism must be preceded by unilateralism” in Kagan, “Benevolent Empire,” n.p. Others ascribe to similar views in Ceasar, 35-36, 41; and Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 104; Joshua Muravchik, “Carrying a Small Stick,” *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*, On the Issues, September 1996, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 February 2002, available from <http://www.aei.org/oti/oti6884.htm>.

<sup>128</sup> Kagan, “Benevolent Empire,” n.p.; Cheney, “Active Leadership?”; Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 21-22.

<sup>129</sup> The desire to create an environment where competition appears futile is described in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 16; Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 22-23, 26; Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 103; Frederick W. Kagan, 264; and Brzezinski, “The Grand Chessboard,” 53.

<sup>130</sup> Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 17-22; Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 28; and Ceasar, 42-43.

that their strategy conveys a sense of self-interest and selfishness that may create environmental resistance.<sup>131</sup> Consequently, primacists stress the importance of acting as a “benevolent hegemon” whose decisions are guided by a sense of moral purpose, universal ideals, and global responsibility.<sup>132</sup> Indeed, these concepts are so important that some primacists describe the need to promulgate them domestically as well as internationally.<sup>133</sup> In sum, primacists believe environmental resistance is reduced by making it clear that a world order maintained by a benevolent and responsible American hegemon is far better than any other alternative.<sup>134</sup>

### **Pre-9-11 Terrorism Stance**

Before 9-11, some primacy advocates cited terrorism as one of several ominous threats that support their view that the post-Cold War world is a dangerous place that warrants increased spending on defense and counterterrorism.<sup>135</sup> Additionally, they argued for taking more draconian measures against state sponsors of terrorism.<sup>136</sup>

### **Defining Terrorism**

Analyzing grand strategy options with respect to combating terrorism is complicated by the fact that there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism.<sup>137</sup> As a pejorative label, some

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<sup>131</sup> Some prefer the term “leadership” over “hegemon” for this reason, as noted in Caesar, 41. Others express similar sentiments in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 21-22; and Joshua Muravchik, “U.S. Dominance not Winning Popularity,” *USA Today*, 27 October 98.

<sup>132</sup> The idea of acting in “enlightened self-interest” captures this sentiment in Kagan, “Benevolent Empire,” n.p. It is discussed elsewhere in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 22; Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 26-27; Muravchik, “U.S. Dominance not Winning Popularity”; and Caesar, 38-39, 41-42.

<sup>133</sup> Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 27-30; Caesar, 43; Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 95, 105-106.

<sup>134</sup> The comparative advantages of this option are noted in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 24; Kagan, “Benevolent Empire,” n.p.; and Huntington, “Primacy Matters,” 82-83.

<sup>135</sup> Robert Kagan, “Don’t Cut Defense; No Deal,” *Weekly Standard*, 12 May 1997, 14.

<sup>136</sup> Muravchik, “Carrying a Small Stick,” n.p.

<sup>137</sup> The lack of an accepted definition is noted in Raphael F. Perl, *Terrorism, the Future, and*

states, groups and individuals seek to shape the definition of terrorism so that it excludes the methods they employ, and/or includes the methods of their enemies.<sup>138</sup> While the definitional debate existed before 9-11,<sup>139</sup> its intensity grew after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.<sup>140</sup> Indeed, one major news agency opted to use “alleged hijacker” instead of “terrorist” to describe the perpetrators, citing the oft-quoted axiom “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”<sup>141</sup> Once articulated, the Bush Doctrine’s promise to “pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism”<sup>142</sup> ostensibly raised the stakes of defining terrorism, while

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*U.S. Foreign Policy*, CRS Issue Brief IB10027, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 2 November 2001), CRS-3; Brian Michael Jenkins, “Forward,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), v; and Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, April 2001), 3, on-line, Internet, 8 December 2001, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2419.htm>.

<sup>138</sup> Perhaps the most illustrative example of this phenomenon can be found in Anthony Deutsh, “Milosevic: I Was Fighting Terrorism,” 14 February 2002, *Associated Press Online*, on-line, bigchalk.com, 14 February 2002. This phenomenon is also noted in William Pfaff, “The Politics of Terrorism, or Civilians vs. Civilians,” *International Herald Tribune*, 10 January 2002; and Pillar, 12-13.

<sup>139</sup> See for example Editorial, “Defining Terrorism,” *Boston Globe*, 2 May 2000; and Eqbal Ahmad, “Straight Talk on Terrorism,” lecture, University of Colorado at Boulder, 12 October 1998, quoted in *Monthly Review* 53, no. 8 (January 2002): 46-54.

<sup>140</sup> See for example United Nations General Assembly, “On second day of debate, General Assembly hears calls for definition of terrorism,” *Daily Highlights*, 2 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 February 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/News/dh/20011002.htm#34>.

<sup>141</sup> “The Right Ear,” *Human Events* 57, no. 39 (22 October 2001): 20.

<sup>142</sup> George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” *News and Policies*, 20 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 December 2001, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

subsequent proclamations about the “axis of evil” and weapons of mass destruction appeared to broaden the scope of the war on terrorism.<sup>143</sup>

Despite the definitional dissonance, the legal definition of terrorism that the United States uses to keep statistics is quite robust in that it offers logical arguments that address the issues cited above. For the United States government, terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”<sup>144</sup> This definition rightly characterizes terrorism as a method and *not* as an ideology, a religious experience, or the objective of a group of enemies. Why is this important? Defining the problem has implications for the solution. For example, defining terrorism as an ideology evokes a massive undertaking to convince others to abandon their beliefs, whether or not those beliefs compel them to violence. Defining terrorism as an enemy objective limits the problem to that specific enemy while others avoid attention. Therefore, defining terrorism as a method appropriately bounds the problem to ensure that efforts and resources are properly focused on an effective solution.<sup>145</sup> This also has labeling implications. For example, the “freedom fighter” argument does not apply since a revolutionary who targets noncombatants is, by definition, a terrorist.<sup>146</sup> While the United States may have

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<sup>143</sup> Michael R. Gordon, “Pointing Finger, Bush Broadens His 'Doctrine',” *New York Times*, 30 January 2002.

<sup>144</sup> *Foreign Relations and Intercourse Act, US Code*, vol. 22, sec. 2656f (d) (1936). This definition also appears in Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2000*, 3.

<sup>145</sup> Defining terrorism as a method is the approach preferred by terrorism experts. An excellent discussion of the definition of terrorism appears in Pillar, 12-18. Pillar notes that Bin Laden “would be of little concern to the United States” were it not for the methods he employs. Walter Laqueur, “Left, Right, and Beyond: The Changing Face of Terror,” in *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War*, ed. James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 71, also defines terrorism as a method.

<sup>146</sup> The “freedom fighter” argument is further refuted in George P. Schultz, “Terrorism: The Challenge of Democracies,” address to the Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism, Washington, D.C., 24 June 1984, quoted in *Vital Speeches of the Day*

good reasons to oppose a revolutionary movement that does not employ terrorism, including activities aimed at countering that movement within the rubric of counterterrorism is inconsistent with the above definition.

Although the United States government’s legal definition of terrorism is generally resilient, the changing nature of terrorism leads to some weaknesses that are worth mentioning here because they may also impact the war on terrorism. First, the rise of religious terrorism calls into question the political motivation component of the definition. If, as one expert notes, political motivation is broadly defined as the desire to address strategic concerns,<sup>147</sup> the above definition is adequate. However, religiously motivated terrorist groups, particularly Islamic groups, grew from virtual non-existence during the 1980s to a major portion of active groups in the 1990s (see Figure 1).




Figure 1 Religious Versus Other Terrorist Groups

**Source:** Data from RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism as depicted in Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 16.

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68, no. 1 (15 October 2001): 30; and Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network*, 2d ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), xxi–xxii, 9.

<sup>147</sup> Pillar, 14.

Additionally, terrorists motivated by religion appear to consider terrorism an end in itself—a method justified by scripture and unconstrained by the attributes of potential targets.<sup>148</sup> Consequently, religiously motivated terrorism is cited by experts as one of several factors contributing to the increased lethality of terrorism.<sup>149</sup> Second, by referring to subnational groups or clandestine agents as the perpetrators of terrorism, the definition might imply a degree of experience and sophistication that, while still prevalent, is no longer an essential element for devastating attacks. In recent years, the full-time, professional terrorist group model has been augmented with the emergence of part-time “amateur” terrorists who operate with relative autonomy either individually, or as part of a loosely defined network or ad hoc group.<sup>150</sup> Given both of the weaknesses in the current definition, terrorism today is perhaps better described as premeditated, politically *or religiously* motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups, clandestine agents, *networks or individuals*, usually intended to influence an audience.

### **Selecting a Counterterrorism Template**

As previously noted, for the purposes of this paper, counterterrorism refers to activities aimed at the international terrorism problem. However, the term counterterrorism, like terrorism, lacks a universal definition. The United States military defines counterterrorism as “offensive

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<sup>148</sup> This is a relatively new and dangerous trend in terrorism. It is discussed further in Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, 28; John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, 40; and Pillar, 37.

<sup>149</sup> These expert opinions appear in Hoffman, 15-20, 28; Laqueur, 73-75; Pillar, 37, 45; and The National Commission on Terrorism, “The International Terrorism Threat is Changing,” *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism*, 7 June 2000, 3, on-line, Internet, 5 February 2002, available from <http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/nct3.pdf>. For a statistical discussion on the increased lethality of terrorism see Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6.

<sup>150</sup> Hoffman, 20-24; Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, 42-44; Pillar, 14, 21, 49; Bruce B. Auster, Kevin Whitelaw, and Lucian Kim, “An Inside Look at Terror Inc.” *U.S. News and World Report*, 19 October 1998, 34.

measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism,”<sup>151</sup> while antiterrorism consists of “defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.”<sup>152</sup> The former definition’s characterization of counterterrorism as offensive is problematic in a grand strategic context since it is possible to make strategic choices to prevent, deter or respond to terrorism that are not inherently offensive.<sup>153</sup> The latter definition is enlightening in that it could include strategic alternatives, like the retrenchment of neo-isolationism, which could reduce vulnerability to terrorism. Hence, this paper adopts a hybrid definition by defining counterterrorism as measures taken to prevent, deter, respond against and reduce vulnerability to terrorism.

Defining counterterrorism is much easier than determining what measures will actually help. Indeed, since 9-11, journalists, scholars and foreign policy professionals have published a plethora of ideas on how best to fight the war on terrorism.<sup>154</sup> However, even before 9-11, counterterrorism experts used decades of experience to formulate counterterrorism strategies that are seldom cited by post-911 commentators. This paper assumes that the counterterrorism approaches promoted by counterterrorism experts collectively offer a more comprehensive and effective template to analyze grand strategy with respect to the war on terrorism than the views of those who have had limited counterterrorism experience. This is not to say that the ideas of journalists, scholars and foreign policy professionals do not provide valuable insights into the

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<sup>151</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 15 October 2001, 105.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>153</sup> For example, Pillar recommends encouraging state sponsors to reform through peaceful engagement in Pillar, 226.

<sup>154</sup> A representative sample includes Michael Howard, “What’s in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1, (January-February, 2002): 8-13; Robert Kagan, “The Powell Papers,” *Washington Post*, 3 October 2001; Stephen Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden’s Gang,” *Newsday*, 4 October 2001, A43, A46; Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 39-55; Henry Kissinger, “Where Do We Go From Here?” *Washington Post*, 6 November 2001; Margaret Thatcher, “Advice to a Superpower,” *New York Times*, 11 February 02; and Charles Krauthammer, Not Enough Might, *Washington Post*, 30 October 2001.

current war on terrorism. Indeed, many of their ideas are shared by counterterrorism experts. However, as scholars writing for the purpose of expanding the body of knowledge on terrorism, the approaches of counterterrorism experts offer a wider coverage of the problem. Consequently, research for this paper sought counterterrorism literature that offered comprehensive templates that are easily applied to strategic decision making. Rather than going about the relatively futile task of predicting the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies,<sup>155</sup> selection of a counterterrorism template was based on each template's utility in objectively analyzing the relationship between decisions of American grand strategy and counterterrorism policy, without prescribing a specific strategic course of action. Simply put, a template that comprehensively describes counterterrorism considerations was preferred over a more prescriptive counterterrorism strategy. Three expert sources with the potential to meet the selection criteria were identified: (1) former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, (2) the RAND Corporation, (3) and former Deputy Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorist Center Paul R. Pillar. Each strategy is summarized below.

#### **Netanyahu.**

Netanyahu makes two key assertions that serve as foundations for his counterterrorism strategy. First, he claims that international terrorism cannot exist without the support of states.<sup>156</sup> Hence, his counterterrorism approach is focused more on states and less on the terrorists themselves. Second, he maintains that the only way to successfully fight terrorism is to attack it.<sup>157</sup> Terrorism expands to fill the vacuum left by "passivity or weakness" and contracts "when confronted with resolute and decisive action."<sup>158</sup> Indeed, Netanyahu dismisses as ineffective or counterproductive such indirect approaches like negotiation,<sup>159</sup> positive incentives<sup>160</sup> or

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<sup>155</sup> Pillar describes the difficulties in assessing, much less predicting, the success of counterterrorism policies in Pillar, 218-219.

<sup>156</sup> Netanyahu, xiii.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 148.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 147.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 110-111, 146.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 135-136.

addressing root causes;<sup>161</sup> therefore, for Netanyahu, removing that hope by attacking terrorists is the only way to address root causes. He cites Israel's experiences in Gaza as an example of how *not* to fight terrorism. Specifically, Netanyahu states that the 1993 withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the transfer of authority for the territory essentially created a terrorist sanctuary from which militants could pursue their goal of eliminating Israel without fear of retribution. As long as Israel continued to hand over land, terrorist attacks would subside. Once the withdrawals stopped, terrorist attacks would escalate. "In Gaza," according to Netanyahu, "Israel demonstrated...that terrorism indeed does pay."<sup>162</sup> Based on his assertions about the necessity for state sponsorship and the need for an active approach, Netanyahu outlines several specific measures that would help to defeat terrorism. He recommends sanctions against suppliers of nuclear technology and terrorist states, to include military strikes against terrorist states, if necessary. He promotes neutralizing terrorist enclaves by pressuring the host state, or through military action, if necessary. American leadership is a necessary ingredient for effective actions, and unilateral action is not ruled out. Freezing financial assets of terrorist states and groups is another recommended action, as is interstate sharing of intelligence on the terrorist threat. His remaining suggestions are domestic in nature, focusing on increasing the ability of states to police terrorism within their own borders and educating the public so that they support a hard line against terrorism.<sup>163</sup>

Netanyahu's approach raises three issues that are problematic for the structure of this research. First, his foundational assertions about state sponsorship and root causes make his ideas on terrorism more prescriptive than descriptive. Second, Netanyahu's perspective on terrorism belies a potential bias that is not conducive to finding a useful, broad-based counterterrorism template with which to analyze competing American grand strategies. As an

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<sup>161</sup> According to Netanyahu, "The root cause of terrorism is not despair. The root cause of terrorism is the hope that the terrorists have that they'll carry out their grizzly goals." See Benjamin Netanyahu, interviewed by Sean Hannity and Greg Meeks, "Interview with Benjamin Netanyahu," *Hannity & Colmes*, Fox News Network, 8 January 2002, on-line, bigchalk.com, 20 February 2002. See also Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, xx-xxi, 65.

<sup>162</sup> Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, 99-120.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 129-148.

Israeli, he understandably bases his strategy heavily on his experiences with the Arab-Israeli conflict. This conflict has produced a terrorist threat that is arguably quite different from the one America faces. While America is geographically separated from known terrorist enclaves, Netanyahu portrays Israel as a state that has lived in close proximity to terrorist strongholds for much of its history.<sup>164</sup> Moreover, while America worries about a terrorist attacks with WMD as one of its most perilous dangers, the problem is presented in terms of its potential to threaten the “peace of the world” or as a means to “blackmail the United States.”<sup>165</sup> In contrast, Netanyahu repeatedly describes Israel’s war on terrorism in terms of a very real struggle for state survival.<sup>166</sup> These gaps in threat perception may have compelled Netanyahu to prescribe a strategy that is generally more confrontational than those described below. Third, Netanyahu’s dismissal of efforts to focus on root causes or environmental conditions that perpetuate terrorism contradicts his claim that terrorist groups are more likely to flourish in dictatorships than they are in democracies.<sup>167</sup> In other words, based on Netanyahu’s claims about democracies and dictatorships, a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy would undertake at least some environment-shaping efforts aimed at promoting democracy. Additionally, by failing to address root causes—a counterterrorism component that the frameworks below identify as a fundamental part of a long-term effort—Netanyahu’s approach is inherently more tactical than strategic.

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<sup>164</sup> Netanyahu’s portrayal of Israel’s long struggle appears in Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, xii, 119-120. America’s relative immunity when compared to the threat faced by its allies is described in Ian O. Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, 111; Even though 9-11 was devastating for America, Israel’s per capita threat is staggering. For example, in the 18 months after Oslo, 123 Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks—proportionally, that equates to 6,000 Americans. See Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, 105.

<sup>165</sup> George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” *State of the Union*, 29 January 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 30 January 2002, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

<sup>166</sup> Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, xii, 87, 101.

<sup>167</sup> Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, 10-21, 75.

**RAND**

The RAND Corporation, with thirty years of terrorism research experience,<sup>168</sup> overtly rejects Netanyahu’s assertions about the essentiality of state sponsorship and the futility of pursuing root causes.<sup>169</sup> RAND suggests a three-dimensional counterterrorism framework focusing on (1) critical long-term objectives, (2) conditions for day-to-day counterterrorism success and (3) limiting the impact prevention and deterrence fail.<sup>170</sup> See Table 1.

Table 1. RAND 3D Approach

Long-Term	Day-to-Day	Limiting Impact
Ameliorate Systemic Origins	Make Terrorism More Transparent	Harden Policies and Strategies
Strengthen and Deepen Deterrence	Shrink Sanctuaries/Zones	Emphasize Stand-Off and Space-Based Capabilities
Reduce WMD Terrorism Risk	Integrate Counterterrorism into Alliance Strategies	Prepare to Mitigate Effects
Capacity and Will to Retaliate	Limit Worldwide Exposure	
	Target Funding and Networks	

**Source:** Ian O. Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 126-140.

**Long-term Dimension.** There are four core components to RAND’s long-term counterterrorism strategy. First, the United States should work to rectify the root causes of terrorism. RAND opines that terrorism could stem from a wide range of social, economic, political, ethnic, or nationalist tensions that America can use its power to help ameliorate.<sup>171</sup> Second, the United States should take measures aimed at strengthening and deepening deterrence. RAND notes that

<sup>168</sup> RAND began formal research on terrorism in 1972. See Jenkins, iii.

<sup>169</sup> Lesser, 126-127.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 127.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 127-128.

detering terrorism is a complicated undertaking filled with pernicious possibilities. For example, economic and political isolation of states that sponsor terrorism may prompt a rise in more lethal, less restrained non-state terrorism that may be more difficult to deter.<sup>172</sup> A third long-term objective is reducing the risk of terrorism using WMD. This involves controlling, tracking, and if necessary, preemptively destroying WMD capabilities.<sup>173</sup> Fourth, according to RAND, America should garner the ability and will to “retaliate against terrorists and their sponsors when deterrence and preventive measures fail.” Aside from improving deterrence, retaliation signals resolve to the international community and reassures allies and the American public that the United States is serious about fighting terrorism.<sup>174</sup>

**Day-to-Day Dimension.** RAND states that the above core elements should be backed by five policies that will help to create an environment favorable for counterterrorism success in the shorter term. First, terrorism should be made more transparent through intelligence and surveillance. In addition to contributing to counterterrorism in the operational sense, increased transparency could help to deter terrorism, and work to persuade the international community to support American efforts by offering credible evidence of terrorist and terrorist-sponsor activities.<sup>175</sup> Second, America should work to reduce areas that shelter terrorists while preventing the creation of new sanctuaries. As an extension of the idea that instability and strife fosters the growth of terrorism, RAND relates this policy to the core component of ameliorating root causes.<sup>176</sup> Third, RAND proposes that the United States should integrate counterterrorism concerns into its alliance system. In the absence of Cold War security threats, America’s alliances are moving toward cooperation on other security challenges, and counterterrorism should be a primary focal point.<sup>177</sup> A fourth policy is to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism by reducing its global presence. RAND caveats this policy by noting that it may be infeasible if America’s grand strategy and its corresponding operational needs necessitate a

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 129-132.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., 134-135.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 135-136.

significant level of international involvement.<sup>178</sup> Fifth, RAND recommends targeting “terrorist funding and networks.” Owing to the notion that organizations need funding and information to operate effectively, and considering the rise of privately funded terrorist networks, this policy is promoted as a candidate for increased emphasis in future counterterrorism efforts.<sup>179</sup>

**Limiting Impact.** Realizing that even the most effective counterterrorism strategy will not eliminate the risk of terrorism, RAND proposes three policies designed to limit terrorism’s impact. First, key negotiations and policies should consider the terrorist threat and be accomplished in such a way as to limit vulnerabilities. This might entail accelerating peace negotiations or formulating and adhering to precise peacekeeping exit strategies. Second, RAND recommends emphasizing “stand-off and space-based” capabilities to reduce the vulnerabilities of the United States military. Third, RAND recommends heightened attention to managing the consequences of terrorist attacks, especially those of the WMD variety.<sup>180</sup>

While a portion of RAND’s approach is prescriptive, it does contain descriptive components that could be used to synthesize a template that may be suitable for an analysis of grand strategy. By considering the elements of RAND’s approach, a rough approximation of a more descriptive statement would be that counterterrorism considers root causes, deterrence, terrorist capabilities and friendly vulnerabilities. Table 2 shows how each element aligns with the descriptive components, with some elements falling under multiple components.

Table 2. RAND-derived Descriptive Template

<b>Root Causes</b>	<b>Deterrence</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>	<b>Vulnerabilities</b>
Ameliorate Systemic Origins	Strengthen and Deepen Deterrence	Reduce WMD Terrorism Risk	Limit Worldwide Exposure

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., 136-137.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 137-138.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., 138-139.

Shrink Sanctuaries/Zones	Capacity and Will to Retaliate	Capacity and Will to Retaliate	Harden Policies and Strategies
	Make Terrorism more Transparent	Make Terrorism more Transparent	Emphasize Stand-Off and Space-Based Capabilities
	Integrate Counterterrorism into Alliance Strategies	Shrink Sanctuaries/Zones	Prepare to Mitigate Effects
		Integrate Counterterrorism into Alliance Strategies	
		Target Funding and Networks	

This rough approximation would provide a suitable framework with which to analyze grand strategic decisions.

**Pillar**

Pillar’s approach is very similar to the template derived from RAND. He bases his template on a four-dimensional life-cycle approach to terrorism.<sup>181</sup> First, Pillar notes that no one is born a terrorist—personal choices are made with respect to becoming and remaining a terrorist. Factors that influence those personal choices are root causes that can be impacted via counterterrorism. Root causes can be separated into two categories: (1) issues and (2) environmental. Issues are complaints expressed directly by the terrorist group.<sup>182</sup> For example, Usama bin Laden has expressed three specific grievances with respect to the United States—(1) American presence in Saudi Arabia, (2) American containment of Iraq and (3) American support

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<sup>181</sup> Pillar, 29.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 30-31.

for Israel.<sup>183</sup> As root issues, these grievances are presumably useful in recruiting terrorists for bin Laden's group.<sup>184</sup> The environmental roots of terrorism are those societal or cultural conditions that make people more likely to use terrorism as a method to achieve their goals. Environmental roots are more difficult to define.<sup>185</sup> There are plenty of people with grievances, but not all of them become terrorists. Why? In the case of militant Islamic terrorism, some believe that poverty or perceived deprivation play a role,<sup>186</sup> while others disagree, arguing that militant Islam rises from less perceptible identity issues.<sup>187</sup> Notwithstanding the difficulty in identifying a cause and effect relationship, Pillar argues that ignoring its existence leads to sub-optimal counterterrorism policy.<sup>188</sup> The second dimension to Pillar's approach is capabilities. Someone who has decided to become a terrorist needs the capability to act. While a terrorist can create problems without them, money, weapons, information, training and safe havens all have the potential to increase a terrorist's capabilities and those capabilities can be reduced via

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<sup>183</sup> Usama bin Laden, "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," *World Islamic Front Statement*, 23 February 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 14 January 2002, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>.

<sup>184</sup> Pillar, 132-133.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-32.

<sup>186</sup> Pillar speculates on these as potential root causes in Pillar, 31. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated "root cause of terrorism...come from situations where there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where

people see no hope." See Colin Powell, "Transcript: Powell Reaches out to Global Youth on MTV," *Washington File, U.S. Department of State's Office of International Information Programs*, 15 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 February 2002, available from <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/forpo478.html>; see also Jessica Stern, "Being Feared Is Not Enough to Keep Us Safe," *Washington Post*, 15 September 2001, where she states the United States needs to focus more on "health, education and economic development."

<sup>187</sup> Daniel Pipes, "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" *National Interest*, no. 66 (Winter 2001/02): 14-21.

<sup>188</sup> Pillar, 30.

counterterrorism.<sup>189</sup> Third, there is a significant amount of terrorist capability in the world, but terrorists have to make decisions about whether that capability is used, and how and when it will be employed. Therefore, terrorists' intentions are another component of Pillar's counterterrorism approach.<sup>190</sup> Fourth, once terrorists act, the impact of their attack can depend on defensive measures taken prior to the attack. Accordingly, Pillar places defenses as the fourth and final element of his life cycle-based approach.<sup>191</sup> In total, Pillar advocates a counterterrorism template focusing on roots, capabilities, intentions and defenses.

Pillar notes that counterterrorism efforts can simultaneously impact multiple facets of his framework. For example, erecting strong physical defenses can influence terrorists' intentions to the point of aborting a planned attack, and even if the plans are not aborted, their capabilities may be less effective.<sup>192</sup> Similarly, attacking capabilities with military force may exacerbate resentments that fuel root causes, embolden terrorist leaders to retaliate, and generate intentions to escalate the level of violence.<sup>193</sup> More specifically, acting to address bin Laden's three grievances could theoretically change al Qaeda's intentions to target the United States as aggressively as it has.<sup>194</sup> Effective counterterrorism policy, according to Pillar, devotes attention to all four components.<sup>195</sup> The interdependent nature of counterterrorism that Pillar depicts lends validity to the notion that using a prescriptive counterterrorism strategy to make grand strategy decisions is less utilitarian than analyzing the impacts of grand strategic decisions using a descriptive counterterrorism framework. Stated in more general terms, strategic decisions almost always impact multiple components of counterterrorism; consequently, they should be made by considering all the possible consequences.<sup>196</sup> Pillar's life cycle approach to

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., 37-38.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., 37-38.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 102 – 107.

<sup>194</sup> Theoretically because, as will be discussed later, bin Laden's larger goals may still motivate al Qaeda to target America.

<sup>195</sup> Pillar, 29.

<sup>196</sup> Pillar recommends such a holistic approach in Pillar, 10.

counterterrorism appears to consider all conceivable consequences without prejudging grand strategic decisions with a prescriptive set of rules that might serve the short-term goals of counterterrorism while damaging long term national interests. As Pillar notes, “*the purpose of counterterrorism is to save lives (and limbs and property) without unduly compromising other national interests and objectives.*”<sup>197</sup>

Pillar’s approach and the RAND-derived template are quite similar, but there are two primary differences that are important from a grand strategy perspective. First, Pillar describes his concept of “defenses” as a “short-term, tactical” concept.<sup>198</sup> Consequently, it has little relevance in the grand strategic context. Nevertheless, a terrorist who intends to use his capabilities still needs a target, and grand strategy can play a role in target availability. Replacing Pillar’s “defenses” element with the RAND-derived “vulnerabilities” component better addresses the target availability issue at the grand strategic level. However, there is reason to believe that reducing vulnerabilities is less effective than other counterterrorism initiatives. Since American targets are plentiful, both RAND and Pillar note that denying one target can lead terrorists to attack others that are more vulnerable.<sup>199</sup> As Figure 2 shows, the vast majority of terrorist attacks are against targets over which governments have little control. Does reducing government-controlled targets increase terrorism aimed at softer targets like businesses? There is no conclusive answer, but the question does illustrate that reducing vulnerabilities is a complex consideration. Second, the subtle yet powerful difference between “deterrence” and

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<sup>197</sup> Pillar, 219, italics in original.

<sup>198</sup> Pillar, 37.

<sup>199</sup> Jenkins, vii; Lesser, 136-137; and Pillar, 39.




Figure 2 Total Facilities Struck by International Attacks, 1995-2000

**Source:** Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, April 2001), 3, on-line, Internet, 8 December 2001, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2419.htm>.

“intentions” tilts the balance in favor of Pillar’s concept of intentions. There are at least five cases that illustrate this difference. First, for RAND, deterrence involves behavior that keeps terrorists from attacking. One component of this concept is to deter states from sponsoring terrorists, which might result in less attacks or, as RAND notes, could compel terrorists to pursue more lethal, less restrained non-state terrorism. Second, as RAND points out, retaliation against terrorism may have some deterrent value, but it could also strengthen resolve to continue the struggle.<sup>200</sup> Third, consider that it is United States policy to “bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance.”<sup>201</sup> It is conceivable that through this policy, America could support an ally in its counterterrorism efforts against a terrorist group that rarely targets the United States. While this support may deter the terrorists from attacking in their native land, it may prompt them or others that sympathize with

<sup>200</sup> Lesser, 129-132.

<sup>201</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2000*, 3.

their cause to begin targeting Americans.<sup>202</sup> Fourth, some who have studied terrorism's root causes believe that America is the target of certain terrorist groups partially due to frustration that group members experience with the policies of their native governments—a frustration deftly deflected towards America in the interest of self preservation by the very governments who spark it.<sup>203</sup> In other words, deterring these terrorists from acting, which may be impossible, is less relevant than changing the focus of their frustration to those who are better positioned to address it.<sup>204</sup> Finally, using deterrence as a part of the template implies that a terrorist attack can be deterred. Both RAND and Pillar have noted that some terrorists regard the killing and

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<sup>202</sup> This fear is articulated in Doug Bandow, "Succumbing to the Terrorist Temptation," *Copley News Service*, 6 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 7 February 2002, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20020206.shtml>; and Ravenal, "Isolationism" as the Denial of Intervention," 1.

<sup>203</sup> The autocratic government theory is outlined in Fouad Ajami, "The Uneasy Imperium: Pax Americana in the Middle East," in *How Did This Happen?* 18-22, 28-30; Kenneth M. Pollack, "Anti-Americanism and the Roots of Middle Eastern Terrorism," *Council on Foreign Relations*, October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 January 2002, available from <http://www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?pub!4141>; Thomas L. Friedman, "Run, Osama, Run!" *New York Times*, 23 Jan 2002; Sandy Tolan, "Roots of Resentment: America, Great Britain and the Arab World," *American Radioworks*, December 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 December 2002, available from <http://www.americanradioworks.org/features/resentment/print.html>; Jeff Jacoby, "Saudi Arabia's Anti-American Fiction," *Boston Globe*, 10 January 2002; and Kissinger, "Where Do We Go From Here?"

<sup>204</sup> This is not to say that we want terrorists to attack their governments instead of America. Indeed, RAND and Pillar both point out that terrorist attacks on other countries can impact US interests also. See Lesser, 111; and Pillar, 233. Terrorism is never justified, but changing the focus and intentions of terrorists is at least a first step in getting their grievances addressed or denied in a civilized manner. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the reforms he envisions stand as good examples of what would be a better approach. For commentary on Musharraf's reforms, see Ajami, 28; and Powell, n.p.

destruction of terrorism as an end in itself—their intentions defy deterrence.<sup>205</sup> In all five of these cases, counterterrorism based on deterrence would restrict the range of options and arguably fall short of the most effective course of action. Focusing on intentions instead of deterrence adds fidelity to the counterterrorism analysis by considering what the next terrorist move might be instead of focusing on whether a terrorist will be compelled to entirely abandon their current modus operandi. As a result, using the most strategically-relevant components from Pillar and RAND, this paper adopts a counterterrorism template that includes roots, capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities. As explained for the Pillar model, counterterrorism efforts can simultaneously impact multiple facets of this modified framework as well.

### **Selecting Strategic Questions**

Using similar approaches to help articulate each of the four grand strategies with respect to the war on terrorism should help reveal the differences in each strategy. Hence, this paper uses a set of common questions to provide a definitional framework. Unlike the traditional grand strategic issues, prior to 9-11 strategic questions about terrorism played a less prominent role in characterizing each of the four grand strategies. Indeed, before 9-11, the terrorist threat was a relatively high priority for the American public,<sup>206</sup> but counterterrorism considerations were

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<sup>205</sup> Jenkins, viii; Hoffman, 28; Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, 40; and Pillar, 37, 131, 145.

<sup>206</sup> Theo Downes-LeGuin and Bruce Hoffman, *The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion, 1998 to 1989*, RAND Report MR-225-FF/RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993), 16. This report showed terrorism as the most important problem facing the United States by a margin of 15 percent. A 1997 Time-CNN Poll found that “fighting international terrorism was among the top priorities. Eighty percent of Americans rated it either as a top foreign policy priority for the U.S. (25%) or as a high priority (55%). This was somewhat below the goal of “stopping international drug trafficking” (88% rated it a top priority or a high priority), but was tied for second in importance with “promoting nuclear arms control” (80%) and “promoting chemical and biological weapons arms control” (78%). See Alvin Richman, “Report on U.S. Public Support for Strikes on Terrorist Sites,” *United States Information Service, Washington File*, 28 August 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 18 February 2002, available from

generally divorced from foreign policy decision making.<sup>207</sup> It is reasonable to assume; therefore, that to the extent foreign policy decision making was guided by grand strategy, counterterrorism policy was not informed by grand strategy, and grand strategy was not informed by counterterrorism policy. More specifically, while the four competing visions reviewed earlier contain ideas about alliances, human rights, democratization, military basing, nuclear weapons, great power war and the like, there is little evidence that any of these grand strategies concern themselves much with counterterrorism—certainly not to the degree that Pillar and RAND have advocated.<sup>208</sup> To the extent that any of the competing visions were conceptualized to address threats, terrorism does not appear to have ranked high on the list of threats to counter. Whether 9-11 has brought counterterrorism into parity with other security concerns that have traditionally dominated grand strategy formulation remains to be seen, but as the following chapter will illustrate, there is at least an indication that the proponents of each grand strategy seek to prove that their past approaches remain relevant, if not superior, when viewed through a counterterrorism lens.

Since 9-11, questions about America's new war on terrorism have dominated public discourse and some of these questions have grand strategic implications since they involve the use of national means to achieve large ends. Even those with the narrowest view of national interests—limited solely to survival, safety and vitality—see 9-11 as a legitimate catalyst for some type of action.<sup>209</sup> Certainly 9-11 proved that terrorism can threaten American security and

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<http://www.usembassy.ro/USIS/Washington-File/500/98-08-21/eur506.htm>. See also Pillar, 1, 200.

<sup>207</sup> Pillar, 6-7; and Lesser, 126.

<sup>208</sup> Pillar advocates this throughout his book, but most pointedly in Pillar, 220-221; See also Lesser, 126-127, 140.

<sup>209</sup> See for example Patrick J. Buchanan, "Architects of American Vulnerability," *Creators Syndicate*, 5 November 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 November 2001, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/patbuchanan/pb20011105.shtml>; and Doug Bandow, "The price of terrorism," *Copley News Service*, 19 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12

prosperity.<sup>210</sup> The fact that those vital interests—security and prosperity—are shared by all four competing visions leaves little room for debate on whether some type of military action was appropriate in response to 9-11. Indeed, after 9-11, 88 percent of Americans supported such an effort.<sup>211</sup> But as questions delve into the strategic context, there is less agreement. Seventy one percent of Americans supported broadening the war to include terrorist groups and state sponsors not directly responsible for the 9-11 attacks,<sup>212</sup> while 57 percent support a “long-term war to defeat global terrorism.”<sup>213</sup> One can argue that public opinion is a poor way to make strategic decisions, but these poll results at least illustrate a point—in contrast to the issue of retaliation for the 9-11 attacks, there is far less consensus on the level of effort needed to address terrorism as a long-term threat to security and prosperity. In other words, the contentious issues have to do with the “means employment” and “minimizing environmental resistance” components of grand strategy. Accordingly, the questions that have dominated this debate concern those components of grand strategy. Stated in general terms, the questions are:

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December 2001, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20010919.shtml>.

<sup>210</sup> The threat to security is noted in Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 3-4, on-line, Internet, 17 October 2001, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>; and one “conservative” estimate puts the annual post-9-11 terrorism-related costs to American businesses at \$151B. See Anna Bernasek, “The Friction Economy: American Business Just Got the Bill for the Terrorist Attacks: \$151 Billion--a Year,” *Fortune* 145, no. 4 (18 February 2002): 104-112.

<sup>211</sup> Karlyn Bowman, “American Public Opinion on Terrorist Attacks,” *American Enterprise Institute*, 15 February 2002, 2, on-line, Internet, 20 February 2002, available from <http://www.aei.org/ps/psfront.htm>.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

Should the United States engage in nation-building and other forms of aid to address the root causes of terrorism?<sup>214</sup>

Beyond targeting those responsible for the 9-11 attacks, what terrorist capabilities should the United States attack, if any? In other words, should the United States widen the war on terrorism? If yes, how far?<sup>215</sup>

How vigorously and in what situations should the United States pursue international consensus before taking action in the war on terrorism?<sup>216</sup>

Experts tend to agree that the United States is the target of terrorism both because of what it is and because of what it does. This leads them to conclude that, even if America changes its

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<sup>214</sup> Arguments related to this question can be found in Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "To Fight Terror, Increase Foreign Aid," *Newsday*, 14 February 2002, A43; Kissinger, "Where Do We Go From Here?"; Jim Lobe, "Billions for Defense, Pennies for Development," 14 February 2002, *Inter Press Service English News Wire*, on-line, bigchalk.com, 14 February 2002; Spencer S. Hsu, "Wolf Urges More Afghan Aid," *Washington Post*, 17 January 2002; M. Ishaq Nadiri, "Rebuilding a Ravaged Land," *New York Times*, 26 November 2001; and Klaus Schwab, "Building the Future," *Newsweek* 138, no. 25 (17 December 2001): 130.

<sup>215</sup> See for example Curt Weldon, "How We can Win Terror War," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 24 February 2002; Kissinger, "Where Do We Go From Here?"; "Post-Afghan Phase Of War On Terror Begins Taking Shape In The Wings," *Wall Street Journal*, 29 November 2001; "US Targets Three More Countries," *London Sunday Times*, 25 November 2001; Mark Mazzetti, "Now What?" *U.S. News & World Report*, 31 December 2001, 15.

<sup>216</sup> Opinions and commentary related to this question can be found in Kissinger, "Where Do We Go From Here?"; Anne Applebaum, "America Is Right, But It Needs to Work on Its Image," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 January 2002; and Karen DeYoung, "'Doctrine' Awaits Definition," *Washington Post*, 16 October 2001.

behavior, it will always be a target.<sup>217</sup> Nevertheless, is it worth changing what America does, or trying to change how America is perceived, in order to become less of a target?<sup>218</sup>

Answers to the strategic questions above will serve as a framework for articulating and analyzing the approach that each of the four grand strategies would use to address the war on terrorism.

### **USAF Capabilities for the War on Terrorism**

Selecting a grand strategy implies more than the relationship of means to large ends—it has implications for the characteristics of the means needed to achieve the large ends. For example, Posen and Ross, and others to a lesser extent, have estimated required force structures and funding levels based on grand strategy, but rather than constraining their analyses to counterterrorism as this paper seeks to do, their macro-level estimates take into account the full range of activities the Department of Defense could be expected to undertake.<sup>219</sup> While countering terrorism has risen to new prominence as a threat that needs attention, it is not the

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<sup>217</sup> Pillar, 60–69; Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, 35; and Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, xvi – xviii.

<sup>218</sup> Some examples of candidates for changing what America does include: U.S. support for Israel, containment of Iraq, support for domineering Arab regimes and US intervention. These issues are presented in varying degrees in . Pollack, “Anti-Americanism and the Roots of Middle Eastern Terrorism”; Michael Slackman, “Saudis Feel Unfairly Tarded With A Terrorist Brush,” *Los Angeles Times*, 17 January 2002; Steven Erlanger, “In Europe, Some Critics Say the Attacks Stemmed From American Failings,” *New York Times*, 22 September 2001; Nicholas D. Kristof, “Why Do They Hate Us?” *New York Times*, 15 January 2002; “Divergent Views Of U.S. Role In World,” *Washington Post*, 20 December 2001; and Pillar alludes to the importance of foreign perceptions in Pillar, 197.

<sup>219</sup> See Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 5-53. Others relating grand strategy to funding and force structure include Gohlz, Press and Sapolsky, 208 – 210; Tonelson, 166-180; Van Evera, “Europe Matters,” 32-34; Steinbruner, “Problems of Predominance,” 14-17; Carter, Perry and Steinbruner, 5-7, 50-51; Khalilzad, “Losing the Moment?” 101-103; and Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 23-26.

sole purpose of America's military<sup>220</sup> and many of the capabilities required for other missions could play a role in the war on terrorism.<sup>221</sup> As a result, even if a grand strategy is selected, separating terrorism-related costs from other expenditures is difficult in the short term, and virtually impossible over the long term.<sup>222</sup> Nevertheless, at least for the foreseeable future, the war on terrorism will be America's top priority, and investment decisions made now will impact future effectiveness.<sup>223</sup> Similarly, training and organizational judgments made now may impact the way the USAF fights terrorism later. Hence, there is value in examining military capabilities in terms of relevancy to the war on terrorism, but as the next chapter will illustrate, the relative importance of capabilities is dependent on grand strategy.

The USAF is already planning for the future via a cross-cutting concept called the Global Strike Task force. This concept was initially communicated as a means to address what was envisioned as one of the most difficult problems of twenty-first century warfare—the challenge

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<sup>220</sup> The missions of the United States military are listed in Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 17. They are defense of the US, deterring aggression, and conducting smaller-scale contingency operations.

<sup>221</sup> For one of the most illustrative examples of this point, see Paul Wiseman, "In Philippines, Electricity Is Anti-Terror Tool," *USA Today*, 28 January 2002. "In this front in the war against terrorism, two feeble generators and some power lines tacked to poles can mean more than rocket launchers and helicopters."

<sup>222</sup> This point is made in Department of Defense, "Background Briefing on the Fiscal 2003 DOD Budget Submission," *Department of Defense News Transcript*, 1 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 22 February 2002, available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/t02042002\\_t201budg.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/t02042002_t201budg.html).

<sup>223</sup> "Preventing mass terror will be the responsibilities of Presidents far into the future. And this obligation sets three urgent and enduring priorities for America. The first priority is to speed the transformation of our military." See George W. Bush, "President Speaks on War Effort to Citadel Cadets," *News and Policies*, 11 December 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 December 2001, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html>.

of ensuring access in an anti-access environment to allow for “persistent, follow-on forces.”<sup>224</sup> Since 9-11, the task force concept has been promoted as a method of addressing several requirements that the war on terrorism might generate. From the destruction of fleeting, time-sensitive targets, to the delivery of humanitarian aid, the task force construct lends itself to integrating capabilities to solve complex problems.<sup>225</sup> But, determining exactly what long-term problems need solving delves into the realm of grand strategy, and although the defense budget is increasing, trade-offs are still required.<sup>226</sup> Consequently, the arguments for determining the relative utility of capabilities are just as pertinent for the USAF as a service as they are for the military as a whole.

Categorizing USAF capabilities and their desired effects will simplify the process of segregating primary and secondary capabilities. The USAF has essentially done this categorization by articulating a set of core competencies. These core competencies and their desired effects are listed in the table below:

Table 3. USAF Core Competencies

<b>Competency</b>	<b>Definition – The ability to...</b>	<b>Effect</b>
Aerospace Superiority	...control what moves through air and space	ensures freedom of action
Information Superiority	...control and exploit information to our nation’s advantage...	ensures decision dominance
Global Attack	...engage adversary targets anywhere, anytime	holds any adversary at risk
Precision	...deliver desired effects with	denies the enemy

<sup>224</sup> Tech. Sgt. Scott Elliott, “Chief of staff shares views on Global Strike Task Force,” *Air Force News Archive*, 29 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 23 February 2002, available from [http://www.af.mil/news/Oct2001/n20011029\\_1543.shtml](http://www.af.mil/news/Oct2001/n20011029_1543.shtml).

<sup>225</sup> Elaine M. Grossman, “Air Force To Build Task Force For Global Terror War, Other Missions,” *Inside The Pentagon*, 31 January 2002, 1.

<sup>226</sup> Some of these trade-offs are noted in Department of Defense, “Background Briefing on the Fiscal 2003 DOD Budget Submission.”

Engagement	minimal risk and collateral damage	sanctuary
Rapid Global Mobility	...rapidly position forces anywhere in the world	ensures unprecedented responsiveness
Agile Combat Support	...sustain flexible and efficient combat operations	serves as the foundation of success

**Source:** Department of the Air Force, *Global Vigilance, Reach & Power: America's Air Force, Vision 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 2000), 6, on-line, Internet, 23 February 2002, available from <http://www.af.mil/vision>.

There are three caveats to the use of core competencies as a framework for determining primary and secondary capabilities. First, while this paper will treat these competencies separately, it is important to note that they are interrelated. That is to say, success in executing one competency might rely on the successful execution other competencies. For example, agile combat support is a foundational prerequisite for virtually all operations.<sup>227</sup> It is due to this interdependency that separating the full range of core competencies into primary and secondary categories is preferred over selecting some and eliminating others. Second, the USAF has presented its core competencies in terms of their contribution to combat operations, but some of them may support the war on terrorism in a non-combat environment. For example, humanitarian assistance aimed at ameliorating root causes of terrorism might involve agile

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<sup>227</sup> Department of the Air Force, *Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1997), 18, on-line, Internet, 23 February 2002, available from <http://www.af.mil/current/global/global.pdf>.

combat support and rapid global mobility assets.<sup>228</sup> Consequently, for the purposes of this paper, the core competencies of the USAF are considered for their potential combat and non-combat contributions to the war on terrorism.

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<sup>228</sup> See Wiseman, “In Philippines, Electricity Is Anti-Terror Tool”; and Grossman, “Air Force To Build Task Force For Global Terror War, Other Missions.”

### Chapter 3 Post-9-11 Strategies and Capabilities

Each of the four grand strategies addresses low probability/high consequence threats, and to the extent that terrorism is such a threat, one can extrapolate counterterrorism tenets for each grand strategy. But a low probability/high consequence counterterrorism mindset can lead to dangerous policy deficiencies that result in a narrowly focused approach focused on state sponsors and WMD terrorism, and little else.<sup>229</sup> Additionally, because terrorism is quite different from most of the low probability/high consequence threats that influenced the development of the four grand strategies, the threat-mitigating mechanisms lack functionality. Take, for example, the 9-11 attacks. Neo-isolationism relies heavily on geographic separation, but terrorists lived in our midst and attacked our homeland with relative ease.<sup>230</sup> Selective engagement hedges against great power war and nuclear proliferation, but 9-11 was an unconventional, non-nuclear attack that occurred after more than 50 years of great power peace. Cooperative security has lofty expectations for international consensus, but there is international disagreement on widening the war on terrorism<sup>231</sup> and the United Nations cannot even agree on a definition of terrorism.<sup>232</sup> Finally, primacy depends on American power to ensure security and prosperity, but America's overwhelming power did not prevent the horrific events of 9-11.

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<sup>229</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism -- A Policy Behind the Times," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 November 2000; and Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 4-5.

<sup>230</sup> The relative ease with which terrorists to penetrated America is reported in Roy Gutman, et al., "Bin Laden's Invisible Network," *Newsweek*, 29 October 2001, 42.

<sup>231</sup> See for example "Allies Caution Bush On An Iraq Campaign," *International Herald Tribune*, 29 November 2001; "Divergent Views Of U.S. Role In World," *Washington Post*, 20 December 2001.

<sup>232</sup> United Nations General Assembly, "On second day of debate, General Assembly hears calls for definition of terrorism," *Daily Highlights*, 2 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 February 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/News/dh/20011002.htm#34>.

Simply put, each grand strategy requires augmentation to address the heightened threat of terrorism.

Since 9-11, some of the proponents of each grand strategy have offered their opinions on matters of strategic consequence concerning the war on terrorism. Their ideas are framed below in terms of the four strategic questions presented earlier. Scant coverage is given to issues on which there is broad consensus. For example, each grand strategic school of thought espouses the virtues of economic sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism and freezing of terrorists' financial accounts. While these methods are recognized by terrorism experts as valid approaches to reducing terrorist capabilities,<sup>233</sup> they are not discussed in any great detail below. Where proponents have failed to articulate their views, or where their views are inconsistent, a prediction is offered based on pre-9-11 predilections. For each approach, a critique using the modified Pillar model is offered, and an attempt is made at prioritizing USAF competencies.

### **Neo-isolationism**

Neo-isolationists have cited the 9-11 attacks to support their view that taking an expanded view of national interests is not only wasteful, it can be dangerous. They claim that the international projection of American power makes the United States less secure.<sup>234</sup> As one neo-isolationist put it, "terrorism must be understood as an inevitable consequence of global

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<sup>233</sup> The financial aspects of counterterrorism are covered in Pillar, 92-97; and Ian O. Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 113.

<sup>234</sup> The counterproductive nature of power projection is alleged in Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "A New Grand Strategy," *Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 1 (January 2002): 36, 38, 42; Patrick J. Buchanan, "Architects of American Vulnerability," *Creators Syndicate*, 5 November 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 November 2001, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/patbuchanan/pb20011105.shtml>; and Doug Bandow, "The price of terrorism," *Copley News Service*, 19 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 December 2001, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20010919.shtml>.

intervention.”<sup>235</sup> America is the world’s sole superpower—we cannot be defeated on our terms, but we give others cause to try when we intervene in their affairs.<sup>236</sup> The post-911 neo-isolationist view with respect to fighting terrorism is perhaps most simply described by quoting Richard Nixon’s first inaugural address, as one neo-isolationist does: “we cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.”<sup>237</sup>

### **Nation-building and Other Aid**

Neo-isolationists agree that eradicating al-Qaeda is in America’s interest, but what happens in Afghanistan once the region has been purged of global terrorists is of little concern to the United States. True, America has an interest in keeping Afghanistan terrorist-free, but the probability of reversion to a terrorist safe haven is low. Additionally, continued American presence could result in violent opposition and embroil the United States in a conflict that has little to do with American security and prosperity.<sup>238</sup> Neo-isolationists have been less vocal about economic aid as a method to fight terrorism; however, their apathy about post-war Afghanistan suggests that they would be against such an initiative. While recent neo-isolationist commentary has centered on Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree Pakistan, there is no evidence to suggest that differing views would prevail for other parts of the world. Once international terrorists that target America are eliminated from a location, America’s job there is essentially done.

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<sup>235</sup> Doug Bandow, “The price of intervention,” *Copley News Service*, 24 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 December 2001, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20011024.shtml>.

<sup>236</sup> Doug Bandow, “Retaliation Alone Is Not Enough,” *Australian Financial Review*, 13 September 2001, 63; and Patrick J. Buchanan, “U.S. Pays the High Price of Empire,” *Los Angeles Times*, 18 September 2001.

<sup>237</sup> Quoted in Layne and Schwarz, 40.

<sup>238</sup> This line of reasoning is articulated in Doug Bandow, “Rebuilding what in Afghanistan?” *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 7 February 2002; Patrick J. Buchanan, “Courting another Beirut bombing,” *Creators Syndicate*, 22 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 1 March 2002, available from [http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\\_ID=26571](http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=26571); and Layne and Schwarz, 41-42.

## Widening the War

Neo-isolationists are interested in eradicating global terrorists that seek to harm America and punishing their sponsors, but they cower at the notion that the war on terrorism justifies ubiquitous American involvement.<sup>239</sup> For example, using the American military in the name of the war on terrorism to help nations like the Philippines “means joining a bitter struggle with no relevance to American security.”<sup>240</sup> Additionally, a global project could create more terrorists than it neutralizes, and motivate attacks against the United States from terrorists organizations that had not previously targeted America.<sup>241</sup> Widening the war on terrorism to “prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction”<sup>242</sup> is also problematic for neo-isolationists for four primary reasons. First, there is no credible evidence that America’s security and prosperity are sufficiently threatened to provoke a preventive campaign—the threat is the same now as it was before 9-11.<sup>243</sup> Second,

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<sup>239</sup> The potential perils of a global war on terrorism are cited Ivan Eland, “Robust Response to 9/11 Is Needed but Poking the Hornets’ Nest Is Ill-Advised,” *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing* No. 69, 18 December 2001, 1, on-line, Internet, 20 December 2001, available from <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb69.pdf>; and Patrick J. Buchanan, “Why does Islam hate America?” *Creators Syndicate*, 5 March 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 March 2002, available from [http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\\_ID=26706](http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=26706).

<sup>240</sup> Doug Bandow, “Succumbing to the Terrorist Temptation,” *Copley News Service*, 6 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 7 February 2002, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20020206.shtml>.

<sup>241</sup> These dire potentials are noted in Eland, “Robust Response,” 1-5; and Doug Bandow, “The wrong solution to the wrong problem,” *Copley News Service*, 26 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 2 November 2002, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20010926.shtml>.

<sup>242</sup> George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” *State of the Union*, 29 January 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 30 January 2002, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

<sup>243</sup> Doug Bandow, “The Iraqi question,” *Copley News Service*, 23 January 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 7 February 2002, available from

there is no credible evidence implicating these regimes in the 9-11 attacks or the subsequent anthrax mailings.<sup>244</sup> Third, the prospects for creating a coalition to support attacks of the magnitude envisioned appear to be quite low.<sup>245</sup> Fourth, launching such an attack, especially against Iraq, could detract from the clarity of the war on terrorism and indirectly bolster support for terrorists by increasing international anti-Americanism and giving credence to the perception that the United States is at war with Islam.<sup>246</sup> Finally, pursuing WMD nonproliferation through military force against one country may motivate others to accelerate their WMD programs to deter America from attacking them.<sup>247</sup>

### **International Consensus**

Neo-isolationists approach the question of international consensus in the war on terrorism with some ambivalence. On the one hand, they realize the utility of “cooperative international relationships to destroy small, shadowy terrorist networks that span the globe” and on the other

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<http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20020123.shtml>; and Patrick J. Buchanan, “The war party and the 'axis of evil',” *Creators Syndicate*, 6 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 7 February 2002, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/patbuchanan/pb20020206.shtml>.

<sup>244</sup> Bandow, “The Iraqi question,” n.p.; and Patrick J. Buchanan, “No more undeclared wars,” *Creators Syndicate*, 24 November 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 28 November 2001, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/patbuchanan/pb20011124.shtml>.

<sup>245</sup> Bandow, “The Iraqi question,” n.p.; and Buchanan, “The war party and the 'axis of evil',” n.p.

<sup>246</sup> Consistent with the neo-isolationist view that the international environment is benign as long as America restrains itself, the backlash potential from widening the war is articulated in Buchanan, “Why does Islam hate America?” n.p.; Bandow, “The Iraqi question,” n.p.; Bandow, “The wrong solution to the wrong problem,” n.p.; and Patrick J. Buchanan, “Whose War is This?” *USA Today*, 27 September 2001; and Buchanan, “No more undeclared wars,” n.p.

<sup>247</sup> Patrick J. Buchanan, “American Caesar,” *Creators Syndicate*, 4 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 7 February 2002, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/patbuchanan/pb20020204.shtml>; and Bandow, “The Iraqi question,” n.p.

hand they are wary of “becoming ensnared in the volatile political problems of other states”<sup>248</sup> This creates a conundrum in which America must enlist the help of others without committing to reciprocation. Since they believe America has a vital interest in eradicating al-Qaeda, neo-isolationists are willing to pursue some degree of cooperative activity in that effort. “Combating terrorism is not easy,” says one neo-isolationist, who goes on to say “allies are essential, particularly in the Islamic world.”<sup>249</sup> Additionally, neo-isolationists worry about Arab and Muslim backlash if the United States takes a unilateral approach.<sup>250</sup> Since neo-isolationists rule out widening the war beyond those responsible for the 9-11 attacks, pursuing international consensus for further operations is not an issue. Indeed, as stated previously, neo-isolationists cite lack of international consensus as one of several arguments *against* widening the war on terrorism.

### **Changing Actions or Perceptions**

The perceived cause and effect relationship between American interventionism and international terrorism directed at the United States makes prescribing post-9-11 policy changes quite simple for neo-isolationists—in order to reduce terrorism aimed at the United States, America should do less in the world. They claim that American attempts at brokering peace and enforcing international order has been counterproductive, serving only to create enemies who now target the United States. Favoring the Israelis over the Palestinians, containing Iraq for more than 10 years, and getting involved in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, or Columbia does little for America except make it the target of the weak. Consequently, neo-isolationists believe that

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<sup>248</sup> Bandow, “The wrong solution to the wrong problem,” n.p.

<sup>249</sup> Doug Bandow, “Emerging friendships?” *Copley News Service*, 12 December 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 24 February 2002, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20011212.shtml>; and Buchanan attests to the importance of the anti-terror coalition in Patrick J. Buchanan, “How a president’s words can lead to war,” *Creators Syndicate*, 18 February 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 26 February 2002, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/patbuchanan/pb20020218.shtml>.

<sup>250</sup> Buchanan, “How a president’s words can lead to war,” n.p.; and Bandow, “The Iraqi question,” n.p.

the 9-11 attacks intimate more about what America should not do, than what it should do.<sup>251</sup> As one neo-isolationist stated after 9-11, “there is no vital American interest at risk in all these religious, territorial and tribal wars from Algeria to Afghanistan. Let us pay back those who did this, then let us extricate ourselves.”<sup>252</sup>

In summary, as a strategy of restraint, neo-isolationism calls for a careful balancing act when prosecuting the war on terrorism. Retaliation is justified, but sweeping intervention is not. Allies are needed, but binding relationships should be avoided.

### **Critique**

The neo-isolationist approach to the war on terrorism that is outlined above addresses all four components of the modified Pillar model to some degree.

**Roots.** Neo-isolationists address both the specific issues and broader environmental features of root causes. Through their disdain for picking sides in the conflicts of others and their calls for military restraint and withdrawal, they address many of the specific grievances raised by terrorist groups, thereby reducing the rationale for terrorist group membership. Additionally, neo-isolationists exhibit some concern for the environmental roots of terrorism by expressing trepidation about military actions that may promulgate the myth of a United States-versus-Islam war, and a more general sense of anti-Americanism around the world.

Although neo-isolationism addresses both components of the roots of terrorism, there are some potential criticisms. First, neo-isolationism calls for actions which essentially satisfy the specific demands that Usama bin Laden has placed on America. For terrorism experts, appeasing terrorists is generally recognized as sometimes necessary, but always undesirable. It may be necessary to avoid the risk of further attacks,<sup>253</sup> but it is always undesirable because it

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<sup>251</sup> The lessons of 9-11 are expounded on in Doug Bandow, “Defending whom?” *Copley News Service*, 3 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 2 November 2001, available from <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dougbandow/db20011003.shtml>; Bandow, “Retaliation Alone Is Not Enough”; and Layne and Schwarz, 36, 38, 42.

<sup>252</sup> Buchanan, “U.S. Pays the High Price of Empire.”

<sup>253</sup> Pillar says this was the case with the early withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1984. See Pillar, 37.

conveys the message that terrorism pays, which presumably leads to more terrorism.<sup>254</sup> This dilemma, expressed in Netanyahu's portrayal of Israel's experience in Gaza,<sup>255</sup> has ramifications in bin Laden's case as well. Although bin Laden has stated three specific grievances with the United States,<sup>256</sup> his ultimate goal is believed to be nothing less than the violent imposition of an Islamic order on the world.<sup>257</sup> He subscribes to the teachings of Egyptian Muhammad Abdel Salam Al-Farag, who was executed in 1982 after being implicated in the assassination of President Anwar Al-Sadat. Farag called for the incremental spread of a fundamentalist Islamic order in which mosque and state are united under a sole sovereign entity—Allah. While bin Laden's campaign has deviated from Farag's original strategy, he still seems to share his vision of a global Islamic order.<sup>258</sup> Given the global nature of bin Laden's vision, the neo-isolationist strategy could create the conditions for Gaza on a global scale—a world in which terrorism pays, and one concession gained via reprehensible coercion is used to fuel the fire for the next round of terror attacks. For their part, neo-isolationists argue that the threat of terrorism is sufficient to make restraint necessary. The safety and security of neo-isolationism outweigh the negative implications of what might be perceived as appeasement.<sup>259</sup> Second, since neo-isolationism is a

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<sup>254</sup> The dangers of appeasement are noted in Pillar, 35; and Benjamin Netanyahu, "This Is Israel's Fight Too," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 October 2001.

<sup>255</sup> See Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network*, 2d ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 99-120.

<sup>256</sup> See Usama bin Laden, "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," *World Islamic Front Statement*, 23 February 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 14 January 2002, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>.

<sup>257</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, April 2001), 15, on-line, Internet, 8 December 2001, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2419.htm>.

<sup>258</sup> Ahmed S. Hashim, "The World According to Usama Bin Laden," *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 14-19.

<sup>259</sup> See Ted Galen Carpenter, "Reducing the Risk of Terrorism," *Cato Handbook for Congress*, 105<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1997, n.p., on-line, Internet, 19 December 2001, available from <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-45.html>; and Ivan Eland, "Protecting the Homeland:

strategy of restraint and reduced presence, neo-isolationists oppose addressing root causes that involve the commitment of resources. As a result, societal maladies that may contribute to terrorism are ignored. Third, while some people resent America for what it does, they also resent it for what it fails to do. Failure to quickly intervene to stop the massacre of Muslims in the Yugoslav civil war, doing nothing to stop Russians from slaughtering Chechens, and passively tolerating the “depredations of Arab and Muslim rulers against their own peoples”—these grievances are cited not only by terrorists, but by others in the Middle East who do not share the vision of militant Islam.<sup>260</sup> Similarly, neo-isolationists’ distaste for binding cooperative arrangements that require America to help fight terrorists who do not target the United States could create similar resentment about America’s perceived apathy. Consequently, the inactivity that serves as a guiding precept for neo-isolationism could fuel the environmental roots of terrorism.

**Capabilities.** Since neo-isolationists advocate destroying global terrorists that seek to harm America as well as punishing their sponsors, they obviously consider targeting terrorist capabilities. However, neo-isolationists take a cautious approach. As one neo-isolationist says, “although the U.S. must strike hard, it must strike accurately.”<sup>261</sup> Rather than speculating about the need to target other state terror supporters like Afghanistan, neo-isolationists worry about states aligning themselves with international terrorists as a response to American intervention executed as part of the war on terrorism.<sup>262</sup> By discounting the need to attack other state supporters, carefully limiting their target set, and consistently demanding a clear link to the 9-11

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The Best Defense Is to Give No Offense,” *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Analysis* No. 306, 5 May 1998, 33, on-line, Internet, 19 December 2001, available from <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-306.pdf>.

<sup>260</sup> Hashim, 23-24.

<sup>261</sup> Bandow, “The price of terrorism,” n.p.

<sup>262</sup> Bandow and Buchanan express this fear repeatedly. Some examples are Bandow, “The Iraqi question,” n.p.; Bandow, “The wrong solution to the wrong problem,” n.p.; Buchanan, “Whose War is This?”; and Patrick J. Buchanan, “Into the Big Muddy – again?” *Creators Syndicate*, 16 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 26 February 2002, available from [http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\\_ID=24936](http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=24936).

attacks, neo-isolationists suggest a reactive counterterrorism strategy that has the potential to leave a significant amount of potential terrorist capability untouched. The most obvious examples are the “axis of evil” states which could supply WMD to terrorists, “giving them the means to match their hatred.”<sup>263</sup> Neo-isolationists’ concerns about preventive strikes on these states could result in a very dangerous outcome—WMD terrorism.

**Intentions.** Although their approach is a careful one, neo-isolationists give some credence to the notion that a strong response to terrorist attacks will alter terrorists’ intentions by making them think twice about striking again.<sup>264</sup> However, as noted above, neo-isolationists express a good deal of concern about making enemies of terrorists who did not previously target the United States. Additionally, just as restraint and reduced presence addressed environmental roots of terrorism, it might also serve to diminish the propensity for some terrorists to target America. On the other hand, the same counter-arguments regarding the appeasement dilemma, lack of positive gestures and perceived American apathy apply to intentions. In other words, terrorists could intend to harm America because it is an effective way to change United States policy or because they believe America has the power to address some of their grievances, but fails to do so. Finally, while experts believe that America will always be a target because of what it is,<sup>265</sup> neo-isolationists believe that America is targeted primarily for what it does.<sup>266</sup> Assuming the experts are correct, a restraint and reduced presence approach to changing terrorist intentions will not live up to the neo-isolationists’ lofty expectations.

**Vulnerabilities.** The neo-isolationist approach to counter-terrorism not only considers vulnerabilities, it reduces them further than any other approach. One neo-isolationist is

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<sup>263</sup> George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” n.p.

<sup>264</sup> “To deter future attacks, the U.S. response should be potent” in Eland, “Protecting the Homeland,” 31.

<sup>265</sup> This belief is articulated in Pillar, 60-69; Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, xvi-xviii; and Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, 35.

<sup>266</sup> “Whoever brought down the twin towers...did not do so because of irritation with American culture. They did so because of opposition to Washington's intervention in what they saw as their affairs” in Bandow, “Retaliation Alone Is Not Enough”; and Buchanan expresses similar sentiments in Buchanan, “Into the Big Muddy – again?”

especially concerned with the network of Central Asian bases that the United States is reportedly establishing, arguing that they are “sitting ducks for guerrillas and terrorists.”<sup>267</sup> Additionally, policies and strategies are hardened by avoiding diplomatic conflict and minimizing America’s activity in the world. Most of the criticisms that apply to other parts of the neo-isolationist approach apply here as well. One criticism that applies to reducing vulnerabilities that has not already been mentioned is the fact that reducing global presence also reduces America’s capability to retaliate against international terrorist groups.<sup>268</sup>

### **USAF Core Competencies**

The neo-isolationist counterterrorism approach is constrained by a narrow view of national interests which manifests itself in a strong desire to avoid confrontations and overseas presence that might commit American forces to operations that have no obvious connection to the security and prosperity of the United States. Such a counterterrorism approach implies a set of operational demands on the USAF that are low in quantity, small in scope, and high in terms of precision and accuracy. A relatively low number of counterterrorism operations are expected because neo-isolationists warn that a worldwide war on terrorism could actually degrade America’s security.<sup>269</sup> The scope of these operations should be minimal since neo-isolationists are extremely careful to fight terrorism without provoking other states to turn against America.<sup>270</sup> Neo-isolationists see the international environment as relatively benign entity unless the United States does something to change it, and they aim to keep it that way. Finally, in order to avoid a

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<sup>267</sup> Buchanan, “Courting another Beirut bombing,” n.p.

<sup>268</sup> See Pillar, 69. “The United States must operate abroad to fight terrorism effectively.”

<sup>269</sup> For example, “A global war on terrorism is fraught with difficulties and may actually reduce U.S. security” in Eland, “Robust Response,” 2.

<sup>270</sup> In Buchanan, “Whose War is This?” he warns that a wider war is exactly what bin Laden wants, and fears that attacks on Iraq, Syria, Iran and Hezbollah would “metastasize into a two-continent war from Algeria to Afghanistan, with the United States and Israel alone against a half-dozen Arab and Muslim states.”

number of unintended consequences, from conflict escalation to increased anti-Americanism, neo-isolationists advocate a high degree of precision when force is applied.<sup>271</sup>

Given the characterization of operational requirements above, USAF capabilities that primarily support major theater war are less important than those that are able to strike with precision and minimal unintended consequences. This makes precision engagement a primary counterterrorism capability. Additionally, by advocating reduced overseas presence, neo-isolationists make the ability to strike from the United States more critical. Consequently, global attack is also a primary capability. Finally, information superiority is a “vital enabler” of the ability to “find, fix, assess, track, target and engage anything of military significance.”<sup>272</sup> This sensor-to-shooter cycle will be an especially critical component of a counterterrorism strategy that usually will not have the advantage of some type of forward infrastructure or combat presence. Hence, information superiority is also a primary capability for the neo-isolationist counterterrorism approach. Since control of air and space will only be needed for short periods, aerospace superiority is a secondary capability. Also, since neo-isolationism favors operations from the United States and resists nation-building which might require some significant airlift efforts, rapid global mobility is a secondary capability. Finally, since agile combat support seeks to sustain operations—to include nation-building—it is also a secondary capability.<sup>273</sup> A summary of primary and secondary capabilities appears in Table 4.

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<sup>271</sup> Bandow, “The price of terrorism,” n.p. “Although the U.S. must strike hard, it must strike accurately.”

<sup>272</sup> Department of the Air Force, *Global Vigilance, Reach & Power: America’s Air Force, Vision 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 2000), 8, on-line, Internet, 23 February 2002, available from <http://www.af.mil/vision>.

<sup>273</sup> Neo-isolationists argue against sustained operations. See Buchanan, “Courting another Beirut bombing,” n.p. where he warns against “mission creep” in the war on terrorism.

Table 4. Neo-isolationism Counterterrorism Capabilities

<b>Competency</b>	<b>Pri ority</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
Aerospace Superiority	Sec ondary	Control needed for short duration
Information Superiority	Pri mary	Enables precision engagement from a distance
Global Attack	Pri mary	Enables precision engagement from a distance
Precision Engagement	Pri mary	Reduces likelihood of unintended consequences
Rapid Global Mobility	Sec ondary	Operations originate in the United States
Agile Combat Support	Sec ondary	Sustained operations are less likely

### **Selective Engagement**

As noted above, neo-isolationists claim that the forward presence prescribed by selective engagement increases the probability of continued terrorism, but selective engagers do not argue that the 9-11 attacks are grounds for military withdrawal. As a strategy designed to hedge against low probability/high consequence threats, selective engagement seems ideally conceptualized to fight terrorism; however, the traditional mechanisms of deterrence—forward presence, nuclear weapons and security alliances—do not appear to prevent or reduce terrorism. Consequently, terrorism requires a different approach. Selective engagers emphasize diplomacy

over military force.<sup>274</sup> Nevertheless, selective engagers view international terrorism as a grave threat that will require the use of military power by going on the offensive in a sort of preventive campaign that aims to destroy international terrorists and make examples of those states that do not cooperate with America's counterterrorism efforts.<sup>275</sup> However, their approach is a measured one. Just as pre-9-11 selective engagement sought to steer "the middle course between" the divergent paths of the other grand strategies<sup>276</sup> by focusing on regions that matter, a post-9-11 counterterrorism strategy formed from a selective engagement mindset appears to attempt a similar compromise by focusing the terrorism war on actions that are most likely to make a difference.

### **Nation-building and Other Aid**

Selective engagement advocates have not addressed nation-building or economic aid in any depth since 9-11; however, their pre-9-11 stance is quite clear. Always wary of costly projects with a low probability of success, selective engagers view nation-building with a good deal of skepticism, especially when the project seems "particularly complex, costly, and open-ended."<sup>277</sup> Rebuilding Afghanistan would be a difficult chore—even those in favor of attempting the challenge agree on that.<sup>278</sup> Consequently, the cost-benefit analysis would probably make

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<sup>274</sup> See Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," *International Security* 26, no.3 (Winter 2001-02): 42; Stephen Van Evera, "U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang," *Newsday*, 4 October 2001, A43, A46.

<sup>275</sup> Posen, "The Struggle against Terrorism," 44.

<sup>276</sup> This desire is expressed in Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998-99): 80.

<sup>277</sup> Barry R. Posen, "Developing a National Strategy in an Era of 'Invitational Crises'," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 42, no. 19 (19 January 1996): B1. The value of narrowly defining goals is echoed in John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen Van Evera, and Michael Lind, "When Peace Means War," *New Republic* 213, no. 25 (18 December 1995): 16.

<sup>278</sup> See for example, Llewellyn D. Howell, "Nation Building II," *USA Today Magazine*, World Watcher Section 130, no. 2680 (January 2002): 29. Howell, a proponent of nation-building, lists Afghanistan as the most difficult of several proposed nation-building challenges.

post-9-11 nation-building less than attractive. What might change the analysis? There are two primary cases where selective engagers might favor nation-building and economic aid in support of counterterrorism, and both have to do with the question: Does nation-building and economic aid matter? If specific societal conditions and international terrorism were highly correlated, selective engagers might favor supporting American nation-building to change those societal conditions. Given the debate about the root causes of terrorism, establishing such a link seems unlikely. Second, if international pressures created the need to choose between the costs of nation-building/economic aid and the benefits of an international counterterrorism coalition, selective engagers might choose to forego the antagonism created by perceived American apathy. One selective engager warned against this pitfall in general terms, stating that if American power is wielded “exclusively and selfishly” for America, “America’s exercise of power will be widely resisted, if not immediately, then eventually.”<sup>279</sup>

### **Widening the War**

Like neo-isolationists, selective engagers advocate the destruction of al-Qaeda and its current and future imitators, but their approach is less restrained. Consistent with their pre-9-11 focus on WMD, selective engagers justify a more aggressive approach by citing the possibility of WMD terrorism.<sup>280</sup> Also consistent with their pre-9-11 view that America should focus limited resources on what really matters, selective engagers see no point in pursuing “a wide crusade against all forms of terrorism.”<sup>281</sup> Widening the war to states that support international terrorists that target the United States is viewed as a necessary component of a successful counterterrorism strategy, although selective engagers prefer to rely on diplomacy and other forms of coercion to eliminate state sponsorship. Nevertheless, should diplomacy fail, it is incumbent on the United States to engage militarily. Launching preemptive strikes or waging conventional war to affect a regime change are viewed as acceptable counterterrorism options for two reasons. First, international terrorists must be denied sanctuary—their total destruction is probably unlikely, but

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<sup>279</sup> Art, “Geopolitics Updated,” 109-110.

<sup>280</sup> WMD fears and the response they should produce are covered in Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 42, 44; and Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A43, A46.

<sup>281</sup> Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A43.

keeping them on the run will severely degrade their ability to strike. Second, targeting states that align themselves with al-Qaeda or those who mimic it dissuades others from similar misguided alliances.<sup>282</sup> While selective engagers are willing to fight conventional wars in support of the war on terrorism, they are not willing to attack rogue states with no connection to al-Qaeda simply because they may someday mix WMD capabilities with international terrorism. On this issue, selective engagers side with neo-isolationists by using the same argument about avoiding the perception of an anti-Arab/Muslim campaign.<sup>283</sup>

### **International Consensus**

For selective engagers, diplomacy trumps military force in the war on terrorism. Why? Because selective engagers, like neo-isolationists, realize the efficacy of attacking international terrorism in concert with a large group of allies. As a group located in various countries and regions, finding and destroying al-Qaeda will require intelligence, law enforcement, and military efforts, but those efforts are better accomplished by states operating inside their borders.<sup>284</sup> Simply put, the cost-benefit analysis that selective engagers rely on yields lower costs and more benefits when diplomacy convinces other states to take care of their internal problems. Selective engagers are not too concerned about losing allies by aggressively pursuing al Qaeda, nor do they view international consensus as a prerequisite for action—this is war, the United States has been attacked, and self defense is justified. Trade-offs between effectiveness and unintended casualties will occasionally require the United States to “err on the side of effectiveness”—American diplomats will have to persuade allies to stay the course.<sup>285</sup> On the other hand, expanding the war to those not associated with al-Qaeda unnecessarily risks breaking the counterterrorism coalition.<sup>286</sup>

### **Changing Actions or Perceptions**

Selective engagers advocate a more disciplined approach to foreign policy that pays more attention to sustaining the counterterrorism coalition over the long term. Unlike neo-

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<sup>282</sup> Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 42-48.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*, 43, 48.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

isolationists, selective engagers do not necessarily advocate doing less in the world, they simply recommend that if America is going to do something, it ought to do it smarter and explain it better. For example, America's tolerance of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories creates antagonism in the Arab world—a world that is home to vital counterterrorism allies.<sup>287</sup> Similarly, America's containment of Iraq plays badly in the Arab world. Selective engagers propose that America soften its policy, or look for ways to communicate it in a more positive fashion.<sup>288</sup> Finally, selective engagers do not suggest immediate withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, but one advocates evaluating “whether basing American forces in Saudi Arabia remains worth the cost of the friction that the U.S. presence engenders.”<sup>289</sup>

### **Critique**

The selective engagement approach to the war on terrorism that is outlined above primarily addresses terrorists' capabilities and includes considerations for root causes of terrorism. However, intentions and vulnerabilities are given scant coverage. Simply put, for selective engagers who are sensitive to costs and benefits, destroying capabilities and ameliorating root causes are currently the most lucrative objectives, while intentions and vulnerabilities hold less prominence.

**Roots.** Selective engagers exhibit some concern for both the specific issues and broader environmental features of root causes. By suggesting that policies with respect to Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia be altered, but not entirely abandoned, selective engagers address some specific issues and predictably display their middle ground inclinations. Environmental factors are addressed by focusing on public perceptions in the Arab world. As one selective engager states, “successful action against terror requires that states fighting terror must first legitimate their policies in the eyes of the societies where the terror breeds.”<sup>290</sup> Additionally, selective engagers worry about the potential for backlash from widening the war to states and groups that were

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<sup>287</sup> This sensitivity is noted most prominently in Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A43; and also in Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 52.

<sup>288</sup> Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A46; and Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 52.

<sup>289</sup> Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A46.

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

reportedly not involved in the 9-11 attacks. This also shows consideration of the environmental roots of terrorism.

Potential criticisms of the selective engagers root cause approach center around the tension between terrorists and societies with extreme views on the one hand, and a strategy that tends to produce compromise solutions on the other. Selective engagers ostensibly attempt to strike a balance between addressing root causes and conceding victory to the terrorists. While this is a laudable sentiment, a recent poll shows that the overwhelming majority of people in the Islamic world hold a very negative opinion of the United States.<sup>291</sup> Although there is anecdotal evidence that American counterterrorism successes will have a positive impact,<sup>292</sup> changing Arab and Islamic attitudes will probably require a very long and intense struggle—a struggle which selective engagers seem prepared to undertake.<sup>293</sup> Realistically, the moderate measures that selective engagers propose, coupled with the absence of more proactive approaches like nation-building, economic aid, or withdrawing from the Middle East, do not constitute a very aggressive approach to ameliorating root causes. It is not clear whether omission of some of the proactive measures signals opposition to them, but it is reasonable to assume that selective engagers would support them with more zest if they indeed were an important part of their counterterrorism strategy. Finally, the same criticisms that applied to neo-isolationists with respect to helping other states in their internal fights against terrorism apply here, but to a lesser degree. While neo-isolationists are quite wary of even tacitly supporting these types of initiatives, selective

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<sup>291</sup> Andrea Stone, “In Poll, Islamic World says Arabs not Involved in 9/11,” *USA Today*, 27 February 2002. According to the poll, the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey consider America “ruthless, aggressive, conceited, arrogant, easily provoked” and “biased.”

<sup>292</sup> Reports link American successes in Afghanistan with a reduction in anti-Americanism based on an implicit desire to avoid support for a futile cause. See “Arab Opinions Slowly Begin To Change,” *Wall Street Journal*, 26 November 2001.

<sup>293</sup> See Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A43, “the long fight ahead”; and Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 42, “the United States...must be prepared to accept significant costs and risks over an extended period.”

engagers might support some American assistance in fighting terrorists that do not target the United States if the cost-benefit analysis was compelling.

**Capabilities.** While selective engagers stress diplomacy and help from allies as a means to bolster their counterterrorism strategy, they advocate a relatively unrestrained but focused use of force to destroy terrorist capabilities. Their strategy is relatively unrestrained because they advocate bypassing and occasionally fighting countries that do not cooperate with the United States. Additionally, they recommend preemptive strikes on terrorist groups that align with al-Qaeda or appear to be preparing to strike American interests themselves.<sup>294</sup> The selective engagement strategy is focused because efforts are directed solely at those associated with al-Qaeda and its imitators.<sup>295</sup> Simply put, selective engagers hope to “reduce the terrorists to desperate groups of exhausted stragglers, with few resources and little hope of success.”<sup>296</sup> Precision, accuracy and sensitivity to casualties are important, but they do not outweigh the need to destroy capabilities.<sup>297</sup> Hence, selective engagers are likely to reduce terrorist capabilities to a greater extent than the cautious neo-isolationists. Like the neo-isolationists, selective engagers do not preemptively target rogue states that show some potential for supplying terrorists with WMD; consequently, their approach to capabilities is submaximal—a feature that some might regard as suboptimal. Additionally, as neo-isolationists have argued, taking a blunter approach to retaliation may create more terrorists.

**Intentions.** Selective engagers show little interest in addressing terrorists’ intentions. They imply that expending intellectual capital on changing terrorists’ intentions will not yield much benefit. The line of reasoning that leads to this conclusion starts with the fact that selective engagers are only interested in targeting al-Qaeda and groups like it. These groups have ambitious goals that they are willing to die for, signaling a degree of determination that may not be changeable. Indeed, Pillar argues that groups motivated by “simple hatred” or “divine

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<sup>294</sup> Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 43-44.

<sup>295</sup> This is the primary argument in Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A43, A46.

<sup>296</sup> Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 42.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

mandate” are not likely to “give up terrorism.”<sup>298</sup> Hence, as one selective engager notes, they “will continue to attack the United States so long as it asserts its power and influence in other parts of the world.”<sup>299</sup> However, for selective engagers, withdrawal from regions that matter—like the Middle East—would create national security risks that are not worth the potential benefit of changed intentions.<sup>300</sup> Consequently, selective engagers do not attempt to change the intentions of the terrorists they concentrate on. That said, at least one component of the selective engagement counterterrorism strategy might have a favorable impact on terrorists’ intentions. Because of the global effort to destroy them, some international terrorists who survive might be compelled to reform or change their target set.<sup>301</sup>

Criticisms of the selective engagement approach (or lack thereof) to intentions can be summarized by stating previous arguments in favor of a neo-isolationist strategy. Specifically, neo-isolationists would argue that the benefits of asserting power and influence are not worth the risks to security—especially the elevated risk of WMD terrorism. Similarly, a neo-isolationist would claim that retaliatory campaigns involving approaches that are more aggressive than the one they advocate will have a counterproductive effect on terrorists’ intentions, making America a more frequent target of increasingly dangerous terrorism.

**Vulnerabilities.** Perhaps because they consider the dangers of terrorism worth the risk of “significant U.S. casualties”,<sup>302</sup> selective engagers do not overtly consider reducing vulnerabilities. For example, there is very little evidence to suggest that selective engagers would recommend reduced presence to mitigate exposure risks. Certainly, if a cost-benefit analysis proved that presence was counterproductive, some amount of withdrawal seems likely, but the rationale for withdrawal would probably have more to do with root causes and terrorists’ intentions than it would with limiting worldwide vulnerabilities. Indeed, withdrawal from Saudi

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<sup>298</sup> Pillar, 131.

<sup>299</sup> Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 43.

<sup>300</sup> Posen warns of the potential for a range of disasters should the United States withdraw from the Middle East. For example, an unbridled, WMD-capable Saddam might make war with Iran, Saudi Arabia or Israel. See Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 54-55.

<sup>301</sup> Pillar makes this connection. See Pillar, 34.

<sup>302</sup> Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 48.

Arabia is discussed as a means to remove “irritants to its relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds.”<sup>303</sup> Similarly, while selective engagers discuss the need to consider changes to United States policies that might reduce vulnerabilities, these changes are presented in terms of acquiring allies for the war on terrorism.<sup>304</sup>

### **USAF Core Competencies**

The selective engagement counterterrorism approach focuses primarily on destroying terrorists’ capabilities and, if necessary, attacking states that align themselves with the perpetrators of terrorism against the United States. Additionally, when compared to neo-isolationists, selective engagers are less averse to casualties, collateral damage, overseas basing and armed intervention. Consequently, this strategy implies operational demands on the USAF that are higher in quantity, larger in scope, and less demanding in terms of precision and accuracy. A higher number of operations are expected because selective engagers are less cautious about acting militarily. They advocate preemptive strikes<sup>305</sup> and actually make the case that the United States needs to attack occasionally to maintain the credibility of the counterterrorism threat and bolster diplomatic efforts.<sup>306</sup> The scope of these operations will be larger because selective engagers support conventional war against terrorist-aligned states.<sup>307</sup> Demands for precision and accuracy will be lower because selective engagers are willing to concede some amount of collateral damage to ensure operations are successful.<sup>308</sup>

The increased probability of conventional war implies a greater need for aerospace superiority; hence, it becomes a primary capability. Information superiority remains a primary capability as a vital enabler. The fact that selective engagers are less averse to overseas basing makes global attack less important; consequently, it becomes a secondary capability. Indeed, since they are less averse to casualties, selective engagers are predisposed to using special

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<sup>303</sup> Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A46.

<sup>304</sup> Van Evera, “U.S. Should Only Target bin Laden's Gang,” A43; and Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 52-53.

<sup>305</sup> See for example, Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 43.

<sup>306</sup> Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” 47-48.

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*, 42-48.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

operations forces for quick strikes in an effort to bolster effectiveness and reduce some collateral damage.<sup>309</sup> A predisposition for special operations forces and less concern about collateral damage involves less emphasis on precision engagement; hence, it is reduced to a secondary capability. Additionally, the use of special operations forces combined with the fleeting characteristics of some terrorist targets will require a heightened degree of rapid global mobility, which is therefore elevated to a primary capability. Finally, the type of sustained operations required by conventional war makes agile combat support a primary capability. A summary of primary and secondary capabilities appears below in Table 5.

Table 5. Selective Engagement Counterterrorism Capabilities

<b>Competency</b>	<b>Pri ority</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
Aerospace Superiority	Pri mary	Sustained control needed for conventional war
Information Superiority	Pri mary	Vital enabler for combat operations
Global Attack	Sec ondary	Overseas basing reduces requirement
Precision Engagement	Sec ondary	Less aversion to collateral damage
Rapid Global Mobility	Pri mary	Needed to move special operations forces
Agile Combat Support	Pri mary	Needed for sustained combat operations

#### Cooperative Security

Even after the 9-11 attacks, some cooperative security advocates viewed terrorism primarily as a law enforcement problem.<sup>310</sup> There are two reasons for this. First, as discussed in

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., 48-49.

<sup>310</sup> According to Steinbruner, the appropriate way to address the attacks is to punish those responsible via legal action. See Etan Horowitz and Tom LoBianco, "Professors speculate about attacks," *The Diamondback*, 12 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 November 2001,

more detail below, America needs allies to fight terrorism, and the international community is more likely to support law enforcement against terrorists than it is to agree to the use of military force which might impact their interests. Second, cooperative security advocates believe that international terrorists that target America would like the United States to overreact with military force, thereby undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of the global community.<sup>311</sup> Treating terrorism as a law enforcement problem avoids these pitfalls.

Cooperative security advocates point to the 9-11 attacks as evidence that post-Cold War security problems have little to do with balance of power or decisive superiority. Today's security concerns arise from "angry individuals, terrorist groups, and weak states" who can employ asymmetric warfare against society in general and America in particular. Traditional military threats have given way to new forms of conflict that employ otherwise innocuous items, like airplanes and envelopes, or dual-use technologies, like fissionable materials and biological agents. Access to these "weapons" is enhanced by strong forces of globalization. Since civilized society has a collective interest in reducing the increasingly dangerous trend of asymmetric non-state and weak-state violence, the best mechanisms for overcoming these new threats involve empowered global security institutions and "a fundamental reorientation of security policy from confrontation to cooperation."<sup>312</sup> Using the 9-11 attacks as a catalyst, cooperative security

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available from <http://www.inform.umd.edu/News/Diamondback/archives/2001/09/12/news7.html>. For a mix of military and law enforcement, see Morton H. Halperin, "Collective Security," *American Prospect* 12, no. 18 (22 October 2001): 26. Halperin states "we should develop military plans to seize bin Laden...air strikes with cruise missiles will do no good. If we spill innocent blood in a mindless technological attack, we will lose the moral high ground."

<sup>311</sup> See "Breaking News with Dr. John Steinbruner," *Washingtonpost.com*, 11 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 30 November 2001, available from [http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/01/nation\\_steinbruner0911.htm](http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/01/nation_steinbruner0911.htm).

<sup>312</sup> This line of reasoning is presented in John D. Steinbruner and Nancy W. Gallagher, "The Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Project," *Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland*, December 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from

advocates see “a unique opportunity to create effective...international structures to deal not only with terrorism but with the other twenty-first-century threats.”<sup>313</sup> Finally, since 9-11, most cooperative security advocates point to the United Nations as an international institution that can help with the war on terrorism.<sup>314</sup> Hence, some counterterrorism strategies advanced by the United Nations should provide useful insights into the cooperative security mindset. Consequently, answers to the strategic questions in this section are partially drawn from post-9-11 United Nations’ communiqués.

### **Nation-building and Other Aid**

Since proponents of cooperative security advocate a preventive approach that concentrates efforts on cooperation versus confrontation, nation-building and economic aid are attractive options to help rectify what the international community believes to be root causes of terrorism. It is important to note that it is not entirely clear if cooperative security advocates believe that nation-building or economic aid help reduce terrorism, or whether they pursue them because they help to maintain international consensus.<sup>315</sup> What is clear is that many in the

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<http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Projects/AMCS.htm>. The indivisibility of civilization is also noted in United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Condemns, ‘In Strongest Terms’, Terrorist Attacks On United States,” *Press Release SC/7143*, 12 September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm>. “A terrorist attack on one country was an attack on all humanity.”

<sup>313</sup> Halperin, 26.

<sup>314</sup> See Halperin, 26; Howell, “Nation Building II,” 29; and Madeleine K. Albright interviewed by Jeff Greenfield, “America Strikes Back: Interview with Madeleine Albright,” *Greenfield at Large*, Cable News Network, Transcript # 102300CN.V80, 23 October 2001, on-line, bigchalk.com, 5 March 2002. Albright stated “the United Nations can play a very large role.”

<sup>315</sup> Articles that address the motivation for United States actions argue in terms of assisting the international community in order to maintain a robust counterterrorism coalition. See Halperin, 26; Howell, “Nation Building II,” 29. In what has been perhaps the most telling

international community believe there is some correlation between these initiatives and reduced terrorism.<sup>316</sup> Therefore, as proponents of a strategy that commits to subordinating some of America's interests to the greater interests of the world,<sup>317</sup> the counterterrorism utility of nation-building and other aid might be a secondary consideration, with the primary determinant for support being the fact that the global community believes these measures are useful.

If cooperative security advocates do indeed believe that nation-building and other aid are useful tools to ameliorate root causes, the sentiment rises from a starting point that is similar to the neo-isolationists' view. Like neo-isolationists, cooperative security advocates are prone to cite America's foreign policy as a contributing factor to international terrorism. However, while neo-isolationists take issue with what America has done, cooperative security advocates focus on what America—and the global community—has failed to do. For example, the United States has

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example of the primacy of maintaining international consensus, the United States representative to the United Nations Counterterrorism Committee said “The goal of the fight against terrorism should be to build and maintain the strongest consensus possible.” United Nations Security Council, “Addressing Security Council, Secretary-General Calls on Counter-Terrorism Committee to Develop Long-Term Strategy to Defeat Terror,” *Press Release SC/7276*, 18 January 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7276.doc.htm>.

<sup>316</sup> The cause and effect relationship between terrorism and environmental conditions like poverty is often heard in United Nations deliberations. Some examples are: United Nations General Assembly, “Assembly Hears Call for Definition of Terrorism,” *Press Release GA/9925*, 3 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/GA9925.doc.htm>; United Nations Security Council, “Addressing Security Council, Secretary-General Calls on Counter-Terrorism Committee,” ; and United Nations General Assembly, “General Assembly Hears 34 Speakers In Continued Debate On Global Terrorism,” *Press Release GA/9927*, 4 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/ga9927.doc.htm>.

<sup>317</sup> For example, Halperin, 26, calls for “the United Nations Security Council to handle this crisis.”

allowed “serious inequities...to fester in critical areas of the world.”<sup>318</sup> Those inequities involve a host of issues including the preservation of human rights, the spread democracy, the amelioration of extreme poverty and the promotion of peace.<sup>319</sup> Consequently, nation-building and other aid, provided not only by America, but by the international community, are ingredients of the cooperative security counterterrorism strategy. As one cooperative security advocate stated about problems that may have fueled the 9-11 attacks, “the best way to reduce the lines of conflict is for the West to absorb immigrants, educate the world, and feed its poor.”<sup>320</sup>

### **Widening the War**

Since cooperative security advocates primarily view the struggle against terrorism as a global law enforcement project, widening the military component of the effort is typically viewed as a very troublesome last resort that should be backed by a United Nations Security Council Resolution.<sup>321</sup> Nevertheless, as proponents of a strategy that seeks to deter aggression and reward compliance, it is reasonable to assume that some cooperative security advocates would support collective military action against states or groups who failed to comply with applicable Security Council resolutions with respect to terrorism. That said, the prospects for international consensus on confrontational military action are reduced due to the ongoing United

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<sup>318</sup> John D. Steinbruner quoted in Burt Solomon, “Shock Therapy,” *National Journal*, 2 November 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 January 2001, available from <http://nationaljournal.qpass.com/about/njweekly/stories/2001/1102nj1.htm>. Howell makes a similar claim in Howell, “Nation Building II,” 29.

<sup>319</sup> This list was compiled from United Nations Security Council, “Addressing Security Council, Secretary-General Calls on Counter-Terrorism Committee,” ; Howell, “Nation Building II,” 29; and Stephen Watson, “Albright Gives Mixed Reviews to Bush in the War On Terrorism,” *Buffalo News*, 16 November 2001.

<sup>320</sup> Llewellyn D. Howell, “The Clash of Civilizations,” *USA Today Magazine*, World Watcher Section 130, no. 2678 (November 2001): 29.

<sup>321</sup> The reluctance to use the military instrument of power and proclivity to put retaliation in the hands of the United Nations is quite obvious in Halperin, 26.

Nations debate over the definition of terrorism.<sup>322</sup> Cooperative security advocates would presumably also support military augmentation for those countries that request counterterrorism help. Finally, cooperative security advocates are against widening the war to the “axis of evil” states if the only rationale for doing so is the potential for WMD terrorism. On the other hand, at least one cooperative security advocate is willing to consider military action against Iraq based on its long record of disregard for United Nations Security Council resolutions.<sup>323</sup> However, cooperative security advocates would not see this action as part of the war on terrorism, but rather as a necessary component of the global communities’ responsibility to assure compliance with international norms.<sup>324</sup>

### **International Consensus**

Cooperative security advocates value international consensus more than other grand strategists. Like the proponents of other grand strategies, cooperative security proponents extol the pragmatic virtues of having allies to help in the war on terrorism. Sharing of counterterrorism intelligence, cooperation on freezing of financial assets, and collaborative law enforcement actions inject synergism into efforts to address an international problem.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> This debate is covered in United Nations General Assembly, “Assembly Hears Call for Definition of Terrorism,” ; United Nations Security Council, “Addressing Security Council, Secretary-General Calls on Counter-Terrorism Committee,” n.p. ; and United Nations General Assembly, “General Assembly Hears 34 Speakers In Continued Debate On Global Terrorism,” n.p.

<sup>323</sup> Madeleine K. Albright interviewed by Cokie Roberts, “This Week with Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts,” 3 March 2002, *Burrelle's Information Services: ABC News*, online, Lexis-Nexis, 5 March 2002.

<sup>324</sup> See Sarah Lyall, “In Norway, Annan Warns U.S. Against Attacking Iraq,” *New York Times*, 10 December 2001.

<sup>325</sup> These points are made in Madeleine K. Albright interviewed by Jeff Greenfield, “America Strikes Back;” and Michael Hill, “The world is anticipating a war unlike all others,” *Baltimore Sun*, 30 September 2001. Hill quotes Steinbruner as saying “First, we need information and, therefore, international collaboration much broader than our normal alliance system.” Additionally, a host of cooperative actions are listed in United Nations Security

Additionally, cooperative security advocates worry about the negative impacts of failing to give the international community a say in how the war on terrorism is prosecuted. Allied governments that are concerned about backlash from their people for blindly following the United States need to have a voice<sup>326</sup> and unilateral or overzealous action by the United States threatens to break the coalition and fuel the very antagonisms that terrorists use to advance their agendas.<sup>327</sup> What significantly separates the views of cooperative security advocates from those of others on this issue is their propensity to intimate that international consensus is a prerequisite for action. After 9-11, one cooperative security advocate stated “we need to devise a reaction that is appropriate with the support of other major governments”<sup>328</sup> while another warned that America “must craft solutions that respond to others' perception of threats as well as to our own”<sup>329</sup>

### **Changing Actions or Perceptions**

Some of the same motivational questions posed with respect to nation-building and other aid apply here as well. That is, whether cooperative security advocates see America’s behavior as a contributing factor to international terrorism is less clear than the fact that they would like to change America’s behavior to assure the continued support of the international community. Indeed, two cooperative security advocates have made the case that America needs to change by assuming a multilateral approach that considers the interests of other countries.<sup>330</sup> One advocate goes on to say that America’s past transgressions include abandoning Afghanistan after the Soviets were defeated, failing to intervene in Rwanda, blindly siding with the Israelis over the

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Council Resolution 1373 (2001), 4385<sup>th</sup> Meeting, 28 September 2001, 1-4, on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1373e.pdf>.

<sup>326</sup> Halperin, 26.

<sup>327</sup> These arguments against unilateralism are made in Madeleine K. Albright interviewed by Katie Couric, “Madeleine Albright Discusses Terrorist Situation,” 25 September 2001, *NBC News Transcripts*, Today on NBC, on-line, Lexis-Nexis, 5 March 2002; and “Breaking News with Dr. John Steinbruner,” n.p.

<sup>328</sup> “Breaking News with Dr. John Steinbruner,” n.p.

<sup>329</sup> Halperin, 26.

<sup>330</sup> Howell, “Nation Building II,” 29; and Halperin, 26.

Palestinians, and tolerating undemocratic regimes with questionable governing practices. What do all of these issues have in common? According to one cooperative security advocate, they are cases in which America did what was best for itself, and not necessarily what was best for the international community or the people who live in that community.<sup>331</sup> Consequently, while cooperative security proponents do propose a change in America's behavior to improve how others view America, they appear to be motivated more by the opportunity to cement the support of the international community than by concerns for the root causes of terrorism or changing terrorists' intentions.

### **Critique**

The cooperative security counterterrorism approach addresses some root causes and capabilities, but little attention is paid to intentions or vulnerabilities.

**Roots.** Cooperative security advocates do not address specific terrorist issues, but they do pay some attention to environmental root causes. Specific issues present a problem for cooperative security advocates because they tend to view problems in a non-specific, global context. International terrorism strikes many countries throughout the world and terrorists' grievances vary widely. Consequently, managing specific issues on a global scale could require as many approaches as there are terrorist groups.<sup>332</sup> Additionally, specific actions that might satisfy or otherwise neutralize the grievances that some groups have with America could negatively impact members of the international community, thereby limiting the ability to gain international support. Perhaps the most poignant example of this rises from the fact that militant Islamic terrorists want America to do less in the world, which runs counter to the internationalist approach of cooperative security which suggests that America ought to have an interest everywhere. More specifically, to satisfy some of al Qaeda's grievances, America would have to take actions that would look very much like the beginning of American isolationism.

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<sup>331</sup> Howell, "Nation Building II," 29

<sup>332</sup> Pillar makes this point in Pillar, 130-131. The scope of the global problem is enormous. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2000*, 15, lists 43 terrorist groups.

International support for such action seems quite unlikely.<sup>333</sup> Hence, the complexities involved in addressing specific issues on a global scale make it incompatible with the cooperative security strategy. Conversely, concerns that might be considered environmental causes of terrorism are less controversial for the international community. Indeed, many of the issues cited during post-9-11 United Nations Counterterrorism Committee deliberations are recognized as global problems in their own right.<sup>334</sup> Including these global concerns under the umbrella of counterterrorism is a relatively benign proposition for the international community. Additionally, because cooperative security demands a multi-lateral approach, it removes some discord that might result from America acting alone, and helps to reduce the perception of a war against Islam. This should also have a positive impact on environmental root causes. Finally, since those who subscribe to cooperative security argue that America has an interest in what happens everywhere, there is less probability that terrorists will be able to recruit new followers based on the argument that America fails to address global problems.

An obvious potential criticism of the cooperative security counterterrorism approach to root causes is that it fails to address specific issues, although this failure leads to successfully avoiding the appeasement dilemma. Also, while environmental causes are addressed, it is not clear that anything new will come of it. The international community has addressed these problems for decades and simply putting them into the counterterrorism accounting category does not necessarily mean that they will be pursued with increased vigor or effectiveness. Indeed, the shortcomings of past international efforts to inject stability into chaotic countries

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<sup>333</sup> “Most mainstream comment in Europe and Asia has expressed concern that the Washington and New York attacks could have the ultimate effect of promoting American isolationism.” See William Pfaff, “The War on Terrorism May Bring on a New U.S. Isolationism,” *International Herald Tribune*, 20 September 2001.

<sup>334</sup> The committee cited “poverty, intolerance, regional conflicts, denial of human rights, environmental degradation, lack of access to justice, ...equal protection under the law,... lack of sustainable development, ... transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering and trafficking in illegal arms.” See United Nations Security Council, “Addressing Security Council, Secretary-General Calls on Counter-Terrorism Committee,” n.p.

have compelled some analysts to call for yet another revised approach.<sup>335</sup> Additionally, a strategy that relies on international political will to get things done might be hampered by the fact that some environmental root causes fall outside the realm of broadly supported global initiatives. For example, as previously mentioned, some believe that autocratic and oppressive governments contribute to the roots of terrorism, but history shows that banking on the global community to impose its will on matters of state sovereignty is a precarious proposition.<sup>336</sup>

**Capabilities.** Cooperative security advocates' plan for degrading terrorist capabilities relies heavily on the rule of international law and the power of the world community. Force is used only after seeking the approval of the United Nations Security Council.<sup>337</sup> State sponsors of terrorism, and those that harbor terrorists are subjected to a graduated scale of international isolation and punishment.<sup>338</sup> Finally, states are to collaborate on a wide range of law enforcement initiatives, from disrupting financial support for terrorist groups to controlling the trafficking of weapons.<sup>339</sup>

There are several potential criticisms of this approach. First, a multilateral approach is constrained by the lowest common denominator. In other words, "the limits to what can be accomplished are set by the state that is least willing to cooperate."<sup>340</sup> Second, the need to garner international consensus, the slow and deliberate application of increasingly severe punishments,

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<sup>335</sup> On a new approach, see Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, "Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief* #12, January 2002, 1-8, on-line, Internet, 3 January 2002, available from <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief12.pdf>. On historical record, "The track record for such massive, long-term international efforts is not promising." See Karen DeYoung and Marc Kaufman, "Afghan Rebuilding Will Be Costly," *Washington Post*, 10 December 2001.

<sup>336</sup> Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, no. 96 (Fall 1991): 8. Evans takes the United Nations Security Council to task for "reluctance to intervene decisively in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda."

<sup>337</sup> See Halperin, 26, for a summary of the proposed sequence of events for Afghanistan.

<sup>338</sup> Pillar discussed the United Nations process in Pillar, 76-77.

<sup>339</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), 3, lists the initiatives.

<sup>340</sup> Pillar, 76.

and the aversion to military force combine to create an environment where much is said about the terrorist threat, but little is done to degrade terrorist capabilities. For example, the United Nations Security Council commented that “continued conflict in Afghanistan provides fertile ground for terrorism” in February 1996<sup>341</sup> and it reiterated its concerns in September 1996.<sup>342</sup> In October 1996, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1076 calling for all Afghan parties to cease hostilities and repeating concerns about terrorism.<sup>343</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1193, issued in August 1998, also called for an end to the conflict in Afghanistan and expressed deep concern over “the continuing presence of terrorists in the territory of Afghanistan”.<sup>344</sup> In December of 1998, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1214 demanding peace and expressing consternation over “use of Afghan territory...for the sheltering and training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts.”<sup>345</sup> Two subsequent Security Council resolutions issued in October 1999 and December 2000 further isolated the Taliban from the international community, expressed even deeper concerns about the use of Afghanistan as a headquarters for international terrorism, and demanded the immediate

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<sup>341</sup> United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President, S/PRST/1996/6, 15 February 1996, 1-2, on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/1996/prst6e.pdf>.

<sup>342</sup> United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President, S/PRST/1996/40\*, 30 September 1996, 1-2, on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/1996/prst40e.pdf>.

<sup>343</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1076 (1996), 3706<sup>th</sup> Meeting, 22 October 1996, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1996/9628426E.htm>.

<sup>344</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1193 (1998), 3921<sup>st</sup> Meeting, 28 August 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1193.htm>.

<sup>345</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1214 (1998), 3952<sup>nd</sup> Meeting, 8 December 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1214.htm>.

extradition of Usama bin Laden.<sup>346</sup> By comparison, the United States, acting unilaterally, attacked targets in Sudan and Afghanistan on 20 August 1998 in retaliation for the 7 August 1998 bombing of embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.<sup>347</sup> To be fair, there may have been intervening variables that reduce the credibility of this comparison. Nevertheless, it does illustrate that in some situations, the cooperative security approach to counterterrorism can dictate a degree of paralysis that is not apparent in initiatives that are less multilateral.<sup>348</sup> Finally, controversy over the definition of terrorism could have a negative effect on the cooperative security approach to degrading terrorists' capabilities. For example, in the wake of 9-11, the United Nations General Assembly heard calls for the need to distinguish between terrorism and acts of opposition against *foreign occupation*. While some in the assembly argued that a precise definition was not necessary in the case of the 9-11 attacks,<sup>349</sup> and much of the definitional debate centered around the Arab-Israeli crisis,<sup>350</sup> it is worth noting that bin Laden has called the American presence in Saudi Arabia an occupation.<sup>351</sup> Whether this debate ultimately degrades

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<sup>346</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999), 4051<sup>st</sup> Meeting, 15 October 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1267.htm>; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000), 4251<sup>st</sup> Meeting, 19 December 2000, 1-7, on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1333e.pdf>.

<sup>347</sup> Douglas J. Gillert, "U.S. Strikes Against Terrorist Forces," *American Forces Press Service*, n.p., on-line, Internet, 8 March 2002, available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1998/n08201998\\_9808201.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1998/n08201998_9808201.html).

<sup>348</sup> Pillar, page 75 states "In general, the larger the gathering to address terrorism, the less effective it has been."

<sup>349</sup> See United Nations General Assembly, "Assembly Hears Call for Definition of Terrorism," n.p.

<sup>350</sup> See United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Hears 34 Speakers In Continued Debate On Global Terrorism," n.p.

<sup>351</sup> Usama bin Laden, "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," n.p..

the United Nations' efforts to reduce terrorists' capabilities remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the potential for disruption is more pronounced in a cooperative security environment.

**Intentions.** Cooperative security advocates generally do not address terrorists' intentions for the same reasons that they do not address specific issues. Managing the multitude of terrorists' intentions on a global scale is infeasible and could lead to helping one state or group at the expense of another. For cooperative security advocates, the neo-isolationist warning about the potential for America to become a target of terrorists who previously had no grievance with the United States does not apply, because terrorism against one, is terrorism against all.<sup>352</sup> Better to act to help the global community in its quest to rid the world of terrorism than to succumb to fears of retaliation. On the other hand, a multilateral approach may induce some terrorists to target America less frequently, although there is no evidence to suggest that cooperative security advocates favor collaboration to change terrorists' intentions.

**Vulnerabilities.** In order for cooperative security advocates to implement a proactive plan to reduce vulnerabilities, they would have to sacrifice some of the internationalism that their grand strategy relies on to manage global problems. Consequently, reducing vulnerabilities is not a guiding consideration for cooperative security advocates. Ironically, since cooperative security tends to produce slow, deliberate and relatively restrained intervention and involvement, it does have some trappings of a strategy informed by concerns about vulnerability. Additionally, as a strategy that relies on international structures and law enforcement to a greater degree than military intervention and presence, a cooperative security approach to counterterrorism should reduce vulnerabilities to some degree.

### **USAF Core Competencies**

Since cooperative security proponents choose to fight terrorism with law enforcement first, and with multi-lateral military force as a last resort, the counterterrorism combat capabilities of the USAF would be de-emphasized if America adopted a cooperative security strategy. Indeed, after the 9-11 attacks, cooperative security advocates were the only grand

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<sup>352</sup> This sentiment is expressed in United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Condemns, 'In Strongest Terms', Terrorist Attacks On United States," n.p.

strategists inclined to recommend actions short of a military response.<sup>353</sup> However, some USAF capabilities can be useful in humanitarian assistance and nation-building efforts. Additionally, if combat operations are required, precision will be important, and America will have to provide capabilities that others may not possess. Finally, information superiority will be a useful asset for law enforcement activities.

Based on the analysis above, dual-use competencies like agile combat support and rapid global mobility would be primary capabilities for providing non-combat support. Additionally, America’s preeminence in precision engagement makes it a primary capability for its utility in destroying terrorist capabilities that cannot be neutralized by other means. As a means to assist law enforcement efforts and enable precision engagement, information superiority is a primary capability. Other combat capabilities like aerospace superiority and global attack are less relevant. The need for sustained control of air and space is unlikely because cooperative security advocates do not foresee the need for conventional war in support of counterterrorism. Lastly, because military operations will be multilateral, access to bases should be less of a problem; consequently, global attack is a secondary priority. A summary of primary and secondary capabilities appears below in Table 6.

Table 6. Cooperative Security Counterterrorism Capabilities

<b>Competency</b>	<b>Pri ority</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
Aerospace Superiority	Sec ondary	Not needed for law enforcement approach
Information Superiority	Pri mary	Useful for law enforcement and precision engagement
Global Attack	Sec ondary	Access to bases is less of a problem
Precision Engagement	Pri mary	Uniquely American--needed for multilateral approach
Rapid Global Mobility	Pri mary	Dual-use capability

<sup>353</sup> See Etan Horowitz and Tom LoBianco, n.p.; and Halperin, 26.

Agile Combat Support	Pri mary	Dual-use capability
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### Primacy

The primacy approach to counterterrorism is very similar to the one proposed by Netanyahu. For primacy advocates, the 9-11 attacks confirmed their belief that the post-Cold War world is a very dangerous place that requires American hegemony to ensure safety and prosperity.<sup>354</sup> As one primacist claimed, “American preponderance is currently the only practical alternative to global anarchy.”<sup>355</sup> As Pearl Harbor was for the “The Greatest Generation,” primacists view the 9-11 attacks as the start of a significant new struggle—a struggle that will rival World War II and the Cold War in terms of intensity and importance. In making the comparison, primacists are quick to point out that those epic conflicts of the past were won with a good dose of military might and moral clarity—the war on terrorism should be no different.<sup>356</sup> Additionally, it is no coincidence that the perpetrators of the horrific 9-11 attacks emanated from the same group that, save for a half-hearted attempt at retaliation in 1998, were allowed to flourish in an Afghanistan that America had abandoned as a result of counterterrorism policy paralyzed by the intricacies of international law.<sup>357</sup> Finally, for primacists the war on terrorism is

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<sup>354</sup> Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “Bush’s War Budget,” *Weekly Standard* 7, no. 20 (4 February 2002): n.p., on-line, Internet, 4 February 2002, available from <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/000/830eoxpg.asp>. “After September 11, no one can any longer doubt that dire threats exist in the world, or deny that a strong American military is the sine qua non for meeting and defeating those threats.”

<sup>355</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A New Age of Solidarity? Don’t Count on It,” *Washington Post*, 2 November 2001.

<sup>356</sup> See Robert Kagan, “We Must Fight This War,” *Washington Post*, 11 September 2001; and Charles Krauthammer, “To War, Not to Court,” *Washington Post*, 12 September 2001.

<sup>357</sup> Past lack of resolve is criticized in Ronald D. Asmus and Robert Kagan, “Commit for the Long Run,” *Washington Post*, January 29, 2002; Krauthammer, “To War Not to Court”; and Richard N. Perle, “The U.S. Must Strike at Saddam Hussein,” *New York Times*, 28 December

really more than a war to rid the world of terrorists—it is a war in defense of Western civilization.<sup>358</sup> This will involve more than fighting in Afghanistan and military counterterrorism assistance in places like the Philippines. For primacists, the 9-11 attacks were a call for “a new internationalism based on democratic purpose, active engagement and military strength” that requires America to “shape a world where terrorists find no haven and where democratic peoples can flourish.”<sup>359</sup>

### **Nation-building and Other Aid**

Nation-building creates tension for primacists because it implies a choice between permanently denying safe havens for terrorists on the one hand, and risking a long-term reduction in available American fighting power on the other. As one primacist warns, “in facing the challenge posed by terrorism, the heavy lifting will have to be done by the United States...I would hope the United States will...not...become entangled for years to come in trying to stabilize Afghanistan.”<sup>360</sup> Nevertheless, America must be ready “to allow nation-building to proceed.”<sup>361</sup> Perhaps the best characterization of the post-9/11 primacist view of nation-building is “nation-building lite” – a form of nation-building in which America has an interest, but others take the risks and do most of the work. The line of reasoning for this concept begins with the perception that international terrorism clearly threatens Western civilization, the leader of which is America. Therefore, international terrorism threatens America’s status as a global hegemon. Since international terrorism can flourish under radical Muslim regimes like the Taliban, nation-building aimed at preventing the reemergence of such a regime is in order. However, for pragmatic reasons, America should not deploy peacekeeping troops. America has allies that are more capable of performing this function. The United States should support the effort logistically, but America’s military is best used as a fighting force, and for primacists, the war on

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2001. Perle states “We should have taken terrorism seriously three years ago, when our embassies in East Africa were destroyed.”

<sup>358</sup> Kagan and Kristol, “Bush’s War Budget,” n.p.; and Charles Krauthammer, “The Axis of Petulance,” *Washington Post*, 1 March 2002.

<sup>359</sup> Asmus and Kagan, “Commit for the Long Run.”

<sup>360</sup> Brzezinski, “A New Age of Solidarity? Don’t Count on It.”

<sup>361</sup> Kagan and Kristol, “Bush’s War Budget,” n.p.

terrorism will require a full complement of American warfighters.<sup>362</sup> Similarly, primacists might support economic aid if it enhances America's position as a global leader and prevents terror havens from reappearing,<sup>363</sup> but as discussed below, primacists reject the notion that reducing poverty is an effective way to reduce international terrorism.

### **Widening the War**

While other grand strategists worry about the consequences of widening the war on terrorism to groups and states that have not been implicated in the 9-11 attacks, primacists argue that failing to expand the war would be a mistake.<sup>364</sup> Helping other countries to rid themselves of terrorists is a useful mechanism for keeping the focus on the war and fulfilling America's benevolent hegemon role as it reconstitutes for a more serious engagement.<sup>365</sup> Advocates of primacy make no secret of what they think this more serious engagement should entail. As one primacist notes, "Saddam and his regime pose a direct and unacceptable threat to the United States. And therefore the United States has the right to take preemptive action."<sup>366</sup> Linking Iraq to the 9-11 attacks is not a prerequisite for military action. Why? Saddam is pursuing WMD<sup>367</sup> and international terrorists would like to use these weapons against America. Additionally,

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<sup>362</sup> "Nation-building lite" is outlined in Charles Krauthammer, "We Don't Peacekeep," *Washington Post*, 18 December 2001.

<sup>363</sup> Krauthammer, "We Don't Peacekeep." On aid, Krauthammer says: "We should, however, give...enough economic, political and military support to make sure (Afghanistan) is stable and held together."

<sup>364</sup> See Perle, "The U.S. Must Strike at Saddam Hussein"; Charles Krauthammer, "A War on Many Fronts...," *Washington Post*, 5 October 2001; and William Kristol, "Taking The War Beyond Terrorism," *Washington Post*, 31 January 2002. Of these three sources, perhaps the most succinct statement on the primacist view widening the war comes from Kristol who states "our task is not merely to uproot terrorism, and then go back to the status quo."

<sup>365</sup> Charles Krauthammer, "Redefining the War," *Washington Post*, 1 February 2002. Krauthammer refers to these smaller operations as "low-hanging fruit."

<sup>366</sup> Robert Kagan, "On to Phase II," *Washington Post*, 27 November 2001.

<sup>367</sup> For a recent report, see Judith Miller, "An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at Least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites," *New York Times*, 20 December 2001.

history shows that Saddam is not averse to working with terrorist groups or using WMD. Based on the above facts, primacists argue that the probability of WMD terrorism coupled with the severe consequences should such an attack occur make establishing Iraqi complicity in the 9-11 attacks a relatively irrelevant distraction.<sup>368</sup> As one primacy proponent notes, “The point is not finding a miscreant's fingerprints on the World Trade Center. The point is finding the next miscreant's plans for the next World Trade Center.”<sup>369</sup> Finally, primacists leave their options open for additional terror war conflicts for reasons that have something to do with their beliefs about the root causes of international terrorism. Specifically, primacists argue that militant Islamic terrorism is nurtured by the anger and fanaticism that proliferates in societies that are ruled by oppressive, autocratic regimes.<sup>370</sup> Consequently, to fight terrorism, America should use its power and influence to promote democracy.<sup>371</sup> While America should use its political influence to compel reform, this project need not be entirely peaceful. As one primacist suggests, “the more terror-loving tyrannies the United States can topple the better.”<sup>372</sup>

### **International Consensus**

Primacists value allies in the war on terrorism, but only to the point that they do not impede progress. The 9-11 attacks occurred on American soil, more attacks are likely, and the threat of state-sponsored WMD terrorism looms large. If ever there was a time to risk the good will of a few unwilling friends for the sake of safety and security, that time is now.<sup>373</sup> Far from being a prerequisite for action, primacists argue that international consensus is the result of successful military operations. As two leading primacists note, “successful diplomacy follows

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<sup>368</sup> This line of reasoning is articulated in Kagan, “On to Phase II”; Brzezinski, “A New Age of Solidarity? Don't Count on It”; and Perle, “The U.S. Must Strike at Saddam Hussein.”

<sup>369</sup> Krauthammer, “Redefining the War.”

<sup>370</sup> See Joshua Muravchik, “When Tyrants Rule, Terrorists Will Rise,” *The Australian*, 26 December 2001, 9.

<sup>371</sup> Asmus and Kagan, “Commit for the Long Run.”

<sup>372</sup> Muravchik, “When Tyrants Rule, Terrorists Will Rise,” 9.

<sup>373</sup> These arguments for unilateralism are made in Robert Kagan, “Coalition of the Unwilling,” *Washington Post*, 17 October 2001; and Krauthammer, “The Axis of Petulance.”

success on the battlefield, not vice versa.”<sup>374</sup> For primacists, it is pointless and downright dangerous to waste precious time attempting to gain the consent and commitment of allies who argue against preemption while terrorists plot their next attack and Saddam pursues his WMD program. “A policy of waiting to be attacked with nuclear (and other genocidal) weapons is suicidal.”<sup>375</sup> American leadership, resolve, and military success will convince America’s true allies to support the cause. “But if we let the coalition of the unwilling call the shots, they’ll gladly drag us down to defeat, everywhere.”<sup>376</sup>

### **Changing Actions or Perceptions**

Proponents of primacy argue that international terrorism can be defeated if America becomes more engaged in the world. The Post-Cold War policies of the 1990s were either paralyzed by obsessive attempts at multilateralism, or altogether abandoned for fear of becoming entangled in another Vietnam. As a result, trouble in the periphery was inadequately addressed, and absent the positive influence of American power, terrorists and tyrants were allowed to thrive. “Sept. 11 has taught us that troublesome regions once labeled “too hard” or “too messy” can no longer be neglected except at our peril.”<sup>377</sup> Primacists find it absurd to suggest that America should restrain itself to avoid being targeted in the future, just as they reject the notion that the Americans should ask themselves what the United States has done that might have prompted the 9-11 attacks.<sup>378</sup> American interventions in the 1990s—the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo—were all conducted in support of beleaguered Muslim populations. How then can anyone conclude that America is an anti-Islamic state that must be attacked in the name of a

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<sup>374</sup> Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “A Winning Strategy,” *Weekly Standard*, 26 November 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 December 2001, available from <http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/standard112601.asp>.

<sup>375</sup> Krauthammer, “The Axis of Petulance.”

<sup>376</sup> Robert Kagan, “Coalition of the Unwilling.”

<sup>377</sup> Asmus and Kagan, “Commit for the Long Run.” See also Kristol, “Taking The War Beyond Terrorism,” in which Kristol characterizes the 1990s as a “decade of temporizing and timidity.”

<sup>378</sup> See Kagan, “We Must Fight This War.”

besieged Muslim people?<sup>379</sup> For proponents of primacy then, anti-Americanism in the Arab/Muslim world is at worst a constant that cannot be ameliorated,<sup>380</sup> and at best the result of autocratic regimes that tolerate or encourage militant Islam and allow America's benevolent actions to be twisted into negative propaganda.<sup>381</sup> In both cases, American power is the answer. In the case of the former, successful application of American military power against terrorist groups and states results in a level of respect and fear sufficient to prevent anti-Americanism from manifesting itself in international terrorism.<sup>382</sup> In the latter case, American power can be applied to reform the regime or change it, thereby eliminating a large amount of dangerous anti-Americanism.<sup>383</sup>

### **Critique**

The primacist approach to counterterrorism addresses capabilities more than any other strategy, while root causes and vulnerabilities are addressed to a lesser extent, and intentions are largely ignored.

**Roots.** For primacists, the environmental root causes of international terrorism rise from the false perception that terrorism will make things better. Therefore, the logical counter to that perception is to prove that terrorism will make things much worse. As one primacist notes, "fanaticism thrives on its sense of inevitability, on its aura of triumph and divine appointment. Nothing, therefore, deflates it like military defeat."<sup>384</sup> Individuals considering a career in terrorism will think twice before engaging in what is obviously an exercise in futility. States

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<sup>379</sup> America's past record of armed support for Muslims is reviewed in Charles Krauthammer, "Voices of Moral Obtuseness," *Washington Post*, 21 September 2001.

<sup>380</sup> This observation is made in Charles Krauthammer, "Victory Changes Everything . . .," *Washington Post*, 30 November 2001.

<sup>381</sup> Muravchik, "When Tyrants Rule, Terrorists Will Rise," 9.

<sup>382</sup> "The demonstration effect of the Afghan war has already deeply changed the Near East" says Charles Krauthammer, "Where Power Talks," *Washington Post*, 4 January 2002. See also Krauthammer, "Victory Changes Everything . . ."

<sup>383</sup> This solution is proposed in Muravchik, "When Tyrants Rule, Terrorists Will Rise," 9; and Krauthammer, "Victory Changes Everything . . ."

<sup>384</sup> Krauthammer, "Where Power Talks."

seduced by terrorism's asymmetric and anonymous features will realize that succumbing to the temptation will assure their destruction—destruction that may come well before they stage a terrorist attack. The primacy approach also lays a treacherous path for states that tolerate terrorism or otherwise fuel it with oppressive policies. While they are less likely to be on the receiving end of American military power, their prospects for survival are not good unless they make some discernible effort at reform. Additionally, once American power has created conditions unfavorable to the perpetuation of terrorism, primacists are willing to stay the course via support for nation-building and if necessary, reapplication of force. While primacy advocates address environmental root causes, they work very hard to avoid the appeasement dilemma. For them, even opening a dialogue with states previously tied to terrorism sends the message that terrorism pays.<sup>385</sup> Hence, specific issues are not addressed. Perhaps the primacist view on addressing root causes is best expressed by one advocate who stated “The way to tame the Arab street is not with appeasement and sweet sensitivity, but with raw power and victory.”<sup>386</sup>

The main criticism of the primacy counterterrorism approach to root causes stems from the fact that they rely almost entirely on projecting American power, which is itself a possible root cause of terrorism.<sup>387</sup> Additionally, the preemptive and unilateral nature of the primacy approach may be more likely to spark resentment and fuel a United States-versus-Islam war mentality, which could also be counterproductive. In other words, Muslims previously resigned to sit out the war on terrorism may be compelled to join in once they are convinced their religion is under attack. There is also at least one historical example to suggest that American military

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<sup>385</sup> The primacists' distaste for appeasement is communicated in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Coalition Trap,” *Weekly Standard*, 15 October 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 December 2001, available from <http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/standard101501.asp>.

<sup>386</sup> Krauthammer, “Victory Changes Everything...”

<sup>387</sup> For a discussion of the pros and cons of using military force to fight terrorism, see Lesser, 129-132; and Pillar, 102-107. For a more intimate view on the frustration of fighting terrorism with the military, see Amos Harel, “Security brass: Targeted killings don't work; no military solution to terror,” *Ha'aretz*, 8 January 2002.

power may not quell the Arab street. Specifically, Kuwaitis who were themselves liberated by American power reportedly harbor a great deal of resentment toward the United States. Additionally, even though Yasser Arafat backed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kuwaitis now cite America's alleged lack of sympathy for the Palestinians as a grievance that contributes to their anti-Americanism.<sup>388</sup> Since primacists are opposed to addressing specific issues, they are also subject to criticism for having a relatively inflexible approach. On the other hand, they avoid the appeasement dilemma entirely.

**Capabilities.** Primacists appear willing to strongly support virtually any type of military operation to destroy terrorist capabilities. Additionally, they are the only grand strategists who advocate near-term, preemptive war against states who *might* engage in WMD terrorism. Consequently, the primacist approach has the potential to destroy more terrorist capability than the other counterterrorism approaches. One criticism with respect to the primacists' approach to destroying terrorist capabilities is the neo-isolationist argument that an aggressive approach may drive terrorists or states to accelerate and better conceal their efforts to acquire WMD.<sup>389</sup> Another potential flaw in the primacist approach involves the propensity to act without international consensus and the negative implications it might have for persuading others to cooperate. If some states are offended by American unilateralism to the point that they refuse to collaborate on counterterrorism intelligence, some terrorist capabilities could be spared. Additionally, national leaders may feel compelled to choose between a hostile population fraught with anti-Americanism and prone to sympathize with terrorists on the one hand, and a less-than-cooperative America on the other. They may decide that their survival is better served by

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<sup>388</sup> See Victor Davis Hanson, "Listen to the Kuwaitis: What can we learn from the baffling stance of the Kuwaitis?" *National Review Online*, 11 March 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 March 2002, available from <http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson031102.shtml>.

<sup>389</sup> This point is raised in Bandow, "The Iraqi question," n.p.; and Buchanan, "American Caesar," n.p.

perpetuating an environment that assuages their society and tolerates the existence of terrorist capabilities.<sup>390</sup>

**Intentions.** Primacists choose to ignore terrorists' intentions based on logic similar to that employed by selective engagers. While primacists are not necessarily content with constraining their efforts to al Qaeda, they do state that terrorists cannot be deterred.<sup>391</sup> Additionally, primacists make it clear that in their view, America is the prime target—Israel and the rest of the West are of far less importance.<sup>392</sup> Hence, terrorists cannot be deterred from attacking the United States, regardless of America's best efforts to change their intentions. For primacists, terrorism is war and terrorists are soldiers. Just as America's response to the attack on Pearl Harbor was not sidetracked by questions about Japan's motivations or calls to bring the perpetrators to justice, America should respond to the 9-11 attacks with a similar degree of moral clarity.<sup>393</sup> Although primacists ignore terrorists' intentions, their approach may have an impact on them. Unintentional though it may be, the aggressive approach that primacists outline might compel some terrorists to reform or change their target set.<sup>394</sup>

Criticisms of the primacist approach (or lack thereof) to intentions are the same as those posed for selective engagement. Namely, intervention and internationalism could result in more terrorists that target America.

**Vulnerabilities.** In general, primacists are not concerned about vulnerabilities—their strategy is one of maximal internationalism which by definition maximizes vulnerabilities. However, one primacist does use concerns about vulnerability as a secondary argument to recommend against using American soldiers for peacekeeping. "Being the best, and representing

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<sup>390</sup> For a concise description of these dangerous choices, see Fouad Ajami, "The Uneasy Imperium: Pax Americana in the Middle East," in *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War*, ed. James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 28. Ajami states, "Ride with the foreigners at your own risk, the region's history has taught."

<sup>391</sup> Kagan, "On to Phase II."

<sup>392</sup> Krauthammer, "To War, Not to Court."

<sup>393</sup> These comparisons are made in Kagan, "We Must Fight This War"; and Krauthammer, "To War, Not to Court."

<sup>394</sup> Pillar, 34 makes this connection.

the strongest country in the world, they automatically become prime targets” for terrorists.<sup>395</sup> Nevertheless, the primacy strategy is generally void of any concerns about vulnerabilities.

### **USAF Core Competencies**

Since primacists do not put limits on military operations in support of the war on terrorism, and in some cases actually advocate preemptive conventional war, there is no reason to categorize USAF core competencies. In the case of primacy, they are all primary capabilities.

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<sup>395</sup> Krauthammer, “We Don't Peacekeep.”

## Chapter 4

### Conclusions

Counterterrorism books typically conclude with a list of recommendations that will presumably help to reduce terrorism.<sup>396</sup> While many of these recommendations could be implemented without much impact on other national interests prior to 9-11, that is no longer the case. For example, Netanyahu recommends “neutralizing terrorist enclaves”<sup>397</sup> and Pillar wants to “disrupt terrorist infrastructures worldwide.”<sup>398</sup> As the war in Afghanistan has shown, implementing these recommendations could involve a significant amount of American blood and treasure. The point is that counterterrorism has entered the realm of grand strategy and promises to remain there for a long time. Consequently, exploring the relationship between counterterrorism and each of the four grand strategies, as this paper has done, has intrinsic value. Additionally, looking at all four grand strategies simultaneously gives insight into some additional questions. First, has the increased emphasis on the terrorist threat been a catalyst for changing the four grand strategies? Second, what counterterrorism issues do the four grand strategies agree on? Where do they differ? Third, what USAF capabilities apply to all four counterterrorism approaches? Finally, Pillar has stated that effective counterterrorism considers all elements of terrorism.<sup>399</sup> Which approaches meet his criteria?

#### **Changes to Grand Strategies?**

The 9-11 attacks appear to have caused subtle changes in the arguments posed by two of the grand strategies. Although they express some skepticism, neo-isolationists seem more likely to accept the idea that allies are needed. Before 9-11, neo-isolationists generally saw alliances as

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<sup>396</sup> See for example Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 220-229; Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network*, 2d ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 129-148; and Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 128-160.

<sup>397</sup> Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism*, 136.

<sup>398</sup> Pillar, 222.

<sup>399</sup> Pillar, 29.

a give and take proposition—America gives, allies take. The 9-11 attacks proved that America’s oceanic fortress is quite penetrable, and the post-9-11 counterterrorism efforts have been very international. Hence, neo-isolationists have realized that America cannot go it alone. Selective engagers seem to have determined that the benefits of fighting the war on terrorism are worth the significant costs it will impose. In other words, counterterrorism matters, along with the other vital interests of selective engagement. There do not appear to be any changes to cooperative security or primacy.

While two of the grand strategies appear to have undergone subtle changes, it would be wrong to say that any of the foundational underpinnings of the grand strategies have evolved in any way. In fact, proponents of all four grand strategies base their counterterrorism arguments on their original premises. Neo-isolationists continue to state that internationalism makes America less secure. Selective engagers remain interested in striking the right balance between costs and benefits. Cooperative security advocates espouse a global approach to fighting terrorism, and primacists argue that American power is the answer.

### Counterterrorism Issues

The strategic questions covered earlier show some similarities and differences in the counterterrorism strategies advanced by proponents of the four competing visions. Table 7 is a visual depiction of these similarities and differences. The second column shows the need to obtain international consensus prior to action, while the columns to the right show the general propensity to undertake military operations for a given scenario. While mitigating circumstances might change some of these propensities, in general, there is a lack of consensus for every scenario. Consequently, the conclusion that the war on terrorism will engender debates—perhaps grand strategic debates—is quite robust.

Table 7. Counterterrorism Strategy Comparison

<b>G</b>	<b>Int'</b>	<b>In</b>	<b>S</b>	<b>Pr</b>	<b>H</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>P</b>
<b>Grand Strategy</b>	<b>International Consensus prerequisite</b>	<b>International Terrorists that target US</b>	<b>States that support or harbor</b>	<b>Preemptive or preventive</b>	<b>Help for States that ask</b>	<b>International building / aid</b>	<b>Potential WMD States</b>

Ne o- isolationis m	Ma ybe	Y es	M aybe	No	N o	N o	N o
Se lective Engagem ent	No	Y es	Y es	Ma ybe	N o	M aybe	N o
Co operative Security	Yes	M aybe	M aybe	Ma ybe	M aybe	Y es	M aybe
Pri macy	No	Y es	Y es	Ye s	Y es	M aybe	Y es

### USAF Capabilities

Table 8 shows that information superiority is a primary counterterrorism capability that is independent of grand strategic choices. This could have implications for decision making when budgetary compromises are required.

Table 8. USAF Capabilities Comparison

Grand Strategy	Ae rospace Superiori ty	Inf ormation Superiorit y	G lobal Attack	Pre cision Engagem ent	R apid Global Mobilit y	A gile Combat Support
Neo- isolationism	Se condary	Pri mary	P rimary	Pri mary	S econdar y	S econdary
Selective	Pri	Pri	S	Sec	P	Pr

Engagement	mary	mary	econdar y	ondary	rimary	imary
Cooperativ e Security	Se condary	Pri mary	S econdar y	Pri mary	P rimary	Pr imary
Primacy	Pri mary	Pri mary	P rimary	Pri mary	P rimary	Pr imary
Total Primary	2	4	2	3	3	3

### Breadth of Attention

Based on the presumed relationship between the breadth of attention that a counterterrorism strategy exhibits and the effectiveness of that strategy, the counterterrorism approach proposed by neo-isolationists would be the most effective. However, it's worth noting that Pillar himself decries calls for a neo-isolationist response to terrorism, characterizing it as a misguided attempt at totally eliminating the problem.<sup>400</sup> In other words, unless one already advocates a neo-isolationist grand strategy, terrorism is not a valid reason to adopt such a strategy. Additionally, several grand strategists ignore certain elements of counterterrorism based on their assumption that militant Islamic terrorism cannot be deterred. As previously stated, some terrorism experts agree with that assumption, hence Pillar's contention about the breadth of counterterrorism loses some validity in some cases. Perhaps the best lesson that can be taken from Table 9 is that those grand strategists that ignore certain elements of terrorism should strive to at least consider incorporating them in a way that is consistent with their grand strategic outlook.

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<sup>400</sup> Pillar, 218. See also Ian O. Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 126, stating that terrorism "cannot be eliminated, only contained and managed."

Table 9. Counterterrorism Considerations Comparison

<b>Grand Strategy</b>	<b>Environmental Roots</b>	<b>Specific Issues</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>	<b>Intentions</b>	<b>Vulnerabilities</b>	<b>Total</b>
Neo-isolationism	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Selective Engagement	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	
Cooperative Security	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	
Primacy	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	

This paper has only scratched the surface on a very timely and complicated subject. Clearly, there are no perfect solutions and far from definitively answering critical counterterrorism questions, this paper seeks to spur more thought. Will America now choose a grand strategy? Which one? What are the counterterrorism implications of switching from one to another? What are the root causes of terrorism? Can we change them? Does militant Islamic terrorism call for a new paradigm? Does the application of military force deter future attacks, or create the impetus for them? What can the USAF do to help? Having launched a war against terrorism that creates an undeniable nexus between grand strategy and counterterrorism, we should similarly embark on a quest to better understand this important relationship.

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